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**The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe:
Public Statements and Documents,
1954 - 1986**

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PREFACE

The Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, prepared this collection of public statements and documents on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as part of U.S. Government preparations for the CSCE Followup Meeting to begin at Vienna, Austria in November 1986. The collection includes key documents tracing the origins and development of the CSCE idea from the first Soviet proposal for a European security conference in 1954; the negotiations preceding the holding of the first conference in Helsinki (1973-1975); the Helsinki Conference; and the gatherings which have succeeded Helsinki, including two followup meetings, eight experts meetings and forums, and the Conference of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Documents illuminating the commitment to and involvement in the CSCE process of the last four U.S. presidential administrations are also included. A brief narrative which provides historical context for the documents precedes the collection.

Karen A. Collias and Nina J. Noring of the Policy Studies Division, Office of the Historian, prepared the documentary collection. Ms. Collias drafted the narrative introduction. Gabrielle S. Mallon and Elizabeth B. Ballard, of the same Division, provided research support. Paul Claussen, Chief of the Division, provided overall guidance.

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THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE:
PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS, 1954-1986

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THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW

Summary

The Soviet Union first proposed a conference on security in Europe at the Berlin Foreign Ministers meeting in February 1954. This and subsequent Warsaw Pact proposals during the later 1950s failed to win approval from the United States and its Western European Allies. In the mid-1960s, the Warsaw Pact renewed calls for a European security conference. The relaxation of East-West tensions, the Federal Republic of Germany's Ostpolitik, and the Great Powers' 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin set the stage for NATO participation in a European security conference. The original Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) convened in 1973 and concluded at the 1975 Helsinki Summit, which was attended by the Heads of State and Government of 33 European nations, the United States, and Canada. The Final Act of August 1, 1975, known also as the Helsinki Accords, is a statement of principles committing states to standards of conduct toward their own citizens as well as toward other states. The CSCE process has continued with two followup meetings: Belgrade in 1977-1978 and Madrid in 1980-1983, as well as several experts' meetings in Europe and North America addressing Mediterranean questions, scientific cooperation, human rights and humanitarian issues, and confidence-building measures. A third followup meeting will begin in Vienna on November 4, 1986.

The Genesis of the CSCE Idea: 1954-1969

The Soviet Union first proposed a conference on security in Europe at a Foreign Ministers meeting of the Four Great Powers in Berlin on February 10, 1954 (doc. 1). The Soviet proposal came as Western efforts to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO were near completion. Unable to obtain Western agreement on German neutrality and border changes, the Soviet Union called for withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany, a 50-year treaty on collective security in Europe, and special conferences to help implement treaty provisions concerning consultation and to consider questions relating to European security. The Western nations rejected the Soviet initiative, noting that the proposed security treaty was obviously intended to replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provided for European but not U.S. participation (doc. 2).

The following fall, the four Foreign Ministers met again, this time in Geneva. On October 31, 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov presented a revised version of a European security treaty, intended as a replacement for existing military alliances, which provided for U.S. participation (doc. 3). The Western nations again rejected the proposal. In a speech before the Conference, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted Western agreement with several of the principles contained in the draft treaty, but maintained that progress on outstanding European problems, especially the German question, was of foremost importance (doc. 4). The 1950s closed with no agreement on Germany or European security.

After a hiatus of several years, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies renewed their calls for an all-European conference to discuss questions of security and cooperation (docs. 5, 6). By 1967 changes in the political climate of Europe were creating the basis for improved dialogue. The Federal Republic of Germany's "Grand Coalition Government" adopted a less restricted policy toward Eastern Europe, opening diplomatic relations with Romania and establishing a trade mission in Czechoslovakia. In the wake of these West German initiatives, and after the European Communist parties issued yet another call for a European security conference (doc. 7), the Western Allies, under the auspices of NATO, began to explore the possibility of extending the process of detente in Europe.

A study released December 14, 1967 as an annex of a communiqué of the North Atlantic Council entitled The Future Tasks of the Alliance (the Harmel Report, named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel) affirmed that the NATO Allies wanted a "more stable relationship" with Eastern Europe and would prepare for the time when fruitful discussions on European security might be possible between Western and Eastern nations (doc. 8). At a Foreign Ministers meeting in Reykjavik the following June, NATO signaled its readiness to discuss mutual and balanced force reduction with the Warsaw Pact nations (doc. 9). The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia two months later, however, interrupted this process. On March 17, 1969, a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest formally proposed a European security conference to "strengthen political, economic and cultural links" (doc. 10). Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, submitted a copy of the Budapest document to the White House the following month, along with assurances that the United States would indeed be invited to participate in the European security conference.

The Ministers of the North Atlantic Council discussed the Warsaw Pact proposal the next month in Washington, and indicated the Allies' intention to explore with the Soviet

Union and other Eastern European countries which concrete issues best lent themselves to fruitful negotiation (doc. 11). On May 6, 1969, the Finnish Government sent a memorandum to all European countries, the United States, and Canada, offering Helsinki as the conference site (doc. 12).

Meanwhile, the new West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, continued to elaborate an Ostpolitik aimed at improving relations with the German Democratic Republic and Eastern Europe. The NATO Allies formally responded to the Warsaw Pact's initiative on December 5, 1969 (doc. 13). To strengthen Brandt's Ostpolitik bargaining position, they insisted upon progress on German relations with the East and on Berlin-related issues as prerequisites for Western participation in the conference. NATO members agreed in principle to discuss European security issues, but also proposed that the question of "freer movement of people, ideas, and information between the countries of East and West" be put on the agenda. This initiative represented the first movement toward the formation of a Western strategy at the European conference.

Prelude to the Conference: 1970-1972

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union signed a treaty on August 12, 1970, in which the two countries committed themselves to "regard the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable" (doc. 14). On December 7, 1970, the West German Government signed a treaty with Poland, relinquishing any claim to recover territories east of the Oder-Neisse line as part of their normalization of relations (doc. 15). The United States and its NATO Allies expressed satisfaction with progress made in this area (docs. 16, 17). On September 3, 1971, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France signed the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (doc. 18). The Four Powers agreed on improvements in the Berlin situation, including unhindered movement of people and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Quadripartite Agreement entered into force on June 3, 1972.

The signing of the Quadripartite Agreement fulfilled NATO's prerequisite for the holding of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. At a North Atlantic Council meeting in December, the Ministers affirmed their readiness to undertake multilateral conversations leading toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (doc. 19). In his report to the Congress, President Richard Nixon noted developments toward the Conference and indicated U.S. support if the agenda was carefully prepared and if delegates were willing to discuss

substantive issues (doc. 20). The United States and the Soviet Union included an endorsement of the Conference and principles upon which it would be based in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Moscow Summit meeting in May 1972 (doc. 21). The NATO Allies accepted the proposal of the Finnish Government to act as host for the preparatory talks and indicated their objectives in these discussions in a North Atlantic Council Communiqué issued on May 31, 1972 (doc. 22). Several months later, the Government of Finland issued a formal invitation to the United States and 34 other nations to attend the opening phase of the Conference in Helsinki. The United States accepted the invitation on November 16, 1972 (doc. 23).

On December 21, 1972, the two Germanies signed a treaty outlining the basis of their relationship (doc. 24). Reaffirming the "inviolability now and in the future of the border existing between them," the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic pledged to "work together to promote peaceful relations between the European States and contribute to security and cooperation in Europe." These treaties, along with Soviet agreement to participate in parallel troop reduction talks formalized during President Richard Nixon's 1972 trip to Moscow, set the stage for the conference. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks began on October 31, 1973.

The U.S. objectives for the European conference emphasized substance over atmosphere, encouraging reconciliation of the European states, rather than confirmation of their divisions. The United States intended to address governing principles of interstate relations regardless of their social systems, such as the sovereign equality of states, noninterference in their internal and external affairs, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Discussion of East-West issues on which progress was thought to be attainable, specifically scientific and technical exchanges and environmental improvements, was encouraged. On the eve of the Conference, the United States was sticking to its emphasis on concrete issues with the goal of attaining concrete results.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
July 3, 1973-July 25, 1975

On November 22, 1972, representatives from all the European countries except Albania, the United States, and Canada gathered at Helsinki for preliminary discussions. Delegations submitted proposals for a conference agenda, literally putting them into baskets, for consideration. These proposals, which eventually fell into three areas, political (including military security), economic, and cultural-humanitarian (the 3

"baskets"), were studied by working groups as part of the process of developing a provisional agenda (doc. 25).

In June 1973, the delegates, who had organized themselves into major groupings--NATO, Warsaw Pact, and the neutral and nonaligned countries (NNAs)--agreed upon an agenda and submitted it to their governments as a final recommendation for a conference (doc. 26). They also presented a conference-site compromise. The first and third phases of the conference would take place in Helsinki, the second in Geneva.

These recommendations were ratified the following month at the first session of the conference. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, speaking before a meeting of foreign ministers of the participating states, characterized the document as "a commitment to find new and more civilized ways of dealing with one another" (doc. 28). Delegations then returned to their capitals to prepare for detailed negotiations. The U.S.-Soviet joint communique, issued at the conclusion of the Washington summit meeting in June 1973, expressed satisfaction with the progress that had been made and pledged that "the USA and the USSR will conduct their policies so as to realize the goals of the Conference and bring about a new era of good relations in this part of the world" (doc. 27).

The second, or working phase, of CSCE began in Geneva the following September. For the next 2 years, delegates undertook the serious work of drafting the Final Act. The NATO nations agreed they must avoid any implication of legal recognition of the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe. The Western European governments were at the forefront in pursuing provisions on human contacts, which they defined in humanitarian, cultural, and commercial terms. The Soviet Union sought the legitimization of the European territorial and ideological status quo. Soviet negotiating efforts centered on that goal, which was obtained on April 23, 1974, when the 35 states agreed to the principle of inviolability of frontiers.

The United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their support for the Conference in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the July 1974 Moscow summit. They affirmed their intention "to make every effort, in cooperation with the other participants, to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems" (doc. 29).

"Human contacts" remained an outstanding item of unfinished business on the agenda. The Soviet Union, long intransigent in this area, was anxious to conclude the conference. Seeing potential gains, the NATO nations utilized the Soviet desire for a summit to bargain for progress on human contacts. By December 1974, the Soviet Union had promised freer movement of

people and information, including family reunification. Western officials felt that such progress merited planning for a summit meeting at the concluding signing ceremonies.

Negotiations at Geneva concluded in July 1975, with agreement of the 35 states on a Final Act. Within the United States, strident domestic opposition to the conference and especially to the principles in Basket I emerged. Critics charged that these amounted to a de facto recognition of the post-World War II European frontiers, including incorporation of the formerly-independent countries of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the Soviet Union in 1940. Opposition was especially intense among Soviet and East European emigré groups in the United States, whose most vocal spokesman was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Congressional critics, including Senators Henry Jackson and Strom Thurmond, also warned of the dangers of Helsinki. Media opposition became so vocal that before departing for Europe to attend the Conference, President Gerald R. Ford affirmed that the United States had "never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now" (doc. 30).

The Final Act: August 1, 1975

The Final Act was signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 35 nations at a summit lauded as the largest assemblage of Heads of State and Government since the Congress of Vienna (doc. 31). President Ford participated in the Helsinki Summit, addressing the gathering and signing the Final Act, as part of a European tour that included stops in Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Federal Republic of Germany (doc. 32).

The Final Act, also known as the Helsinki Accords, is not a treaty, but rather a statement of principles of behavior for states toward their own citizens as well as other states. It includes four baskets. Basket I is a general statement of 10 accepted principles on interstate behavior including sovereign equality, respect for human rights, and refraining from the threat or use of force. While referring to the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of states, Basket I allows that "frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement." It also includes confidence-building measures to promote European security.

At the insistence of Malta, the Final Act included a declaration on Mediterranean security and cooperation. The declaration noted that Europe's security is closely linked with that of the Mediterranean region, and declared that the CSCE

participating states would promote the "development of good neighborly relations" with non-participating Mediterranean states through economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges. The declaration also called for a reduction of armed forces in the region.

Basket II addresses cooperation among the 35 participating states in the fields of economics and technology. It contains provisions to improve and expand commercial relations between East and West. Further, Basket II provides for scientific and technical cooperation, including scholarly exchanges. Basket III applies to cooperation in humanitarian fields to promote the freer flow of information, ideas, and people among the participating states.

Basket III applies to cooperation in humanitarian fields to promote the freer flow of information, ideas, and people among the participating states. It contains specific measures to foster human contacts and cultural exchanges, including family reunification. A final and less well-known Basket IV provides for the continuation of the CSCE process in the form of followup meetings and conferences.

Formation of a United States Commission: 1976

On June 3, 1976, an Act of Congress (P.L. 94-304) created the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, an independent advisory agency, to oversee progress in implementing the Final Act (doc. 33). The authorizing legislation specifically instructed the Commission to "monitor the acts of the signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act, with particular regard to the provisions relating to 'Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields.'" The 15-member Commission is composed of 6 members from the Senate, 6 members from the House of Representatives, and 1 member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.

The activities of the Commission include study trips to Europe, Congressional hearings, and interviews with recent Eastern European emigrés. Basket III and Principle VII on fundamental freedoms in Basket I incorporate the human rights provisions of the Final Act. These aspects, along with the implementation of the economic cooperation provisions contained in Basket II, receive the most attention. The Commission also publishes periodic reviews of the status of the Final Act.

The Belgrade Followup Meeting
October 4, 1977-March 9, 1978

As part of his emphasis on human rights, President Jimmy Carter stressed the provisions contained in Principle VII and Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. The Administration's tone and actions at the first Followup Meeting, held at Belgrade, reflected President Carter's belief that human rights belonged in the first rank of U.S. foreign policy concerns.

Preparatory meetings for the Belgrade Followup Meeting began in June 1977, as specified in the Final Act. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained the U.S. objectives at the conference in a statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on June 6, 1977 (doc. 34). The Belgrade meeting, which lasted 8 weeks, had the task of preparing an agenda and procedures for the main meeting scheduled to begin in October. The U.S. delegation achieved its major objective, which was to ensure that a thorough review of the implementation of the Final Act be put on the agenda.

At the Followup Meeting, the United States cited Soviet human rights violations, particularly the persecution of Helsinki monitoring groups in Warsaw Pact countries. The United States charged the Soviet Union with violations of Principle VII, which called for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (docs. 35, 38). The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies responded by citing Principle VI, which prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of states.

The Belgrade Concluding Document was brief, containing a schedule for future meetings, and admitting disagreement among the delegations (doc. 37). The Concluding Document recognized "that the exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by CSCE, although different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far."

President Jimmy Carter affirmed that the United States had achieved its major goals at Belgrade, which he outlined as a review of implementation and a detailed discussion of human rights (doc. 36). The President intended that the United States abide by the spirit of the Final Act. On December 6, 1978, he issued a memorandum to the heads of all U.S. Government agencies directing them to enforce CSCE guidelines within their departments (doc. 40).

The Road to Madrid: 1978-1980

The followup meeting to Belgrade was scheduled for Madrid in 1980. In the interim, the Commission continued monitoring Final Act implementation. Other experts' meetings, spawned from the Concluding Document, were held at various European cities. The Montreux Conference, held in Switzerland from October 31 to December 9, 1978, sought to define procedures for the peaceful settlements of disputes (docs. 39, 41). The following year, between February 13 and March 26, 1979, delegates met in Valletta, Malta, to discuss general problems in economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation among the Mediterranean states (docs. 42, 43).

In the U.S.-Soviet joint communique, ending the Vienna summit meeting in June 1979, the two nations promised that they would work to facilitate a constructive CSCE Followup Meeting at Madrid (doc. 44).

A Scientific Forum held at Hamburg from February 18 to March 3, 1980, allowed scholars and scientists from East and West to meet and discuss problems related to their academic disciplines. Western scientists, sharply critical of Soviet repression, sent a message of solidarity to dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov. In the Hamburg final report, Eastern delegations acknowledged that human rights and freedoms were a necessary foundation for successful scholarly cooperation (docs. 45, 46). These experts' meetings, along with preparations for the Madrid Followup Meeting, ensured the continuity of the CSCE process.

President Carter and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie marked the fifth anniversary of the Helsinki Accords by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to CSCE (docs. 47, 48).

The Madrid Followup Meeting November 11, 1980-September 9, 1983

The preliminary meetings of the Madrid Followup Meeting commenced on September 9, 1980. Representatives from the 35 participating nations met for 8 weeks to prepare the ground rules and set the agenda for the formal conference. The major objectives of the U.S. delegation were to ensure a complete and thorough review of the Final Act and to continue the Helsinki process in further meetings. The formal conference opened on November 11. Remarks by the U.S. delegation emphasized Soviet and other Warsaw Pact nation violations of the human rights and human contacts provisions of the Final Act (doc. 49). Disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over the length of time to be devoted to human rights

discussions caused the preparatory meeting to deadlock over the agenda. Many feared this disagreement would lead to cancellation of the conference. A compromise, sponsored by the NNAs, solved the problem. The agenda would allow 5 weeks for a review of implementation, followed by talks on improving detente.

Following the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in January 1981, the new administration reaffirmed U.S. support for the CSCE process. Throughout the Madrid Meeting, the United States with its NATO Allies and several NNAs stressed Soviet and Eastern European human rights violations, particularly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 (docs. 50 and 51). The Warsaw Pact nations argued that such charges amounted to interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Poland and, therefore, violated Principle VI of the Final Act. They also insisted that discussions of a Soviet version of the proposal for a conference on European disarmament could be far more productive than discussions on human rights.

The Madrid negotiations were completed in July 1983 with agreement by the representatives of the 35 participating states on a concluding document. U.S. assessments characterized the outcome as a positive achievement (docs. 52, 53). The Madrid Followup Meeting ended on September 9, 1983, with the signing of the Concluding Document by the Foreign Ministers of the participating states. The lengthy Concluding Document reaffirmed the commitment of the 35 participating states to continuation of the CSCE process and listed agreed-upon measures and principles relating to all three Baskets, including the convening of a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (doc. 54). In a speech before the participants, Secretary of State George P. Shultz praised the addition of "important new commitments with respect to human rights, trade union freedoms, religious liberties, reunification of families, free flow of information, and measures against terrorism" as accomplishments of Madrid (doc. 55).

Supplementary Meetings: 1984-1986

The Concluding Document of the Madrid Followup Meeting ensured the continuation of the Helsinki process, providing for several more experts' meetings. A CSCE experts' meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes held at Athens from March 21 to April 30, 1984, continued the work begun at the Montreux Conference 6 years earlier (docs. 60, 61). A seminar on Mediterranean cooperation was held at Venice between October

16-26, 1984. The delegations reviewed initiatives taken after the 1979 Malta meeting, but did not agree upon a final report (docs. 62, 63).

An experts' meeting to review human rights progress convened at Ottawa on May 7, 1985. For 6 weeks, until June 17, 1985, delegates from East and West discussed human rights, trading charges on violations and proposing specific language for a concluding document. The United States and several of its NATO Allies put forth a single comprehensive proposal that set forth a series of highly specific steps in human rights conduct. But the Soviet Union and its allies refused to accept the Allied proposal or the shorter one introduced by the NNAs. The West and the NNAs stood together, preferring no concluding document to one that compromised human rights principles (docs. 64, 65, 66, 67).

President Reagan issued a statement on the 10th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, and sent Secretary of State Shultz to Helsinki July 29-August 1, 1985, as his envoy to participate in a commemoration of the signing of the Final Act (doc. 68). In a speech before representatives of the participating states on July 30, Secretary Shultz called upon the 35 nations to rededicate themselves to the "twin goals of greater peace and freedom" in Europe (doc. 69).

The CSCE Cultural Forum met in Budapest October 15-November 25, 1985. The first CSCE meeting held in a Warsaw Pact state, it addressed the cultural provisions of the Final Act. The participants discussed interrelated problems of cultural creation, cooperation, and dissemination, including expansion of cultural contacts and exchanges. The U.S. delegation consisted of 25 distinguished artists, writers and experts representing the diversity of American cultural life, as well as officials from the Department of State and members and staff of the CSCE Commission. The Western delegations presented a draft concluding document that was rejected by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (docs. 70, 71, 73, 74). Like Ottawa, Budapest produced no concluding document.

A meeting of experts on human contacts convened in Bern, Switzerland, on April 15, 1986. At that meeting, the United States and its Allies addressed issues of divided families, separated spouses, and Soviet emigration figures which had plummeted since the late 1970s (doc. 77). The Soviet Union charged that the United States ignored the possibilities for contacts between "mass" organizations, such as peace groups. The NATO Allies tabled a draft concluding document (doc. 78). Subsequently, the United States declined to consent to an NNA compromise draft since it backtracked from several Final Act commitments on human contacts (docs. 79, 80, 81, 82). Although

the meeting ended without a concluding document, it provided an opportunity for East-West bilateral discussions on human contacts. Moreover, before the meeting adjourned, the Soviet Union agreed to allow 119 Soviet citizens to join their families in the United States.

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) commenced on January 17, 1984 in Stockholm, to negotiate militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable confidence- and security-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe, including the entire European portion of the Soviet Union (docs. 56, 57, 58, 59, 75). U.S. and Soviet support for a constructive conclusion to the conference was affirmed in the joint communique following the November 1985 Vienna summit (doc. 72). On September 19, 1986, CDE adopted a final document which created verifiable mechanisms for the notification and observation of all significant military activities in Europe, in an effort to provide for a more open European military environment and increased the political cost of using military force for political intimidation. The verification measures of the accord provide, for the first time, for inspection of military activities in Soviet territory upon request of a participating state (docs. 85, 86, 87, 88).

The Reagan administration continues to support the CSCE process which it considers a valuable instrument of Western diplomacy (doc. 76). On August 1, 1986, while commemorating the 11th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, President Reagan issued a proclamation designating that day as Helsinki Human Rights Day (docs. 83, 84). The successor meeting to Madrid will convene in Vienna on November 4, 1986. U.S. preparations are well under way to coordinate an Allied position to meet the challenges at Vienna.

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
OCTOBER 1986

**THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE:
PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS,
1954-1986**

1. Proposal by the Soviet Delegation to the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Berlin, February 10, 1954
2. Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Before the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Berlin, February 10, 1954 [Extracts]
3. Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov Before the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Geneva, October 31, 1955
4. Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Before the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Geneva, November 2, 1955
5. Address by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki Before the United Nations General Assembly, New York, December 14, 1964 [Extract]
6. Declaration by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States, Bucharest, July 6, 1966
7. Statement by European Communist Parties, Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, April 26, 1967
8. Report by the North Atlantic Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), Brussels, December 14, 1967
9. Communiqué and Declaration of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Reykjavik, June 25, 1968 [Extracts]
10. Appeal by Warsaw Pact Nations to All European Countries, Budapest, March 17, 1969
11. Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Washington, April 11, 1969
12. Note From the Government of Finland to the Governments of All European Countries, the United States, and Canada, Helsinki, May 6, 1969

13. Communiqué and Declaration of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Brussels, December 5, 1969 [Extracts]
14. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, Signed at Moscow, August 12, 1970
15. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, Signed at Warsaw, December 7, 1970
16. Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, Washington, February 25, 1971 [Extract]
17. Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Lisbon, June 4, 1971 [Extract]
18. Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Signed at Berlin, September 3, 1971
19. Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Brussels, December 10, 1971 [Extract]
20. Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, Washington, February 9, 1972 [Extract]
21. Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Moscow, May 29, 1972 [Extracts]
22. Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Bonn, May 31, 1972
23. Note From the United States Embassy at Helsinki to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, November 16, 1972
24. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Signed at Berlin, December 21, 1972
25. Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, Washington, May 3, 1973 [Extract]
26. Final Recommendations of the Consultations Preceding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, June 8, 1973
27. Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, San Clemente, California, June 25, 1973 [Extracts]

28. Statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers Before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, July 5, 1973
29. Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Moscow, July 3, 1974 [Extracts]
30. Remarks by President Gerald R. Ford, Washington, July 25, 1975
31. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords), Signed at Helsinki, August 1, 1975
32. Address by President Gerald R. Ford Before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, August 1, 1975
33. Public Law 94-304 Establishing the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 3, 1976
34. Statement by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 6, 1977
35. Opening Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Belgrade, October 6, 1977
36. White House Statement, Washington, March 3, 1978
37. Concluding Document of the CSCE Followup Meeting, Belgrade, March 8, 1978
38. Concluding Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Belgrade, March 8, 1978
39. Opening Statement by R. Spencer Oliver Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Montreux, November 2, 1978
40. Memorandum From President Jimmy Carter to Heads of U.S. Government Agencies, Washington, December 6, 1978
41. Final Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Montreux, December 9, 1978
42. Opening Statement by Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Valletta, February 16, 1979

43. Final Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Mediterranean Cooperation, Valletta, March 26, 1979
44. Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Vienna, June 18, 1979 [Extracts]
45. Opening Statement by Dr. Philip Handler Before the CSCE Scientific Forum, Hamburg, February 23, 1980
46. Final Report of the CSCE Scientific Forum, Hamburg, March 3, 1980
47. Remarks by President Jimmy Carter at a Ceremony Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Accords, Washington, July 29, 1980
48. Statement by Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie Before a Foreign Policy Conference on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, July 29, 1980
49. Opening Statement by Ambassador Griffin B. Bell Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, November 11, 1980
50. Statement by Ambassador Max M. Kampelman Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, January 27, 1981
51. Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, December 16, 1982
52. Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Washington, July 15, 1983
53. Statement by Ambassador Max M. Kampelman Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, July 15, 1983
54. Concluding Document of the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, September 6, 1983
55. Address by Secretary of State George P. Shultz Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, September 9, 1983
56. Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz Before the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, January 17, 1984
57. News Conference by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Stockholm, January 17, 1984 [Extracts]

58. Statement by President Ronald Reagan Following the Opening Session of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Washington, January 20, 1984
59. Announcement by the Department of State on NATO Proposals to the CDE Meeting, Washington, January 24, 1984
60. Opening Statement by Louis B. Sohn Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Athens, March 12, 1984
61. Final Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Athens, April 30, 1984
62. Opening Statement by Ambassador Raymond Ewing Before the CSCE Seminar on Mediterranean Cooperation, Venice, October 18, 1984
63. Report of the Seminar on Mediterranean Cooperation, Venice, October 26, 1984
64. Opening Statement by Ambassador Richard Schifter Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Ottawa, May 10, 1985
65. Draft Report Submitted to the Human Rights Meeting of Experts, Ottawa, June 15, 1985
66. Closing Statement by Ambassador Richard Schifter Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Ottawa, June 17, 1985
67. Testimony of Ambassador Richard Schifter Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 25, 1985
68. Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Washington, July 30, 1985
69. Address by Secretary of State George P. Shultz at the Ceremony Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, Helsinki, July 30, 1985
70. Opening Statement by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Before the CSCE Cultural Forum, Budapest, October 15, 1985
71. Draft Report Presented to the CSCE Cultural Forum, Budapest, November 25, 1985
72. Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Geneva, November 21, 1985 [Extracts]

73. Closing Statement by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Before the CSCE Cultural Forum, Budapest, November 25, 1985
74. Statement by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, December 11, 1985
75. Address by Ambassador Robert L. Barry Before the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, February 4, 1986
76. Statement by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, March 25, 1986
77. Opening Statement by Ambassador Michael Novak Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Bern, April 17, 1986
78. Draft Report Submitted to the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts, Bern, May 23, 1986
79. Draft Report Submitted to the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts, Bern, May 26, 1986
80. Closing Statement by Ambassador Michael Novak Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Bern, May 27, 1986
81. Testimony of Ambassador Michael Novak Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 18, 1986
82. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 18, 1986
83. Statement by President Ronald Reagan on the 11th Anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, Washington, August 1, 1986
84. Proclamation by President Ronald Reagan on Helsinki Human Rights Day, Washington, August 1, 1986
85. Final Document of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, September 19, 1986
86. Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Washington, September 22, 1986

87. Statement by Ambassador Robert L. Barry Before the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, September 22, 1986
88. Statement by Ambassador Robert L. Barry Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, October 1, 1986

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation to the Meeting of
British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers,
Berlin, February 10, 1954

For the purpose of insuring peace and security and of preventing aggression against any state in Europe,

for the purpose of strengthening international cooperation in conformity with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of noninterference in their internal affairs,

striving to prevent the formation of groupings of some European States directed against other European States, which gives rise to friction and strained relations among nations, and to achieve concerted efforts by all European States in insuring collective security in Europe,

the European States, guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, shall conclude a general European treaty on collective security in Europe, the basic provisions of which shall be as follows:

1. All European States, irrespective of their social systems, may become party to the treaty provided they recognize the purposes and assume obligations set forth in the treaty.

Until the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German State, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic may be parties to the treaty enjoying equal rights with other parties thereto. It is understood that after the unification of Germany the united German State may become a party to the treaty on an equal footing with any other European State. —

The conclusion of the treaty on collective security in Europe shall not affect the competence of the Four Powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, and France—to deal with the German problem which shall be settled in accordance with decisions previously taken by the Four Powers.

2. The parties to the treaty undertake to refrain from aggression against one another and also to refrain from having recourse to the threat or the use of force in their international relations and, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to settle by peaceful means and in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security in Europe any dispute that may arise among them.

3. Whenever, in the view of any party to the treaty, there is danger of an armed attack in Europe against one or more of the parties to the treaty, the latter shall consult each other in order to take effective steps to remove the danger and to maintain security in Europe.

4. An armed attack in Europe against one or more of the parties to the treaty by any state or group of States shall be deemed to be an attack against all the parties. In the event of such an attack, each of the parties, exercising the right of individual or collective

Source: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 415-416. For the texts of the major statements and documents presented at the conference, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954, Department of State Publication 5399 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954).

self-defense, shall assist the state or states so attacked by all the means at its disposal, including the use of armed force, for the purpose of reestablishing and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

5. The parties to the treaty undertake jointly to discuss and determine as soon as possible the procedure under which assistance, including military assistance, shall be provided by the parties in the event of there arising in Europe a situation requiring a collective effort for the reestablishment and maintenance of peace in Europe.

6. The parties to the treaty, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any action taken or envisaged for the purpose of exercising the right of self-defense or of maintaining peace and security in Europe.

7. The parties to the treaty undertake not to participate in any coalition or alliance nor to conclude agreements the objectives of which are contrary to the purposes of the treaty on collective security in Europe.

8. In order to implement the provisions of the treaty concerning consultation among its parties and to consider questions arising in connection with the task of insuring security in Europe, the following shall be provided for:

(a) regular or, when required, special conferences at which each state shall be represented by a member of its government or by some other specially designated representative;

(b) the setting up of a permanent consultative political committee the duty of which shall be the preparation of appropriate recommendations to the governments of the states which are parties to the treaty;

(c) the setting up of a military consultative organ the terms of reference of which shall be determined in due course.

9. Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the parties to the treaty shall invite the Governments of the U.S.A. and the Chinese People's Republic to designate representatives to the organs set up in accordance with the treaty in the capacity of observers.

10. The present treaty shall not impair in any way the obligations of European States under international treaties and agreements to which they are party, provided the principles and purposes of such agreements are in conformity with those of the present treaty.

11. The duration of the treaty shall be 50 years.

Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Before the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Berlin, February 10, 1954

[Extracts]

Since Mr. Molotov has been kind enough to say that the United States can be an "observer," I thought it would be in order to make some observations on his plan.

The proposals submitted are in two parts, one of which deals primarily with Germany and the other of which represents the draft of a proposed European treaty on collective security.

The second paper is the text of a proposed general European treaty on collective security in Europe. Since the United States would presumably not be a part of that treaty, my observations are not directed primarily to the actual text of the treaty, although there are certain implications in it which do affect the United States. It is perhaps implicit in the draft, although not entirely clear, that it is designed to replace the North Atlantic Treaty. I assume that from the provisions of article 7 and perhaps 10 and the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister, in introducing his text, made a serious attack upon the North Atlantic Pact as resembling in many ways "the Anti-Comintern Pact" which led to the unleashing of the Second World War." He went on to say that "there are no reasons to doubt that the fate of the North Atlantic Pact shall be any better than that of the Anti-Comintern Pact."

So I presume, although the Soviet Foreign Minister can correct me if I am wrong, that his proposed treaty for European collective security would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European countries should get together for their own collective security without the participation of the United States. The United States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and we do not have any intentions of doing so in the future.

The American people have a very deep and legitimate interest in Europe. Most of us derive from Western Europe. We share the culture and traditions and religion of Western Europe, and there are many bonds which tie us very closely together. But we do not feel that on that account we have any right to demand participation in European affairs.

Source: American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, Volume II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 1855-1858. For French and British objections to the Soviet proposal, see "Statement by M. Bidault, February 15," and "Statement by Mr. Eden," in Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954, Department of State Publication 5399 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 164-170.

¹ Protocol of Nov. 6, 1937; *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1891-1941*, vol. II, pp. 189-190.

² Statement of Feb. 10, 1954; *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 189-191.

The United States sent its armed forces to Europe in the First World War when the West was threatened by German militarism under the Kaiser. We delayed somewhat in doing so. But at the urgent appeal and desire of the threatened peoples of Western Europe, and because our own interests became involved, we did participate and certainly contributed to the final defeat of the German militarists represented by the Kaiser.

When that war was over, we took our troops home at once. And then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World War, and again, after some delay and when the danger, not only to Western Europe but also to the Soviet Union, was immense and when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made a gigantic effort of putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from the renewed militarism of Germany.

And after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for occupation purposes in Germany.

Now, for the third time in this century we have sent forces back to Europe and again the reason was that there were many in Europe who were afraid and who asked us to do so.

That fear is, I imagine, a fear which cannot be allayed by new words and new promises, because the fear was inspired by a country which was already bound by the United Nations Charter not to use force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state. Whether that fear will be allayed by any repetition of that pledge is not for me to decide.

It has been suggested that our participation in the present defense of West Europe to which I now refer caused the division of Europe. That is one of these strange reversals of history—the upside-down talk—to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves. Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because of the division of Europe.

It cannot, I think, be forgotten that, when the United States proposed the Marshall plan,¹ which involved the contributions of many billions of dollars to the rehabilitation of Europe, that plan was initially made available to all of the European states. It was at that juncture that the Soviet satellites, under the direction of the Soviet Union, were not permitted to share in that plan. Perhaps if that plan had been carried out in its original scope, it would have prevented the division of Europe—or at least mitigated the division of Europe—which unfortunately was intensified by the Soviet action.

¹ See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (Revised edition) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 806-807; pp. 810-852.

The division of Europe, I am afraid, comes from causes which considerably antedate the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty¹ and the proposed European Defense Community.² It goes back to the date when the Soviet control, initially confined to the Soviet Union itself, was extended to a vast area which now includes one-third of the human race.

I recall the pacts of mutual assistance which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia,³ Latvia,⁴ and Lithuania⁵ which the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time described in language which is almost exactly the same as the second preamble of the proposed new European treaty.

The pacts with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Mr. Molotov said on October 31, 1939, "strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each others affairs."

The second preamble to which I refer speaks of the "respect for the independence and sovereignty of States and noninterference in their internal affairs."

What quickly happened to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has gone on and on and has, I suggest, created the division to which the Soviet Foreign Minister refers.

It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed.

Whether or not the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be considered by other states than the United States.

So far as the United States is concerned, we are determined that we will not be absorbed.

¹ Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; see *supra*, pp. 813-818.

² See treaty of May 27, 1962; *supra*, pp. 1107-1150.

³ Pact of Sept. 28, 1939; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 108, pp. 233-239.

⁴ Pact of Oct. 5, 1939; *ibid.*, pp. 281-287.

⁵ Pact of Oct. 10, 1939; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1939, pp. 705-707.

⁶ *Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov* (London, 1941), p. 36.

Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov Before
the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign
Ministers, Geneva, October 31, 1955

Mr. Chairman,

We have had an exchange of opinions on the proposal by the Soviet Union on the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe as well as on the relevant proposal by France, Great Britain and the USA. This exchange has shown that the necessary agreement among the members of the Meeting on such an important problem as that of ensuring security in Europe is still lacking. Though all members of the Meeting stated their desire to seek agreed ways to solve this problem, the difference in the approach to its solution has nevertheless become evident.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion, as it was heretofore, that the interests of improvement of peace in Europe are best satisfied by the establishment of such a system of security in Europe, in which all those European states that wish to participate in it, irrespective of their social and state order, including the United States of America, would participate.

The USSR Government is convinced that it is this path, the path of joint efforts of European states, instead of the preservation of military groupings, that is capable of ensuring stable guarantees for the peaceful development of European nations.

In spite of the fact that we have not yet reached the necessary agreement among us on this point, the Soviet Delegation holds that possibilities of achieving positive results on European security at our Meeting are not exhausted.

The Soviet Delegation proposes to discuss the possibility of concluding a security treaty for Europe with the participation, in the first instance, of a more limited group of the states concerned. It is known that the Directives agreed upon by the Heads of Government * instruct us to consider various proposals aimed at achieving Euro-

Source: The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955, Department of State Publication 6156 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 76-82. The Soviet proposal of October 31, 1955, printed here, was a revision of one presented to the conference on October 28. For text, see ibid., pp. 45-48.

* The reference is to the "Directive of the Heads of Government to the Foreign Ministers," agreed to by the 4 Foreign Ministers on July 23, 1955, which confirmed the agenda guidelines. For the text, see ibid., pp. 12-13.

pean security, including a security pact both for Europe and "for a part of Europe". In raising this question, the Soviet Government takes account of those constructive suggestions that were made at the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government, in particular by Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain. We also take into account the proposals by the three powers submitted at this Meeting.

As to the group of states-parties to such a treaty on security in Europe, we propose that it be comprised of the four powers—the USSR, the USA, France and Great Britain, as well as all other parties to both the Western European Union and the Warsaw Treaty, including the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic.

The Soviet Government also agrees to having as participants in the agreement other European states that wish to join it, such as Yugoslavia and Denmark.

Naturally, the question arises as to the nature of the obligations which might be assumed by the States-parties to the treaty on security in Europe. In our opinion, the major obligations assumed by these states should be the following:

- a) To undertake not to use armed force against one another and to settle any dispute that may arise among them by peaceful means;
- b) To render each other mutual assistance, including military assistance, in case any of the parties to the treaty is subjected to attack in Europe;
- c) To hold mutual consultations of the parties to the treaty in connection both with the obligations provided for in paragraph "a" and the obligations provided for in paragraph "b".
- d) To establish, by special agreement of the participants of the treaty, a body (or bodies) for the purpose of holding the above-mentioned consultations and also of taking such other steps as may be found necessary in connection with the fulfilment by the states of their undertakings under the present treaty.

In submitting this proposal the Soviet Government proceeds, of course, from the premise that afterwards the existing treaties and agreements (North Atlantic bloc, Western European Union, the Warsaw Treaty) shall become ineffective and the military groupings based on them shall be liquidated. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government at present does not propose in connection with the present proposal on the treaty of security in Europe any concrete time limit for this treaty and its replacement by the All-European Treaty. We find it possible to limit ourselves to a stipulation in the treaty that it remain in force until it is replaced by another broader treaty on European security which will provide for the replacement of the existing treaties and agreements.

The Soviet Government proceeds also from the premise that the conclusion of the treaty should not affect the obligations of the states parties to it assumed by them under the existing treaties and agreements, which point should be directly stipulated in the text of the treaty.

The same should be said with regard to the right of the states to individual and collective self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter in the event of an armed attack. This right should not be prejudiced by the assumption by the states of the obligations under the treaty on European security.

The Soviet Union when considering European security raises the question not only of its own security and not only of the security of states represented at this Meeting. In manifesting legitimate concern for ensuring its own security, the Soviet Union cannot fail to consider this question in connection with the problem of the security of those European states which suffered very severely from German aggression. These countries, naturally, show concern about their security in connection with the plans to resurrect German militarism and in connection with the existence of military groupings with the participation in them of Western Germany and later of a unified Germany. In considering the question of European security, we cannot help thinking of the security of such states as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and other European states whose people suffered so many hardships as a result of Hitlerite invasion.

It is conspicuous that the draft treaty on "Special guarantees in connection with the reunification of Germany" does not say anything as to whether this treaty provides for the security, for instance, of the states bordering on Germany. Yet this problem cannot be ignored when we speak of European security. It is desirable to have the necessary elucidation on this point.

In accordance with what has been said, the Soviet Delegation submits for consideration by the Meeting the draft treaty on European security, the text of which reads as follows:

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"DRAFT TREATY ON SECURITY IN EUROPE

"Inspired by the desire to strengthen peace and recognizing the necessity to contribute in every possible way to reducing international tension and establishing confidence in relations between states,

"Guided by the peaceful purposes and principles of the United Nations,

"The Governments -----

**-----
have agreed to conclude the present Treaty.**

"The States-parties to the Treaty solemnly declare that they assume the following obligations:

Article 1

"The contracting parties undertake not to use armed force against one another and also to refrain from having recourse to the threat of force in their relations with each other and to settle any dispute that may arise among them by peaceful means.

Article 2

"In the event that any one or several States-parties to the Treaty is subjected to an armed attack in Europe by any state or group of states, the other States-parties to the Treaty shall immediately render the state or states so attacked all such assistance, including military assistance, as may be deemed necessary for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

Article 3

"The States-parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from rendering under any pretext any direct or indirect assistance to the attacking state in Europe.

Article 4

"The States-parties to the Treaty shall consult one another whenever, in the view of any one of them, there arises a threat of an armed attack in Europe against one or more of the States-parties to the

Treaty, in order to take effective steps to remove any such threat. They shall immediately conduct the necessary consultations whenever agreed steps may be required for the reestablishment of peace, in the event of an attack on any State-party to the Treaty.

Article 5

"The signatory states shall establish, by common consent, a special body (or bodies) for the purpose of holding the above-mentioned consultations and also for taking such other steps to assure security as may be found necessary in connection with the fulfilment by the states of their obligations under the present Treaty.

Article 6

"The States-parties to the Treaty agree that obligations under the present Treaty shall not infringe upon the obligations assumed by them under existing treaties and agreements.

Article 7

"The assumption by states of obligations under the present Treaty shall not prejudice the right of the States-parties to the Treaty to individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack, as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Article 8

"The Treaty is of a provisional character and shall remain in effect until replaced by another, more extensive Treaty on European security which shall replace the existing treaties and agreements."

At the same time, the Soviet Delegation would like to present another question having a direct bearing on the problem of ensuring European security.

It is a known fact that at the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government, considerations were expressed, especially by Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom, on the expediency of creating in Europe a special zone for limiting and inspecting armaments. It is also a known fact that President N. A. Bulganin of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was favorably impressed with the considerations expressed by Mr. Eden.

We all remember that in the directives of the Heads of Government mention was also made of the "creation of a zone between East and West in which the disposition of armed forces shall be arranged by mutual agreement." This wording concerning "the creation of a zone between East and West" corresponds to the proposal made by Mr.

Eden. But if we speak of creating a zone "between East and West" then obviously we must keep in mind the fact that the line between East and West runs exactly where it does. In the meantime, in the draft of the three Ministers, something quite different is stated concerning the zone. In this draft mention is made of a zone "along both sides of the demarkation line between a reunited Germany and Eastern Europe." Such a proposal does not correspond to the directives of the Heads of Government concerning the zone "between East and West" and does not correspond to what everybody knows to be the actual state of affairs. It is absolutely obvious that we cannot disregard this.

The Soviet Government has carefully studied all proposals and considerations relative to the zone and has come to the conclusion that this question deserves serious attention and that we must try to reconcile our positions with regard to this problem, all the more so since on a number of points they have much in common.

In expressing a desire to approach Mr. Eden's proposal favorably, in accordance with the directives of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers, we would propose to come to an agreement on the following:

1. The zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe must include the territory of the German Federal Republic, of the German Democratic Republic, and of states bordering on them, or at least certain ones of them.

2. The agreement on the zone shall envisage the maximum levels for the number of troops of the USA, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France stationed within the territory of other states in this zone. The question of such limitation must be the subject of further consideration.

3. Obligations pertaining to the limitation of armaments and their control assumed by states under the respective agreement shall be subject to agreement with such states, which shall be free in making decisions on this matter in accordance with their sovereign rights.

4. Joint inspections shall be established over the armed forces and armaments of the States-parties to the agreements for the fulfilment of obligations on the limitation of armaments within territories of the zone. If understanding on this subject is reached among us, and with other states subsequently, it would be of great importance for the consolidation of peace and would contribute to lessening tension in Europe. Furthermore, the reaching of such an agreement would facilitate the possibility of solving the problem of disarmament, since the example of a given region in Europe would indicate the possibility of applying such disarmament measures as would in the future be carried out on a wider scale.

The Delegation of the USSR would like to express the hope that these new proposals of the Soviet Government prepared, as we have already indicated, with consideration of the respective proposals of the other participants of this Meeting, will serve as a suitable basis for the rapprochement of our positions and will facilitate the reaching of the necessary agreement between the Four Powers on the important problem of ensuring European security.

Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Before the Meeting of British, French, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Geneva, November 2, 1955

Mr. Chairman, I feel that the discussions which we have had on one-half of Item 1, namely, the question of security, has brought about a considerable rapprochement of our positions. I am encouraged to think if we could make comparable progress on the other half of Item 1 that we would have fulfilled the expectations which the world placed in this conference.

As I have examined, in parallel columns, the proposals which were put forward by the Western Powers on the first working day of the conference, Document No. 7,* and compared them with the proposals and propositions which Mr. Molotov advanced last Monday, I found that there was a very considerable parallelism in our thinking. I do not mean to suggest that our form of relations is alike or that important differences do not subsist but that there does seem to be a large measure of similarity in the approach. For example, Article 1 of the Western security proposal dealing with renunciation of force has its counterpart in Article 1 of the suggested security treaty which the Soviet Union put forward on Monday.

The principle that there should be no help given to an aggressor appears in Article 3 of the Western proposal and in Article 3 of the draft Soviet treaty.

The idea that there should be a substantial zone within which special measures would be taken appears in Article 3 of the Western proposal and in the first proposition which Mr. Molotov outlined in his presentation on Monday.

The idea that within this zone there should be agreed limits of forces appeared in Article 3 of the Western proposal and in the second of the propositions which Mr. Molotov outlined in his presentation of Monday.

Source: The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955, Department of State Publication 6156 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 85-87. For the French objections to the Soviet proposal, see "Statement by Foreign Minister Pinay, November 2," pp. 87-89.

* Reference is to the Tripartite Proposal for Reunification of Germany and Security submitted by the French Delegation to the conference on October 27, 1955. For the text of the proposal, see ibid., pp. 27-33.

The idea that within this zone there should be reciprocal inspections to verify the agreed limitations appeared in Article 4 of the Western proposal and in the fourth proposition which Mr. Molotov outlined in his presentation of Monday.

Another special measure which the Western Powers suggested—that is, overlapping radar—does not have any counterpart in the Soviet proposals but this is a detailed proposal not touching on the substance.

The concept of consultation appeared in Article 6 of the Western proposals and appears in Articles 4 and 5 of the Soviet draft treaty.

Recognition of the inherent right of collective self-defense is found in Article 7 of the proposed Western treaty and in Article 7 of the draft Soviet treaty.

The concept that foreign forces, not forming part of agreed collective security, should be withdrawn on demand appears in Article 7 of the Western proposals and perhaps, although this is somewhat ambiguous, may be found within the context of the third of the propositions which Mr. Molotov made in his exposition of Monday when he speaks about the exercise of sovereignty.

The concept that there should be reaction against aggression appears in Article 8 of the Western Powers proposal and is also found in Article 2 of the draft Soviet treaty.

As I have said, the expression of these concepts is not always identical and there are sometimes quite important differences in the manner of expression. But, broadly speaking, we have, I think, achieved a quite remarkable degree of parallel thinking with respect to the concept of European security. When I say "parallel thinking" I am not using that word in the geometric term, which means two lines which never meet. I think there is reason to hope that these parallel lines may meet, and may meet shorter than infinity.

So where are we? It seems to me that we have reached a point where as a result of constructive thinking on both sides we can see a realizable vision of security in Europe through means of a treaty which would conform to the Directive which the Heads of Government have given us.

We have, however, made no progress at all with reference to the other half of the first item, namely, the reunification of Germany, and I would like to endorse all that Mr. Macmillan has said with reference to the importance, if not the urgency, of the Soviet Union now making its proposals with respect to the reunification of Germany, the proposals that Mr. Molotov has indicated some days ago he has ready, but which so far he has not submitted. It is the view of the delegation of the United States that security proposals of the kind that we are considering could, indeed, provide security and the assurance of a durable peace in Europe if they were predicated, as the

Directive indicates they should be, upon the reunification of Germany. We do not believe that any proposals, however, resourceful or ingenious, however buttressed, could provide durable peace for Europe if they were predicated upon the unnatural division of one of the great nations and one of the great peoples of Europe. That, I think, was surely the view of the Heads of our Governments, and is the view that is embodied in the Directive under which we are operating and which binds us.

I recall the statement by Premier Bulganin, his opening statement to the Summit Conference, in which he said, and I quote, "The reunification of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state would be of paramount importance both to the peace of Europe and for the German nation itself". In other words, Marshal Bulganin recognised that the thing which was of "paramount" importance was not a security treaty but the reunification of Germany. That, he said, was of "paramount importance" for the peace of Europe and that, I suppose, is why the Heads of Government in their Directive, having first taken account, as they put it, of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, agreed that "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out."

In conclusion, let me say that I think we have made progress, good progress, in our discussion of the problem of European security. But I am convinced of this, that it is not possible to make any further progress until we know the views of the Soviet Union with respect to the closely linked problem which we are directed, as part of the same subject, to consider, namely, "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections."

So I repeat the plea of Mr. Macmillan that Mr. Molotov should give us his ideas on that subject. And I am confident that if we can bring our ideas on that subject as close together as we have brought our ideas together in relation to the problem of European security, then, indeed, we will have made this conference successful.

Address by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki Before the
United Nations General Assembly, New York, December 14, 1964

[Extract]

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I must also stress our strong belief that the time is ripe for examining the problem of European security in its entirety. In our considered opinion, the advisability of convening for this purpose a conference of all European States, with the participation, of course, of both the Soviet Union and the United States, should be closely examined. If it is deemed useful, such a conference could be initially prepared by representatives appointed by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO groups and possibly, if so desired, by representatives sent on behalf of European States not belonging to either of the two groups.

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Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 527. Rapacki's address to the General Assembly also dealt with the German question and the control of nuclear weapons.

**Declaration by the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact States, Bucharest, July 6, 1966**

I.

The ensuring of lasting peace and security in Europe accords with the ardent desires of all peoples of the European continent and with the interests of universal peace.

The peoples of Europe, who have made and are making an immense contribution to the cause of the progress of mankind, can and must create in that part of the world a climate of detente and international mutual understanding that will make it possible to utilize in full measure the material and spiritual resources of each people, of each country in conformity with their will and decision.

The state of the relations between the European countries exerts a great influence on the state of affairs throughout the world. It should not be forgotten that two world wars, which cost tens of millions of human lives and caused vast devastation, arose on the European continent.

The problem of European security did not arise today or yesterday. Half a century ago it was placed on the agenda with the outbreak of World War I. It rose before the peoples in all its vital significance two decades later, when Europe and the world came face to face with a brutal fascism that crushed one country after another under its feet.

The peoples who entered the mortal combat imposed on them inspired by the hope that they were fighting the last world war.

In 1945 the goal of ensuring European security appeared close; the roads to it seemed open. German fascism had been defeated and was awaiting judgment. Justice was celebrating victory. The peoples who had just lived through a war of unprecedented savagery with Hitler's Germany were demanding that everything possible be done to prevent the forces of militarism and aggression from ever again disrupting the peaceful life and creative labor of the present and future generations.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 407-420.

The Potsdam Agreement, which crowned the allied relations of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, proclaimed a broad program, aimed at the future, for establishing peace.¹ For the first time in history Europe had a real chance of solving the problem of its own security. It was generally recognized that the chief condition for security in Europe was to prevent a resurgence of German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany would never again threaten its neighbors or the preservation of peace throughout the world. Nor was there any disagreement that the fulfillment of this chief condition called for honest and friendly cooperation among the states of Europe, among all states interested in the preservation of European and universal peace.

But events did not justify these aspirations. The hopes of the peoples of Europe did not materialize, their desire for a life free of the fear of war has not been realized to this day. The responsibility for this devolves on the powers which immediately after the defeat of the German aggressors renounced the cooperation that had been forged in the great anti-Hitler coalition, which did not follow the common path of building peace in Europe and, moreover, became themselves the bearers of an aggressive policy.

Now, two decades after the end of World War II, its consequences have not yet been liquidated in Europe; there is no German peace treaty, there are hotbeds of tension, abnormal situations in the relations between states.

The socialist states that have signed the present Declaration believe that if this situation is to be eliminated and a firm foundation is to be laid for peace and security in Europe, relations between states must proceed from the renunciation of the threat of force or the use of force, from recognition of the need to solve international disputes only through peaceful means, on the principles of sovereignty and national independence, of equality and noninterference in domestic affairs, on respect for territorial inviolability. The European states must strive for the adoption of effective measures for preventing the danger of the outbreak of armed conflict in Europe and for strengthening European collective security. The realization of the common desire of all European nations presupposes the responsibility of and a contribution from each state, big or small, irrespective of its social and political system, in establishing worthy cooperation between sovereign, independent and equal states.

In the opinion of the states participating in the present conference, today's situation requires of all the peoples of Europe, of all peace-loving forces even greater determination and vigor in the struggle for strengthening peace and security in Europe.

¹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 34 ff.

II.

One of the decisive features of the present-day international situation is the growth of the forces that favor the preservation and strengthening of peace. Against the imperialist policy of aggression and for ensuring the security of peoples are resolutely ranged the socialist states with their vast economic, political and military might, the international working class headed by its Communist Parties, the national-liberation movement, the new states that have attained independence in the last few years, the progressive and democratic forces of the whole world. Tendencies are increasingly arising and developing in Europe toward liquidating the sediment of the cold war and the obstacles standing in the way of the normal development of all-European cooperation, toward solving disputed issues through mutual understanding, toward the normalisation of international life and the rapprochement of peoples.

This course is opposed by imperialist reactionary circles, which, pursuing aggressive goals, are striving to fan tensions, to poison relations between European states.

A direct threat to peace in Europe and the security of the European peoples is presented by the present policy of the United States of America, that same policy which in another part of the world—South-east Asia—has already led to the unleashing of an aggressive war against the Vietnamese people and which in recent years has more than once exacerbated relations between states to the point of international crises. The United States interferes in the domestic affairs of other states, violates the sacred right of each people to decide its own destiny, resorts to colonial repressions and armed interventions, stages plots in various parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and everywhere supports reactionary forces and venal regimes hated by the peoples.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the goals of U.S. policy in Europe have nothing in common with the vital interests of the European peoples, with the tasks of Europe's security. The American ruling circles would like to impose their will on their allies in Western Europe with a view to making Western Europe a tool of the global policy of the U.S.A., which is based on a desire to halt or even turn back the historical process of the national and social liberation of peoples. Hence the attempts to draw some West European states into military ventures even in other regions of the world, in particular Asia.

The aggressive circles of the U.S.A., which are supported by the reactionary forces of Western Europe, are trying, with the help of the North Atlantic military bloc and the war machine it has created, to deepen ever further the division of Europe, to fan the arms race, to increase international tension and to frustrate the establishment and development of normal ties between the West European and East European states.

In pursuit of these ends, which are alien to the genuine interests of the security of the European peoples, troops of the United States are still kept in Europe, their military bases are located in West European countries, stockpiles of nuclear weapons are being created, nuclear submarines are sent to the seas that wash Europe, the American Sixth Fleet sails in the Mediterranean Sea and planes carrying nuclear bombs fly in the skies over European countries.

The policy pursued by the U.S.A. in Europe in the postwar decades is all the more dangerous for the European peoples in that it is increasingly based on collusion with the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany. These forces are directly prodding the U.S.A. to a still more dangerous course in Europe.

This policy finds its expression in the projected creation of a sort of alliance between the American imperialists and the West German revanchists.

The militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany refuse to consider the vital interests of the German people themselves and are pursuing aggressive goals that manifest themselves in all their actions in the switching of the country's economic potential to military rails, in the creation of a 500,000-strong Bundeswehr, in the glorification of the history of German conquests, and in the nurturing of hatred against other peoples, whose lands are again coveted by the above-mentioned circles of the Federal Republic of Germany.

At present this policy is focused on the demand for nuclear weapons. In the F.R.G. the creation of a scientific-technological and industrial base that could at some time serve for the production of its own atomic and hydrogen bombs is being openly and secretly pushed. The combined efforts of the peace-loving countries and peoples have so far succeeded in delaying the creation of a joint NATO nuclear force that would give the F.R.G. access to nuclear weapons. However, plans to this effect have not been abandoned.

The fundamental interests of all peoples demand the renunciation of plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force. But if the NATO members, acting in disregard of the interests of peace, embark on the path of implementing the plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force or for giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, in that case the Warsaw Treaty member-states, faced with the grave consequences that this would entail for the cause of peace and security in Europe, would be compelled to carry out the necessary defensive measures to ensure their security.

The territorial demands of the West German revanchists must be decisively rejected. They are totally unfounded and hopeless. The question of the frontiers in Europe has been solved finally and irrevocably, and the peoples of Europe will know how to bar the path to revanchism.

One of the chief conditions for ensuring European security is the inviolability of the existing borders between the European states, including the borders of the sovereign German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The states represented at this conference reaffirm their resolve to crush any aggression against them on the part of the forces of imperialism and reaction.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states declare for their part that they have no territorial claims with respect to any state in Europe.

The policy of revanchism and militarism pursued by German imperialism has always suffered bankruptcy. Given the present correlation of forces in the world arena and in Europe, it not only will fail to bring any advantages or benefits to the F.R.G. but is fraught with irreparable consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany.

The interests of peace and security in Europe and in the whole world, like the interests of the German people, demand that the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany take into account the actually existing situation in Europe. And this means that they must proceed from the fact of the existence of two German states, renounce their claims for the redrawing of the map of Europe, their claims to the exclusive right to represent the whole of Germany and the attempts to exert pressure on states that recognize the German Democratic Republic, renounce the criminal Munich diktat and recognize that it has been invalid from the very beginning. They must prove in deeds that they are really taking the lessons of history to heart, are putting an end to militarism and revanchism and will pursue a policy of normalizing relations between states and developing cooperation and friendship among peoples.

The German Democratic Republic, which is an important factor in ensuring peace in Europe, has addressed constructive proposals to the F.R.G. government and the Bundestag: to renounce nuclear arms on a reciprocal basis, to reduce the armies of both German states, to pledge not to use force against each other, to sit down at a table and confer on the solution of urgent national questions of interest to both the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. However, the F.R.G. government has displayed no interest in these proposals. The states that have signed the present Declaration support the above-mentioned initiative of the G.D.R.

Having comprehensively reviewed the present situation in Europe and weighed the basic factors determining its development, the states represented at the conference arrived at the conclusion that in Europe, where almost half of the states are socialist, there are chances for preventing an undesirable development of events. The problem of European security can be solved through the joint efforts of all the European states, of all social forces that are for peace, regardless of their ideological views and religious and other persuasions. The more quickly the influence of the forces that would like to continue kindling tension in relations between European states is paralyzed, the more successfully will this task be solved.

In the postwar years it has more than once been possible to thwart plans aimed at undermining peace in Europe. Of decisive importance in this have been the unity and solidarity of the European socialist states, of all the countries of socialism, their pursuit of a peace-loving foreign policy while maintaining vigilance with respect to potential violators of peace, their willingness to cooperate with all states that are ready to make their contribution to the strengthening of European security. The efforts of the working class of the West European countries, of its advanced detachments, of democratic progressive organizations and the movement of peace partisans, which mold the public opinion of the broad working masses, are directed with all vigor to the same end.

A major factor that is increasingly complicating the implementation of military ventures in Europe is the growing influence of forces in the West European states that are aware of the need to rise above differences in political views and convictions and to take steps toward a relaxation of international tension, toward the all-round development of mutually advantageous relations among all the states of Europe without discrimination, toward the complete independence of their countries and the preservation of their national identities.

The states that have signed the present Declaration note as a positive phenomenon the presence in the Federal Republic of Germany of circles that oppose revanchism and militarism, demand the establishment of normal relations with the countries of both West and East, including normal relations between the two German states, and strive for a relaxation of international tension and the ensuring of European security so that all Germans may enjoy the blessings of peace.

The influence of those who are for peace and security in Europe is becoming more marked each day, while the proponents of an aggressive course are beginning to lose their positions. More and more European countries and peoples are coming to understand the real source of the threat to each of them and to Europe as a whole and what is needed to protect the security of all European states.

The participants in the conference proceed from the premise that each European state is called upon to play a worthy role in international affairs and to become a full-fledged partner in building in Europe a system of relations between peoples and relations between states whereby the security of each would at the same time be the security of all. The European states are capable of solving questions of the relations among them without outside interference.

The socialist countries believe that one of the basic conditions for the realization of European security is the affirmation and development of normal relations between states based on observance of the principles of sovereignty and national independence, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage. The situation in Europe proves that, despite various obstacles, these principles are being more and more broadly recognized as a reasonable basis for cooperation between peoples and for improving the international situation.

It is very important to strengthen political relations between states, regardless of their social systems, aimed at the defense of peace.

The European countries, bound by traditional trade relations, can only gain from the development of their economic cooperation on a reciprocal basis. A broadening of economic relations between European states, and the elimination of the discrimination and obstacles existing in this area, is an especially important factor for rapprochement and for the establishment of an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding among peoples. The development of economic relations among European countries makes it possible to broaden their trade with partners in other parts of the world. These relations, together with the all-round development of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation which makes possible the better mutual acquaintance of peoples, may provide as they develop a material base for European security and for the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

Despite all the differences in social-political systems, ideologies and political views, the European states and peoples have a common cause, conforming to the vital national interests of all—it is the task of preventing a disturbance of peace in Europe, of curbing the forces of aggression.

III.

The states that have signed the present Declaration believe that the situation as it is now developing demands of all European states vigorous actions toward strengthening European peace.

The governments of the European states cannot rely on the soothing assurances of those who are hatching plans of aggression, cannot take on faith the declarations of those who want to revise the results of World War II while claiming that they need nuclear weapons for their own security, cannot remain passive, thereby willingly or unwillingly encouraging the forces that are preparing for Europe the fate of being a springboard for a devastating nuclear conflict.

Conscious of their lofty responsibility before the peoples, the governments of the European states must undertake steps capable of ensuring a turn toward a relaxation of tension in Europe, the strengthening of security and the development of peaceful mutually advantageous cooperation among the European states.

This is not the first time Europe has been confronted with this task. The first and second world wars were prepared by the aggressive forces in deep secrecy, under the cover of deceptive declarations about peaceful intentions. A gigantic apparatus of propaganda and misinformation was used each time to lull the vigilance of the peoples. The peoples' eyes did open, but not before millions of people were already dying, and flourishing cities and villages lay in ruins. This cannot be permitted to happen for a third time—in the age of nuclear energy and mighty rockets.

The countries participating in the conference resolutely favor the speediest implementation of constructive measures for strengthening security in Europe. They are convinced that in present-day conditions it is actually possible to undertake such steps. To this end they are ready to cooperate with other states.

The creation of stable guarantees for the cause of peace and security in Europe is an important task demanding the participation of all European states, the patient and constructive discussion of points of view with the aim of reaching decisions that would enjoy general approval.

The European socialist countries have repeatedly submitted well-grounded proposals constituting a concrete program of action.

The states that have signed the Declaration believe that measures for strengthening security in Europe can and must be carried out above all in the following chief directions:

First. The states participating in the conference appeal to all European states to develop good-neighbor relations on the basis of the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage—on the basis of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Proceeding from this premise, they favor the strengthening of economic and trade ties and the multiplication of contacts and forms of cooperation in the fields of science, technology, culture and art, as well as in other fields that provide new opportunities for the cooperation of European countries.

There is no field of peaceful cooperation where the European states could not find opportunities for undertaking further mutually advantageous steps.

The development of all-European cooperation demands from all European states the renunciation of any kind of discrimination and pressure, whether it be economic or political in nature, aimed against other countries, equal cooperation among them and the establishment of normal relations between them, including the establishment of normal relations with both German states.

The establishment and development of good-neighbor relations between European states that have different social systems could intensify their economic and cultural ties and thus increase the possibilities of the European states for making an effective contribution to the cause of the improvement of the atmosphere in Europe and the development of mutual confidence and respect.

Second. The socialist countries have always consistently stood against the division of the world into military blocs and alliances and for the elimination of the dangers for universal peace and security stemming from this.

In reply to the formation of the military aggressive NATO grouping and to the inclusion in it of West Germany, the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid—a defensive pact of sovereign and equal states that is an instrument for the defense of the security of the treaty's member-states and of peace in Europe—was concluded.

But the members of the Warsaw Treaty have been and are of the opinion that the military blocs imposed by the imperialist forces and the presence of military bases on the territories of other states constitute an obstacle to cooperation among states. The security and progress of each European country can be genuinely guaranteed not by the existence of military groupings, which do not correspond to the present-day healthy tendencies of international life, but by the establishment in Europe of an effective security system based on relations of equality and mutual respect among all the states of the continent, on the joint efforts of all the European nations.

The countries that have signed the present Declaration believe that the necessity for measures toward the easing first of all of military tension in Europe has become ripe. A radical way to achieve this would be the simultaneous dissolution of the existing military alliances, and the present situation makes this possible. The governments of our states have pointed out more than once that should the North Atlantic alliance halt its activities the Warsaw Treaty will become invalid, and that the two would be replaced by a system of European security. They now formally reaffirm their readiness for the simultaneous liquidation of the above-mentioned alliances.

If, however, the members of the North Atlantic alliance are not yet ready for the simultaneous dissolution of the two groupings, the states that have signed the present Declaration consider it feasible even now to reach agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of both the North Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Treaty. At the same time they declare that as long as the North Atlantic bloc exists and the aggressive imperialist circles jeopardize peace throughout the world, the socialist countries represented at the conference, maintaining high vigilance, are fully resolved to strengthen their might and defense capability.

At the same time we consider it necessary that all the member-states of the North Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Treaty, as well as countries that do not participate in any military alliance, undertake bilateral and multilateral efforts to advance the cause of European security.

Third. At present it is also very important to adopt such partial measures toward a military detente on the European continent as:

- the liquidation of foreign military bases;

- the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territories to within their national frontiers;

- a reduction, in agreed-upon numbers and according to agreed-upon schedules, of the armed forces of the two German states;

- measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict: the creation of denuclearized zones, a pledge by all powers possessing nuclear weapons not to use these weapons against states belonging to these zones, etc.;

- the cessation of flights by foreign aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over the territories of European states and of the entry into these states' ports of submarines and surface vessels with weapons on board.

Fourth. In view of the danger to the cause of peace in Europe of the F.R.G.'s nuclear claims, states must direct their efforts to precluding the possibility of the F.R.G.'s access to nuclear arms in any form whatever—directly or indirectly through groupings of states, of its exclusive command or its participation in any form in command over such arms. The way in which this question is solved will to a large extent decide the future of the European, and not only the European, peoples. And half-hearted solutions to this question are impermissible.

Fifth. The inviolability of frontiers is the foundation of a durable peace in Europe. The interests of a normalization of the situation in Europe demand that all states, both those in Europe and those outside the European continent, base their foreign-policy actions on the recognition of the actually existing frontiers between European states that were established after the most devastating war in the history of mankind, including the Polish frontier along the Oder-Neisse and the frontiers between the two German states.

Sixth. A German peace settlement accords with the interests of peace in Europe. The socialist states represented at the conference are willing to continue searches for the solution to this problem. This solution must take into account the interests of the security of all the countries concerned, the security of Europe as a whole.

A constructive approach to this question, as to other aspects of security in Europe, is possible only proceeding from reality, in the first place the existence of the two German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time such a settlement calls for recognition of the existing frontiers and for the renunciation by both German states of the possession of nuclear weapons.

The equal participation of the two German states in efforts aimed at the development and strengthening of relations of all-European cooperation in various fields of activity—political, economic, scientific-technical, cultural—will enable their working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, their entire population, to make their contribution, to the measure of their possibilities and creative abilities, to progress and peace jointly with the other European peoples.

As for the unification of the two German states, the road to this goal lies through a relaxation of tension, a gradual rapprochement of the two sovereign German states and agreement between them, through agreements on disarmament in Germany and Europe and on the basis of the principle that once the unification of Germany is achieved, the united German state will be genuinely peace-loving and democratic and will never again pose a threat to its neighbors or to peace in Europe.

Seventh. It is of great positive importance to convene an all-European conference to discuss questions of ensuring security in Europe and establishing all-European cooperation. The accord reached at the conference could be expressed, for example, in the form of an all-European declaration on cooperation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security. This declaration could provide for pledges on the part of the signatory states to be guided in their relations with one another by the interests of peace, to settle disputed questions only by peaceful means, to hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest and to assist in the comprehensive development of economic, scientific-technical and cultural ties with one another. The declaration should be open for all interested states to join.

The convocation of a conference on questions of European security and cooperation could promote the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and would be a major landmark in contemporary European history. Our countries are ready to participate in such a conference at any time convenient for the other interested states, both North Atlantic and Treaty members and neutrals. The neutral European countries could also play a positive role in the convocation of such a conference.

Naturally, the agenda and other questions relating to the preparation of such a meeting or conference should be established jointly by all the participating states, keeping in mind the proposals submitted by each one of them.

The countries represented at the present conference are also prepared to employ other possible methods for discussing problems of European security: negotiations through diplomatic channels, meetings of Foreign Ministers or special representatives on a bilateral or multilateral basis, and contacts at the highest level. They believe that the considerations presented above cover the chief and most important aspects of ensuring European security. They are also prepared to discuss other proposals for the solution of this problem that have been or may be advanced by any state.

As for the participants in such a discussion, the Warsaw Treaty states make no exceptions. It is for each state to decide whether or not to participate in the discussion and solution of European problems.

The peoples, of course, are not indifferent to the political course this or that state may choose—one corresponding to the interests of peace and security or one running counter to these interests.

The participants in this conference are convinced that the countries of other continents as well cannot be indifferent to the direction in which affairs in Europe develop. The flames of two world wars broke out on European soil, but they scorched almost the whole planet. Devastation and death was visited on many countries, including some on continents far from Europe. Therefore any government that is concerned for the destiny of the world cannot but welcome each step that leads to a detente and to an improvement of the situation in Europe, cannot but support such efforts.

In expressing this concern for the strengthening of European security and their willingness to participate in the implementation of appropriate steps directed toward this goal, our countries are convinced that it is the duty of all European states to contribute to the solution of problems of worldwide significance, the adjustment of which will unquestionably have a beneficial effect on the situation in Europe as well. These include the problems of ensuring noninterference in the internal affairs of states, the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of force in international relations, disarmament, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and other major measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict, the final liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, the dismantling of foreign military bases on other countries' territory and the development of international economic cooperation on equal terms. For their part, the states represented at this conference will continue to do everything in their power to promote the earliest possible solution of these world problems. They attach great importance to the strengthening of the United Nations on the basis of strict observance of its Charter, ensuring the universality of the U.N. and bringing its activity in line with the changes that have taken place in the world, and will help in every way to raise the effectiveness of the organization with a view to the preservation of universal peace and security and to the development of friendly relations among peoples.

The states that have signed the present Declaration express a readiness to seek jointly with other states for mutually acceptable ways to strengthen peace in Europe. They are fully resolved to defend in the international arena the line of peace, the international cooperation of states and the rallying of all freedom-loving and progressive forces, to fight against imperialist aggression and a policy of diktat and violence, to support the cause of freedom, national independence and social progress.

The participants in the conference appeal to all European governments and nations, to all the forces of peace and progress on our continent, regardless of their ideological, political or religious persuasion, to join forces in making Europe—one of the most important centers of world civilization—a continent of all-round and fruitful cooperation between equal nations, a mighty factor for the stability of peace and of mutual understanding throughout the world.

Bucharest, July 5, 1966.

Statement by European Communist Parties, Karlovy Vary,
Czechoslovakia, April 26, 1967

We representatives of European communist and workers parties who gathered in Karlovy Vary realize our responsibility for the future of our peoples and the cause of the international working class and believe that preservation of peace is the most important question for all the peoples of our continent. We met to discuss the present situation, to exchange experience, and jointly work out ways and means to help unite all forces of peace and progress in the struggle for European security.

The experience of the past few years has borne out the correctness of the communist thesis that world war is not inevitable and that it can be averted by the joint efforts of the world socialist community, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and all states opposed to war—all peace forces. These forces have grown considerably, but the aggressiveness of American imperialism has also increased.

The United States, the main force of aggression and reaction, is trying to reverse the march of history and wipe out the right of the peoples to decide their own destinies. It is grossly interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and is extending its war of aggression against the Vietnamese people, a war which today represents the most serious danger to world peace.

In this situation the struggle against the imperialist forces assumes special significance in Europe. Every success in this struggle means not only a step toward a stable peace in this part of the world, but also a new blow at the policy of strength and the system of interconnected aggressive military pacts with which imperialism has girdled the globe.

Europe, which lived through two world wars, remains a troubled region where the main forces of the imperialist camp and the socialist community confront each other. An armed conflict between them would threaten to grow into a total nuclear war. This danger hangs over the entire life of the European peoples, retards social and economic progress, vitiates international relations, and involves tremendous loss of material means in the course of the arms race. Military intervention by certain European states to suppress the national liberation movements also creates hotbeds of tension and imperils peace.

Following World War II, the imperialist nations headed by the United States concluded the North Atlantic pact, spearheaded against the socialist states and against democratic movements in the capitalist countries. This brought about the division of Europe into counterposed military blocs.

Having remilitarized the Federal Republic of Germany and supported its unlawful claims to represent all of Germany, the imperialists assigned it the role of an advanced anticommunist bastion, which became a seat of tension and which threatens peace and security in

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 197-203. Moscow broadcast, Apr. 26, 1967. The statement was issued at the European Communist conference held at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.

Europe as a whole. The Bonn state, where revanchist and militarist forces have come to power, has turned into the mainstay of U.S. global strategy in Europe.

The growing strength of the Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Hitlerite officers, testifies to an increasing scope of military preparations. Activities of the Communist Party of Germany have been banned in the German Federal Republic, while other democratic and peace-loving organizations are being subjected to repression. Broad scope is being given at the same time to the activities of extremely reactionary and neofascist forces. Their growing influence greatly alarms the European people, who know from painful experience that fascism is always accompanied by aggressive militarism.

The cold war has become for the monopolies of all the European capitalist states an instrument for waging an offensive against democracy, a tool for exerting pressure on the working people with the aim of suppressing their struggle for better living conditions, of restricting their social gains—a means of shifting the growing burden of armaments onto the popular masses.

The cold war conceptions, the myth of the menace of "communist aggression" used by the United States to justify its hegemony in Europe, have failed. The aggressive course of imperialism has been undermined by the active foreign policy of the socialist states, which are consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, a policy being carried through on an ever greater scale—especially since the 20th CPSU Congress. This course was also undermined by the struggle of communist and workers parties, the actions of the masses, the activity of broad sections of the West European people. The joint defensive might of the socialist states, which relies above all on the technical and scientific achievements of the Soviet Union, constitutes an obstacle on the path to war.

The Atlantic bloc has entered a stage of open crisis. The ruling circles of some Western countries challenge the value and expediency of the policy of military alliance with the United States or participation in the NATO joint armed forces, which threatens to draw their states into war and has nothing in common with their national interests. Tendencies toward emancipation from political and military trusteeship by the United States are growing in the European capitalist countries. At the same time, anxiety is growing over the intensified penetration by American capital.

The contradictions have also been aggravated between the national interests of West European states and the expansionist aims of the German Federal Republic—its desire to occupy a dominating position in NATO, the "Common Market," and Euratom.

The German Democratic Republic, which has carried out the Potsdam agreements,^{*} has strengthened its sovereignty as a state and its international prestige. Its growing strength and constructive peace policy raise a barrier to the plans of West German imperialism. Recognition of the GDR and defense of its sovereign rights have become one

^{*} Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1947-49* (S. Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 24-25.

of the main tasks in the struggle for European security. The existence and development of a peaceable socialist German state has great implications not only for the German people but also for peace all over Europe.

The crisis of the cold war policy has opened up new opportunities for the democratic and progressive forces of West Germany, forces that sincerely demand radical changes of the foreign policy and which deserve every support. Replacement of the Bonn government was brought about precisely by this crisis. However, there are no signs that the new government of the so-called grand coalition has abandoned the imperialist goals of its predecessors. On the contrary, despite assurances of peaceful designs, it maintains its claim to represent all of Germany, continues to strive to swallow up the GDR, to restore Germany within the frontiers of 1937, refuses to recognize the unlawfulness of the Munich diktat, continues to advance provocative claims to West Berlin, and strives to gain access to nuclear arms.

Serious changes are now taking place in public opinion. The awareness of the fruitlessness and danger of the imperialist policy of splitting Europe is constantly growing. Ties of cooperation, specifically in the fields of economy and culture, are developing between countries with different social systems. In the course of establishing relations, representatives of government and public circles of socialist and capitalist countries carry out a useful exchange of views on problems of European security.

The constructive proposals for the strengthening of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe, set forth by the socialist countries in the Bucharest declaration of the Warsaw Pact states,¹ and the proposals of the communist parties of capitalist countries advanced at their meetings and in their decisions, provide a realistic basis for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

New and positive trends toward international detente and cooperation with communists are appearing in the socialist and social democratic movements in some West European countries. New trends are emerging in Christian circles regarding problems of progress and peace. New possibilities have arisen for contacts and cooperation between various trade union and other democratic organizations. Cooperation of communists with socialists and those who believe in the question of European security can promote the cause of peace on our continent.

The people of Europe want no further war! They want neither a cold war nor a "balance of fear" leading to a still more intense arms race and increasing the risk of a deliberate or accidental conflict.

It is high time to achieve the establishment of new relations in Europe based on a genuine relaxation of tension and mutual confidence.

We communists, acting under different national conditions, will spare no effort to build a system of collective security, to establish relations between states which will preclude any possibility of aggression and insure an enduring peace in Europe and throughout the world. This is a difficult but feasible task.

The communist and workers parties of Europe submit for the con-

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 407-420.

sideration of public opinion and of all political and public forces concerned a program for actions in the interests of creating a system of collective security based on principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. This requires, primarily, that all states recognize the existing situation as it has developed in Europe in the postwar period.

This means: Recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe, particularly on the Oder and the Neisse, and also of the borders between both German states; recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German states, the GDR and the German Federal Republic, which requires of the latter the renunciation of its claim to represent all of Germany; preclusion of any opportunity for the German Federal Republic to gain access to nuclear arms in any form, either European, multilateral, or Atlantic; and recognition of the Munich treaty as invalid from the moment of its conclusion.

The European and working class movement and all democratic peace forces now face the task of insuring the development of peaceful relations and cooperation among all European states on the basis of respect for their sovereignty and equality. With these aims in view, it is necessary to fight for the realization of a number of aims which can be achieved in a new situation, namely:

Conclusion by all European states of a treaty renouncing the use of force or threat of force in their relations and interference in internal affairs; a treaty guaranteeing the solution of all disputes by peaceful means only, in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter; normalization of relations between all states and the GDR, and between both German states and between the GDR and West Berlin as a separate political entity; consistent defense and development of democracy in the German Federal Republic—the right to demand this is given to the peoples by law, the experience of history, and postwar international agreements. This envisages universal support for the struggle of progressive forces in the German Federal Republic for the banning of neo-Nazi organizations and all revanchist propaganda, annulment of the emergency legislation, freedom of activity of the democratic and peace-loving forces, lifting of the ban on the Communist Party of Germany; and conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty as an important step toward halting the arms race.

The system of European security must contain a recognition of the principles of neutrality and unconditional respect for the inviolability of neutral states. A more active peace-loving policy of these countries and their contribution to the cause of disarmament would help to establish such a system.

Liquidation of artificially created barriers in economic relations between the socialist and capitalist states of Europe would be of particular importance for all states and would be conducive to the establishment of fruitful cooperation, including broad agreements in the sphere of production and scientific research.

Striving to open the road to European security and cooperation, we resolutely advocate the conclusion of agreements on partial solutions, above all in the sphere of disarmament, which would create a favorable climate for more far-reaching treaties. All proposals in this field, advanced by governments, parties, public organizations, political lead-

ers, and scientists, deserve thorough examination. Particularly topical among these proposals are those which deal with the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European states, liquidation of foreign war bases, establishment of denuclearized zones in central Europe, in the Balkans, the territory of Danubian countries, in the Mediterranean, and in northern Europe, and also zones of thinned-out or frozen armaments, and in general zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the continent. These, just as other steps, would check the tendency toward intensification of the arms race.

The 20-year period of the validity of the Atlantic pact expires in 1969, and this makes possible a clear alternative: a Europe without military blocs. This alternative must be put on the agenda with all earnestness.

No effort should be spared in order to develop a broad movement of the peace-loving forces of our continent against the extension or any modification of the Atlantic pact. This movement is favored by the constructive attitude of the Warsaw Pact states which have repeatedly stated and solemnly confirmed in the Bucharest declaration their readiness for a simultaneous liquidation of both military alliances. We second the moves of these states regarding an immediate agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of the Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Pact.

We express readiness to support any initiatives or proposals pursuing the purpose of achieving a détente and strengthening the security of the peoples of our continent.

We fully support the proposal to call a conference of all European states on the question of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe. The proposal to call a conference of representatives of all European parliaments also deserves support.

Consolidation of security and peace will open up before the peoples of our continent new prospects for progress and prosperity. The peoples of Europe are faced with important social, economic, and cultural problems. A Europe rid of the arms race, which consumes tremendous economic resources and the fruits of the labor of workers, engineers, and scientists, will be able not only to insure higher living standards for its people but also to make a valuable contribution to the development of all mankind.

The struggle for such a Europe is closely associated with the struggle for genuine national independence, for democracy, against reactionary and fascist dictatorships such as exist in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The fact that the governments of Spain, Portugal, and Greece assist American imperialism in building atomic bases in exchange for U.S. support for these discredited regimes shows what a great danger they are to Europe. European communist and workers parties express complete solidarity with and provide support to the important struggle now being waged by the united front of Spanish workers and democratic forces, and to all the peoples fighting against reactionary regimes, for freedom and democracy.

The communist and workers parties of Europe are ready to dedicate all their forces to the realization of these tasks, serving the cause of peace, progress, and democracy.

Our movement, which this year marks the 50th anniversary of its

great victory—the Great October Socialist Revolution—has become a mighty political force, exerting a decisive influence on the development of all of mankind.

Each of the communist parties, in the specific conditions in which it is fighting, bears responsibility for its policy to its working class and working people, to the people in general. At the same time, each party is aware of its international responsibility for safeguarding peace, for forming new international relations conforming to the needs of our time.

This sense of responsibility requires of us communist parties of Europe the pooling of our efforts for the solving of these problems. The stronger the unity and solidarity of the communist and workers parties in Europe and all over the world, the more effective our struggle shall be.

This sense of responsibility obliges us to address, primarily, all the working class, which is the main producer of material values, the most conscientious and progressive class of modern society. We address the closest ally of the working class, the peasantry, and also the middle strata, which are vitally interested in peace and prosperity. The workers and all the working people of Europe, combining patriotism with international fraternal solidarity, are capable of playing a decisive role in the struggle for peace and European security, for democracy and social progress in our continent.

We address the socialist and social democratic parties, which have a broad influence among the European working class and participate in the governments of a number of European countries. The experience of decades has shown that joint actions by communists and socialists enable the working class to exert a decisive influence on political life and rally around themselves public sections interested in maintaining peace and implementing democratic social changes.

We address the trade unions of Europe, which for 100 years now have been the biggest mass organization of the working class, defending its material and social interests. We call upon the trade union organizations to use their authority and influence in the struggle for a peaceful Europe.

We address scientists, writers, artists, all European intellectuals, whose fine representatives have always defended human rights and freedoms, independence of the peoples, international cooperation, and peace.

We address the Christian forces, the Catholics and Protestants, the believers of all religious denominations who motivate their striving for peace and social justice with religious convictions.

We address the younger generation of Europe, whose future is inseparably linked with victory for the idea of collective security and peace. The place of the youth is in the front ranks of the fighters against the policy of war, against reaction and fascism, for freedom and progress, for friendship of the peoples.

We address the women whose role in social life is increasing all the time and whose participation in the defense of peace and the security of mankind is so important.

We address the bourgeois groups which display a realistic approach to modern reality, realize the danger of a nuclear war, wish to rid

their countries of dependence on the United States, and are ready to support the policy of European security.

We call upon all peace-loving forces to rally and launch a broad campaign in their countries and on a continental scale to expand direct actions for collective security. We urge support in every possible way for the proposal to call a conference of European nations.

The communists of European countries are deeply convinced that by defending peace and security on their continent against the forces of aggression and war they are acting in the interests of democracy, social progress, and national liberation, in the interests of the peoples of all the world.

The present historic period requires courage and initiative. We address all the people of good will, irrespective of their political convictions and party membership, nationality or religion, with a call to use all their influence and exert every effort to achieve our common goal—peace. By overcoming all that divides us, we shall be able to create a mighty force, capable of triumphing over war and the uncertainty of tomorrow, of paving the way to a lasting peace and prosperity of the peoples.

The European people are capable of deciding themselves the questions of peace and security on their continent. May they take the destinies of Europe into their own hands!

Report by the North Atlantic Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), Brussels, December 14, 1967

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

Report of the Council

A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to "study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace". The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schütz, Watson, Speak, Kohler and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the U.S.S.R. has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unresolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide his policy in the light of close knowledge of each others' problems and objectives. To this

Source: "Future Tasks of the Alliance," American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1967, U.S. Department of State Publication 8495 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 321-323. The report was issued as an annex to the communiqué released following a Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, December 14, 1967. The communiqué endorsed the report. For a text of the communiqué, see ibid., pp. 320-321.

and the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognise the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is now mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature, a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of

Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective détente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. the South-Eastern flank. In this respect the current situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle-East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies or such of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialised studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of détente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.

Communiqué and Declaration of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Reykjavik, June 25, 1968

[Extracts]

The regular spring ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held at Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25.¹ Following is the text of a final communiqué issued at the close of the meeting on June 25, together with a declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions, which was attached to the communiqué.

Press release 146 dated June 26

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Reykjavik on 24th and 25th June, 1968.

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3. Ministers discussed the follow-up to the report, approved at the Ministerial Meeting of December 1967,² on the future tasks of the Alliance. For this purpose the Council in permanent session submitted to Ministers a comprehensive report on work which it had accomplished thus far in carrying out the main tasks set for the Alliance in the years ahead.

4. The first part of this report reviewed East-West relations since 1966. It set forth the results of a co-operative study by Member Governments of their policies designed to promote progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues in Europe can be solved. The study noted that in certain respects improvements in East-West relations had taken place. It concluded that, while in the longer term prospects for further improvements could be favourable, opportunities for rapid progress towards general détente should not be over-rated.

5. Ministers nevertheless reaffirmed their intention to continue their efforts to promote détente. Each ally should play its full part in improving East-West relations, bearing in mind the established practice of timely consultation

within the Alliance. Ministers concluded that the intensified examination and review, within the Alliance, of suitable policies to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security had proved of great value and should continue. This task will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

6. A second part of the Council's report summarised the results so far of intensive work on a programmed study of disarmament and practical arms control measures. As an initial effort, Member Governments and their experts have concentrated on the study of the possibility of balanced force reductions as between East and West. The Ministers confirmed the decision of the Permanent Council to give priority to this complex and important work. They did not under-estimate the existing obstacles but they confirmed the need to prevent an escalation in arms levels on both sides.

7. Ministers representing the nations participating in the NATO Defence Programme adopted a Declaration on Mutual Force Reductions, which is attached to this Communiqué. The French Delegation declared, for reasons of principle and procedure, that it could associate itself only with Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the attached Declaration. It has nevertheless affirmed that, since the study of possibilities of balanced and mutual force reductions has not been completed, France will continue to take part in the further work in the Council foreseen in Paragraph 18 of the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.

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Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75-77.

¹ For names of members of the U.S. delegation, see Department of State press release 146 dated June 21.

² For texts of a final communiqué and annex issued at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1967, see 6944, Jan. 2, 1968, p. 49.

**Appeal by Warsaw Pact Nations to All European Countries,
Budapest, March 17, 1969**

Budapest Appeal by Warsaw Pact Nations to All European Countries, March 17, 1969

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—the States Members of the Warsaw Pact—participants in the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee, expressing the aspirations of their peoples to live in peace and good-neighbourliness with the rest of the European peoples, as well as their firm resolve to assist in establishing an atmosphere of security and co-operation on our continent, address to all European States the following appeal for the redoubling of efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security in Europe.

The present and the future of the peoples of Europe is indissolubly linked with the maintenance and consolidation of peace on our continent. Genuine security and reliable peace can be ensured, if the thoughts, pursuits and energy of the European States are directed towards the aim of relaxing tension, solving with due regard to realities international problems that are ripe for solution and arranging for all-round co-operation on an All-European basis.

The way to good-neighbourliness, confidence and mutual understanding depends on the will and efforts of the peoples and governments of all European countries. The Europe of today, as it came out of the Second World War, is made up of more than thirty States, large and small, differing according to their social system, location and interests. By the will of history they are destined to live side by side, and no one can change this fact.

More and more governments, parliaments, Parties, political and social leaders are imbued with understanding of the responsibility that lies upon them before present and future generations for the prevention of a new military conflict in Europe. However, there are still active in Europe forces which put on the credit side of European development, not the settlement of disputes and peaceful agreements, but additional divisions and missiles, and new military programmes calculated for decades in advance. Also active together with them are those who have not drawn the proper lessons from the outcome of the Second World War, as a result of which German militarism and nazism were crushed. Their intrigues are a source of tension and bring complications into international relations.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 106-108. The appeal was signed by the first secretaries of the central committees of the communist parties and the Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States.

The States participating in the Conference consider it their duty, in future also, to do all that lies in their power to shield Europe from the danger of new military conflicts, to clear the way for the development of co-operation among all European countries irrespective of their social system, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

However complex unsolved problems may be, their solution must be achieved by peaceful means through negotiation and not through the use, or threat of the use, of force.

In analysing the situation in Europe, the States Members of the Warsaw Pact consider that there is a real possibility of ensuring European security through common efforts, taking into account the interests of all European States and peoples.

Almost three years ago States Members of the Warsaw Pact put forward at Bucharest a proposal to convoke a general European conference to consider questions of European security and peaceful co-operation.¹ The contacts which have taken place since then have shown that not a single European government expressed opposition to the idea of a general European conference and that there are real possibilities of holding one. Not once since the Second World War have all the States of Europe come together, although there are numerous questions which await consideration at the conference table. From the standpoint of the interests of consolidating peace, there are no serious reasons for putting off the convening of a general European conference.

Such a conference would meet the interests of all European States. It would make it possible together to find ways and means of doing away with the division of Europe into military groupings and achieving peaceful co-operation among European States and peoples.

However, there are forces in the world which, because they seek to maintain the division of our continent, conduct a policy of fomenting tension, and refuse to facilitate peaceful co-operation among States and peoples, openly oppose the holding of such a conference and other measures to strengthen European security.

The States participating in the present Conference are convinced that the development of general European co-operation has been and continues to be the only real alternative to dangerous military confrontation, the armaments race and the dissensions which aggressive forces, seeking to undo the results of the Second World War and remake the map of Europe, are trying and will continue to try to impose on Europe.

The States Members of the Warsaw Pact confirm their proposals against the division of the world into military blocs, against the armaments race and the resultant threat to the cause of international peace and security, and the other measures and proposals contained in the Declaration on the strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe adopted at Bucharest in 1966.

It is a vital necessity, for the European peoples, to avert new military conflicts, and to strengthen the political, economic and cultural links between all States on the basis of equal rights and respect for the independence and sovereignty of States. A durable system of European security will create the objective possibility and necessity of carrying out, by combined efforts, large-scale projects in the fields of power production, of transport, of the hydrospheric and atmospheric environment and of health, which have a direct bearing on the well-being of the population of the entire continent. It is precisely this common interest which can and should become the foundation for European co-operation.

¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 407-420.

One of the basic pre-conditions for safeguarding the security of Europe is the inviolability of the existing European frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontiers and those between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, recognition of the fact of the existence of those two countries, renunciation by the latter of its claims to represent the whole of the German people, and renunciation of possession in any form of nuclear weapons. West Berlin has a special status and does not belong to Western Germany.

A practical step towards strengthening European security would be a meeting in the immediate future between representatives of all the European States concerned in order to establish by mutual agreement the procedure for convening the Conference and to determine the items on its agenda. We are prepared to consider at the same time any other proposal regarding the method for preparing and convening the Conference.

The States participating in the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee address to all the countries of Europe an appeal for co-operation in convening a general European conference and in creating the necessary preconditions for ensuring that the Conference is successful and that it justifies the hopes which the peoples connect with it.

In order to bring about this important action, which would constitute an historical moment in the life of the continent, the States participating in the Conference make a solemn appeal to all European countries to strengthen the climate of confidence, and to that end to refrain from any action liable to poison the atmosphere in relations between States. They call upon them to go beyond general statements about peace to concrete acts and measures for the relaxation of tension and disarmament, for the development of co-operation and peace between the peoples. They appeal to all European governments to unite their efforts so that Europe may become a continent of fruitful collaboration between nations possessing equal rights, and a factor for stability, peace and mutual understanding throughout the world.

Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Washington, April 11, 1969

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Washington on 10th and 11th April, 1969. The Council commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty creating the Alliance and was addressed by the President of the United States. Ministers expressed their deep satisfaction at the decisive contribution the Alliance had made to the maintenance of peace in Europe and to the security of all its members.

2. The Alliance was established to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and in response to a common fear that without an effective security system, another war might erupt in a divided Europe. The Alliance continues as the expression of common purposes and aspirations.

3. In 1967 the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance emphasized the dual task of the latter: the defence of the West and the search for a stable peace with the East. In June 1968 Allied Ministers declared their readiness to seek, with the other States concerned, specific practical measures for disarmament and arms control, including possible measures for mutual and balanced force reductions.¹ Notwithstanding the serious setback to hopes for improvement in East-West relations as a result of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Ministers in November 1968 stated that secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West remained the political goal of the Alliance.² They reaffirmed at this Session that the intention of their Governments was to continue the search for real progress towards this objective by contacts and to explore all appropriate openings for negotiations.

4. Bearing especially in mind the situation in Eastern Europe, member governments recall that any lasting improvement in international relations presupposes full respect for the principles of the independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their domestic affairs, the right of each people to shape its own future, and the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force.

5. Ministers recalled that one of the essential aims of the Alliance is the establishment of a just and lasting peace in Europe, based on stability, security and mutual confidence. The Alliance proposes, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution. Consequently, they instructed the Council to draft a list of these issues and to study how a useful process of negotiation could best be initiated, in due course, and to draw up a report for the next meeting of Ministers. It is clear that any negotiations must be well prepared in advance, and that all governments whose participation would be necessary to achieve a political settlement in Europe should take part.

6. The Allies will also pursue their efforts and studies in the field of disarmament and practical arms control, including balanced force reductions and the initiatives already undertaken for the renunciation of the use of force.

7. The political solidarity of the Alliance constitutes an essential element while approaching a period of expanding East-West contacts and possible negotiations. This solidarity can best be maintained by strict adherence to the principle of full consultation in the Council both before and during any negotiations that might affect the interests of the Alliance or any of its members. On this understanding, the Allied Governments welcome the intention of the United States to engage the USSR in discussion of limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms.

8. The Allies participating in the NATO integrated defence programme agreed that it was extremely important that during an era of negotiation the defence posture of the Alliance should not be relaxed and that premature expectations of solutions to outstanding questions should not be generated. The maintenance of effective defence is a stabilizing factor and a necessary condition for effective détente policies.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 28, 1969, pp. 354-356.

¹For text of a final communiqué and attachment issued at Reykjavik on June 25, 1968, see BULLETIN of July 15, 1968, p. 75.

²For text of a final communiqué issued at Brussels on Nov. 16, 1968, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1968, p. 596.

8. Accordingly these members of the Alliance reaffirmed their continuing determination to make appropriate contributions to joint efforts for defence and deterrence at all levels both nuclear and conventional. They accepted the continuing need for the current NATO strategy based on a forward defence and appropriate response to any aggression, and for a credible conventional and nuclear deterrent including adequate overall and local force levels. The necessary military posture of the Alliance consists of the strategic nuclear deterrent forces, the presence of sufficient substantial and effective North American and European conventional forces as well as supporting tactical nuclear forces in the European area and adequate ready reinforcements.

10. Defence Ministers will meet on 28th May, 1960 and will examine the more specific elements in the defence posture necessary to fulfil the above requirements. They will also examine the possibility of improving the efficiency of the defence effort by intensifying mutual and co-operative approaches to, for example, the problems of arms production and arms standardisation either among all Allied nations or between some of them.

11. Reviewing the situation in Berlin, the Ministers noted that obstacles have recently been placed on freedom of access to Berlin. Such obstructions cannot be accepted. The Ministers supported the determination of the Three Powers to maintain free access to the city, and recalled the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 16th December, 1958,¹ and the responsibilities which each member State assumed with regard to the security and welfare of Berlin.

12. The Ministers consider that the achievement of a peaceful European settlement presupposes, among other things, progress towards eliminating existing sources of tension in the centre of Europe. They consider that concrete measures aimed at improving the situation in Berlin, safeguarding free access to the city, and removing restrictions which affect traffic and communications between the two parts of Germany would be a substantial contribution toward this objective. They expressed their support for continued efforts by the Three Powers to explore, in the framework of their special responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole, possibilities for ordered and negotiated progress in these important questions.

13. A peaceful solution must be found for the German question based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security.

14. The members of the Alliance are conscious that they share common environmental problems which, unless squarely faced, could imperil the welfare and progress of their societies. The Ministers recognize that important work on these problems is already being carried out within other international organizations. The Ministers instructed the Council in Permanent Session to examine how to improve, in every practical way, the exchange of views and experience among the Allied countries, whether by action in the appropriate international organizations or otherwise, in the task of creating a better environment for their societies.

15. While concerned with these problems, Ministers are also mindful that the Allied countries are entering an era in which scientific, technical and economic resources should contribute to the peaceful progress and development of all nations.

16. Apart from regular meetings at Ministerial level, Ministers agreed that the Council in Permanent Session should consider the proposal that high officials of their Foreign Ministries meet periodically for a review of major, long-range problems before the Alliance.

17. The next Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in December 1960.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of JAN. 8, 1960, p. 4.

Note From the Government of Finland to the Governments of All European Countries, the United States, and Canada, Helsinki, May 6, 1969

The Government of the Soviet Union approached recently the Governments of European countries in the matter of the arrangement of a European security conference and of its preparations. This proposal concerning a special preparatory meeting was extended to the Government of Finland on April 8, 1969.

The Government of Finland has on several occasions stated that Finland considers a well prepared conference on European security problems useful. The Government of Finland considers well-founded the view of the Soviet Union that such a conference should be convened without any preliminary conditions. The participants should have the right to present their views and to make their proposals on European questions.

Furthermore, the Government of Finland is of the opinion that all Governments concerned should participate in such a conference. This opinion was expressed, e.g., in the Finnish-Soviet Communiqué in June 1966 on the occasion of the visit to Finland of the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. N. Kossygin.¹ At the Foreign Ministers' meeting of Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, held in Copenhagen on April 23 and 24, 1969, a joint position was defined according to which "preconditions for conferences on security problems are that they should be well prepared, that they should be timed so as to offer prospects of positive results, and that all states, whose participation is necessary for achieving a solution to European security problems, should be given opportunities to take part in the discussions."

The Government of Finland is, consequently, favourably disposed to the convening of a conference on European security problems. The success of such a conference requires careful preparations in advance. This is necessary to assure both a sufficiently representative participation and the technical arrangement of the conference. Considering the great importance of European security problems the prerequisites for success of the conference should be guaranteed as well as possible. The Government of Finland considers that the preparations for the conference should begin through consultations between the Governments concerned and, after the necessary conditions exist, a preparatory meeting for consideration of the questions connected with the arrangement of the conference could be convened.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 197-198.

Finland has good relations with all the countries which are concerned with European security and her impartial attitude towards the most vital problem of European security, the German question, has been appreciated by different interested parties. This is why the Government of Finland is willing to act as the host for the security conference as well as for the preparatory meeting provided that the Governments concerned consider this as appropriate.

The Government of Finland will send this memorandum to the Governments of all European states, to those of East and West Germany and to the Governments of the United States of America and Canada and will instruct her representatives to sound the position of these countries on the European security conference and to consult them on questions connected with the preparations of such a conference.

In view of this, the Government of Finland will closely follow this matter and consider what real possibilities it may have in order to take new measures on its part.

Communiqué and Declaration of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Brussels, December 5, 1969

[Extracts]

The North Atlantic Council held its regular ministerial meeting at Brussels December 4-5. Following are texts of the final communiqué and declaration issued at the close of the meeting on December 5.

Press release 879 dated December 6

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session at Brussels on 4th and 5th December, 1969. The meeting was attended by Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers.

2. Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty twenty years ago, the members of the Alliance have dedicated their efforts to the preservation of their freedom and security and to the improvement of East-West relations in the aim of reaching an ultimate peaceful solution of outstanding problems in Europe. They will continue to do so.

3. By approving in December 1967 the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance,¹ the Allied Governments resolved to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur; and to examine suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security.

4. On the basis of these two concepts of defence and the relaxation of tensions, the Ministers issued the Declaration attached to this Communiqué in which they set forth their views on the future development of relations between Eastern and Western countries.

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Source: Department of State Bulletin, December 29, 1969, p. 627.

TEXT OF DECLARATION

1. Meeting at Brussels on 4th and 5th December, 1969, the Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed the commitment of their nations to pursue effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions in their continuing search for a just and durable peace.

2. Peace and security in Europe must rest upon universal respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and the territorial integrity of each European state; the right of its peoples to shape their own destinies; the peaceful settlement of disputes; nonintervention in the internal affairs of any state by any other state, whatever their political or social system; and the renunciation of the use of the threat of force against any state. Past experience has shown that there is, as yet, no common interpretation of these principles. The fundamental problems in Europe can be solved only on the basis of these principles and any real and lasting improvement of East-West relations presupposes respect for them without any conditions or reservations.

3. At their meeting in Washington in April 1969, Ministers had expressed the intention of their governments to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution. To this end, the Council has been engaged in a detailed study of various issues for exploration and possible negotiation. Ministers recognised that procedure merited closer examination and, accordingly, requested the Council in Permanent Session to report to the next Ministerial Meeting.

4. Ministers considered that, in an era of negotiation, it should be possible, by means of discussion of specific and well-defined subjects, progressively to reduce tensions. This would in itself facilitate discussion of the more fundamental questions.

Arms Control and Disarmament

5. Ministers again expressed the interest of the Alliance in arms control and disarmament and recalled the Declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions adopted at Reykjavik in 1966 and reaffirmed in Washington in 1969.¹ The Members of the Alliance have noted that up to now this suggestion has led to no result. The Allies, nevertheless, have continued, and will continue, their studies in order to prepare a realistic basis for active exploration at an early date and thereby establish whether it could serve as a starting point for fruitful negotiations. They requested that a report of the Council in Permanent Session on the preparation of models for mutual and balanced force reductions be submitted as soon as possible.

6. Ministers of countries participating in NATO's integrated defence programme consider that the studies on mutual and balanced force reductions have progressed sufficiently to permit the establishment of certain criteria which, in their view, such reductions should meet. Significant reductions under adequate verification and control would be envisaged under any agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions, which should also be consistent with the vital security interests of all parties. This would be another concrete step in advancing "along the road of ending the arms race and of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament".

7. These Ministers directed that further studies should be given to measures which could accompany or follow agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions. Such measures could include advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres and possibly the establishment of observation posts. Examination of the techniques and methods of inspection should also be further developed.

Germany and Berlin

8. The Ministers welcome the efforts of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, in the framework of their special responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole, to gain the co-operation of the Soviet Union in improving the situation with respect to Berlin and free access to the city. The elimination of difficulties created in the past with respect to Berlin, especially with regard to access, would increase the prospects for serious discussions on the other concrete issues which continue to divide East and West. Furthermore, Berlin could play a constructive rôle in the expansion of East-West economic relations if the city's trade with the East could be facilitated.

9. A just and lasting peace settlement for Germany must be based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security. The Ministers are convinced that, pending such a settlement, the proposals of the Federal Republic for a *modus vivendi* between the two parts of Germany and for a bilateral exchange of declarations on the non-use of force or the threat of force would, if they receive a positive response, substantially facilitate co-operation between East and West on other problems. They consider that these efforts by the Federal Republic represent constructive steps toward relaxation of tension in Europe and express the hope that the governments will therefore take them into account in forming their own attitude toward the German question.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 15, 1966, p. 77, and Apr. 28, 1969, p. 355.

10. The Ministers would regard concrete progress in both these fields as an important contribution to peace in Europe. They are bound to attach great weight to the responses to these proposals in evaluating the prospects for negotiations looking toward improved relations and co-operation in Europe.

Economic, technical and cultural exchanges

11. Allied governments consider that not only economic and technical but also cultural exchanges between interested countries can bring mutual benefit and understanding. In these fields more could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas and information between the countries of East and West.

12. The benefit of the Alliance's work in the field of human environment would be enhanced if it were to become the basis of broader co-operation. This could, and should, be an early objective, being one in which the Warsaw Pact governments have indicated an interest. Further co-operation could also be undertaken, for example, in the more specialised field of oceanography. More intensive efforts in such fields should be pursued either bilaterally, multilaterally or in the framework of existing international bodies comprising interested countries.

Perspectives for negotiations

13. The Ministers considered that the concrete issues concerning European security and co-operation mentioned in this Declaration are subjects lending themselves to possible discussions or negotiations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. The Allied governments will continue and intensify their contacts, discussions or negotiations through all appropriate channels, bilateral or multilateral, believing that progress is most likely to be achieved by choosing in each instance the means most suitable for the

subject. Ministers therefore expressed their support for bilateral initiatives undertaken by the German Federal Government with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe, looking toward agreements on the renunciation of force and the threat of force. Ministers expressed the hope that existing contacts will be developed so as to enable all countries concerned to participate in discussions and negotiations on substantial problems of co-operation and security in Europe with real prospects of success.

14. The Members of the Alliance remain receptive to signs of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to discuss measures to reduce tension and promote co-operation in Europe and to take constructive actions to this end. They have noted in this connection references made by these countries to the possibility of holding an early conference on European security. Ministers agreed that careful advance preparation and prospects of concrete results would in any case be essential. Ministers consider that, as part of a comprehensive approach, progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already begun, or could begin shortly, and which relate to fundamental problems of European security, would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe. Progress in these discussions and negotiations would help to ensure the success of any eventual conference in which, of course, the North American members of the Alliance would participate, to discuss and negotiate substantial problems of co-operation and security in Europe.

15. The Ministers affirmed that, in considering all constructive possibilities, including a general conference or conferences, they will wish to assure that any such meeting should not serve to ratify the present division of Europe and should be the result of a common effort among all interested countries to tackle the problems which separate them.

Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, Signed at Moscow, August 12, 1970

***Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, Signed at Moscow, August 12, 1970*¹**

The High Contracting Parties

Anxious to contribute to strengthening peace and security in Europe and the world,

Convinced that peaceful cooperation among States on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations complies with the ardent desire of nations and the general interests of international peace,

Appreciating the fact that the agreed measures previously implemented by them, in particular the conclusion of the Agreement of 13 September 1955 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations,² have created favourable conditions for new important steps destined to develop further and to strengthen their mutual relations,

Desiring to lend expression, in the form of a treaty, to their determination to improve and extend co-operation between them, including economic relations as well as scientific, technological and cultural contacts, in the interest of both States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consider it an important objective of their policies to maintain international peace and achieve détente.

They affirm their endeavour to further the normalization of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations among all European States, and in so doing proceed from the actual situation existing in this region.

ARTICLE 2

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall in their mutual relations as well as in matters of ensuring European and international security be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly they shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force, pursuant to Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, in any matters affecting security in Europe or international security, as well as in their mutual relations.

Source: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 1103-1105.

¹ German Federal Press and Information Office *Bulletin*, August 13, 1970 (unofficial translation from the German text). Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel signed the treaty on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman Kossygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko signed on behalf of the Soviet Union. Earlier, on August 7, 1970, Scheel and Gromyko had initialed the treaty at Moscow.

² *Ibid.* under date of September 13, 1955.

ARTICLE 3

In accordance with the foregoing purposes and principles the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics share the realization that peace can only be maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs the present frontiers.

—They undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all States in Europe within their present frontiers;

—They declare that they have no territorial claims against anybody nor will assert such claims in the future;

—They regard today and shall in future regard the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of the present Treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

ARTICLE 4

The present Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not affect any bilateral or multilateral treaties or arrangements previously concluded by them.

ARTICLE 5

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification which shall take place in Bonn.

Done at Moscow on 12 August 1970 in two originals, each in the German and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

**Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland,
Signed at Warsaw, December 7, 1970**

***Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland Concerning the Basis for Normalizing Their Mutual Relations, Signed at Warsaw, December 7, 1970*¹**

**THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
POLAND**

Considering that more than 25 years have passed since the end of the Second World War of which Poland became the first victim and which inflicted great suffering on the nations of Europe,

Conscious that in both countries a new generation has meanwhile grown up to whom a peaceful future should be secured,

Desiring to establish durable foundations for peaceful coexistence and the development of normal and good relations between them,

Anxious to strengthen peace and security in Europe,

Aware that the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in Europe within their present frontiers are a basic condition for peace,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland state that in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line the course of which is laid down in Chapter IX of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 2 August 1945² as running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, shall constitute the western State frontier of the People's Republic of Poland.

(2) They reaffirm the inviolability of their existing frontiers now and in the future and undertake to respect each other's territorial integrity without restriction.

(3) They declare that they have no territorial claims whatsoever against each other and that they will not assert such claims in the future.

Source: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 1125-1127.

¹ German Federal Press and Information Office *Bulletin*, November 24, 1970.

² For the relevant section of the Communiqué of the Potsdam Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, vol. II, p. 1509. For identical language appearing in Chapter VIII of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference, see *acta* under date of August 1, 1945.

ARTICLE II

(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland shall in their mutual relations as well as in matters of ensuring European and international security be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) Accordingly they shall, pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, settle all their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from any threat or use of force in matters affecting European and international security and in their mutual relations.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland shall take further steps towards full normalization and a comprehensive development of their mutual relations of which the present Treaty shall form the solid foundation.

(2) They agree that a broadening of their co-operation in the sphere of economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other relations is in their mutual interest.

ARTICLE IV

The present Treaty shall not affect any bilateral or multilateral international arrangements previously concluded by either Contracting Party or concerning them.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification which shall take place in Bonn.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Warsaw on _____ * in two originals, each in the German and Polish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND.

* The treaty was signed on December 7, 1970, at Warsaw by Chancellor Willy Brandt and Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany and by Chairman of the Council Foreign Ministers Józef Cyrankiewicz and Foreign Minister Stefan Jędrzejowski of the People's Republic of Poland. The two Foreign Ministers had initialed the treaty, also at Warsaw, on November 18, 1970.

Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, Washington, February 25, 1971

[Extract]

.....

EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE

Security in Europe depends on more than NATO's military strength. The close ties of friendship in the West and the stability of the military balance set the stage for renewed effort at a broader reconciliation.

East-West conflict in Europe springs from historical and objective causes, not transient moods or personal misunderstandings. For 25 years Europe has been divided by opposing national interests and contrary philosophies, which clash over specific issues: the military confrontation of opposing coalitions, the division of Germany, the situation in and around Berlin, the nature of relations between Western and Eastern countries and institutions, and the barriers to travel and cultural and intellectual intercourse.

These issues will not be quickly resolved. To relax tensions means a patient and persistent effort to deal with specific sources and not only with their manifestations. The West will be conciliatory on substance, but we are determined to deal with substance and not simply with atmosphere.

We in the West are convinced by the history of the postwar period that a détente that does not apply equally to Eastern and Western Europe will be inherently unstable. In our view, détente means negotiating the concrete conditions of mutual security that will allow for expanded intra-European contact and cooperation without jeopardizing the security of any country. Soviet policies and

doctrines, however, too often interpret détente in terms of Western ratification of the status quo and acknowledgment of continuing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Beyond this, Soviet policy has been tempted to offer a relaxation of tension selectively to some allies but not to others, and only on limited issues of primary interest to the USSR. In view of this fundamental difference, a major question for the Alliance to face is whether we can overcome the East-West stalemate while maintaining unity among ourselves and avoiding internal divisions in our countries.

A Western Consensus. In the postwar period, East-West relations were almost an exclusive preserve of Soviet and American policies and negotiations, just as the major European crises of this period were predominantly Soviet-American confrontations.

Today, our Western European allies are properly anxious to make their own contribution to East-West negotiations. They will increasingly assert their own judgment and interests in doing so. A wide variety of contacts and negotiations are proceeding today, involving different participants in different forums on several issues:

- The United States is negotiating with the USSR in SALT.
- The United States, the Soviet Union, the UK and France are holding Four Power talks at the UN on the Middle East.
- The same four powers are negotiating in Europe on Berlin.
- The Federal Republic of Germany has negotiated new treaties with the USSR and Poland, and may soon open talks with Czechoslovakia. For the first time the Chancellor of the

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 229-241.

Federal Republic has met with the East German Premier.

- France reached agreement with the USSR in 1970 for periodic consultation on major world issues.
- NATO allies have conversed bilaterally with Warsaw Pact countries on a Conference on European Security, as well as on the question of mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

At issue are major national questions (such as the relationship between East and West Germany), basic regional problems (such as mutual force reductions), and the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Whatever the issue, however, its resolution will engage the interests of NATO and Europe as a whole.

Obviously, the Western countries do not have identical national concerns and cannot be expected to agree automatically on priorities or solutions. Each ally is the best judge of its own national interest. But our principal objective should be to harmonize our policies and insure that our efforts for détente are complementary. A differentiated détente, limited to the USSR and certain Western allies but not others, would be illusory. It would cause strains among allies. It would turn the desire for détente into an instrument of political warfare. Far from contributing to reconciliation in Europe, it would postpone it indefinitely.

Today's pursuit of détente is taking place simultaneously with efforts to strengthen the economic and political solidarity of Western Europe. The West cannot afford to allow the momentum of individual approaches to the East to put allies inadvertently in the painful position of having to choose between their national

concerns and their European responsibilities.

East-West détente and Western cohesion can be mutually supporting, if the Alliance consults thoughtfully to strike a balance between individual and common interests. The United States applies such a code of consultation to itself; we have been scrupulous to maintain a dialogue with our allies on the issues and developments in SALT; in turn, our allies have worked in consultation with us on major East-West issues. It is crucial that this continue.

Our urgent task in the coming year is to achieve an understanding within the Alliance on our analysis of the sources of East-West tensions, on our respective roles in dealing with them through individual and collective diplomacy, and on our evaluation of future trends. I pledge the United States to an intensive effort of Allied consultation on these questions in 1971, at the highest level and in bilateral channels and multilateral forums.

The Major Issues: We must translate our consensus on objectives into specific policies.

Allied efforts toward *mutual force reductions* in Europe will continue in the coming year. Reducing the military confrontation in Europe is in the common interest of East and West. Our mutual objective should be to create a more stable military balance at lower levels and lower costs.

The problem of defining a fair agreement in precise terms is extremely complex. As in the preparations for SALT, I instructed our Government to develop the analytical building blocks of an agreement and evaluate them in differing combinations, as our contribution to the Al-

liance's collective deliberations. Our technical analysis is described in the Arms Control chapter of this report.

The USSR has frequently proposed a general *Conference on European Security*. But such a conference, in the Soviet formulation, would not address the main security issues—the German question, Berlin, mutual force reductions—but only very general themes. We and our allies are prepared to negotiate with the East in any forum. But we see little value in a conference whose agenda would be unlikely to yield progress on concrete issues, but would only deflect our energies to drafting statements and declarations the interpretation of which would inevitably be a continuing source of disagreements. Once a political basis for improving relations is created through specific negotiations already in process, a general conference might build on it to discuss other intra-European issues and forms of co-operation.

Any lasting relaxation of tension in Europe must include progress in resolving the issues related to the division of Germany.

The German national question is basically one for the German people. It is only natural that the government of the Federal Republic should assign it high priority. But as Chancellor Brandt has emphasized, it is the strength of the Western coalition and West Germany's secure place in it that have enabled his government to take initiatives which mark a new stage in the evolution of the German question. The reshaping of German relations with the East inevitably affects the interests of all European states, as well as the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, there has been full consultation within the Alliance during the evolution of the Federal Republic's new policies and the negotiation of its new treaties with the USSR and Poland. It is clearly established that Allied responsibilities and rights are not affected by the terms of these treaties. I emphasized in my talks with Chancellor Brandt in Washington and in intensive Allied consultation in 1970 that we support West Germany's objective of normalizing relations with its eastern neighbors, and that we view its anguish at the unnatural division of the German nation with profound compassion.

New policies and their effects in Central Europe will create new conditions and raise new issues—but none that cannot be dealt with in continuing close consultation with the Federal Republic and within the Alliance.

With the encouragement of the Federal Republic, the U.S., UK and France in August 1969 invited the USSR to discuss Berlin. Four Power ambassadorial discussions started in March 1970. The history of the postwar period demonstrates the complexity and importance of this issue.

The Western objectives are the assurance of unhindered traffic to and from Berlin, Soviet acknowledgment of the existing and entirely legitimate ties between Berlin and Bonn, and improved communications and travel in and around Berlin. An effective Four Power agreement on Berlin will have to encompass arrangements worked out between East and West Germany on technical details. We recognize that new access procedures to Berlin will not necessarily prevent administrative harassment; this will depend as

much on Communist willingness to remove Berlin as a cause of friction as on the specific terms of agreement.

Thus what began essentially as a discussion of practical improvements to assure Berlin's viability has assumed greater significance in East-West relations. To the West German Government, the eastern treaties and a Berlin settlement are parts of the whole complex of Germany's future, and therefore it has conditioned the ratification of the treaties upon a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin talks. To the Western allies, progress on Berlin will be an indicator of the possibilities of moving toward fruitful talks on broader issues of European security.

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Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Lisbon, June 4, 1971

[Extract]

The North Atlantic Council held its regular ministerial meeting at Lisbon, Portugal, June 3-4. Following is the text of the final communiqué issued at the close of the meeting on June 4.

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Lisbon on 3rd and 4th June, 1971.

2. The continuing political aim of the Atlantic Alliance is to seek peace through initiatives designed to relax tensions and to establish a just and durable peaceful order in Europe, accompanied by effective security guarantees. The Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe and to the security of all its members.

3. Ministers reviewed the international situation, concentrating their attention on Europe and the Mediterranean.

4. They assessed the state of progress of the several initiatives which allied countries had undertaken within the framework of the established policy of the Alliance to intensify contacts, explorations and negotiations with members of the Warsaw Pact and other European states. The purpose of all these initiatives is to seek just solutions to the fundamental problems of European security and thus to achieve a genuine improvement of East-West relations. They noted with satisfaction the results obtained and expressed the hope that the continuation of these efforts would lead to further progress helping the development of détente. The allies have consulted and will continue to consult closely on these diplomatic activities.

5. Ministers welcomed the continued negotiations between the US and the USSR with the aim of placing limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. They noted the useful

discussions held in the North Atlantic Council on this subject. Ministers also welcomed the agreement between the US and the USSR announced on 20th May, regarding the framework for further negotiations,¹ and expressed the sincere hope that it would facilitate discussions leading to the early achievement of concrete results enhancing the common security interests of the North Atlantic Alliance and stability in the world.

6. In reviewing the Berlin question, Ministers underlined the necessity of alleviating the causes of insecurity in and around the city. During the past quarter of a century, much of the tension which has characterized East-West relations in Europe has stemmed from the situation in and around Berlin. Thus, the Ministers would regard the successful outcome of the Berlin talks as an encouraging indication of the willingness of the Soviet Union to join in the efforts of the Alliance to achieve a meaningful and lasting improvement of East-West relations in Europe.

7. Ministers therefore reaffirmed their full support for the efforts of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to reach an agreement on Berlin. They shared the view of the three Governments that the aim of the negotiations should be to achieve specific improvements based on firm commitments without prejudice to the status of Berlin. In this context, they emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on unhindered movement of persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and Western sectors of Berlin, on improved opportunities for movement by residents of the Western sectors, and on

Source: Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1971, pp. 819-821.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 7, 1971, p. 741.

respect for the relationship between the Western sectors and the Federal Republic as it has developed with the approval of the three Governments.

8. Ministers were of the view that progress in the talks between German Authorities on a *modus vivendi*, taking into account the special situation in Germany, would be an important contribution to a relaxation of tension in Europe.

9. Ministers, having reviewed the prospects for the establishment of multilateral contacts relating to the essential problems of security and co-operation in Europe, again emphasized the importance they attach to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Berlin. They noted with satisfaction that these negotiations have entered into a more active phase and have enabled progress to be registered in recent weeks. They hope that before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe may then be undertaken. In this spirit they invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue, in the framework of its normal consultations on the international situation, its periodic review of the results achieved in all contacts and talks relative to security and co-operation in Europe so that it could without delay take a position on the opening of multilateral talks.

10. In anticipation of these multilateral contacts, the Council in Permanent Session actively pursued preparations for discussions on the substance and procedures of possible East-West negotiations, and submitted a report to this effect to Ministers. The report stressed that the successful outcome of such negotiations would have to be founded on universal respect for the principles governing relations between states as cited by Ministers in previous Communiqués and Declarations. The various prospects for developing co-operation between East and West in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental fields were closely examined. The report also reviewed in detail the essential elements on which agreement would be desirable in order to promote the freer movement of people, ideas and information so necessary to the devel-

opment of international co-operation in all fields.

11. Ministers noted these studies and instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue them pending the initiation of multilateral contacts between East and West. Ministers stressed that they would press on with their bilateral exploratory conversations with all interested states.

12. Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Council in Permanent Session. While welcoming the efforts currently undertaken to re-establish peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, they observed that developments in the area as a whole continue to give cause for concern. In the light of the conclusions of this report, they instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue consultations on this situation and to report thereon at their next meeting.

13. The allied Governments which issued the declarations at Reykjavik in 1968 and Rome in 1970 and which subscribed to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Brussels Communiqué of 1970 have consistently urged the Soviet Union and other European countries to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions [MBFR].^{*} They reaffirmed that the reduction of the military confrontation in Europe—at which MBFR is aiming—is essential for increased security and stability.

14. Against this background, Ministers representing these Governments welcomed the response of Soviet leaders indicating possible readiness to consider reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. These Soviet reactions, which require further clarification, are, together with those states, receiving the closest attention of the Alliance.

15. In an effort to determine whether common ground exists on which to base negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, these Ministers expressed the agreement of their Governments to continue and intensify explorations with the Soviet Union and also with other interested Governments on the basis of the considerations outlined in paragraph 3 of the Rome

^{*} For texts of the declarations, see BULLETIN of July 15, 1968, p. 77, and June 22, 1970, p. 773; for text of the communiqué, see BULLETIN of Jan. 4, 1971, p. 2.

Declaration.* They expressed their intention to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations. To this end these Ministers agreed that Deputy Foreign Ministers or High Officials should meet at Brussels at an early date to review the results of the exploratory contacts and to consult on substantive and procedural approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions.

16. These Ministers further announced their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives, who would be responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and the other interested Governments and eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

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* Paragraph 3 of the Rome Declaration reads as follows:

"3. Ministers invite interested states to hold exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, with special reference to the Central region. They agree that in such talks the allies would put forward the following considerations:

(a) Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the Alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations.

(b) Reductions should be on a basis of reciprocity, and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing.

(c) Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned.

(d) There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions." (Footnote in original.)

Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Signed at Berlin,
September 3, 1971

*Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Signed at Berlin, September 3,
1971*

The Governments of the United States of America, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Represented by their Ambassadors, who held a series of meetings in the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American Sector of Berlin,

Acting on the basis of their quadripartite rights and responsibilities, and of the corresponding wartime and postwar agreements and decisions of the Four Powers, which are not affected,

Taking into account the existing situation in the relevant area, Guided by the desire to contribute to practical improvements of the situation,

Without prejudice to their legal positions,
Have agreed on the following:

PART I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The four Governments will strive to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in the relevant area.
2. The four Governments, taking into account their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, agree that there shall be no use or threat of force in the area and that disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means.
3. The four Governments will mutually respect their individual and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged.
4. The four Governments agree that, irrespective of the differences in legal views, the situation which has developed in the area, and as it is defined in this Agreement as well as in the other agreements referred to in this Agreement, shall not be changed unilaterally.

Source: Documents on Germany: 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 1135-1143.

PART II

PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN

A. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment.

Detailed arrangements concerning this civilian traffic, as set forth in Annex I, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

B. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declare that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it.

Detailed arrangements concerning the relationship between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are set forth in Annex II.

C. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these Sectors will be improved. Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas.

The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

Detailed arrangements concerning travel, communications and the exchange of territory, as set forth in Annex III, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

D. Representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and consular activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Western Sectors of Berlin can be exercised as set forth in Annex IV.

PART III

FINAL PROVISIONS

This Quadripartite Agreement will enter into force on the date specified in a Final Quadripartite Protocol to be concluded when the measures envisaged in Part II of this Quadripartite Agreement and in its Annexes have been agreed.

DONE at the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American Sector of Berlin this 3rd day of September 1971, in four originals, each in the English, French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

KENNETH RUSH.

For the Government of the French Republic:

JEAN SAUVAGNARGUES.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

PYOTE A. ABRASIMOV.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

ROGER JACKLING.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH RE-
PUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMER-
ICA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(A) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1. Transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be facilitated and unimpeded. It will receive the most simple, expeditious and preferential treatment provided by international practice.

2. Accordingly,

(a) Conveyances sealed before departure may be used for the transport of civilian goods by road, rail and waterways between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of seals and accompanying documents.

(b) With regard to conveyances which cannot be sealed, such as open trucks, inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of accompanying documents. In special cases where there is sufficient reason to suspect that unsealed conveyances contain either material intended for dissemination along the designated routes or persons or material put on board along these routes, the content of unsealed conveyances may be inspected. Procedures for dealing with such cases will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

(c) Through trains and buses may be used for travel between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will not include any formalities other than identification of persons.

(d) Persons identified as through travellers using individual vehicles between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany on routes designated for through traffic will be able to proceed to their destinations without paying individual tolls and fees for the use of the transit routes. Procedures applied for such travellers shall not involve delay. The travellers, their vehicles and personal baggage will not be subject to search, detention or exclusion from use of the designated routes, except in special cases, as may be agreed by the competent German authorities, where there is sufficient reason to suspect that misuse of the transit routes is intended for purposes not related to direct travel to and from the Western Sectors of Berlin and contrary to generally applicable regulations concerning public order.

(e) Appropriate compensation for fees and tolls and for other costs related to traffic on the communication routes between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, including the maintenance of adequate routes, facilities and installations used for such traffic, may be made in the form of an annual lump sum paid to the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

Annex II

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II(B) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honor to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

1. They declare, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it. The provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Constitution operative in the Western Sectors of Berlin which contradict the above have been suspended and continue not to be in effect.

2. The Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundesversammlung, the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, including their Committees and Fraktionen; as well as other state bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany will not perform in the Western Sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which contradict the provisions of paragraph 1.

3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will be represented in the Western Sectors of Berlin to the authorities of the three Governments and to the Senat by a permanent liaison agency.

Annex III

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(C) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honor to inform the Govern-

ments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1. Communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these Sectors will be improved.

2. Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas. In order to facilitate visits and travel, as described above, by permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin, additional crossing points will be opened.

3. The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

4. Telephonic, telegraphic, transport and other external communications of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be expanded.

5. Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

Annex IV

A. COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II (D) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honor to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

1. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organizations and in relations with other countries.

2. Without prejudice to the above and provided that matters of security and status are not affected, they have agreed that:

(a) The Federal Republic of Germany may perform consular services for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin.

(b) In accordance with established procedures, international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany may be extended to the Western Sectors of

Berlin provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case.

(c) The Federal Republic of Germany may represent the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin in international organizations and international conferences.

(d) Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin may participate jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany in international exchanges and exhibitions. Meetings of international organizations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation may be held in the Western Sectors of Berlin. Invitations will be issued by the Senat or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat.

3. The three Governments authorize the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments in accordance with the usual procedures applied in those Sectors, for the purpose of performing consular services, subject to provisions set forth in a separate document of this date.

B. COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(D) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and to the communication of the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with regard to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organizations and in relations with other countries.

2. Provided that matters of security and status are not affected, for its part it will raise no objection to:

(a) the performance by the Federal Republic of Germany of consular services for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin;

(b) in accordance with established procedures, the extension to the Western Sectors of Berlin of international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case;

(c) the representation of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany in international organizations and international conferences;

(d) the participation jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany of permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin in international exchanges and exhibitions, or the holding in those Sectors of meetings of international organizations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation, taking into account that invitations will be issued by the Senat or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat.

3. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments have given their consent to the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin. It will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments, for purposes and subject to provisions described in their communication and as set forth in a separate document of this date.

Agreed Minute I²

It is understood that permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin shall, in order to receive at appropriate Soviet offices visas for entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, present:

(a) a passport stamped "Issued in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971";

(b) an identity card or other appropriately drawn up document confirming that the person requesting the visa is a permanent resident of the Western Sectors of Berlin and containing the bearer's full address and a personal photograph.

During his stay in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a permanent resident of the Western Sectors of Berlin who has received a visa in this way may carry both documents or either of them, as he chooses. The visa issued by a Soviet office will serve as the basis for entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the passport or identity card will serve as the basis for consular services in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement during the stay of that person in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above-mentioned stamp will appear in all passports used by permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin for journeys to such countries as may require it.

Agreed Minute II³

Provision is hereby made for the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin. It is understood that the details concerning this Consulate General will include the following. The Consulate General will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments in accord-

² Initialed by the four Ambassadors on September 3. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ Initialed by the four Ambassadors on September 3. [Footnote in the source text.]

ance with the usual procedures applying in those Sectors. Applicable Allied and German legislation and regulations will apply to the Consulate General. The activities of the Consulate General will be of a consular character and will not include political functions or any matters related to quadripartite rights or responsibilities.

The three Governments are willing to authorize an increase in Soviet commercial activities in the Western Sectors of Berlin as described below. It is understood that pertinent Allied and German legislation and regulations will apply to these activities. This authorization will be extended indefinitely, subject to compliance with the provisions outlined herein. Adequate provision for consultation will be made. This increase will include establishment of an "Office of Soviet Foreign Trade Associations in the Western Sectors of Berlin", with commercial status, authorized to buy and sell on behalf of foreign trade associations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Soyuzpushnina, Prodintorg and Novoeexport may each establish a bonded warehouse in the Western Sectors of Berlin to provide storage and display for their goods. The activities of the Intourist office in the British Sector of Berlin may be expanded to include the sale of tickets and vouchers for travel and tours in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other countries. An office of Aeroflot may be established for the sale of passenger tickets and air freight services.

The assignment of personnel to the Consulate General and to permitted Soviet commercial organizations will be subject to agreement with the appropriate authorities of the three Governments. The number of such personnel will not exceed twenty Soviet nationals in the Consulate General; twenty in the office of the Soviet Foreign Trade Associations; one each in the bonded warehouses; six in the Intourist office; and five in the Aeroflot office. The personnel of the Consulate General and of permitted Soviet commercial organizations and their dependents may reside in the Western Sectors of Berlin upon individual authorization.

The property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Lietzenburgerstrasse 11 and at Am Sandwerder 1 may be used for purposes to be agreed between appropriate representatives of the three Governments and of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Details of implementation of the measures above and a time schedule for carrying them out will be agreed between the four Ambassadors in the period between the signature of the Quadripartite Agreement and the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol envisaged in that Agreement.

Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Brussels, December 10, 1971

[Extract]

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 9th and 10th December, 1971. Foreign and Defence Ministers were present.

2. Ministers stressed that their governments would continue to pursue their long-standing objectives of achieving, through a genuine relaxation of tensions, a just and lasting peace and stability in Europe. They recalled that since the creation of the Alliance over twenty years ago the treaty area has been free of armed conflict and that under existing international conditions the North Atlantic Treaty remains indispensable for the security of member States.

3. Ministers examined the international situation and expressed their deep concern over the tragic events in Southern Asia. It is their fervent hope that hostilities between India and Pakistan will give way to an early and peaceful solution of all aspects of the conflict.

4. Turning to developments in and around Europe, including the Mediterranean, Ministers reviewed the status of the various initiatives undertaken or supported by the Allies and assessed the results of the numerous bilateral contacts between the Allies and other European states.

5. Ministers noted the effects which continuing difficulties in trade and monetary policy could have, among other things, on the state of the Alliance. They were encouraged by the various efforts underway in other fora to remedy these difficulties in the economic sphere. The Ministers decided to keep this matter under continuing review.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1972, pp. 1-5.

6. Ministers took note with satisfaction of the signature, on 3rd September, 1971, of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.¹ They also noted that the German arrangements to implement and supplement the Quadripartite Agreement now appear to be nearing completion, and that, once these arrangements have been concluded, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States would be prepared to sign forthwith the final Quadripartite Protocol which would bring the complete Berlin Agreement into effect. Ministers expressed the hope that this would soon be achieved.

7. Ministers viewed this emerging Agreement as an important and encouraging development. Once completed and in effect, the Agreement should bring about practical improvements, while maintaining the Quadripartite status of Berlin and the rights and responsibilities of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. Specifically, Ministers noted that movement of civilian persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin will then be unimpeded, and that the residents of the Western Sectors will be able to visit East Berlin and the GDR. Ministers also welcomed the assurance in the Quadripartite Agreement that the ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin will be maintained and developed.

8. Ministers considered that achievement of the Berlin Agreement would also demonstrate that, with a constructive attitude on all sides, it should be possible to reach reasonable solutions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic which take into account the special situation in Germany. Ministers took the view that this example would encourage progress on other problems in Europe.

9. Ministers recalled that at their meeting in Lisbon they declared their readiness to undertake multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as soon as the negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion.² In the light of the encouraging developments referred to above they affirmed their readiness to initiate such conversations on this basis as soon as possible.

10. In this perspective, they propose to intensify their preparations and their bilateral contacts with other interested parties.

11. Ministers also took note of the invitation of the Finnish Government to the effect that heads of mission of the countries concerned accredited in Helsinki should undertake multilateral conversations. They stated that their Governments appreciated this initiative and that they will keep in touch with the Finnish Government in order to consult on this matter.

12. Ministers considered that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should not serve to perpetuate the post-war division of Europe but rather should contribute to reconciliation and co-operation between the participating states by initiating a process of reducing the barriers that still exist. Therefore, Ministers reaffirmed that the Conference should address in a concrete manner the underlying causes of tension in Europe and the basic principles which should govern relations among states irrespective of political and social systems.

13. Ministers took note of the report of the Council in Permanent Session concerning a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This report examined four areas of discussion at such a conference: (A) Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States and certain military aspects of security; (B) Freer Movement of People, Information and Ideas,

¹ For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 27, 1971, p. 318.

² For text of a communique issued at Lisbon on June 4, 1971, see BULLETIN of June 28, 1971, p. 819.

and Cultural Relations; (C) Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, Applied Science and Technology, and Pure Science; and (D) Co-operation to Improve the Human Environment. Ministers requested the Council in Permanent Session to continue these studies with a view to facilitating a constructive discussion of these subjects at the negotiations.

14. Ministers representing countries which participate in the NATO integrated defence programme reaffirmed their long-standing belief that a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe which preserves the legitimate security interests of all concerned would maintain security and enhance stability in Europe, make an important contribution to the easing of tension and improve East-West relations generally.

15. These Ministers reviewed the developments with respect to mutual and balanced force reductions since their last meeting in Lisbon. They reaffirmed the decisions taken at the meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers and High Officials on 5th and 6th October, 1971, to propose exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and other interested governments and to charge Mr. Brosio [Manlio Brosio, former NATO Secretary General]

with this mission on the basis of a substantive mandate. They expressed their thanks to Mr. Brosio for accepting.

16. These Ministers noted with regret that the Soviet Government has so far failed to respond to the Allied initiative in this important area of East-West relations in which that Government had earlier expressed an interest. Noting statements by Soviet leaders to the effect that they hoped East-West talks on force reductions in Europe would begin as soon as possible, these Ministers hope that Mr. Brosio will soon be able to go to Moscow. The interested Allied Governments continue to believe that prior explorations of this question are essential in preparation for eventual multilateral negotiations.

17. These Ministers emphasized the importance they attach to measures which would reduce the dangers of military confrontation and thus enhance security in Europe. They noted that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should deal with these aspects in a suitable manner.

18. Ministers noted a report on further studies conducted within NATO on mutual and balanced force reductions since the Lisbon Meeting. They instructed the Permanent Representatives to continue this work.

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Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, Washington,
February 9, 1972

[Extract]

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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. When the Berlin accord comes into force with the signing of the final Four-Power protocol, this will unlock a diplomatic process. A Berlin agreement, in the view of the Western powers, is a prerequisite to any broader European negotiation: it could smooth the way toward possible accommodations on other European security issues, which are all affected by the Berlin situation; it would also imply a willingness on the Soviet side to reach concrete settlements.

A question now facing the West is the Soviet proposal of a conference of all European countries, plus the United States and Canada, to discuss security and cooperation in Europe.

If such a conference is carefully prepared and will address substantive issues, the United States favors it. It is in the long term interest of the Soviet Union, too, I believe, that a conference be used productively in this way and not be merely a forum for speeches and friendly atmosphere. It is essential that we have a clear picture of what issues a conference can address and what concrete contribution to security it can make.

We therefore intend to discuss the relevant issues of European security and co-

operation fully with our allies, and to develop coordinated Western positions. Then, if the Berlin accord has already been consummated, we will be prepared to move to multilateral exploratory talks with other prospective participants.

The conference as defined by the Warsaw Pact would address two subjects: a joint declaration against the use or threat of force, and an agreement to expand cooperation in scientific, cultural, and economic areas.

The mere atmosphere of detente, in our view, is insufficient—not only because this is not durable, but also because it is difficult to evaluate measures proposed in the name of so vague an objective. Moreover, general declarations open to major disputes over interpretation are of illusory benefit, and possibly even dangerous. It is not enough to agree on cooperation in the abstract. How will cooperation be implemented in practice? Will it include freer intercourse among the European peoples, East and West? How would a conference promote economic relations other than through existing institutions and means?

Real progress, in short, requires pursuing detente in ways that will make it real and lasting, even though this may take more time and more effort.

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Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 229-230.

DOCUMENT 21

Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union,
Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Moscow,
May 29, 1972

[Extracts]

White House press release (Moscow) dated May 29

By mutual agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the USSR President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

President Nixon and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR conducted talks on fundamental problems of American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

* * * * *

The discussions covered a wide range of questions of mutual interest and were frank and thorough. They defined more precisely those areas where there are prospects for developing greater cooperation between the two countries, as well as those areas where the positions of the two sides are different.

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Source: Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972,
pp. 899-902.

II. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Europe

In the course of the discussions on the international situation, both Sides took note of favorable developments in the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts.

They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.

Both Sides view the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin as a good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned, including the USA and the USSR. The two Sides believe that the implementation of that agreement in the near future, along with other steps, will further improve the European situation and contribute to the necessary trust among states.






Both Sides welcomed the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on August 12, 1970. They noted the significance of the provisions of this treaty as well as of other recent agreements in contributing to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine detente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The US and the USSR are in accord that multi-lateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay.

Both sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.

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Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Level, Bonn, May 31, 1972

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Bonn on 30th and 31st May, 1972.

2. Ministers reaffirmed that the purpose of the Alliance is to preserve the freedom and security of all its members. Defence and the relaxation of tension are inseparably linked. The solidarity of the Alliance is indispensable in this respect. Allied Governments seek an improvement in their relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and aim at a just and durable peace which would overcome the division of Germany and foster security in Europe.

3. Ministers noted progress in relations between Western and Eastern countries, increasing contacts between the leaders of these countries, and the conclusion of important agreements and arrangements. They welcomed these developments flowing from major initiatives undertaken by their governments, which had full and timely consultations on these subjects. Such consultations will continue.

4. Ministers welcomed the signing by the United States and the USSR of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the interim agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. They believe these two agreements limiting the strategic arms of the United States and the USSR will contribute to strategic stability, significantly strengthen international confidence, and reduce the danger of nuclear war. Ministers also welcomed the commitment by the United States and the USSR actively to continue negotiations on limiting strategic arms. They expressed the hope that these two agreements will be the beginning of a new and promising era of negotiations in the arms control field.

5. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the Treaty of 12th August, 1970, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and the Treaty of 7th December, 1970, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic are to enter into force in the near future. They reaffirmed their opinion that these treaties are important, both as contributions towards the relaxation of tension in Europe and as elements of the modus vivendi which the Federal Republic of Germany wishes to establish with its Eastern neighbours. Ministers welcomed the Declaration of 17th May, 1972, in which the Federal Republic of Germany confirmed its policy to this end and reaffirmed its loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance as the basis of its security and freedom. They noted that it re-

Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1972, pp. 21-22.

mains the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for circumstances of peace in Europe in which the German people, in free self-determination, can recover their unity; and that the existing treaties and agreements to which the Federal Republic of Germany is a party and the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected.

6. Ministers also welcomed the progress made since their last meeting in the talks between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. They regard the conclusion of the agreements and arrangements between the competent German Authorities, which supplement the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of 3rd September, 1971, as well as the signature of a Treaty on Questions of Traffic between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR, as important steps in the effort to improve the situation in Germany. They thus feel encouraged in the hope that, in further negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR, agreement might be reached on more comprehensive arrangements which would take into account the special situation in Germany.

7. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have arranged to sign the Final Protocol to the Quadripartite Agreement. The entry into force of the entire Berlin Agreement being thus assured, the Ministers hope that a new era can begin for Berlin, free of the tension that has marked its history for the past quarter century.

8. In the light of these favourable developments, Ministers agreed to enter into multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE]. They accepted with gratitude the proposal of the Finnish Government to act as host for such talks in Helsinki at the level of Heads of Mission under the conditions set out in its aide-memoire of 24th November, 1970. Accordingly, they decided to work out with other interested governments the necessary arrangements for beginning the multilateral preparatory talks.

9. Ministers stated that the aim of Allied Governments at the multilateral preparatory talks would be to ensure that their proposals were fully considered at a Conference and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results.

10. Prepared in this way, a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should constitute an important factor in the process of reducing tension. It should help to eliminate obstacles to closer relations and co-operation among the participants while maintaining the security of all. Allied governments look forward to a serious examination of the real problems at issue and to a Conference which would yield practical results.

11. Ministers considered that, in the interest of security, the examination at a CSCE of appropriate measures, including certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability would contribute to the process of reduc-

ing the dangers of military confrontation.

12. Ministers noted the Report of the Council in Permanent Session concerning a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Report examined the issues which might be included on the Agenda of a Conference as set forth in paragraph 13 of the Brussels Communiqué of 10th December, 1971, as well as the procedural questions relating to the convening of a Conference.¹ Ministers directed the Council in Permanent Session to develop further its substantive and procedural studies in preparation for a Conference.

13. Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO's Integrated Defence Programme recalled the offers to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions which they had made at Reykjavik in 1968, at Rome in 1970, and subsequently reaffirmed.²

14. These Ministers continue to aim at negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions and related measures. They believe that these negotiations should be conducted on a multilateral basis and be preceded by suitable explorations. They regretted that the Soviet Government has failed to respond to the Allied offer of October 1971, to enter into exploratory talks. They therefore now propose that multilateral explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

15. These Ministers noted the studies conducted since their last meeting on political, military and technical aspects of mutual and balanced force reductions. They instructed the Permanent Representatives to continue this work in preparation for eventual negotiations.

16. These Ministers stated that the present military balance of forces in Europe does not allow a unilateral relaxation of the defence efforts of the Allies. Unilateral force reductions would detract from the Alliance's efforts to achieve greater stability and détente and would jeopardise the prospects for mutual and balanced force reductions.

17. Ministers took note of a Report by the Council in Permanent Session on the situation in the Mediterranean. They expressed their concern regarding the factors of instability in the area which could endanger the security of the members of the Alliance. They instructed the Council in Permanent Session to follow closely the evolution of the situation and to report to them at their next meeting.

18. The next Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in December 1972.

19. Ministers requested the Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to transmit this Communiqué on their behalf through diplomatic channels to all other interested parties, including neutral and non-aligned governments.

¹ For text of the communiqué, see BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1972, p. 1.

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 15, 1968, p. 77, and June 22, 1970, p. 775.

DOCUMENT 23

Note From the United States Embassy at Helsinki to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, November 16, 1972

Following is the text of a note which was delivered by the American Embassy at Helsinki to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 16.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Ministry's note of November 9, 1972, transmitting a memorandum and an annex, has the honor to accept the invitation of the Finnish Government to attend multilateral consultations in Helsinki, beginning on November 22, on the question of a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. The Government of the United States of America wishes to make clear in this connection that the acceptance of the invitation and participation does not affect the legal position that it has hitherto adopted on questions arising out of the special situation in Germany.

In accordance with the existing understanding, the United States will be represented for the duration of these multilateral consultations by the Chief of its Mission accredited in Helsinki.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1972, p. 660.

Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Signed at Berlin, December 21, 1972¹

The High Contracting Parties,

In consideration of their responsibility for the preservation of peace,

Anxious to contribute to détente and security in Europe,

Conscious that the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in Europe within their present frontiers are a fundamental condition for peace,

Recognizing that therefore the two German States are to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations,

Proceeding from the historical facts and without prejudice to the differing views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on questions of principle, including the national question,

Guided by the desire to create the conditions for co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic for the benefit of the people in the two German States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall develop normal good-neighbourly relations with each other on the basis of equal rights.

ARTICLE 2

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the United Nations Charter, in particular the sovereign equality of all States, respect for independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, the preservation of human rights, and non-discrimination.

Source: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 1215-1217.

¹Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, pp. 5-53. See also Zehn Jahre Deutschlandpolitik, pp. 205-211. For Supplementary Documents to the Treaty, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985, pp. 1217-1230.

ARTICLE 3

In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force.

They reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the border existing between them and undertake fully to respect their territorial integrity.

ARTICLE 4

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on the assumption that neither of the two States can represent the other internationally or act in its name.

ARTICLE 5

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will promote peaceful relations between the European States and contribute to security and co-operation in Europe.

They shall support the efforts to reduce armed forces and armaments in Europe without disadvantages being allowed to arise therefrom for the security of those concerned.

With the aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will support efforts serving international security to achieve armaments limitation and disarmament, especially with regard to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

ARTICLE 6

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on the principle that the jurisdiction of each of the two States is confined to its own territory. They shall each respect the other's independence and autonomy in its internal and external affairs.

ARTICLE 7

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic state their readiness to regulate practical and humanitarian questions in the process of the normalization of their relations. They will conclude agreements with a view to developing and promoting co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, traffic, judicial relations, posts and telecommunications, health, culture, sport, environmental protection, and in other fields, on the basis of the present Treaty and for their mutual benefit. The details have been agreed in the Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE 8

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will exchange permanent missions. They will be established at the respective seat of government.

Practical questions relating to the establishment of the missions will be dealt with separately.

ARTICLE 9

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are agreed that the present Treaty does not affect the bilateral and multilateral international treaties and agreements previously concluded by them or concerning them.

ARTICLE 10

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day after the exchange of appropriate notes.

In witness whereof, the plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty.

Done at Berlin, on 21 December 1972, in two originals in the German language.

For the Federal Republic of Germany
EGON BAHR

For the German Democratic Republic
MICHAEL KOBL

Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, Washington, May 3, 1973

[Extract]

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The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In March 1969, the Warsaw Pact revived its proposal to convene a European Security Conference. Such a conference would be largely symbolic; its purpose would be to confirm the territorial and political status quo in Europe. There was some feeling in the West that this proposal should be accepted; it was thought that it might be a way to dissipate the tensions over the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and to test Soviet policy. Some viewed it as a way of creating a better atmosphere for subsequent talks, while others saw it as a link to more specific issues, such as force reductions.

We were skeptical about symbolic acts that failed to deal with the substance of East-West tensions. The urgent issues of European security were the tensions over Berlin and Germany and the military confrontation in Central Europe. We could not hand over our responsibilities in Berlin to a European conference. If we could not make progress on a central issue such as Berlin, the results of a broad conference would be illusory. To stimulate an atmosphere of détente through symbolic gestures could only lead to disillusionment and insecurity.

The United States, therefore, took the position that a European conference would only be acceptable if there was progress on specific issues, including the Berlin negotiations. A conference might be appropriate if individual countries succeeded in regulating their relations and resolving some of their territorial and political issues.

This was accomplished by West Germany's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, the Quadripartite Agreement on

Berlin, and the SALT agreements. At my summit meeting with the Soviet leaders in May 1972, I agreed that we now could begin preparing for a European Conference with the aim of broadening European cooperation.

Preparatory talks began last November to find out whether there was sufficient common ground to justify a conference of Foreign Ministers. A provisional agenda is being developed, which the Foreign Ministers could consider. Progress thus far suggests that the conference can be convened this year and that it may be possible to move forward on several important questions.

—The participants will address certain principles of security and cooperation. If all European countries subscribe to common principles of conduct, and carry them out in practice, there could be a further relaxation of tensions. Certain military security matters designed to improve confidence will also be considered.

—The conference would be an appropriate forum to discuss practical cooperation in economics, cultural exchange, science, and technology, on which there has already been progress in bilateral relations.

—The conference can consider how to facilitate contacts among the peoples of Europe and how to encourage countries to exchange ideas and information.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe thus can set a new tone for European relations and establish new modes of conduct and means of cooperation. These would be practical steps toward normal relations.

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Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1973 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 412-413.

**Final Recommendations of the Consultations Preceding the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki,
June 8, 1973**

(1) The participants in the Helsinki Consultations on the question of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, representing the Governments of States listed in the annex, recommend to their Governments that this Conference should be convened under the conditions specified below, concerning its organization, agenda and the related instructions, participation, date, place, rules of procedure and financial arrangements.

(2) The participants expressed their collective agreement to these Recommendations on 8 June, 1973.

(3) Each State entitled to participate in the Conference will inform the Government of Finland, within the time limits laid down in Chapter 3, of its decision to take part in this Conference, thereby indicating its intention to do so on the basis of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations. The Government of Finland will inform all States entitled to participate of the communications received in this respect.

(4) The Government of Finland will take the necessary measures, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in the Final Recommendations, to organize the first stage of the Conference.

(5) INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Organization of the Conference
2. Agenda and the Related Instructions
3. Participation, Contributions, Guests
4. Date
5. Place
6. Rules of Procedure
7. Financial Arrangements

ANNEX: List of Participating Countries *

* Not printed here.

**1. Organization of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe**

(6) The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will take place in three stages:

(a) Stage I

(7) The first stage will consist of a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the participating States. In accordance with the recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, the Ministers will adopt the rules of procedure, the agenda and the instructions of the working bodies of the Conference, together with the other arrangements relating to the conduct of the Conference. The Ministers will state the views of their Governments on the problems relating to security and co-operation in Europe. Should they so wish they will put forward, for consideration in the course of the second stage, proposals relating to the various topics on the agenda.

(b) Stage II

(8) The second stage will comprise the work of the specialized committees and sub-committees whose instructions are defined in Chapter 2 of these recommendations (points I, II and III of the agenda). Within this framework and on the basis of the proposals submitted either by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, or subsequently by the delegations of the participating States, the committees and sub-committees will prepare drafts of declarations, recommendations, resolutions or any other final documents. The participating States will be represented in these bodies by such delegates and experts as they shall designate for the purpose.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1973, pp. 181-188. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted these recommendations at its inaugural meeting in Helsinki on July 3, 1973.

(9) A co-ordinating committee, composed of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, will meet periodically during the second stage of the Conference. It will co-ordinate the activities of the committees and assemble the results of their work with a view to the final stage of the Conference. The Co-ordinating Committee shall also be entrusted with the execution of the tasks defined in point IV of the agenda, as stated in Chapter 2 of the present recommendations. It will, furthermore, submit to the participating Governments such recommendations as it may consider useful regarding the conduct of the Conference, especially the organization of its third stage.

(c) Stage III

(10) In the light of the recommendations drawn up by the Co-ordinating Committee, the Conference will meet for its third stage.

(11) The level of representation at the third stage will be decided by the participating States during the Conference, before the end of the second stage.

(12) The Conference will adopt its final documents, in formal session, at the close of this third stage.

2. Agenda and the Related Instructions

1. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

(13) In carrying out the instructions set out below, the Committee will bear in mind the wider objective of promoting better relations among participating States and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security.

(14) In its work the Committee will proceed from the premise that the strengthening of security in Europe is not directed against any State or continent and should constitute an important contribution to world peace and security.

(15) In considering questions relating to security in Europe, the Committee will bear in mind the broader context of world security and in particular the relationship which exists between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean area.

(16) The Committee will be assisted in its tasks by the appropriate Sub-Committees.

1.

(17) (a) The Committee/Sub-Committee is charged with the task of considering and stating in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations those basic principles which each participating State is to respect and apply in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems, in order to ensure the peace and security of all participating States.

(18) The principles to be stated shall be included in a document of appropriate form to be submitted by the Committee for adoption by the Conference. It shall express the determination of the participating States to respect and apply the principles equally and unreservedly in all aspects to their mutual relations and co-operation, in order to ensure to all participating States the benefits resulting from the application of these principles by all.

(19) The reaffirmation, with such clarifications and additions as may be deemed desirable, and the precise statement, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, of the following principles of primary significance guiding the mutual relations of the participating States, are deemed to be of particular importance:

- sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
- refraining from the threat or use of force;
- inviolability of frontiers;
- territorial integrity of States;
- peaceful settlement of disputes;
- non-intervention in internal affairs;
- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
- equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- co-operation among States;
- fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

(20) In discharging itself of these tasks, the Committee/Sub-Committee shall take into account in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation

among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(21) (b) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall give expression to the idea that respect for the above-listed principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations among the participating States as well as of their political contacts which in turn would contribute to the furthering of their co-operation. It shall also consider proposals designed to give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force. In this context, it shall study proposals for and undertake the elaboration of a method for the peaceful settlement of disputes among participating States.

2.

(22) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall have regard to the fact that the participating States are desirous of eliminating any causes of tension that may exist among them and of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world, bearing in mind the fact that efforts aimed at disarmament complement political détente and are essential elements in a process in which all participating States have a vital interest.

(23) In order to strengthen confidence and to increase stability and security, the Committee/Sub-Committee shall submit to the Conference appropriate proposals on confidence-building measures such as the prior notification of major military manoeuvres on a basis to be specified by the Conference, and the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. The Committee/Sub-Committee will also study the question of prior notification of major military movements and submit its conclusions.

(24) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pay due attention to the views expressed by participating States on the various subjects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, on the particular interest they attach thereto, especially from the point of view of their own security and of their desire to be informed about the relevant developments.

II. CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

(25) The Committee shall be responsible for drawing up a draft final document/documents containing guidelines and concrete recommendations which could stimulate common efforts for increased co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology and environment, which might guide the participating States in their mutual relations in these areas and which they might utilise in the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements, as well as recommendations on specific measures for the development of co-operation which could be agreed by participating States.

(26) The Committee will bear in mind the

contribution which such co-operation could make to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe. It will also bear in mind the interests of developing countries and regions and the positive effects which the broadening of co-operation among participating States could have on world economic relations.

(27) The Committee, having in mind the foregoing, shall study ways and means that would make it possible, by mutual agreement among participating States, to facilitate, with due regard for the diversity of economic and social systems and under conditions of reciprocity of advantages and obligations, the development of trade and co-operation in the various fields of economic activity, science, technology and in the field of the environment. In this regard, it will in particular take account of the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

(28) In considering questions relating to co-operation in Europe covered by this mandate, the Committee will bear in mind the relationship which exists between such co-operation in Europe and in the Mediterranean area.

(29) The Committee in its final draft/drafts will formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect for the principles guiding relations among the participating States enumerated in the terms of reference for the Committee on item I of the agenda.

(30) The Committee, assisted by the appropriate Sub-Committees, will examine the following questions:

1. Commercial Exchanges

(31) The Committee/Sub-Committee will examine general provisions designed to promote trade and the exchange of services between participating States. It could discuss general problems relating to most favoured nation treatment. It could also examine measures aiming at the reduction or progressive elimination of all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade.

(32) The Committee/Sub-Committee will examine specific measures designed to facilitate commercial transactions and the exchange of services, such as measures aiming at the improvement of

- business contacts and facilities
- the exchange of information on commercial opportunities and specific trading conditions
- provisions for the settlement of commercial disputes including various forms of arbitration.

2. Industrial Co-operation and Projects of Common Interest

(33) The Committee/Sub-Committee will study the forms and modalities of industrial co-operation and will examine the various measures by which participating States could encourage the development of this co-operation using, as appropriate, the framework of bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental agreements.

(34) The Committee/Sub-Committee will ex-

amine, in particular, the measures which governments could take to create conditions favourable to this co-operation between competent organizations, firms and enterprises of participating States. It will bear in mind that the specific forms of such co-operation should be settled bilaterally unless otherwise agreed upon by the participants. This examination could bear on the various forms of co-operation, such as co-operation in production and sales, on the exchange of information concerning the possibilities of industrial co-operation, on the improvement of conditions for setting up projects, and on other measures which could develop and facilitate various forms of industrial co-operation.

(35) The Committee/Sub-Committee will also examine the possibilities of encouraging projects of common interest and of working out, where relevant, recommendations in this respect.

(36) This examination could bear on the possibilities of implementing projects of common interest in the fields of energy resources, exploitation of raw materials and, when appropriate, of transport and communications.

3. Science and Technology

(37) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall consider proposals for the development of co-operation in the field of science and technology, taking into account already existing or planned co-operation in this field, with a view to facilitating, through such means as the improvement of contacts and information, access to new developments in science and technology, and to contributing to the most effective solution of problems of common interest and to the betterment of the conditions of human life.

(38) These proposals, in particular, shall be concerned with the areas where there are the most favourable prerequisites for such co-operation, the forms and methods for its implementation, as well as with the obstacles that hinder such co-operation and measures for their removal. In the consideration of these questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee will seek to build on existing practices and take into account the possibilities and capabilities of relevant existing international organizations.

4. Environment

(39) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall be responsible for discussing questions of environmental protection and improvement and in particular for determining the fields that are important for the participating States and can best lend themselves to the development of co-operation between them, such as: protection of the seas surrounding Europe, of the waters and of the atmosphere; improvement of environmental and living conditions, especially in towns; protection of nature and of its resources.

(40) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall examine and put forward the most appropriate bilateral and multilateral forms and methods of co-operation, including co-operation on a regional

and subregional basis, for the various fields that have been determined. In the consideration of these questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee will seek to build on existing practices and take into account the possibilities and capabilities of the relevant existing international organizations.

5. Co-operation in Other Areas

(41) The Committee/Sub-Committee could examine the following questions:

—problems relating to the development of transport and communications between participating States;

—promotion of tourism by the exchange of information, techniques and the results of practical experience and by the study of appropriate measures;

—economic and social aspects of migrant labour;

—training of personnel in various fields of economic activity;

—such other questions as may be decided by common agreement.

III. CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

(42) With the aim of contributing to the strengthening of peace and understanding among the peoples of the participating States and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, the Committee, assisted by the appropriate Sub-Committees, shall be charged with examining all possibilities of co-operation conducive to creating better conditions for increased cultural and educational exchanges, for broader dissemination of information, for contacts between people, and for the solution of humanitarian problems. In this connection, it shall not only draw upon existing forms of co-operation, but shall also work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims.

(43) The Committee in its final document will formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect for the principles guiding relations among the participating States enumerated in the terms of reference for the Committee on item I of the agenda.

(44) The Committee shall also consider to what extent existing institutions could be used to achieve these aims.

1. Human Contacts

(45) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually or collectively, privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States.

(46) With a view to contributing to the favourable examination and settlement of relevant matters by the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions, it shall pay particular attention to:

(a) contacts and regular meetings on a basis of

family ties; reunification of families; marriage between nationals of different States;

(b) travel for personal or professional reasons; improvement of conditions for tourism, on an individual or collective basis;

(c) meetings among young people; expansion of contacts and competitions, particularly in the field of sport.

2. Information

(47) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds. In doing so it shall pay particular attention to:

(a) improving the circulation of, and access to, oral, printed, filmed and broadcast information and extending the exchange of information;

(b) encouraging co-operation in these fields of information on a basis of short or long term agreements;

(c) improving conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State.

3. Co-operation and exchanges in the field of culture

(48) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals aimed at extending and improving co-operation and exchanges in the various fields of culture and shall indicate the components and objectives of a consistent long-term development of such exchanges. In its work, it shall bear in mind the results of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, Helsinki, June 1972 including the broader concept of culture outlined by that Conference.

(49) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall consider in particular:

(a) Extension of relations among competent government agencies and non-governmental bodies dealing with matters of culture;

(b) Promotion of fuller mutual knowledge of and access to achievements in literature, art and other fields of cultural activity;

(c) Improvement of facilities for contacts and exchanges in the above-mentioned spheres;

(d) Extension of contacts and co-operation among creative artists and people engaged in cultural activities;

(e) Common search for new fields and forms of co-operation; co-operation in the investigation of the social aspects of culture;

(f) Encouragement of such forms of cultural co-operation as: international events in the fields of art, film, theatre, music, folklore, etc.; book fairs and exhibitions; joint projects in the field of protection of monuments and sites; co-production and exchange of films and of radio and television programmes.

(50) The Committee/Sub-Committee while considering the role of States in co-operation in the

field of culture will bear in mind the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures could make to it within the framework of respect for principles referred to above.

4. Co-operation and exchanges in the field of education

(51) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall prepare proposals aimed at broadening co-operation and exchanges in the fields of education and science on a short or long-term basis. These proposals shall be carried out bilaterally and multilaterally as appropriate, between participating States and non-governmental bodies. The Committee/Sub-Committee shall consider in particular:

(a) Expansion of links between State institutions and non-governmental bodies whose activities are concerned with questions of education and science.

(b) Improved access, under mutually acceptable conditions, for students, teachers and scholars from the participating States to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and a more exact assessment of the problems of comparison and equivalence between academic degrees and diplomas.

(c) Encouragement of the study of the languages and civilizations of other peoples for the purpose of creating favourable conditions for promoting wider acquaintance with the culture of each country.

(d) Exchange of experience in teaching methods in various fields including those used in adult education and exchanges in the field of teaching materials.

(52) The Committee/Sub-Committee while considering the role of States in co-operation in the field of education will bear in mind the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures could make to it within the framework of respect for principles referred to above.

IV. FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

(53) The Co-ordinating Committee shall consider, on the basis of the progress made at the Conference such measures as may be required to give effect to the decisions of the Conference and to further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe. Having considered proposals to this effect, including proposals of an organizational nature, it shall make any recommendations which it deems necessary. In examining the follow-up of the Conference, the Committee shall also consider the contributions which it believes could be asked from existing international organizations.

3. Participation, Contributions, Guests

(a) Participation

(54) All European States, the United States and Canada shall be entitled to take part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. If any of these States wishes to attend as an observer it

may do so. In that case, its representatives may attend all stages of the Conference and of its working bodies, but shall not participate in the taking of decisions. Such a State may decide later to accept these decisions or some of them under the conditions defined by the Conference.

(55) States referred to in the first sentence of the paragraph above wishing to participate in the Conference or to attend as observers must so inform the Finnish Government at the latest on 25 June 1973.

(b) Contributions

(56) The Conference and its working bodies will acquaint themselves, in such manner as they may determine, with the points of view held by non-participating States on the subject of the various agenda items.

(57) States situated in regions adjacent to Europe and to whom reference is made in the provisions of Chapter 2, and in particular those of the Mediterranean States which have already expressed their interest in stating their views to the Conference, are especially envisaged by this Chapter.

(58) The Co-ordinating Committee may decide, by consensus, the means by which the working bodies of the Conference may consult appropriate international organizations, on the subject of the various agenda items.

(c) Guests

(59) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be invited as guest of honour to the inaugural session of the Conference.

4. Date

(60) 1. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe shall be opened on 3 July 1973 at 11:30 a.m.

(61) 2. The date of the opening of the second stage shall be determined by the Ministers during the first stage.

(62) 3. The date of the opening of the third stage shall be decided during the second stage by agreement among the participating States on the basis of the recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee.

5. Place of the Conference

(63) Taking into account with appreciation the invitation by the Government of Finland, having in view practical considerations and rotation, the first stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will be held in Helsinki; the second stage will be held in Geneva; the third stage will be held in Helsinki.

6. Rules of Procedure

(64) The States participating in the Conference

on Security and Co-operation in Europe shall conduct their work as follows:

(65) 1. All States participating in the Conference shall do so as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality. The Conference shall take place outside military alliances.

(66) 2. The representation of the participating States at each stage of the Conference shall be determined in accordance with the provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of these Final Recommendations.

(67) 3. The working bodies of the Conference shall be the Co-ordinating Committee, the Committees and the Sub-Committees. These working bodies will function during the second stage of the Conference. However, the Co-ordinating Committee will meet at the site of the second stage before the opening of the second stage in order to settle questions relating to the organization of that stage.

(68) The working bodies of the Conference may, if they so wish, set up such working groups as they may consider useful. The working bodies and working groups of the Conference shall be open to all participating States.

(69) 4. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus. Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a Representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.

5. Chairmanship

(70) A. The Chair at the inaugural and closing meetings of the first stage of the Conference shall be taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the host country. The Chair at other meetings shall be taken on a basis of rotation, as follows:

(a) The Chair at each meeting shall be taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a different participating State, in an order established in accordance with a list selected by lot country by country before the end of the Helsinki Consultations;

(b) If the Conference should meet both in the morning and in the afternoon of the same day, the two meetings shall be regarded as constituting two distinct meetings;

(c) In the interval between meetings of the Conference, the functions of the Chair shall be exercised by that Minister for Foreign Affairs who presided over the immediately preceding meeting of the Conference;

(d) Should a Minister for Foreign Affairs be prevented from taking the Chair, it shall be taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country next in the order established.

(71) B. The Chair at the inaugural meeting of the working bodies of the Conference shall be taken by the Representative of the host country. Thereafter, the office of Chairman shall be filled as follows:

(a) The Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Chairmen of the Committees shall be designated on a basis of daily rotation, in French alphabetical order, starting from a letter drawn by lot;

(b) The Chairmen of Sub-Committees and of other subsidiary bodies of the Conference shall be designated on a basis of rotation in accordance with practical arrangements to be established at the appropriate time by the bodies in question.

(72) Where necessary, a rapporteur shall be designated by consensus.

(73) C. The provisions laid down for the meetings of the first stage shall be applicable *mutatis mutandis* to the meetings of the third stage of the Conference. They may be further defined by the Co-ordinating Committee.

(74) 6. The Executive Secretary for technical matters at each stage of the Conference shall be a national of the corresponding host country. He is designated by the host country subject to agreement by the participating States.

(75) In organizing the services, the Executive Secretary of each stage will be responsible for the recruitment of his staff and assured of the collaboration of the Secretariats of the other stages.

(76) The Executive Secretaries will work under the authority of the Conference and report on their activities to the appropriate body of each stage of the Conference, especially on financial matters.

(77) 7. Official verbatim records shall be taken at the meetings of the first and third stages of the Conference.

(78) Proposals on matters of substance and amendments thereto shall be submitted in writing to the Chairman and circulated to all participants. The proposals adopted shall be registered by the Executive Secretary and circulated among the participants.

(79) Representatives of States participating in the Conference may ask for their formal reservations or interpretative statements concerning given decisions to be duly registered by the Executive Secretary and circulated to the participating States. Such statements must be submitted in writing to the Executive Secretary.

(80) 8. The inaugural and closing sessions of the first stage of the Conference will be open. Other sessions of the first stage may be open if the Ministers so decide. The Co-ordinating Committee, the Committee and the Sub-Committee shall not, as a rule, meet in open sessions, unless the participants decide otherwise. Arrangements for the third stage will be similar to those for the first stage and may be further defined by the Co-ordinating Committee.

(81) 9. The working languages of the Conference and of its working bodies shall be: English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish.

(82) Speeches made in any of the working lan-

guages shall be interpreted into the other working languages.

(83) 10. Any Representative may make a statement in a language other than the working languages. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of the working languages.

(84) 11. Records and decisions of the Conference shall be issued and circulated to participants in the working languages.

(85) The participants shall decide by consensus whether it is desirable to make public, through the appropriate services of the Conference, certain documents or communiqués on the work of the Conference and, if they decide in the affirmative shall specify the contents.

(86) 12. During the discussion of any matter, a Representative may raise a point of order and the Chairman shall give him the floor immediately. A Representative raising a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

(87) 13. During the meeting the Chairman shall keep a list of speakers and may declare it closed with the consent of the meeting. He shall, however, accord the right of reply to any Representative if a speech after he has declared the list closed makes this desirable.

(88) 14. These procedural arrangements shall be adopted by consensus. Once adopted, they can only be altered by consensus.

7. Financial Arrangements

A. Distribution of Expenses

(89) The following scale of distribution has been agreed for the expenses of the Conference, subject to the reservation that the distribution in question concerns the Conference only and shall not be considered as a precedent which could be relied on in other circumstances:

(90)		
France	8.80 per cent	
Federal Republic of Germany	8.80	
Italy	8.80	
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	8.80	
United Kingdom	8.80	
United States of America	8.80	52.80 per cent
Canada	5.52	5.52
Belgium	3.48	
German Democratic Republic	3.48	
Netherlands	3.48	
Poland	3.48	
Spain	3.48	
Sweden	3.48	20.88

Austria	2.00	
Czechoslovakia	2.00	
Denmark	2.00	
Finland	2.00	
Hungary	2.00	
Norway	2.00	
Switzerland	2.00	14.00
Greece	0.80	
Romania	0.80	
Turkey	0.80	
Yugoslavia	0.80	3.20
Bulgaria	0.60	
Ireland	0.60	
Luxembourg	0.60	
Portugal	0.60	2.40
Cyprus	0.20	
Holy See	0.20	
Iceland	0.20	
Liechtenstein	0.20	
Malta	0.20	
San Marino	0.20	1.20
	100	per cent

(91) Necessary alterations of the cost sharing scale due to any possible modification in the list of participating States above will be decided upon by consensus.

B. System of Financing

(92) 1. The monies needed to finance the Conference will be advanced by the host country of each stage subject to reimbursement out of the contributions of the participating States according to the agreed cost sharing scale.

(93) 2. Payment of contributions by participating States shall be made to a special account of the Conference.

(94) 3. Payment shall be made in the currency of the host country.

(95) 4. Accounts will be rendered in respect of each stage or at intervals of three (3) months, as appropriate.

(96) 5. Accounts shall be expressed in the currency of the host country and shall be rendered as soon as technically possible after the termination of a billing period. They shall be payable [within] sixty (60) days of presentation.

DOCUMENT 27

Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union,
Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, San Clemente,
California, June 25, 1973

[Extracts]

JOINT US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, extended during his official visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 25. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee, CPSU; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; G. E. Tsukanov and A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistants to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS; E. I. Chasov, Deputy Minister of Public Health of the USSR; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; G. A. Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev held thorough and constructive discussions on the progress achieved in the development of US-Soviet relations and on a number of major international problems of mutual interest.

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Europe

In the course of the talks both Sides noted with satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing tensions and developing cooperation is actively continuing and thereby contributing to international stability.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973,
pp. 130-132.

The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the further normalization of relations among European countries resulting from treaties and agreements signed in recent years, particularly between the USSR and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. They also welcome the coming into force of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971. They share the conviction that strict observance of the treaties and agreements that have been concluded will contribute to the security and well-being of all parties concerned.

They also welcome the prospect of United Nations membership this year for the FRG and the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and recall, in this connection, that the USA, USSR, UK and France have signed the Quadripartite Declaration of November 9, 1972, on this subject.

The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire, guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint US-USSR Communiqué adopted in Moscow in May 1972, to continue their separate and joint contributions to strengthening peaceful relations in Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies.

In this connection satisfaction was expressed with the fact that as a result of common efforts by many States, including the USA and the USSR, the preparatory work has been successfully completed for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will be convened on July 8, 1973. The USA and the USSR hold the view that the Conference will enhance the possibilities for strengthening European security and developing cooperation among the participating States. The USA and the USSR will conduct their policies so as to realize the goals of the Conference and bring about a new era of good relations in this part of the world.

Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward the Conference, both Sides will make efforts to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the assumption that progress in the work of the Conference will produce possibilities for completing it at the highest level.

The USA and the USSR believe that the goal of strengthening stability and security in Europe would be further advanced if the relaxation of political tensions were accompanied by a reduction of military tensions in Central Europe. In this respect they attach great importance to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both Sides state their readiness to make, along with other States, their contribution to the achievement of mutually acceptable decisions on the substance of this problem, based on the strict observance of the principle of the undiminished security of any of the parties.

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DOCUMENT 28

Statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers Before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, July 5, 1973

I would like to join my colleagues in expressing the gratitude of the U.S. Government to the Government of Finland for its many and substantial contributions to bringing this conference into being. This conference provides the nations represented here a historic opportunity. But whether the conference itself achieves historic importance depends on how we—the Foreign Ministers here present and the 35 governments we represent—avail ourselves of the opportunity.

I think it can be said that so far the meeting has met our expectations. We have gathered together in a friendly and constructive manner and have engaged in what we refer to as a general debate—but a debate with very few differences. I am the 21st speaker, and unless I missed something, each speaker who preceded me spoke thoughtfully, respectfully of the viewpoints of others, and without using contentious rhetoric. Maybe we should not list this as an accomplishment, but we can say it's a relief.

But beyond the friendly climate which has prevailed throughout, we made a decision of major dimensions at the outset—almost routinely. After careful consideration by our governments, we unanimously adopted the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations. This, in fact, is a remarkable document. It is not merely a conference agenda. It contains a long list of agreed principles and includes a detailed and carefully

drafted work program designed to promote peaceful evolution in Europe for the years ahead. This document is a commitment to find new and more civilized ways of dealing with one another. I wish to underline the point that the commitments we have made here are solemn obligations to develop comprehensive and specific measures to advance our relationships in that spirit.

I think President Kekkonen captured the essence of our decision when he said, "Security is not gained by erecting fences; security is gained by opening gates."

For a quarter century, division has been the dominant feature of Europe. We all recognize that this conference must not confirm the barriers that still divide Europe. Rather, by our support of the final recommendations we have expressly undertaken to lower these barriers. We have said coexistence is not enough. Indeed, the document to which we have agreed requires constructive change on a broad front in order that with the passage of time we can engage in many truly cooperative and mutually beneficial and peaceful relationships.

The decisive challenge of the conference, then, is: Can we follow through?

We have had some discussion here about the time frame for meeting the challenge. It seems to me that that decision can be reached later on. If we are successful—and I believe

Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1973, pp. 177-181.

we can succeed—then scheduling will come easily. If we fail, the schedule will be of little importance.

Cynics have suggested that the objective of an international conference is to complete it. I am sure that does not represent the views of any nation here. This conference, I believe, should proceed as expeditiously as possible, but without undue haste. What we seek is progress. Progress results from practical steps. Practical steps are not easy to take, but they are essential because we do not want to complete our work merely restating familiar principles.

As previous speakers have noted, the conference comes at a propitious time. Many nations represented here have dramatically contributed to creating the conditions which have made this conference possible. Four and one-half years ago President Nixon pledged that the policy of the United States would be to move from confrontation to negotiation in all areas of the world. He acted promptly to carry out his policy, and as a result it is generally acknowledged that today we live in a much more peaceful world. This new climate for peace benefits all of mankind. But much more remains to be done.

The universal hope for a durable peace can be significantly strengthened by the nations participating in this conference; that is the hope that permeates this hall. We represent most of the world's developed nations. Our economies produce about 75 percent of the world's wealth, and together we account for approximately 85 percent of the world's military expenditures. Our long-range goal must be an act of common will to bring our enormous resources to bear on the common problems we face and on assisting others less fortunate. Moreover, it is now within our grasp to contribute to an improved world climate so that a reduction in the world's armaments is a definite possibility.

We are all conscious, as so many have said, that the two World Wars began in Europe. We have all learned lessons from those conflicts. The United States has learned from our experience that Europe's security is indivisible from our own. The presence of my delegation today symbolizes that fundamen-

tal fact—the fact, if you will, of our engagement in Europe.

Americans believe that during the last generation we have made a constructive and successful commitment to peace and stability in Europe. And today, on behalf of the Government of the United States, I want to underscore the firmness of our resolve both to continue that commitment and to strengthen our relationship with all of the states represented here.

Let me turn briefly to some of the specific issues with which the conference has agreed to deal.

Nothing is more important than the principle that states refrain from the use or threat of force. It is the keystone in the arch of a durable peace, and we have accepted it as a fundamental principle in relations between states.

This means, of course, that frontiers should not be violated by force or threats of force. At the same time, this does not rule out—and I emphasize, does not rule out—peaceful changes in frontiers if such changes are based on popular will and mutual agreement between states. Certainly no one could validly contend otherwise, for such contention would violate the twin principles of sovereignty and the right of self-determination.

Another principle which this conference has already endorsed is the principle of universal respect for the right of every country to independence and to its own internal development free of outside interference, irrespective of its political, economic, or social system. We have said in effect that a country must not be denied these rights for any reason. That is why we Foreign Ministers have mandated the committee that it must "express the determination of the participating States to respect and apply the principles equally and unreservedly in all aspects to their mutual relations and co-operation, in order to ensure to all participating States the benefits resulting from the application of these principles by all." There is nothing equivocal about that decision which we have made. And in international affairs strict observance of that mandate is of utmost importance.

Another important mandate in the document states that we should study ways in which problems arising between states can be resolved on a peaceful basis early on to avoid later conflict. The committee could achieve meaningful results in this area by carefully developing plans for early consultation and possibly mediation to avoid confrontation.

The committee is also enjoined to give specific meaning to the concept of reduction of tensions in the military sphere as set forth in paragraph 23 of the final recommendations. Thus we support:

1. Advance notification of major military maneuvers;
2. Exchanges of observers by invitation at military maneuvers under mutually acceptable conditions; and
3. The study of prior notification of major military movements.

We have given support to these measures because we believe greater confidence can result from sharing such military information so that the margin for surprise can be substantially reduced.

A fundamental aspect of our commitment is outlined in section III. I refer of course to the lowering of barriers to the freer flow of people, information, and ideas among the participating states. This aspect of our work stems from the importance we attach to human rights and fundamental freedoms. There are few words which are so filled with meaning, so venerated by people everywhere. But section III could turn out to be a sad footnote in future history books unless the committee finds concrete ways to embody the concepts contained therein so that the everyday lives of people are favorably affected. I have in mind here, for example, proposals for arrangements that will permit the reunification of families, more regular visits between the members of divided families, new ways of sharing experiences in various fields of professional and intellectual endeavor, and promoting closer links between our young people. Our youth should learn more about one another and about other states and systems. The future development of our rela-

tions can only profit from their mutual understanding.

We have agreed here also to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons. In several countries, as in our country, citizens are free to travel anywhere in the world without any restriction or interference. I recognize of course that each state has its own regulations. But the thrust of the mandate is to encourage—indeed, to exhort—states to lower barriers to travel and encourage human contacts that are so essential to understanding and mutual respect in today's world.

It will also be important to give specific content to our agreement to improve the circulation of and access to information transmitted by the various media and to improve the conditions under which journalists may exercise their profession in our countries. The right of people to know fully what is happening in the world is a basic human right and a basic requirement for understanding and knowledge.

We have also agreed to reduce the obstacles in the development of trade by examining specific measures, among other things, to facilitate business contacts and the exchange of information on commercial opportunities.

In addition to our work in this conference, we have recognized that the process of reconciliation must move forward on a broader front. In this connection it should be noted that the increasingly united European Community has a special contribution to make as it forges an economic and political union among member states whose past disputes were a frequent cause of war in Europe. And by building closer ties with individual East European nations, members of the Community and other West European nations are lowering the barriers that have too long divided Europe.

The United States will continue to work closely with its allies in the Atlantic alliance, which contributes not only to the security and independence of its members but is also seeking new ways to improve relations in Europe.

With the nations of eastern Europe the

United States has opened a new era of improved relations. We are dealing with each country in eastern Europe separately—determining our policy in accordance with the specific policies and actions of each and looking forward to a wider and more constructive association with all the nations of the area.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a major contribution to make to a secure and cooperative Europe. Just as the confrontation between our two nations contributed to the division of postwar Europe, so the recent improvement in our relations is helping to bring Europe together again.

At the conclusion of their meeting in Washington last month President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev affirmed that "ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies."¹ The agreement they signed on prevention of nuclear war is a landmark in Soviet-American relations and should have a favorable impact upon European security as well. And by setting forth basic principles for further limitation of strategic arms and by entering into several other agreements involving mutual endeavors, the Soviet Union and the United States further contributed to the goal, held by all of us at this conference, of strengthening stability and security in Europe.

The United States is also gratified by the progress being made in discussions in various forums on the limitation of arms and armaments. We are particularly pleased that many of us here have reached agreement that negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe will begin on October 30. These talks will be proceeding in Vienna at the same time as the second stage of this conference is going forward in Geneva. The Vienna talks should complement our efforts in this conference to strengthen stability and security in Europe.

As the first phase of the conference draws to a close, it might be well briefly to outline

¹ For text of a communiqué issued June 25 upon General Secretary Brezhnev's departure from the United States, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1973, p. 130.

what we hope can be achieved during the second phase. The conference should:

1. Elaborate, with precision, upon the agreed general principles in ways that relate directly and specifically to the problems of states participating in the conference;

2. Reach agreements on specific military matters including exchange of certain significant military information and appropriate exchange of observers in order to increase confidence and dispel suspicion;

3. Develop methods for early and peaceful settlement of disputes which might have the potential for confrontation between any of the participating states;

4. Advance proposals for reducing barriers to the growth of trade, increasing commercial exchanges, industrial cooperation, cooperation in the field of science and technology; and

5. Of paramount importance, work out specific and meaningful ways to facilitate human contacts, the freer dissemination of information, and the broadening of cultural and educational cooperation.

In the second phase we have to translate the results of our work into dynamic programs which would give specific meaning to the relationships that we seek, and the United States will submit concrete proposals for this purpose. Finally, during the process we must adhere in all of our dealings to the spirit of reconciliation. For it is this spirit which has raised all of our hopes for a new era of peace in Europe and throughout the world.

Our goal should be a continent in which no nation feels threatened, a continent open to the free flow of people and ideas, and a continent enriched rather than divided by political and cultural diversity. Such a Europe will not come about merely by wishing for it or by making declarations about it. Only time will tell whether we have accomplished anything or not, but one thing is certain: We must proceed with great industry and diligence in the days ahead and must pursue our goal with patience, understanding, and determination through the years to come. If there is a consensus among us in that spirit, then we may be proud of the few days we spent together in this friendly city of Helsinki.

DOCUMENT 29

Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union,
Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Moscow,
July 3, 1974

[Extracts]

JOINT US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

In accordance with the agreement to hold regular US-Soviet meetings at the highest level and at the invitation, extended during the visit of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev to the USA in June 1973, the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from June 27 to July 3, 1974.

During his stay President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, Minsk and the Southern Coast of the Crimea.

The President of the United States and the Soviet leaders held a thorough and useful exchange of views on major aspects of relations between the USA and the USSR and on the present international situation.

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III. PROGRESS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

In the course of the meeting detailed discussions were held on major international problems.

Both Sides expressed satisfaction that relaxation of tensions, consolidation of peace, and development of mutually beneficial cooperation are becoming increasingly distinct characteristics of the development of the international situation. They proceed from the assumption that progress in improving the international situation does not occur spontaneously but requires active and purposeful efforts to overcome obstacles and resolve difficulties that remain from the past.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974,
pp. 185-188.

The paramount objectives of all states and peoples should be to ensure, individually and collectively, lasting security in all parts of the world, the early and complete removal of existing international conflicts and sources of tension and the prevention of new ones from arising.

The United States and the Soviet Union are in favor of the broad and fruitful economic cooperation among all states, large and small, on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.

The United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm their determination to contribute separately and jointly to the achievement of all these tasks.

Europe

Having discussed the development of the situation in Europe since the last American-Soviet summit meeting, both Sides noted with profound satisfaction the further appreciable advances toward establishing dependable relations of peace, good-neighborliness and cooperation on the European continent.

Both Sides welcome the major contribution which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making to this beneficial process. They consider that substantial progress has already been achieved at the Conference on many significant questions. They believe that this progress indicates that the present stage of the Conference will produce agreed documents of great international significance expressing the determination of the participating states to build their mutual relations on a solid jointly elaborated basis. The US and USSR will make every effort, in cooperation with the other participants, to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems.

Both Sides expressed their conviction that successful completion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be an outstanding event in the interests of establishing a lasting peace. Proceeding from this assumption the USA and the

USSR expressed themselves in favor of the final stage of the Conference taking place at an early date. Both Sides also proceed from the assumption that the results of the negotiations will permit the Conference to be concluded at the highest level, which would correspond to the historic significance of the Conference for the future of Europe and lend greater authority to the importance of the Conference's decisions.

Both Sides reaffirmed the lasting significance for a favorable development of the situation in Europe of the treaties and agreements concluded in recent years between European states with different social systems.

They expressed satisfaction with the admission to the United Nations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Both Sides also stressed that the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, must continue to play a key role in ensuring stability and detente in Europe. The US and USSR consider that the strict and consistent implementation of this Agreement by all parties concerned is an essential condition for the maintenance and strengthening of mutual confidence and stability in the center of Europe.

The USA and the USSR believe that, in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe, the relaxation of political tension on this continent should be accompanied by measures to reduce military tensions.

They therefore attach great importance to the current negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, in which they are participating. The two Sides expressed the hope that these negotiations will result in concrete decisions ensuring the undiminished security of any of the parties and preventing unilateral military advantages.

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Remarks by President Gerald R. Ford, Washington, July 25, 1975

I AM glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada—35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the Conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme, there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be depended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations, I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families, and friends have been and still are profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating State. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 1030-1033. The President's remarks were made during a meeting held at 11 a.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House with 7 members of Congress and representatives of American organizations with Eastern European ethnic backgrounds.

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step—how long a step remains to be tested—in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.

To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, we must remember that it is not simply another summit between the super powers. On the contrary, it is primarily a political dialog among the Europeans—East, West, and neutral—with primary emphasis on European relationships rather than global differences. The United States has taken part, along with Canada, to maintain the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and because our absence would have caused a serious imbalance for the West.

We have acted in concert with our free and democratic partners to preserve our interests in Berlin and Germany and have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers—a major concession which runs quite contrary to the allegation that present borders are being permanently frozen.

The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western preconditions—the Berlin Agreement of 1971, the force reduction talks now underway in Vienna—before our agreement to go to Helsinki.

Specifically addressing the understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

There is included in the declaration of principles on territorial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this longstanding principle.

The question has been asked: What have we given up in these negotiations and what have we obtained in return from the other side? I have studied the negotiations and declarations carefully and will discuss them even more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. In my judgment, the United States and the open countries of the West already practice what the Helsinki accords preach and have no intention of doing what they prohibit—such as using force or restricting freedoms. We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.

We are getting a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information, and ideas than has existed there in the past, and establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions. It is a step in the direction of a greater degree of European community, of expanding East-West contacts, of more normal and healthier relations in an area where we have the closest historic ties. Surely this is the best interest of the United States and of peace in the world.

I think we are all agreed that our world cannot be changed for the better by war, that in the thermonuclear age our primary task is to reduce the danger of unprecedented destruction. This we are doing through continuing strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union and the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. This European Security Conference in Helsinki, while it contains some military understandings such as advance notice of maneuvers, should not be confused with either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The Helsinki summit is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.

Its success or failure depends not alone on the United States and the Soviet Union but primarily upon its 33 European signatories—East, West, and neutral. The fact that each of them, large and small, can have their voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification of families and international marriages, a freer flow of information and publications, and increased tourism and travel, seems to me a development well worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.

I saw an editorial the other day entitled: "Jerry, Don't Go." But I would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying: "United States Boycotts Peace Hopes."

So I am going, and I hope your support goes with me.

Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords), Signed at Helsinki, August 1, 1975

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.

During the opening and closing stages of the Conference the participants were addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as their guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference during its second stage.

During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States on various agenda items: the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of

Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world,

Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to the results of the Conference and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results and thus to broaden, deepen and make continuing and lasting the process of détente,

The High Representatives of the participating States have solemnly adopted the following:

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;

Convinced of the need to exert efforts to make détente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, and

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323-350.

that the implementation of the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will be a major contribution to this process;

Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and to better mutual understanding;

Mindful of their common history and recognizing that the existence of elements common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations, and desiring to search, fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving the problems that separate them and co-operating in the interest of mankind;

Recognizing the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of co-operation throughout Europe and among themselves and expressing their intention to pursue efforts accordingly;

Recognizing the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples;

Have adopted the following:

1.

(a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

The participating States,

Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation;

Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States;

Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Declare their determination to respect and put

into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

II. Refraining from the threat or use of force

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

III. Inviolability of frontiers

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain

now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

IV. Territorial integrity of States

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.

V. Peaceful settlement of disputes

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of co-operation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.

For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.

Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practise, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

IX. Co-operation among States

The participating States will develop their co-operation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their co-operation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in developing their co-operation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their co-operation.

They will strive, in increasing their co-operation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law

The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due re-

gard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in turn would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.

(b) Matters related to giving effect to certain of the above Principles

(i) The participating States,

Reaffirming that they will respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force and convinced of the necessity to make it an effective norm of international life,

Declare that they are resolved to respect and carry out, in their relations with one another, inter alia, the following provisions which are in conformity with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States:

—To give effect and expression, by all the ways and forms which they consider appropriate, to the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with one another.

—To refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of

the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

—To refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

—To refrain from any act of economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

—To take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

—To promote, by all means which each of them considers appropriate, a climate of confidence and respect among peoples consonant with their duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression or for any threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State.

—To make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe, and to seek, first of all, a solution through the peaceful means set forth in Article 23 of the United Nations Charter.

To refrain from any action which could hinder the peaceful settlement of disputes between the participating States.

(ii) The participating States,

Reaffirming their determination to settle their disputes as set forth in the Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of disputes is a complement to refraining from the threat or use of force, both being essential though not exclusive factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security;

Desiring to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes;

1. Are resolved to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, and to continue to this end to work upon the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" submitted by Switzerland during the second stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other proposals relating to it and directed towards the elaboration of such a method.

2. Decide that, on the invitation of Switzerland, a meeting of experts of all the participating States will be convened in order to fulfil the mandate described in paragraph 1 above within the framework and

under the procedures of the follow-up to the Conference laid down in the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference".

3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of the representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States, scheduled according to the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference" for 1977; the results of the work of this meeting of experts will be submitted to Governments.

2.

Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament

The participating States,

Desiring of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final Act;

Recognizing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities;

Taking into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

Recognizing that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

Having studied the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

Recognizing that there are other ways in which individual States can contribute further to their common objectives;

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these objectives;

Recognizing that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

Have adopted the following:

I

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State, the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

Prior notification of other military manoeuvres

The participating States recognise that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognise that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

Exchange of observers

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral

basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

Prior notification of major military movements

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating States studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognise that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

Other confidence-building measures

The participating States recognise that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

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In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognise that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

II

Questions relating to disarmament

The participating States recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature con-

stitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

III

General considerations

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

—The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;

—The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;

—Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;

—The importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those States in having their views considered.

CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The participating States,

Convinced that their efforts to develop co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole,

Recognising that co-operation in these fields would promote economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life,

Aware of the diversity of their economic and social systems,

Reaffirming their will to intensify such co-operation between one another, irrespective of their systems,

Recognising that such co-operation, with due regard for the different levels of economic development, can be developed, on the basis of equality and mutual satisfaction of the partners, and of reciprocity permitting, as a whole, an equitable distribution of advantages and obligations of comparable scale, with respect for bilateral and multilateral agreements,

Taking into account the interests of the develop-

ing countries throughout the world, including those among the participating countries as long as they are developing from the economic point of view; reaffirming their will to co-operate for the achievement of the aims and objectives established by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations in the pertinent documents concerning development, it being understood that each participating State maintains the positions it has taken on them; giving special attention to the least developed countries,

Convinced that the growing world-wide economic interdependence calls for increasing common and effective efforts towards the solution of major world economic problems such as food, energy, commodities, monetary and financial problems, and therefore emphasizes the need for promoting stable and equitable international economic relations, thus contributing to the continuous and diversified economic development of all countries,

Having taken into account the work already undertaken by relevant international organizations and wishing to take advantage of the possibilities offered by these organizations, in particular by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for giving effect to the provisions of the final documents of the Conference,

Considering that the guidelines and concrete recommendations contained in the following texts are aimed at promoting further development of their mutual economic relations, and convinced that their co-operation in this field should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

Have adopted the following:

1. Commercial Exchanges

General provisions

The participating States,

Conscious of the growing role of international trade as one of the most important factors in economic growth and social progress,

Recognising that trade represents an essential sector of their co-operation, and bearing in mind that the provisions contained in the above preamble apply in particular to this sector,

Considering that the volume and structure of trade among the participating States do not in all cases correspond to the possibilities created by the current level of their economic, scientific and technological development,

are resolved to promote, on the basis of the modalities of their economic co-operation, the expansion of their mutual trade in goods and services, and to ensure conditions favourable to such development;

recognize the beneficial effects which can result for the development of trade from the application of most favoured nation treatment;

will encourage the expansion of trade on as broad a multilateral basis as possible, thereby endeavouring to utilize the various economic and commercial possibilities;

recognize the importance of bilateral and multi-

lateral intergovernmental and other agreements for the long-term development of trade;

note the importance of monetary and financial questions for the development of international trade, and will endeavour to deal with them with a view to contributing to the continuous expansion of trade;

will endeavour to reduce or progressively eliminate all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade;

will foster a steady growth of trade while avoiding as far as possible abrupt fluctuations in their trade;

consider that their trade in various products should be conducted in such a way as not to cause or threaten to cause serious injury—and should the situation arise, market disruption—in domestic markets for these products and in particular to the detriment of domestic producers of like or directly competitive products; as regards the concept of market disruption, it is understood that it should not be invoked in a way inconsistent with the relevant provisions of their international agreements; if they resort to safeguard measures, they will do so in conformity with their commitments in this field arising from international agreements to which they are parties and will take account of the interests of the parties directly concerned;

will give due attention to measures for the promotion of trade and the diversification of its structure;

note that the growth and diversification of trade would contribute to widening the possibilities of choice of products;

consider it appropriate to create favourable conditions for the participation of firms, organizations and enterprises in the development of trade.

Business contacts and facilities

The participating States,

Conscious of the importance of the contribution which an improvement of business contacts, and the accompanying growth of confidence in business relationships, could make to the development of commercial and economic relations,

will take measures further to improve conditions for the expansion of contacts between representatives of official bodies, of the different organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with foreign trade, in particular, where useful, between sellers and users of products and services, for the purpose of studying commercial possibilities, concluding contracts, ensuring their implementation and providing after-sales services;

will encourage organizations, enterprises and firms concerned with foreign trade to take measures to accelerate the conduct of business negotiations;

will further take measures aimed at improving working conditions of representatives of foreign organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with external trade, particularly as follows:

—by providing the necessary information, including information on legislation and procedures relating to the establishment and operation of permanent representation by the above mentioned bodies;

—by examining as favourably as possible requests

for the establishment of permanent representation and of offices for this purpose, including, where appropriate, the opening of joint offices by two or more firms;

—by encouraging the provision, on conditions as favourable as possible and equal for all representatives of the above-mentioned bodies, of hotel accommodation, means of communication, and of other facilities normally required by them, as well as of suitable business and residential premises for purposes of permanent representation;

recognize the importance of such measures to encourage greater participation by small and medium sized firms in trade between participating States.

Economic and commercial information

The participating States,

Conscious of the growing role of economic and commercial information in the development of international trade,

Considering that economic information should be of such a nature as to allow adequate market analysis and to permit the preparation of medium and long term forecasts, thus contributing to the establishment of a continuing flow of trade and a better utilization of commercial possibilities,

Expressing their readiness to improve the quality and increase the quantity and supply of economic and relevant administrative information,

Considering that the value of statistical information on the international level depends to a considerable extent on the possibility of its comparability,

will promote the publication and dissemination of economic and commercial information at regular intervals and as quickly as possible, in particular:

—statistics concerning production, national income, budget, consumption and productivity;

—foreign trade statistics drawn up on the basis of comparable classification including breakdown by product with indication of volume and value, as well as country of origin or destination;

—laws and regulations concerning foreign trade;

—information allowing forecasts of development of the economy to assist in trade promotion, for example, information on the general orientation of national economic plans and programmes;

—other information to help businessmen in commercial contacts, for example, periodic directoria, lists, and where possible, organizational charts of firms and organizations concerned with foreign trade;

will in addition to the above encourage the development of the exchange of economic and commercial information through, where appropriate, joint commissions for economic, scientific and technical co-operation, national and joint chambers of commerce, and other suitable bodies;

will support a study, in the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, of the possibilities of creating a multilateral system of notification of laws and regulations concerning foreign trade and changes therein;

will encourage international work on the har-

monization of statistical nomenclatures, notably in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Marketing

The participating States,

Recognizing the importance of adapting production to the requirements of foreign markets in order to ensure the expansion of international trade,

Conscious of the need of exporters to be as fully familiar as possible with and take account of the requirements of potential users,

will encourage organisations, enterprises and firms concerned with foreign trade to develop further the knowledge and techniques required for effective marketing;

will encourage the improvement of conditions for the implementation of measures to promote trade and to satisfy the needs of users in respect of imported products, in particular through market research and advertising measures as well as, where useful, the establishment of supply facilities, the furnishing of spare parts, the functioning of after sales services, and the training of the necessary local technical personnel;

will encourage international co-operation in the field of trade promotion, including marketing, and the work undertaken on these subjects within the international bodies, in particular the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

2. Industrial co-operation and projects of common interest

Industrial co-operation

The participating States,

Considering that industrial co-operation, being motivated by economic considerations, can

—create lasting ties thus strengthening long-term overall economic co-operation,

—contribute to economic growth as well as to the expansion and diversification of international trade and to a wider utilization of modern technology,

—lead to the mutually advantageous utilization of economic complementarities through better use of all factors of production, and

—accelerate the industrial development of all those who take part in such co-operation,

propose to encourage the development of industrial co-operation between the competent organisations, enterprises and firms of their countries;

consider that industrial co-operation may be facilitated by means of intergovernmental and other bilateral and multilateral agreements between the interested parties;

note that in promoting industrial co-operation they should bear in mind the economic structures and the development levels of their countries;

note that industrial co-operation is implemented by means of contracts concluded between competent organisations, enterprises and firms on the basis of economic considerations;

express their willingness to promote measures designed to create favourable conditions for industrial co-operation;

recognize that industrial co-operation covers a number of forms of economic relations going beyond the framework of conventional trade, and that in concluding contracts on industrial co-operation the partners will determine jointly the appropriate forms and conditions of co-operation, taking into account their mutual interests and capabilities;

recognize further that, if it is in their mutual interest, concrete forms such as the following may be useful for the development of industrial co-operation: joint production and sale, specialization in production and sale, construction, adaptation and modernization of industrial plants, co-operation for the setting up of complete industrial installations with a view to thus obtaining part of the resultant products, mixed companies, exchanges of "know-how", of technical information, of patents and of licences, and joint industrial research within the framework of specific co-operation projects;

recognize that new forms of industrial co-operation can be applied with a view to meeting specific needs;

note the importance of economic, commercial, technical and administrative information such as to ensure the development of industrial co-operation;

Consider it desirable:

—to improve the quality and the quantity of information relevant to industrial co-operation, in particular the laws and regulations, including those relating to foreign exchange, general orientation of national economic plans and programmes as well as programme priorities and economic conditions of the market; and

—to disseminate as quickly as possible published documentation thereon;

will encourage all forms of exchange of information and communication of experience relevant to industrial co-operation, including through contacts between potential partners and, where appropriate, through joint commissions for economic, industrial, scientific and technical co-operation, national and joint chambers of commerce, and other suitable bodies;

consider it desirable, with a view to expanding industrial co-operation, to encourage the exploration of co-operation possibilities and the implementation of co-operation projects and will take measures to this end, *inter alia*, by facilitating and increasing all forms of business contacts between competent organisations, enterprises and firms and between their respective qualified personnel;

note that the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to business contacts in the economic and commercial fields also apply to foreign organisations, enterprises and firms engaged in industrial co-operation, taking into account the specific conditions of this co-operation, and will endeavour to ensure, in particular, the existence of appropriate working conditions for personnel engaged in the implementation of co-operation projects;

consider it desirable that proposals for industrial co-operation projects should be sufficiently specific

and should contain the necessary economic and technical data, in particular preliminary estimates of the cost of the project, information on the form of co-operation envisaged, and market possibilities, to enable potential partners to proceed with initial studies and to arrive at decisions in the shortest possible time;

will encourage the parties concerned with industrial co-operation to take measures to accelerate the conduct of negotiations for the conclusion of co-operation contracts;

recommend further the continued examination—for example within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe—of means of improving the provision of information to those concerned on general conditions of industrial co-operation and guidance on the preparation of contracts in this field;

consider it desirable to further improve conditions for the implementation of industrial co-operation projects, in particular with respect to:

—the protection of the interests of the partners in industrial co-operation projects, including the legal protection of the various kinds of property involved;

—the consideration, in ways that are compatible with their economic systems, of the needs and possibilities of industrial co-operation within the framework of economic policy and particularly in national economic plans and programmes;

consider it desirable that the partners, when concluding industrial co-operation contracts, should devote due attention to provisions concerning the extension of the necessary mutual assistance and the provision of the necessary information during the implementation of these contracts, in particular with a view to attaining the required technical level and quality of the products resulting from such co-operation;

recognize the usefulness of an increased participation of small and medium sized firms in industrial co-operation projects.

Projects of common interest

The participating States,

Considering that their economic potential and their natural resources permit, through common efforts, long-term co-operation in the implementation, including at the regional or sub-regional level, of major projects of common interest, and that these may contribute to the speeding-up of the economic development of the countries participating therein,

Considering it desirable that the competent organizations, enterprises and firms of all countries should be given the possibility of indicating their interest in participating in such projects, and, in case of agreement, of taking part in their implementation,

Noting that the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to industrial cooperation are also applicable to projects of common interest,

regard it as necessary to encourage, where appro-

priate, the investigation by competent and interested organizations, enterprises and firms of the possibilities for the carrying out of projects of common interest in the fields of energy resources and of the exploitation of raw materials, as well as of transport and communications;

regard it as desirable that organizations, enterprises and firms exploring the possibilities of taking part in projects of common interest exchange with their potential partners, through the appropriate channels, the requisite economic, legal, financial and technical information pertaining to these projects;

consider that the fields of energy resources, in particular, petroleum, natural gas and coal, and the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials, in particular, iron ore and bauxite, are suitable ones for strengthening long-term economic co-operation and for the development of trade which could result;

consider that possibilities for projects of common interest with a view to long-term economic co-operation also exist in the following fields:

—exchanges of electrical energy within Europe with a view to utilizing the capacity of the electrical power stations as rationally as possible;

—co-operation in research for new sources of energy and, in particular, in the field of nuclear energy;

—development of road networks and co-operation aimed at establishing a coherent navigable network in Europe;

—co-operation in research and the perfecting of equipment for multimodal transport operations and for the handling of containers;

recommend that the States interested in projects of common interest should consider under what conditions it would be possible to establish them, and if they so desire, create the necessary conditions for their actual implementation.

3. Provisions concerning trade and industrial co-operation

Harmonization of standards

The participating States,

Recognizing the development of international harmonization of standards and technical regulations and of international co-operation in the field of certification as an important means of eliminating technical obstacles to international trade and industrial co-operation, thereby facilitating their development and increasing productivity,

reaffirm their interest to achieve the widest possible international harmonization of standards and technical regulations;

express their readiness to promote international agreements and other appropriate arrangements on acceptance of certificates of conformity with standards and technical regulations;

consider it desirable to increase international co-operation on standardization, in particular by supporting the activities of intergovernmental and other appropriate organizations in this field.

Arbitration

The participating States,

Considering that the prompt and equitable settlement of disputes which may arise from commercial transactions relating to goods and services and contracts for industrial co-operation would contribute to expanding and facilitating trade and co-operation,

Considering that arbitration is an appropriate means of settling such disputes,

recommend, where appropriate, to organizations, enterprises and firms in their countries, to include arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and industrial co-operation contracts, or in special agreements;

recommend that the provisions on arbitration should provide for arbitration under a mutually acceptable set of arbitration rules, and permit arbitration in a third country, taking into account existing intergovernmental and other agreements in this field.

Specific bilateral arrangements

The participating States,

Conscious of the need to facilitate trade and to promote the application of new forms of industrial co-operation,

will consider favourably the conclusion, in appropriate cases, of specific bilateral agreements concerning various problems of mutual interest in the fields of commercial exchanges and industrial co-operation, in particular with a view to avoiding double taxation and to facilitating the transfer of profits and the return of the value of the assets invested.

4. Science and technology

The participating States,

Convinced that scientific and technological co-operation constitutes an important contribution to the strengthening of security and co-operation among them, in that it assists the effective solution of problems of common interest and the improvement of the conditions of human life,

Considering that in developing such co-operation, it is important to promote the sharing of information and experience, facilitating the study and transfer of scientific and technological achievements, as well as the access to such achievements on a mutually advantageous basis and in fields of co-operation agreed between interested parties,

Considering that it is for the potential partners, i.e. the competent organizations, institutions, enterprises, scientists and technologists of the participating States to determine the opportunities for mutually beneficial co-operation and to develop its details,

Affirming that such co-operation can be developed and implemented bilaterally and multilaterally at the governmental and non-governmental levels, for example, through intergovernmental and other agreements, international programmes, co-operative proj-

ects and commercial channels, while utilizing also various forms of contacts, including direct and individual contacts,

Aware of the need to take measures further to improve scientific and technological co-operation between them,

Possibilities for improving co-operation

Recognise that possibilities exist for further improving scientific and technological co-operation, and to this end, express their intention to remove obstacles to such co-operation, in particular through:

—the improvement of opportunities for the exchange and dissemination of scientific and technological information among the parties interested in scientific and technological research and co-operation including information related to the organization and implementation of such co-operation;

—the expeditious implementation and improvement in organization, including programmes, of international visits of scientists and specialists in connexion with exchanges, conferences and co-operation;

—the wider use of commercial channels and activities for applied scientific and technological research and for the transfer of achievements obtained in this field while providing information on and protection of intellectual and industrial property rights;

Fields of co-operation

Consider that possibilities to expand co-operation exist within the areas given below as examples, noting that it is for potential partners in the participating countries to identify and develop projects and arrangements of mutual interest and benefit:

Agriculture

Research into new methods and technologies for increasing the productivity of crop cultivation and animal husbandry; the application of chemistry to agriculture; the design, construction and utilisation of agricultural machinery; technologies of irrigation and other agricultural land improvement works;

Energy

New technologies of production, transport and distribution of energy aimed at improving the use of existing fuels and sources of hydroenergy, as well as research in the field of new energy sources, including nuclear, solar and geothermal energy;

New technologies, rational use of resources

Research on new technologies and equipment designed in particular to reduce energy consumption and to minimise or eliminate waste;

Transport technology

Research on the means of transport and the technology applied to the development and operation of international, national and urban transport networks including container transport as well as transport safety;

Physics

Study of problems in high energy physics and plasma physics; research in the field of theoretical and experimental nuclear physics;

Chemistry

Research on problems in electrochemistry and the chemistry of polymers, of natural products, and of metals and alloys, as well as the development of improved chemical technology, especially materials processing; practical application of the latest achievements of chemistry to industry, construction and other sectors of the economy;

Meteorology and hydrology

Meteorological and hydrological research, including methods of collection, evaluation and transmission of data and their utilization for weather forecasting and hydrology forecasting;

Oceanography

Oceanographic research, including the study of air/sea interactions;

Seismological research

Study and forecasting of earthquakes and associated geological changes; development and research of technology of seismic-resistant constructions;

Research on glaciology, permafrost and problems of life under conditions of cold

Research on glaciology and permafrost; transportation and construction technologies; human adaptation to climatic extremes and changes in the living conditions of indigenous populations;

Computer, communication and information technologies

Development of computers as well as of telecommunications and information systems; technology associated with computers and telecommunications, including their use for management systems, for production processes, for automation, for the study of economic problems, in scientific research and for the collection, processing and dissemination of information;

Space research

Space exploration and the study of the earth's natural resources and the natural environment by remote sensing in particular with the assistance of satellites and rocket-probes;

Medicine and public health

Research on cardiovascular, tumour and virus diseases, molecular biology, neurophysiology; development and testing of new drugs; study of contemporary problems of pediatrics, gerontology and the organization and techniques of medical services;

Environmental research

Research on specific scientific and technological problems related to human environment.

Forms and methods of co-operation

Express their view that scientific and technological co-operation should, in particular, employ the following forms and methods:

—exchange and circulation of books, periodicals and other scientific and technological publications and papers among interested organizations, scientific and technological institutions, enterprises and scientists and technologists, as well as participation in international programmes for the abstracting and indexing of publications;

—exchanges and visits as well as other direct contacts and communications among scientists and technologists, on the basis of mutual agreement and other arrangements, for such purposes as consultations, lecturing and conducting research, including the use of laboratories, scientific libraries, and other documentation centres in connexion therewith;

—holding of international and national conferences, symposia, seminars, courses and other meetings of a scientific and technological character, which would include the participation of foreign scientists and technologists;

—joint preparation and implementation of programmes and projects of mutual interest on the basis of consultation and agreement among all parties concerned, including, where possible and appropriate, exchanges of experience and research results, and correlation of research programmes, between scientific and technological research institutions and organizations;

—use of commercial channels and methods for identifying and transferring technological and scientific developments, including the conclusion of mutually beneficial co-operation arrangements between firms and enterprises in fields agreed upon between them and for carrying out, where appropriate, joint research and development programmes and projects;

consider it desirable that periodic exchanges of views and information take place on scientific policy, in particular on general problems of orientation and administration of research and the question of a better use of large-scale scientific and experimental equipment on a co-operative basis;

recommend that, in developing co-operation in the field of science and technology, full use be made of existing practices of bilateral and multilateral co-operation, including that of a regional or sub-regional character, together with the forms and methods of co-operation described in this document;

recommend further that more effective utilization be made of the possibilities and capabilities of existing international organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental, concerned with science and technology, for improving exchanges of information and experience, as well as for developing other forms of co-operation in fields of common interest, for example:

—in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, study of possibilities for expanding multilateral co-operation, taking into account models for projects and research used in various international organizations; and for sponsoring conferences, symposia, and study and working groups such as those which would bring together younger scientists and technologists with eminent specialists in their field;

—through their participation in particular international scientific and technological co-operation programmes, including those of UNESCO and other

international organizations, pursuit of continuing progress towards the objectives of such programmes, notably those of UNISIST [World Science Information System] with particular respect to information policy guidance, technical advice, information contributions and data processing.

5. Environment

The participating States,

Affirming that the protection and improvement of the environment, as well as the protection of nature and the rational utilization of its resources in the interests of present and future generations, is one of the tasks of major importance to the well-being of peoples and the economic development of all countries and that many environmental problems, particularly in Europe, can be solved effectively only through close international co-operation,

Acknowledging that each of the participating States, in accordance with the principles of international law, ought to ensure, in a spirit of co-operation, that activities carried out on its territory do not cause degradation of the environment in another State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,

Considering that the success of any environmental policy presupposes that all population groups and social forces, aware of their responsibilities, help to protect and improve the environment, which necessitates continued and thorough educative action, particularly with regard to youth,

Affirming that experience has shown that economic development and technological progress must be compatible with the protection of the environment and the preservation of historical and cultural values; that damage to the environment is best avoided by preventive measures; and that the ecological balance must be preserved in the exploitation and management of natural resources,

Aims of co-operation

Agree to the following aims of co-operation, in particular:

—to study, with a view to their solution, those environmental problems which, by their nature, are of a multilateral, bilateral, regional or sub-regional dimension; as well as to encourage the development of an interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems;

—to increase the effectiveness of national and international measures for the protection of the environment, by the comparison and, if appropriate, the harmonization of methods of gathering and analysing facts, by improving the knowledge of pollution phenomena and rational utilization of natural resources, by the exchange of information, by the harmonization of definitions and the adoption, as far as possible, of a common terminology in the field of the environment;

—to take the necessary measures to bring environmental policies closer together and, where appropriate and possible, to harmonize them;

—to encourage, where possible and appropriate, national and international efforts by their interested

organizations, enterprises and firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment designed for monitoring, protecting and enhancing the environment.

Fields of co-operation

To attain these aims, the participating States will make use of every suitable opportunity to co-operate in the field of environment and, in particular, within the areas described below as examples:

Control of air pollution

Desulphurization of fossil fuels and exhaust gases; pollution control of heavy metals, particles, aerosols, nitrogen oxides, in particular those emitted by transport, power stations, and other industrial plants; systems and methods of observation and control of air pollution and its effects, including long-range transport of air pollutants;

Water pollution control and fresh water utilization

Prevention and control of water pollution, in particular of transboundary rivers and international lakes; techniques for the improvement of the quality of water and further development of ways and means for industrial and municipal sewage effluent purification; methods of assessment of fresh water resources and the improvement of their utilization, in particular by developing methods of production which are less polluting and lead to less consumption of fresh water;

Protection of the marine environment

Protection of the marine environment of participating States, and especially the Mediterranean Sea, from pollutants emanating from land-based sources and those from ships and other vessels, notably the harmful substances listed in Annexes I and II to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters; problems of maintaining marine ecological balances and food chains, in particular such problems as may arise from the exploration and exploitation of biological and mineral resources of the seas and the sea-bed;

Land utilization and soils

Problems associated with more effective use of lands, including land amelioration, reclamation and recultivation; control of soil pollution, water and air erosion, as well as other forms of soil degradation; maintaining and increasing the productivity of soils with due regard for the possible negative effects of the application of chemical fertilisers and pesticides;

Nature conservation and nature reserves

Protection of nature and nature reserves; conservation and maintenance of existing genetic resources, especially rare animal and plant species; conservation of natural ecological systems; establishment of nature reserves and other protected landscapes and areas, including their use for research, tourism, recreation and other purposes;

Improvement of environmental conditions in areas of human settlement

Environmental conditions associated with trans-

port, housing, working areas, urban development and planning, water supply and sewage disposal systems; assessment of harmful effects of noise, and noise control methods; collection, treatment and utilisation of wastes, including the recovery and recycling of materials; research on substitutes for non-biodegradable substances;

Fundamental research, monitoring, forecasting and assessment of environmental changes

Study of changes in climate, landscapes and ecological balances under the impact of both natural factors and human activities; forecasting of possible genetic changes in flora and fauna as a result of environmental pollution; harmonisation of statistical data, development of scientific concepts and systems of monitoring networks, standardised methods of observation, measurement and assessment of changes in the biosphere; assessment of the effects of environmental pollution levels and degradation of the environment upon human health; study and development of criteria and standards for various environmental pollutants and regulation regarding production and use of various products;

Legal and administrative measures

Legal and administrative measures for the protection of the environment including procedures for establishing environmental impact assessments.

Forms and methods of co-operation

The participating States declare that problems relating to the protection and improvement of the environment will be solved on both a bilateral and a multilateral, including regional and sub-regional, basis, making full use of existing patterns and forms of co-operation. They will develop co-operation in the field of the environment in particular by taking into consideration the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Prague symposium on environmental problems.

The participating States are resolved that co-operation in the field of the environment will be implemented in particular through:

- exchanges of scientific and technical information, documentation and research results, including information on the means of determining the possible effects on the environment of technical and economic activities;

- organization of conferences, symposia and meetings of experts;

- exchanges of scientists, specialists and trainees;

- joint preparation and implementation of programmes and projects for the study and solution of various problems of environmental protection;

- harmonisation, where appropriate and necessary, of environmental protection standards and norms, in particular with the object of avoiding possible difficulties in trade which may arise from efforts to resolve ecological problems of production processes and which relate to the achievement of certain environmental qualities in manufactured products;

—consultations on various aspects of environmental protection, as agreed upon among countries concerned, especially in connexion with problems which could have international consequences.

The participating States will further develop such co-operation by:

- promoting the progressive development, codification and implementation of international law as one means of preserving and enhancing the human environment, including principles and practices, as accepted by them, relating to pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of their States affecting other countries and regions;

- supporting and promoting the implementation of relevant international Conventions to which they are parties, in particular those designed to prevent and combat marine and fresh water pollution, recommending States to ratify Conventions which have already been signed, as well as considering possibilities of accepting other appropriate Conventions to which they are not parties at present;

- advocating the inclusion, where appropriate and possible, of the various areas of co-operation into the programmes of work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supporting such co-operation within the framework of the Commission and of the United Nations Environment Programme, and taking into account the work of other competent international organizations of which they are members;

- making wider use, in all types of co-operation, of information already available from national and international sources, including internationally agreed criteria, and utilizing the possibilities and capabilities of various competent international organizations.

The participating States agree on the following recommendations on specific measures:

- to develop through international co-operation an extensive programme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants, starting with sulphur dioxide and with possible extension to other pollutants, and to this end to take into account basic elements of a co-operation programme which were identified by the experts who met in Oslo in December 1974 at the invitation of the Norwegian Institute of Air Research;

- to advocate that within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe a study be carried out of procedures and relevant experience relating to the activities of Governments in developing the capabilities of their countries to predict adequately environmental consequences of economic activities and technological development.

6. Co-operation in other areas

Development of transport

The participating States,

Considering that the improvement of the conditions of transport constitutes one of the factors essential to the development of co-operation among them,

Considering that it is necessary to encourage the development of transport and the solution of existing problems by employing appropriate national and international means,

Taking into account the work being carried out on these subjects by existing international organizations, especially by the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,

note that the speed of technical progress in the various fields of transport makes desirable a development of co-operation and an increase in exchanges of information among them;

declare themselves in favour of a simplification and a harmonization of administrative formalities in the field of international transport, in particular at frontiers;

consider it desirable to promote, while allowing for their particular national circumstances in this sector, the harmonization of administrative and technical provisions concerning safety in road, rail, river, air and sea transport;

express their intention to encourage the development of international inland transport of passengers and goods as well as the possibilities of adequate participation in such transport on the basis of reciprocal advantage;

declare themselves in favour, with due respect for their rights and international commitments, of the elimination of disparities arising from the legal provisions applied to traffic on inland waterways which are subject to international conventions and, in particular, of the disparity in the application of those provisions; and to this end invite the member States of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, of the Danube Commission and of other bodies to develop the work and studies now being carried out, in particular within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe;

express their willingness, with a view to improving international rail transport and with due respect for their rights and international commitments, to work towards the elimination of difficulties arising from disparities in existing international legal provisions governing the reciprocal railway transport of passengers and goods between their territories;

express the desire for intensification of the work being carried out by existing international organizations in the field of transport, especially that of the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and express their intention to contribute thereto by their efforts;

consider that examination by the participating States of the possibility of their accession to the different conventions or to membership of international organizations specialising in transport matters, as well as their efforts to implement conventions when ratified, could contribute to the strengthening of their co-operation in this field.

Promotion of tourism

The participating States,

Aware of the contribution made by international tourism to the development of mutual understanding among peoples, to increased knowledge of other

countries' achievements in various fields, as well as to economic, social and cultural progress,

Recognising the interrelationship between the development of tourism and measures taken in other areas of economic activity,

express their intention to encourage increased tourism on both an individual and group basis in particular by:

—encouraging the improvement of the tourist infrastructure and co-operation in this field;

—encouraging the carrying out of joint tourist projects including technical co-operation, particularly where this is suggested by territorial proximity and the convergence of tourist interests;

—encouraging the exchange of information, including relevant laws and regulations, studies, data and documentation relating to tourism, and by improving statistics with a view to facilitating their comparability;

—dealing in a positive spirit with questions connected with the allocation of financial means for tourist travel abroad, having regard to their economic possibilities, as well as with those connected with the formalities required for such travel, taking into account other provisions on tourism adopted by the Conference;

—facilitating the activities of foreign travel agencies and passenger transport companies in the promotion of international tourism;

—encouraging tourism outside the high season;

—examining the possibilities of exchanging specialists and students in the field of tourism, with a view to improving their qualifications;

—promoting conferences and symposia on the planning and development of tourism;

consider it desirable to carry out in the appropriate international framework, and with the co-operation of the relevant national bodies, detailed studies on tourism, in particular:

—a comparative study on the status and activities of travel agencies as well as on ways and means of achieving better co-operation among them;

—a study of the problems raised by the seasonal concentration of vacations, with the ultimate objective of encouraging tourism outside peak periods;

—studies of the problems arising in areas where tourism has injured the environment;

consider also that interested parties might wish to study the following questions:

—uniformity of hotel classification; and

—tourist routes comprising two or more countries;

will endeavour, where possible, to ensure that the development of tourism does not injure the environment and the artistic, historic and cultural heritage in their respective countries;

will pursue their co-operation in the field of tourism bilaterally and multilaterally with a view to attaining the above objectives.

Economic and social aspects of migrant labour

The participating States,

Considering that the movements of migrant

workers in Europe have reached substantial proportions, and that they constitute an important economic, social and human factor for host countries as well as for countries of origin,

Recognising that workers' migrations have also given rise to a number of economic, social, human and other problems in both the receiving countries and the countries of origin,

Taking due account of the activities of the competent international organizations, more particularly the International Labour Organisation, in this area,

are of the opinion that the problems arising bilaterally from the migration of workers in Europe as well as between the participating States should be dealt with by the parties directly concerned, in order to resolve these problems in their mutual interest, in the light of the concern of each State involved to take due account of the requirements resulting from its socio-economic situation, having regard to the obligation of each State to comply with the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which it is party, and with the following aims in view:

to encourage the efforts of the countries of origin directed towards increasing the possibilities of employment for their nationals in their own territories, in particular by developing economic co-operation appropriate for this purpose and suitable for the host countries and the countries of origin concerned;

to ensure, through collaboration between the host country and the country of origin, the conditions under which the orderly movement of workers might take place, while at the same time protecting their personal and social welfare and, if appropriate, to organize the recruitment of migrant workers and the provision of elementary language and vocational training;

to ensure equality of rights between migrant workers and nationals of the host countries with regard to conditions of employment and work and to social security, and to endeavour to ensure that migrant workers may enjoy satisfactory living conditions, especially housing conditions;

to endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, that migrant workers may enjoy the same opportunities as nationals of the host countries of finding other suitable employment in the event of unemployment;

to regard with favour the provision of vocational training to migrant workers and, as far as possible, free instruction in the language of the host country, in the framework of their employment;

to confirm the right of migrant workers to receive, as far as possible, regular information in their own language, covering both their country of origin and the host country;

to ensure that the children of migrant workers established in the host country have access to the education usually given there, under the same conditions as the children of that country and, furthermore, to permit them to receive supplementary education in their own language, national culture, history and geography;

to bear in mind that migrant workers, particularly those who have acquired qualifications, can by re-

turning to their countries after a certain period of time help to remedy any deficiency of skilled labour in their country of origin;

to facilitate, as far as possible, the reuniting of migrant workers with their families;

to regard with favour the efforts of the countries of origin to attract the savings of migrant workers, with a view to increasing, within the framework of their economic development, appropriate opportunities for employment, thereby facilitating the reintegration of these workers on their return home.

Training of personnel

The participating States,

Conscious of the importance of the training and advanced training of professional staff and technicians for the economic development of every country,

declare themselves willing to encourage co-operation in this field notably by promoting exchange of information on the subject of institutions, programmes and methods of training and advanced training open to professional staff and technicians in the various sectors of economic activity and especially in those of management, public planning, agriculture and commercial and banking techniques;

consider that it is desirable to develop, under mutually acceptable conditions, exchanges of professional staff and technicians, particularly through training activities, of which it would be left to the competent and interested bodies in the participating States to discuss the modalities—duration, financing, education and qualification levels of potential participants;

declare themselves in favour of examining, through appropriate channels, the possibilities of co-operating on the organization and carrying out of vocational training on the job, more particularly in professions involving modern techniques.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The participating States,

Conscious of the geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political aspects of their relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean States,

Convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area,

Believing that the strengthening of security and the intensification of co-operation in Europe would stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean region, and expressing their intention to contribute towards peace, security and justice in the region, in which ends the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States have a common interest.

Recognising the importance of their mutual economic relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, and conscious of their common interest in the further development of co-operation,

Noting with appreciation the interest expressed by the non-participating Mediterranean States in the Conference since its inception, and having duly taken their contributions into account,

Declare their intention:

—to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, on which their relations are based, and with the United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and accordingly, in this context, to conduct their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States;

—to seek, by further improving their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, to increase mutual confidence, so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole;

—to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean States the development of mutually beneficial co-operation in the various fields of economic activity, especially by expanding commercial exchanges, on the basis of a common awareness of the necessity for stability and progress in trade relations, of their mutual economic interests, and of differences in the levels of economic development, thereby promoting their economic advancement and well-being;

—to contribute to a diversified development of the economies of the non-participating Mediterranean countries, whilst taking due account of their national development objectives, and to co-operate with them, especially in the sectors of industry, science and technology, in their efforts to achieve a better utilisation of their resources, thus promoting a more harmonious development of economic relations;

—to intensify their efforts and their co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the non-participating Mediterranean States directed towards the improvement of the environment of the Mediterranean, especially the safeguarding of the biological resources and ecological balance of the sea, by appropriate measures including the prevention and control of pollution; to this end, and in view of the present situation, to co-operate through competent international organizations and in particular within the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);

—to promote further contacts and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States in other relevant fields.

In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all

the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the region, and widening the scope of co-operation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives.

The participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes.

CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

The participating States,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Conscious that increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these aims,

Determined therefore to co-operate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create better conditions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of co-operation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims,

Convinced that this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

Have adopted the following:

1. Human Contacts

The participating States,

Considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

Affirming, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of détente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field

And conscious that the questions relevant hereto must be settled by the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions,

Make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connexion,

Declare their readiness to these ends to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed, and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

(a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties

In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.

Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. The preparation and issue of such documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of urgent necessity—such as serious illness or death—will be given priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning contacts on the basis of family ties will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

(b) Reunification of Families

The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character—such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connexion with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonably short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Persons whose applications for family reunification are granted may bring with them or ship their household and personal effects; to this end the participating States will use all possibilities provided by existing regulations.

Until members of the same family are reunited meetings and contacts between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning family reunification will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

The receiving participating State will take appropriate care with regard to employment for persons from other participating States who take up permanent residence in that State in connexion with family reunification with its citizens and see that they are afforded opportunities equal to those enjoyed by its own citizens for education, medical assistance and social security.

(c) Marriage between Citizens of Different States

The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification.

In dealing with requests from couples from different participating States, once married, to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their permanent residence to a State in which either one is normally a resident, the participating States will also apply the provisions accepted for family reunification.

(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons and to this end they intend in particular:

—gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry;

—to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory, with due regard to security requirements.

They will endeavour gradually to lower, where necessary, the fees for visas and official travel documents.

They intend to consider, as necessary, means—including, in so far as appropriate, the conclusion of multilateral or bilateral consular conventions or other relevant agreements or understandings—for the improvement of arrangements to provide consular assistance.

• • •

They confirm that religious faiths, institutions and organizations, practising within the constitutional framework of the participating States, and their representatives can, in the field of their activities, have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

(e) Improvement of Conditions for Tourism on an Individual or Collective Basis

The participating States consider that tourism contributes to a fuller knowledge of the life, culture and history of other countries, to the growth of understanding among peoples, to the improvement of contacts and to the broader use of leisure. They

intend to promote the development of tourism, on an individual or collective basis, and, in particular, they intend:

- to promote visits to their respective countries by encouraging the provision of appropriate facilities and the simplification and expediting of necessary formalities relating to such visits;

- to increase, on the basis of appropriate agreements or arrangements where necessary, co-operation in the development of tourism, in particular by considering bilaterally possible ways to increase information relating to travel to other countries and to the reception and service of tourists, and other related questions of mutual interest.

(f) Meetings among Young People

The participating States intend to further the development of contacts and exchanges among young people by encouraging:

- increased exchanges and contacts on a short or long term basis among young people working, training or undergoing education through bilateral or multilateral agreements or regular programmes in all cases where it is possible;

- study by their youth organizations of the question of possible agreements relating to frameworks of multilateral youth co-operation;

- agreements or regular programmes relating to the organization of exchanges of students, of international youth seminars, of courses of professional training and foreign language study;

- the further development of youth tourism and the provision to this end of appropriate facilities;

- the development, where possible, of exchanges, contacts and co-operation on a bilateral or multilateral basis between their organizations which represent wide circles of young people working, training or undergoing education;

- awareness among youth of the importance of developing mutual understanding and of strengthening friendly relations and confidence among peoples.

(g) Sport

In order to expand existing links and co-operation in the field of sport the participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges of this kind, including sports meetings and competitions of all sorts, on the basis of the established international rules, regulations and practice.

(h) Expansion of Contacts

By way of further developing contacts among governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations and associations, including women's organizations, the participating States will facilitate the convening of meetings as well as travel by delegations, groups and individuals.

2. Information

The participating States,
Conscious of the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in

other participating States,

Acknowledging the contribution of this process to the growth of confidence between peoples,

Desiring, with the development of mutual understanding between the participating States and with the further improvement of their relations, to continue further efforts towards progress in this field,

Recognizing the importance of the dissemination of information from the other participating States and of a better acquaintance with such information,

Emphasizing therefore the essential and influential role of the press, radio, television, cinema and news agencies and of the journalists working in these fields,

Make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, and

Express their intention in particular:

(a) Improvement of the Circulation of, Access to, and Exchange of Information

(i) Oral Information

—To facilitate the dissemination of oral information through the encouragement of lectures and lecture tours by personalities and specialists from the other participating States, as well as exchanges of opinions at round table meetings, seminars, symposia, summer schools, congresses and other bilateral and multilateral meetings.

(ii) Printed Information

—To facilitate the improvement of the dissemination, on their territory, of newspapers and printed publications, periodical and non-periodical, from the other participating States. For this purpose:

they will encourage their competent firms and organizations to conclude agreements and contracts designed gradually to increase the quantities and the number of titles of newspapers and publications imported from the other participating States. These agreements and contracts should in particular mention the speediest conditions of delivery and the use of the normal channels existing in each country for the distribution of its own publications and newspapers, as well as forms and means of payment agreed between the parties making it possible to achieve the objectives aimed at by these agreements and contracts;

where necessary, they will take appropriate measures to achieve the above objectives and to implement the provisions contained in the agreements and contracts.

—To contribute to the improvement of access by the public to periodical and non-periodical printed publications imported on the bases indicated above. In particular:

they will encourage an increase in the number of places where these publications are on sale;

they will facilitate the availability of these periodical publications during congresses, conferences,

official visits and other international events and to tourists during the season;

they will develop the possibilities for taking out subscriptions according to the modalities particular to each country;

they will improve the opportunities for reading and borrowing these publications in large public libraries and their reading rooms as well as in university libraries.

They intend to improve the possibilities for acquaintance with bulletins of official information issued by diplomatic missions and distributed by those missions on the basis of arrangements acceptable to the interested parties.

(iii) Filmed and Broadcast Information

—To promote the improvement of the dissemination of filmed and broadcast information. To this end:

they will encourage the wider showing and broadcasting of a greater variety of recorded and filmed information from the other participating States, illustrating the various aspects of life in their countries and received on the basis of such agreements or arrangements as may be necessary between the organizations and firms directly concerned;

they will facilitate the import by competent organizations and firms of recorded audio-visual material from the other participating States.

The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference.

(b) Co-operation in the Field of Information

—To encourage co-operation in the field of information on the basis of short or long term agreements or arrangements. In particular:

they will favour increased co-operation among mass media organizations, including press agencies, as well as among publishing houses and organizations;

they will favour co-operation among public or private, national or international radio and television organizations, in particular through the exchange of both live and recorded radio and television programmes, and through the joint production and the broadcasting and distribution of such programmes;

they will encourage meetings and contacts both between journalists' organizations and between journalists from the participating States;

they will view favourably the possibilities of arrangements between periodical publications as well as between newspapers from the participating States, for the purpose of exchanging and publishing articles;

they will encourage the exchange of technical information as well as the organization of joint research and meetings devoted to the exchange of experience and views between experts in the field of the press, radio and television.

(c) Improvement of Working Conditions for Journalists

The participating States, desiring to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, intend in particular to:

—examine in a favourable spirit and within a suitable and reasonable time scale requests from journalists for visas;

—grant to permanently accredited journalists of the participating States, on the basis of arrangements, multiple-entry and exit visas for specified periods;

—facilitate the issue to accredited journalists of the participating States of permits for stay in their country of temporary residence and, if and when these are necessary, of other official papers which it is appropriate for them to have;

—ease, on a basis of reciprocity, procedures for arranging travel by journalists of the participating States in the country where they are exercising their profession, and to provide progressively greater opportunities for such travel, subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons;

—ensure that requests by such journalists for such travel receive, in so far as possible, an expeditious response, taking into account the time scale of the request;

—increase the opportunities for journalists of the participating States to communicate personally with their sources, including organizations and official institutions;

—grant to journalists of the participating States the right to import, subject only to its being taken out again, the technical equipment (photographic, cinematographic, tape recorder, radio and television) necessary for the exercise of their profession;*

—enable journalists of the other participating States, whether permanently or temporarily accredited, to transmit completely, normally and rapidly by means recognized by the participating States to the information organs which they represent, the results of their professional activity, including tape recordings and undeveloped film, for the purpose of

*While recognizing that appropriate local personnel are employed by foreign journalists in many instances, the participating States note that the above provisions would be applied, subject to the observance of the appropriate rules, to persons from the other participating States, who are regularly and professionally engaged as technicians, photographers or cameramen of the press, radio, television or cinema. [Footnote in original.]

publication or of broadcasting on the radio or television.

The participating States reaffirm that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalize them. If an accredited journalist is expelled, he will be informed of the reasons for this act and may submit an application for re-examination of his case.

3. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture

The participating States,

Considering that cultural exchanges and co-operation contribute to a better comprehension among people and among peoples, and thus promote a lasting understanding among States,

Confirming the conclusions already formulated in this field at the multilateral level, particularly at the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, organized by UNESCO in Helsinki in June 1972, where interest was manifested in the active participation of the broadest possible social groups in an increasingly diversified cultural life,

Desiring, with the development of mutual confidence and the further improvement of relations between the participating States, to continue further efforts toward progress in this field,

Disposed in this spirit to increase substantially their cultural exchanges, with regard both to persons and to cultural works, and to develop among them an active co-operation, both at the bilateral and the multilateral level, in all the fields of culture,

Convinced that such a development of their mutual relations will contribute to the enrichment of the respective cultures, while respecting the originality of each, as well as to the reinforcement among them of a consciousness of common values, while continuing to develop cultural co-operation with other countries of the world,

Declare that they jointly set themselves the following objectives:

- (a) to develop the mutual exchange of information with a view to a better knowledge of respective cultural achievements,
- (b) to improve the facilities for the exchange and for the dissemination of cultural property,
- (c) to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements,
- (d) to develop contacts and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture,
- (e) to seek new fields and forms of cultural co-operation,

Thus give expression to their common will to take progressive, coherent and long-term action in order to achieve the objectives of the present declaration; and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

Extension of Relations

To expand and improve at the various levels co-operation and links in the field of culture, in particular by:

—concluding, where appropriate, agreements on a bilateral or multilateral basis, providing for the extension of relations among competent State institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of culture, as well as among people engaged in cultural activities, taking into account the need both for flexibility and the fullest possible use of existing agreements, and bearing in mind that agreements and also other arrangements constitute important means of developing cultural co-operation and exchanges;

—contributing to the development of direct communication and co-operation among relevant State institutions and non-governmental organizations, including, where necessary, such communication and co-operation carried out on the basis of special agreements and arrangements;

—encouraging direct contacts and communications among persons engaged in cultural activities, including, where necessary, such contacts and communications carried out on the basis of special agreements and arrangements.

Mutual Knowledge

Within their competence to adopt, on a bilateral and multilateral level, appropriate measures which would give their peoples a more comprehensive and complete mutual knowledge of their achievements in the various fields of culture, and among them:

—to examine jointly, if necessary with the assistance of appropriate international organizations, the possible creation in Europe and the structure of a bank of cultural data, which would collect information from the participating countries and make it available to its correspondents on their request, and to convene for this purpose a meeting of experts from interested States;

—to consider, if necessary in conjunction with appropriate international organizations, ways of compiling in Europe an inventory of documentary films of a cultural or scientific nature from the participating States;

—to encourage more frequent book exhibitions and to examine the possibility of organizing periodically in Europe a large-scale exhibition of books from the participating States;

—to promote the systematic exchange, between the institutions concerned and publishing houses, of catalogues of available books as well as of pre-publication material which will include, as far as possible, all forthcoming publications; and also to promote the exchange of material between firms publishing encyclopaedias, with a view to improving the presentation of each country;

—to examine jointly questions of expanding and improving exchanges of information in the various

fields of culture, such as theatre, music, library work as well as the conservation and restoration of cultural property.

Exchanges and Dissemination

To contribute to the improvement of facilities for exchanges and the dissemination of cultural property, by appropriate means, in particular by:

- studying the possibilities for harmonizing and reducing the charges relating to international commercial exchanges of books and other cultural materials, and also for new means of insuring works of art in foreign exhibitions and for reducing the risks of damage or loss to which these works are exposed by their movement;

- facilitating the formalities of customs clearance, in good time for programmes of artistic events, of the works of art, materials and accessories appearing on lists agreed upon by the organizers of these events;

- encouraging meetings among representatives of competent organizations and relevant firms to examine measures within their field of activity—such as the simplification of orders, time limits for sending supplies and modalities of payment—which might facilitate international commercial exchanges of books;

- promoting the loan and exchange of films among their film institutes and film libraries;

- encouraging the exchange of information among interested parties concerning events of a cultural character foreseen in the participating States, in fields where this is most appropriate, such as music, theatre and the plastic and graphic arts, with a view to contributing to the compilation and publication of a calendar of such events, with the assistance, where necessary, of the appropriate international organizations;

- encouraging a study of the impact which the foreseeable development, and a possible harmonization among interested parties, of the technical means used for the dissemination of culture might have on the development of cultural co-operation and exchanges, while keeping in view the preservation of the diversity and originality of their respective cultures;

- encouraging, in the way they deem appropriate, within their cultural policies, the further development of interest in the cultural heritage of the other participating States, conscious of the merits and the value of each culture;

- endeavouring to ensure the full and effective application of the international agreements and conventions on copyrights and on circulation of cultural property to which they are party or to which they may decide in the future to become party.

Access

To promote fuller mutual access by all to the achievements—works, experiences and performing arts—in the various fields of culture of their countries, and to that end to make the best possible efforts, in accordance with their competence, more particularly:

- to promote wider dissemination of books and artistic works, in particular by such means as:

- facilitating, while taking full account of the international copyright conventions to which they are party, international contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses as well as other cultural institutions, with a view to a more complete mutual access to cultural achievements;

- recommending that, in determining the size of editions, publishing houses take into account also the demand from the other participating States, and that rights of sale in other participating States be granted, where possible, to several sales organizations of the importing countries, by agreement between interested partners;

- encouraging competent organizations and relevant firms to conclude agreements and contracts and contributing, by this means, to a gradual increase in the number and diversity of works by authors from the other participating States available in the original and in translation in their libraries and bookshops;

- promoting, where deemed appropriate, an increase in the number of sales outlets where books by authors from the other participating States, imported in the original on the basis of agreements and contracts, and in translation, are for sale;

- promoting, on a wider scale, the translation of works in the sphere of literature and other fields of cultural activity, produced in the languages of the other participating States, especially from the less widely-spoken languages, and the publication and dissemination of the translated works by such measures as:

- encouraging more regular contacts between interested publishing houses;

- developing their efforts in the basic and advanced training of translators;

- encouraging, by appropriate means, the publishing houses of their countries to publish translations;

- facilitating the exchange between publishers and interested institutions of lists of books which might be translated;

- promoting between their countries the professional activity and co-operation of translators;

- carrying out joint studies on ways of further promoting translations and their dissemination;

- improving and expanding exchanges of books, bibliographies and catalogue cards between libraries;

- to envisage other appropriate measures which would permit, where necessary by mutual agreement among interested parties, the facilitation of access to their respective cultural achievements, in particular in the field of books;

- to contribute by appropriate means to the wider use of the mass media in order to improve mutual acquaintance with the cultural life of each;

- to seek to develop the necessary conditions for migrant workers and their families to preserve their links with their national culture, and also to adapt themselves to their new cultural environment;

- to encourage the competent bodies and enterprises to make a wider choice and effect wider distribution.

bution of full-length and documentary films from the other participating States, and to promote more frequent non-commercial showings, such as previews, film weeks and festivals, giving due consideration to films from countries whose cinematographic works are less well known;

—to promote, by appropriate means, the extension of opportunities for specialists from the other participating States to work with materials of a cultural character from film and audio-visual archives, within the framework of the existing rules for work on such archival materials;

—to encourage a joint study by interested bodies, where appropriate with the assistance of the competent international organizations, of the expediency and the conditions for the establishment of a repertory of their recorded television programmes of a cultural nature, as well as of the means of viewing them rapidly in order to facilitate their selection and possible acquisition.

Contacts and Co-operation

To contribute, by appropriate means, to the development of contacts and co-operation in the various fields of culture, especially among creative artists and people engaged in cultural activities, in particular by making efforts to:

—promote for persons active in the field of culture, travel and meetings including, where necessary, those carried out on the basis of agreements, contracts or other special arrangements and which are relevant to their cultural co-operation;

—encourage in this way contacts among creative and performing artists and artistic groups with a view to their working together, making known their works in other participating States or exchanging views on topics relevant to their common activity;

—encourage, where necessary through appropriate arrangements, exchanges of trainees and specialists and the granting of scholarships for basic and advanced training in various fields of culture such as the arts and architecture, museums and libraries, literary studies and translation, and contribute to the creation of favourable conditions of reception in their respective institutions;

—encourage the exchange of experience in the training of organizers of cultural activities as well as of teachers and specialists in fields such as theatre, opera, ballet, music and fine arts;

—continue to encourage the organization of international meetings among creative artists, especially young creative artists, on current questions of artistic and literary creation which are of interest for joint study;

—study other possibilities for developing exchanges and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture, with a view to a better mutual knowledge of the cultural life of the participating States.

Fields and Forms of Co-operation

To encourage the search for new fields and forms of cultural co-operation, to these ends contributing to the conclusion among interested parties, where necessary, of appropriate agreements and arrange-

ments, and in this context to promote:

—joint studies regarding cultural policies, in particular in their social aspects, and as they relate to planning, town-planning, educational and environmental policies, and the cultural aspects of tourism;

—the exchange of knowledge in the realm of cultural diversity, with a view to contributing thus to a better understanding by interested parties of such diversity where it occurs;

—the exchange of information, and as may be appropriate, meetings of experts, the elaboration and the execution of research programmes and projects, as well as their joint evaluation, and the dissemination of the results, on the subjects indicated above;

—such forms of cultural co-operation and the development of such joint projects as:

international events in the fields of the plastic and graphic arts, cinema, theatre, ballet, music, folklore, etc.; book fairs and exhibitions, joint performances of operatic and dramatic works, as well as performances given by soloists, instrumental ensembles, orchestras, choirs and other artistic groups, including those composed of amateurs, paying due attention to the organization of international cultural youth events and the exchange of young artists;

the inclusion of works by writers and composers from the other participating States in the repertoires of soloists and artistic ensembles;

the preparation, translation and publication of articles, studies and monographs, as well as of low-cost books and of artistic and literary collections, suited to making better known respective cultural achievements, envisaging for this purpose meetings among experts and representatives of publishing houses;

the co-production and the exchange of films and of radio and television programmes, by promoting, in particular, meetings among producers, technicians and representatives of the public authorities with a view to working out favourable conditions for the execution of specific joint projects and by encouraging, in the field of co-production, the establishment of international filming teams;

the organization of competitions for architects and town-planners, bearing in mind the possible implementation of the best projects and the formation, where possible, of international teams;

the implementation of joint projects for conserving, restoring and showing to advantage works of art, historical and archaeological monuments and sites of cultural interest, with the help, in appropriate cases, of international organizations of a governmental or non-governmental character as well as of private institutions—competent and active in these fields—envisaging for this purpose:

periodic meetings of experts of the interested parties to elaborate the necessary proposals, while bearing in mind the need to consider these questions in a wider social and economic context;

the publication in appropriate periodicals of articles designed to make known and to compare, among the participating States, the most significant achievements and innovations;

a joint study with a view to the improvement and possible harmonization of the different sys-

tems used to inventory and catalogue the historical monuments and places of cultural interest in their countries;

the study of the possibilities for organizing international courses for the training of specialists in different disciplines relating to restoration.

. . .

National minorities or regional cultures. The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of culture, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.

4. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Education

The participating States,

Conscious that the development of relations of an international character in the fields of education and science contributes to a better mutual understanding and is to the advantage of all peoples as well as to the benefit of future generations,

Prepared to facilitate, between organizations, institutions and persons engaged in education and science, the further development of exchanges of knowledge and experience as well as of contacts, on the basis of special arrangements where these are necessary,

Desiring to strengthen the links among educational and scientific establishments and also to encourage their co-operation in sectors of common interest, particularly where the levels of knowledge and resources require efforts to be concerted internationally, and

Convinced that progress in these fields should be accompanied and supported by a wider knowledge of foreign languages,

Express to these ends their intention in particular:

(a) Extension of Relations

To expand and improve at the various levels co-operation and links in the fields of education and science, in particular by:

—concluding, where appropriate, bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for co-operation and exchanges among State institutions, non-governmental bodies and persons engaged in activities in education and science, bearing in mind the need both for flexibility and the fuller use of existing agreements and arrangements;

—promoting the conclusion of direct arrangements between universities and other institutions of higher education and research, in the framework of agreements between governments where appropriate;

—encouraging among persons engaged in education and science direct contacts and communications, including those based on special agreements or arrangements where these are appropriate.

(b) Access and Exchanges

To improve access, under mutually acceptable con-

ditions, for students, teachers and scholars of the participating States to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and to intensify exchanges among these institutions in all areas of common interest, in particular by:

—increasing the exchange of information on facilities for study and courses open to foreign participants, as well as on the conditions under which they will be admitted and received;

—facilitating travel between the participating States by scholars, teachers and students for purposes of study, teaching and research as well as for improving knowledge of each other's educational, cultural and scientific achievements;

—encouraging the award of scholarships for study, teaching and research in their countries to scholars, teachers and students of other participating States;

—establishing, developing or encouraging programmes providing for the broader exchange of scholars, teachers and students, including the organization of symposia, seminars and collaborative projects, and the exchanges of educational and scholarly information such as university publications and materials from libraries;

—promoting the efficient implementation of such arrangements and programmes by providing scholars, teachers and students in good time with more detailed information about their placing in universities and institutes and the programmes envisaged for them; by granting them the opportunity to use relevant scholarly, scientific and open archival materials; and by facilitating their travel within the receiving State for the purpose of study or research as well as in the form of vacation tours on the basis of the usual procedures;

—promoting a more exact assessment of the problems of comparison and equivalence of academic degrees and diplomas by fostering the exchange of information on the organization, duration and content of studies, the comparison of methods of assessing levels of knowledge and academic qualifications, and, where feasible, arriving at the mutual recognition of academic degrees and diplomas either through governmental agreements, where necessary, or direct arrangements between universities and other institutions of higher learning and research;

—recommending, moreover, to the appropriate international organizations that they should intensify their efforts to reach a generally acceptable solution to the problems of comparison and equivalence between academic degrees and diplomas.

(c) Science

Within their competence to broaden and improve co-operation and exchanges in the field of science, in particular:

To increase, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the exchange and dissemination of scientific information and documentation by such means as:

—making this information more widely available to scientists and research workers of the other participating States through, for instance, participation in international information-sharing programmes or through other appropriate arrangements;

—broadening and facilitating the exchange of samples and other scientific materials used particularly for fundamental research in the fields of natural sciences and medicine;

—inviting scientific institutions and universities to keep each other more fully and regularly informed about their current and contemplated research work in fields of common interest.

To facilitate the extension of communications and direct contacts between universities, scientific institutions and associations as well as among scientists and research workers, including those based where necessary on special agreements or arrangements, by such means as:

—further developing exchanges of scientists and research workers and encouraging the organization of preparatory meetings or working groups on research topics of common interest;

—encouraging the creation of joint teams of scientists to pursue research projects under arrangements made by the scientific institutions of several countries;

—assisting the organization and successful functioning of international conferences and seminars and participation in them by their scientists and research workers;

—furthermore envisaging, in the near future, a "Scientific Forum" in the form of a meeting of leading personalities in science from the participating States to discuss interrelated problems of common interest concerning current and future developments in science, and to promote the expansion of contacts, communications and the exchange of information between scientific institutions and among scientists;

—foreseeing, at an early date, a meeting of experts representing the participating States and their national scientific institutions, in order to prepare such a "Scientific Forum" in consultation with appropriate international organizations, such as UNESCO and the ECE;

—considering in due course what further steps might be taken with respect to the "Scientific Forum".

To develop in the field of scientific research, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the co-ordination of programmes carried out in the participating States and the organization of joint programmes, especially in the areas mentioned below, which may involve the combined efforts of scientists and in certain cases the use of costly or unique equipment. The list of subjects in these areas is illustrative; and specific projects would have to be determined subsequently by the potential partners in the participating States, taking account of the contribution which could be made by appropriate international organizations and scientific institutions:

—exact and natural sciences, in particular fundamental research in such fields as mathematics, physics, theoretical physics, geophysics, chemistry, biology, ecology and astronomy;

—medicine, in particular basic research into cancer and cardiovascular diseases, studies on the diseases endemic in the developing countries, as well

as medico-social research with special emphasis on occupational diseases, the rehabilitation of the handicapped and the care of mothers, children and the elderly;

—the humanities and social sciences, such as history, geography, philosophy, psychology, pedagogical research, linguistics, sociology, the legal, political and economic sciences; comparative studies on social, socio-economic and cultural phenomena which are of common interest to the participating States, especially the problems of human environment and urban development; and scientific studies on the methods of conserving and restoring monuments and works of art.

(d) Foreign Languages and Civilizations

To encourage the study of foreign languages and civilizations as an important means of expanding communication among peoples for their better acquaintance with the culture of each country, as well as for the strengthening of international co-operation; to this end to stimulate, within their competence, the further development and improvement of foreign language teaching and the diversification of choice of languages taught at various levels, paying due attention to less widely-spread or studied languages, and in particular:

—to intensify co-operation aimed at improving the teaching of foreign languages through exchanges of information and experience concerning the development and application of effective modern teaching methods and technical aids, adapted to the needs of different categories of students, including methods of accelerated teaching; and to consider the possibility of conducting, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, studies of new methods of foreign language teaching;

—to encourage co-operation between institutions concerned, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, aimed at exploiting more fully the resources of modern educational technology in language teaching, for example through comparative studies by their specialists and, where agreed, through exchanges or transfers of audio-visual materials, of materials used for preparing textbooks, as well as of information about new types of technical equipment used for teaching languages;

—to promote the exchange of information on the experience acquired in the training of language teachers and to intensify exchanges on a bilateral basis of language teachers and students as well as to facilitate their participation in summer courses in languages and civilizations, wherever these are organized;

—to encourage co-operation among experts in the field of lexicography with the aim of defining the necessary terminological equivalents, particularly in the scientific and technical disciplines, in order to facilitate relations among scientific institutions and specialists;

—to promote the wider spread of foreign language study among the different types of secondary education establishments and greater possibilities of choice between an increased number of European languages; and in this context to consider, wherever appropriate, the possibilities for developing the re-

recruitment and training of teachers as well as the organization of the student groups required;

—to favour, in higher education, a wider choice in the languages offered to language students and greater opportunities for other students to study various foreign languages; also to facilitate, where desirable, the organization of courses in languages and civilizations, on the basis of special arrangements as necessary, to be given by foreign lecturers, particularly from European countries having less widely-spread or studied languages;

—to promote, within the framework of adult education, the further development of specialized programmes, adapted to various needs and interests, for teaching foreign languages to their own inhabitants and the languages of host countries to interested adults from other countries; in this context to encourage interested institutions to co-operate, for example, in the elaboration of programmes for teaching by radio and television and by accelerated methods, and also, where desirable, in the definition of study objectives for such programmes, with a view to arriving at comparable levels of language proficiency;

—to encourage the association, where appropriate, of the teaching of foreign languages with the study of the corresponding civilizations and also to make further efforts to stimulate interest in the study of foreign languages, including relevant out-of-class activities.

(e) Teaching Methods

To promote the exchange of experience, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in teaching methods at all levels of education, including those used in permanent and adult education, as well as the exchange of teaching materials, in particular by:

—further developing various forms of contacts and co-operation in the different fields of pedagogical science, for example through comparative or joint studies carried out by interested institutions or through exchanges of information on the results of teaching experiments;

—intensifying exchanges of information on teaching methods used in various educational systems and on results of research into the processes by which pupils and students acquire knowledge, taking account of relevant experience in different types of specialized education;

—facilitating exchanges of experience concerning the organisation and functioning of education intended for adults and recurrent education, the relationships between these and other forms and levels of education, as well as concerning the means of adapting education, including vocational and technical training, to the needs of economic and social development in their countries;

—encouraging exchanges of experience in the education of youth and adults in international understanding, with particular reference to those major problems of mankind whose solution calls for a common approach and wider international co-operation;

—encouraging exchanges of teaching materials—including school textbooks, having in mind the possibility of promoting mutual knowledge and facilitating the presentation of each country in such books—as well as exchanges of information on technical innovations in the field of education.

. . .

National minorities or regional cultures. The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of education, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.

FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

The participating States,

Having considered and evaluated the progress made at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

Considering further that, within the broader context of the world, the Conference is an important part of the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe and that its results will contribute significantly to this process,

Intending to implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference in order to give full effect to its results and thus to further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe,

Convinced that, in order to achieve the aims sought by the Conference, they should make further unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts and continue, in the appropriate forms set forth below, the multilateral process initiated by the Conference,

1. *Declare their resolve, in the period following the Conference, to pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference:*

(a) *unilaterally, in all cases which lend themselves to such action;*

(b) *bilaterally, by negotiations with other participating States;*

(c) *multilaterally, by meetings of experts of the participating States, and also within the framework of existing international organizations, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO, with regard to educational, scientific and cultural co-operation;*

2. *Declare furthermore their resolve to continue the multilateral process initiated by the Conference:*

(a) *by proceeding to a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and*

the development of the process of détente in the future;

(b) by organizing to these ends meetings among their representatives, beginning with a meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This meeting will define the appropriate modalities for the holding of other meetings which could include further similar meetings and the possibility of a new Conference;

2. The first of the meetings indicated above will be held at Belgrade in 1977. A preparatory meeting to organize this meeting will be held at Belgrade on 15 June 1977. The preparatory meeting will decide on the date, duration, agenda and other modalities of the meeting of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

4. The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses of the Conference will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the meetings envisaged in paragraphs 1 (c), 2 and 3 above. All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in the participating States in rotation. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

The original of this Final Act, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Finland, which will retain it in its archives. Each of the participating States will receive from the Government of the Republic of Finland a true copy of this Final Act.

The text of this Final Act will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to its circulation to all the members of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations.*

The Government of the Republic of Finland is also requested to transmit the text of this Final Act to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Wherefore, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance which they attach to the results of the Conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts, have subscribed their signatures below:*

The Federal Republic of Germany:
HELMUT SCHMIDT, *Federal Chancellor*

The German Democratic Republic:
ERICH HONNECKER, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany*

The United States of America:
GERALD R. FORD, *President of the United States of America*

The Republic of Austria:
BRUNO KREISKY, *Federal Chancellor*

The Kingdom of Belgium:
LEO TINDEMANS, *Prime Minister*

The People's Republic of Bulgaria:
TODOR JIVKOV, *First Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and President of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria*

Canada:
PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, *Prime Minister*

The Republic of Cyprus:
His Beatitude Archbishop MAKARIOS III, *President of the Republic of Cyprus*

Denmark:
ANKER JOERGENSEN, *Prime Minister*

Spain:
CARLOS ARIAS NAVARRO, *Head of the Government*

The Republic of Finland:
URHO KEKKONEN, *President of the Republic*

The French Republic:
VALÉRY GISCARD D'ESTAING

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
The Rt. Hon. HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E., M.P.,
F.R.S., *First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*

The Hellenic Republic:
CONSTANTIN CARAMANLIS, *Prime Minister*

*Journal no. 80/bis of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, July 18, 1975, reported that the delegate of Finland had on that day informed the committee of the intention of his government to send the following letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

"Sir, I have the honour to inform you that the High Representatives of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have requested the Government of the Republic of Finland to transmit to you the text of the Final Act of the Conference signed at Helsinki on [1 August 1975].

"I have also been asked to request you, Mr. Secretary General, to arrange for the circulation of this Final Act to Member States of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations, and to draw your attention to the fact that this Final Act is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement, under the aforesaid Article.

"Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration."

*The final act was signed in alphabetical order according to the French spelling of the names of the countries.

The Hungarian People's Republic:

JANOS KADAR, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Member of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic*

Ireland:

LIAM COSGRAVE, *Prime Minister*

Iceland:

GUNN HALLGRIMSSON, *Prime Minister*

The Italian Republic:

ALDO MORO, *Prime Minister of the Italian Republic and in his capacity as President in office of the Council of the European Communities*

The Principality of Liechtenstein:

WALTER KIMMER, *Head of Government*

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

GASTON THORN, *Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs*

The Republic of Malta:

DOM MINTOFF, *Prime Minister, Minister for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs*

The Principality of Monaco:

ANDRE SAINT-MLEUX, *Minister of State, President of the Government Council, Representing H.S.H. the Prince of Monaco*

Norway:

TRYGVE BRATTEN, *Prime Minister*

The Kingdom of the Netherlands:

J.M. DEN UYL, *Prime Minister*

Polish People's Republic:

EDWARD GIEREK, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Worker's Party*

Portugal:

FRANCISCO DA COSTA GOMES, *President of the Republic*

The Socialist Republic of Romania:

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, *President of the Socialist Republic of Romania*

San Marino:

GIAN LUIGI BERTI, *Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs*

The Holy See:

San Excellence Monsignor AGOSTINO CARACOLI, *Secretary of the Council for Church Public Affairs, Special Delegate of His Holiness Pope Paul VI*

Sweden:

OLOF PALME, *Prime Minister*

The Swiss Confederation:

PIERRE GRASER, *President of the Confederation, Head of the Federal Political Department*

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:

GUSTAV HUBAK, *Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic*

The Republic of Turkey:

SULEYMAN DEMIREL, *Prime Minister*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. BREZHNEV, *General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU*

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:

JOSEF BROZ TITO, *President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*

Address by President Gerald R. Ford Before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, August 1, 1975

Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues:

May I begin by expressing to the Governments of Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb hosts for the several phases of this Conference, my gratitude and that of my associates for their efficiency and hospitality.

Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I must convey to the people of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the 214 million people of the United States of America, a reaffirmation of the longstanding affection and admiration which all my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful land.

We are bound together by the most powerful of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the granite rock on which this city stands and as moving as the music of Sibelius.

Our visit here, though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation of the pride, industry, and friendliness which Americans always associate with the Finnish nation.

The nations assembled here have kept the general peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have been too many narrow escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a just and lasting peace for all peoples.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 1074-1081. The President spoke at 10:30 a.m. in Finlandia Hall. He was introduced by Walter Kieber, Foreign Minister of Liechtenstein and chairman of the plenary session of the Conference.

I have not come across the Atlantic to say what all of us already know—that nations now have the capacity to destroy civilization and, therefore, all our foreign policies must have as their one supreme objective the prevention of a thermonuclear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard realities of continuing ideological differences, political rivalries, and military competition that persist among us.

I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a nation whose vision has always been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and whose united will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress not only for ourselves but for all mankind.

I am simply here to say to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any opportunity, not to mangle for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the monumental task of building a better and a safer world.

The American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principles are not enough. But if we proceed with care, with commitment to real progress, there is now an opportunity to turn our peoples' hopes into realities.

In recent years, nations represented here have sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more remains to be done before we prematurely congratulate ourselves.

Military competition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained. Crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war. The process of negotiation must be sustained, not at a snail's pace, but with demonstrated enthusiasm and visible progress.

Nowhere are the challenges and the opportunities greater and more evident than in Europe. That is why this Conference brings us all together. Conflict in Europe shakes the world. Twice in this century we have paid dearly for this lesson; at other times, we have come perilously close to calamity. We dare not forget the tragedy and the terror of those times.

Peace is not a piece of paper.

But lasting peace is at least possible today because we have learned from the experiences of the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements.

This Conference is a part of that process—a challenge, not a conclusion. We face unresolved problems of military security in Europe; we face them with

very real differences in values and in aims. But if we deal with them with careful preparation, if we focus on concrete issues, if we maintain forward movement, we have the right to expect real progress.

The era of confrontation that has divided Europe since the end of the Second World War may now be ending. There is a new perception and a shared perception of a change for the better, away from confrontation and toward new possibilities for secure and mutually beneficial cooperation. That is what we all have been saying here. I welcome and I share these hopes for the future.

The postwar policy of the United States has been consistently directed toward the rebuilding of Europe and the rebirth of Europe's historic identity. The nations of the West have worked together for peace and progress throughout Europe. From the very start, we have taken the initiative by stating clear goals and areas for negotiation.

We have sought a structure of European relations, tempering rivalry with restraint, power with moderation, building upon the traditional bonds that link us with old friends and reaching out to forge new ties with former and potential adversaries.

In recent years, there have been some substantial achievements.

We see the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin of 1971 as the end of a perennial crisis that on at least three occasions brought the world to the brink of doom.

The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the states of Eastern Europe and the related intra-German accords enable Central Europe and the world to breathe easier.

The start of East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions demonstrate a determination to deal with military security problems of the continent.

The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms were the first solid breakthroughs in what must be a continuing, long-term process of limiting strategic nuclear arsenals.

I profoundly hope that this Conference will spur further practical and concrete results. It affords a welcome opportunity to widen the circle of those countries involved in easing tensions between East and West.

Participation in the work of détente and participation in the benefits of détente must be everybody's business—in Europe and elsewhere. But détente can succeed only if everybody understands what détente actually is.

First, détente is an evolutionary process, not a static condition. Many formidable challenges yet remain.

Second, the success of détente, of the process of détente, depends on new behavior patterns that give life to all our solemn declarations. The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured.

The people of all Europe and, I assure you, the people of North America are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what we mean and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.

While we must not expect miracles, we can and we do expect steady progress that comes in steps—steps that are related to each other that link our actions with words in various areas of our relations.

Finally, there must be an acceptance of mutual obligation. Détente, as I have often said, must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone. Both sides must want détente and work to achieve it. Both sides must benefit from it.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, this extraordinary gathering in Helsinki proves that all our peoples share a concern for Europe's future and for a better and more peaceful world. But what else does it prove? How shall we assess the results?

Our delegations have worked long and hard to produce documents which restate noble and praiseworthy political principles. They spell out guidelines for national behavior and international cooperation.

But every signatory should know that if these are to be more than the latest chapter in a long and sorry volume of unfulfilled declarations, every party must be dedicated to making them come true.

These documents which we will sign represent another step—how long or short a step only time will tell—in the process of détente and reconciliation in Europe. Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

The documents produced here represent compromises, like all international negotiations, but these principles we have agreed upon are more than the lowest common denominator of governmental positions.

They affirm the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and political rights; the rights of minorities.

They call for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people; greater scope for the press, cultural and educational exchange, family reunification, the right

to travel and to marriage between nationals of different states; and for the protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.

They offer wide areas for greater cooperation: trade, industrial production, science and technology, the environment, transportation, health, space, and the oceans.

They reaffirm the basic principles of relations between states: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and the possibility of change by peaceful means.

The United States gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles.

Almost 200 years ago, the United States of America was born as a free and independent nation. The descendants of Europeans who proclaimed their independence in America expressed in that declaration a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and asserted not only that all men are created equal but they are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The founders of my country did not merely say that all Americans should have these rights but all men everywhere should have these rights. And these principles have guided the United States of America throughout its two centuries of nationhood. They have given hopes to millions in Europe and on every continent.

I have been asked why I am here today.

I am here because I believe, and my countrymen believe, in the interdependence of Europe and North America—indeed in the interdependence of the entire family of man.

I am here because the leaders of 34 other governments are here—the states of Europe and of our good neighbor, Canada, with whom we share an open border of 5,526 miles, along which there stands not a single armed soldier and across which our two peoples have moved in friendship and mutual respect for 160 years.

I can say without fear of contradiction that there is not a single people represented here whose blood does not flow in the veins of Americans and whose culture and traditions have not enriched the heritage which we Americans prize so highly.

When two centuries ago the United States of America issued a declaration of high principles, the cynics and doubters of that day jeered and scoffed. Yet 11 long years later, our independence was won and the stability of our Republic was really achieved through the incorporation of the same principles in our Constitution.

But those principles, though they are still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of an American policy. And the American people are still dedicated, as they were then, to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all peoples everywhere.

To our fellow participants in this Conference: My presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being, as well as our security, is linked increasingly with yours. The distance of geography is bridged by our common heritage and our common destiny. The United States, therefore, intends to participate fully in the affairs of Europe and in turning the results of this Conference into a living reality.

To America's allies: We in the West must vigorously pursue the course upon which we have embarked together, reinforced by one another's strength and mutual confidence. Stability in Europe requires equilibrium in Europe. Therefore, I assure you that my country will continue to be a concerned and reliable partner. Our partnership is far more than a matter of formal agreements. It is a reflection of beliefs, traditions, and ties that are of deep significance to the American people. We are proud that these values are expressed in this document.

To the countries of the East: The United States considers that the principles on which this Conference has agreed are a part of the great heritage of European civilization, which we all hold in trust for all mankind. To my country, they are not clichés or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very seriously. We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve problems between us. But it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this Conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, information.

In building a political relationship between East and West, we face many challenges.

Berlin has a special significance. It has been a flashpoint of confrontation in the past; it can provide an example of peaceful settlement in the future. The United States regards it as a test of détente and of the principles of this Conference. We welcome the fact that, subject to Four-Power rights and responsibilities, the results of CSCE apply to Berlin as they do throughout Europe.

Military stability in Europe has kept the peace. While maintaining that stability, it is now time to reduce substantially the high levels of military forces on both sides. Negotiations now underway in Vienna on mutual and balanced

force reductions so far have not produced the results for which I had hoped. The United States stands ready to demonstrate flexibility in moving these negotiations forward, if others will do the same. An agreement that enhances mutual security is feasible—and essential.

The United States also intends to pursue vigorously a further agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. This remains a priority of American policy. General Secretary Brezhnev and I agreed last November in Vladivostok on the essentials of a new accord limiting strategic offensive weapons for the next 10 years. We are moving forward in our bilateral discussions here in Helsinki.

The world faces an unprecedented danger in the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The nations of Europe share a great responsibility for an international solution to this problem. The benefits of peaceful nuclear energy are becoming more and more important. We must find ways to spread these benefits while safeguarding the world against the menace of weapons proliferation.

To the other nations of Europe represented at this Conference: We value the work you have done here to help bring all of Europe together. Your right to live in peace and independence is one of the major goals of our effort. Your continuing contribution will be indispensable.

To those nations not participating and to all the peoples of the world: The solemn obligation undertaken in these documents to promote fundamental rights, economic and social progress, and well-being applies ultimately to all peoples.

Can we truly speak of peace and security without addressing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world or the creation of more sophisticated forms of warfare?

Can peace be divisible between areas of tranquillity and regions of conflict?

Can Europe truly flourish if we do not all address ourselves to the evil of hunger in countries less fortunate than we? To the new dimensions of economic and energy issues that underline our own progress? To the dialog between producers and consumers, between exporters and importers, between industrial countries and less developed ones?

And can there be stability and progress in the absence of justice and fundamental freedoms?

Our people want a better future. Their expectations have been raised by the very real steps that have already been taken—in arms control, political negotiations, and expansion of contacts and economic relations. Our presence here offers them further hope. We must not let them down.

If the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement so that our astronauts can fit together the most intricate scientific equipment, work together, and shake hands 137 miles out in space, we as statesmen have an obligation to do as well on Earth.

History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Public Law 94-304 Establishing the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 3, 1976

An Act

To establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is established the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Commission").

SEC. 2. The Commission is authorized and directed to monitor the acts of the signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with particular regard to the provisions relating to Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields. The Commission is further authorized and directed to monitor and encourage the development of programs and activities of the United States Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and a greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West.

SEC. 3. The Commission shall be composed of fifteen members as follows:

(1) Six Members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Four members shall be selected from the majority party and two shall be selected, after consultation with the minority leader of the House, from the minority party. The Speaker shall designate one of the House Members as chairman.

(2) Six Members of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate. Four members shall be selected from the majority party and two shall be selected, after consultation with the minority leader of the Senate, from the minority party.

(3) One member of the Department of State appointed by the President of the United States.

(4) One member of the Defense Department appointed by the President of the United States.

(5) One member of the Commerce Department appointed by the President of the United States.

SEC. 4. In carrying out this Act, the Commission may require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it deems necessary. Subpoenas may be issued over the signature of the Chairman of the Commission or any member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or such member. The Chairman of the Commission, or any member designated by him, may administer oaths to any witness.

SEC. 5. In order to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties, the President shall submit to the Commission a semiannual report, the first one to be submitted six months after the date of enactment of this Act, which shall include (1) a detailed survey of actions by the signatories of the Final Act reflecting compliance with or violation of the provisions of the Final Act, and (2) a listing and description of

Source: Public Law 94-304, June 3, 1976, 94th Congress.

present or planned programs and activities of the appropriate agencies of the executive branch and private organizations aimed at taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and to promote a greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West.

Sec. 6. The Commission is authorized and directed to report to the House of Representatives and the Senate with respect to the matters covered by this Act on a periodic basis and to provide information to Members of the House and Senate as requested. For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made the Commission shall submit to Congress a report on its expenditures under such appropriation.

Sec. 7. There is authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for each fiscal year and to remain available until expended \$350,000 to assist in meeting the expenses of the Commission for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, such appropriation to be disbursed on voucher to be approved by the Chairman of the Commission.

Sec. 8. The Commission may appoint and fix the pay of such staff personnel as it deems desirable, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and general schedule pay rates.

Approved June 3, 1976.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1149 (Comm. on International Relations).

SENATE REPORT No. 94-756 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976):

May 5, considered and passed Senate.

May 17, considered and passed House, amended.

May 21, Senate concurred in House amendment.

Statement by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance Before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington,
June 6, 1977

Statement by Secretary Vance ¹

Mr. Chairman [Congressman Dante B. Fascell, of Florida], Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: You have all received the Administration's report on the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.²

Today I want to underline, as did the report, the continuing importance of the effort which began at Helsinki.

You are fully aware of this Administration's interest in promoting more stable and mutually beneficial relations between the peoples of East and West. The Helsinki Final Act provides one framework for such cooperation.

You are also aware of our commitment to honor and promote the rights of individuals, the human rights of all peoples, no matter what their political or social origins and affiliations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has provided a multilateral mechanism through which to pursue these aims.

Before discussing our plans for the forth-

¹ Made before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on June 6 (text from press release 256). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the Commission and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Single copies are available from the Public Correspondence Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5819-A, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

coming meeting in Belgrade, I want to convey my thanks for the close working collaboration achieved between the executive and legislative branches of our government on the many political, economic, and humanitarian issues involved in the Helsinki accords.

I wrote you three months ago, Mr. Chairman, to say that "I am most anxious to bring about a relationship of full cooperation between the State Department and the Commission." I think that this relationship has been achieved. You and your colleagues in the Congress have played a helpful and constructive role. We are looking forward to your personal contribution in the work of the Belgrade review conference.

The spirit of collaboration has also marked our relations with our allies, at the Geneva and Helsinki phases of CSCE, as well as in our preparatory work for the forthcoming review process.

Let me now state the objectives which we seek at our Belgrade meeting:

—We seek full implementation of all the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act. None can be called more binding, more vital, than others. All three of the so-called baskets are important.

—We seek incremental improvements in relations between East and West on all the fronts surveyed at Helsinki: political, economic, scientific, cultural, security, and humanitarian.

—We seek to move forward on all these fronts simultaneously: the freer flow of people and ideas is as important to long-term security and cooperation as, for exam-

Source: Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1977, pp. 669-670.

ple, advance notice of major military maneuvers; the humanitarian pledges at Helsinki are as important as, say, the promises of greater commercial cooperation.

—There will be consideration of new proposals. But we must not be diverted from assessment of how fully the specific undertakings of Helsinki have been carried out by all the signatories.

This is an ambitious agenda. There may well be differences in understanding and priority; these can be discussed in good faith, in hopes of narrowing such differences.

But such discussions cannot serve as a diversion or a cloak for inaction. The CSCE Final Act was approved by 35 heads of state and government after three years of intense negotiations. Undertakings of such gravity cannot subsequently be relaxed or overlooked.

At Belgrade we will assess on the spot how best to be effective and persuasive in pursuing our objectives. Between public diplomacy and quiet diplomacy, we will strive for maximum practical impact. We will avoid grandiose new proposals that have little chance of being acceptable. Propaganda ploys, debating points have no place in our strategy. We will state our goals and our assessments clearly, without polemics. It would serve no one's interests if such serious and far-reaching questions were dealt with in anything other than a serious and straightforward manner.

The report I have transmitted to the Commission on behalf of the President gives you a detailed assessment of what has been done and what has not been done.

Let me say from the start that no nation's record is perfect, and we will accept constructive criticism of our own record, just as we ask others to do.

When I outlined the Administration's human rights policy at the University of Georgia last April,⁸ I said that:

... a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.

So it will be in our decisions about working for implementation of the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act, those dealing with our political, economic, and military relations, as well as those affecting human rights.

Respect for the undertakings solemnly accepted at CSCE is an effort to which our government is firmly committed, in the full knowledge that the pursuit of security and cooperation in Europe poses a test of our perseverance as much as of our ideals. I am confident that we will, together, persevere.

⁸ For text, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1977, p. 505.

Opening Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Before the
CSCE Followup Meeting, Belgrade, October 6, 1977

On behalf of the American delegation, permit me to express our sincere thanks to our hosts, the Government of Yugoslavia. We are more than grateful for the facilities and support they have so generously provided for the conduct of our work. It is particularly symbolic that this conference is held in a nation which has done so much for so long to promote security and cooperation in Europe.

Two years and two months ago the leaders of our 35 nations assembled in Helsinki to conclude—with their solemn approval—the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).¹

This week we are beginning in Belgrade a new phase of the process they initiated. We are embarking on a mutual examination of our experiences in implementing the Final Act. We are also seeking together new means of solidifying and building from the foundations laid in Helsinki.

Our task is part of a great and ancient enterprise: the search for security, the advance of cooperation in Europe. This conference is one more step toward that high goal, one part of the broader process of reducing risks of confrontation in Europe and of replacing them with opportunities for cooperation.

This meeting is both an expression and a result of considerable improvements in East-West relations. In turn, what we accomplish here in the coming months can

have a direct impact on the further development of détente.

I have been designated by President Carter to speak here as the representative of the U.S. Secretary of State. I carry with me the President's deep, personal commitment to advance the goals of the Final Act and the work of which it is such an important element. He is dedicated to working constructively with all nations represented here to help fulfill the Final Act's commitment to improved European security and cooperation.

Two corollary principles make the Helsinki approach unique. One is our rule of consensus, the recognition that every nation should take part on an equal footing in decisions which affect the future of Europe. The second is also crucial: the tie, formalized by the Final Act, between the freedom and welfare of each of our nations and the freedom and welfare of each of our individual citizens.

Let me reaffirm in the most positive terms the wholehearted commitment of the U.S. Government to the pursuit of détente. Let me also restate our view that a deepening of détente, a healing of the divisions in Europe, cannot be divorced from progress in humanitarian matters and human rights. Rather, it can strengthen détente and provide a firmer basis for both security and cooperation.

The United States wants to build upon and enlarge the scope of East-West understanding, for my government is convinced that this conference in Belgrade must not be the end of the CSCE process. Rather, it must be an occasion to inject fresh momen-

¹ Made at the opening plenary session on Oct. 6, 1977 (text as prepared for delivery).

² For full text of the CSCE Final Act, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323; for an outline of the act, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1977, p. 604.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1977, pp. 674-679. Ambassador Goldberg was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Belgrade.

tum into that process. The true test of the work we do together lies not only in the conclusions we reach, it lies also in the higher goals we set and in the energy with which we set about meeting them.

My government will do its best to provide new impetus to the CSCE process, both here in Belgrade and in our overall policies toward Europe and the world.

—We will conduct the review of implementation on the basis of unity of all sections of the Final Act and the equal value of all the principles.

—We will make clear our intention to honor the political commitments in this document and to utilize fully the practical opportunities which it opens.

—We will discuss concrete problems of both past and future implementation.

—And we will conduct our policies in Europe fully aware of the fact that CSCE can only bear part of the burden for guarding the peace. There must also be progress in other efforts at détente; and the benefits of our efforts must be applied throughout Europe. Berlin, for example, remains a basic testing place of détente. This divided city must continue to receive the benefits of the Final Act. Berlin must prosper under the Quadripartite Agreement, free from crisis, if détente and CSCE are to succeed.

Just as the U.S. goal for Europe is one of peace, so at this conference we see no confrontation. We have no desire to trade debating points. Instead, we want to exchange ideas on how better to implement the Final Act. We seek a thorough, nonpolemical, straightforward, and detailed review of implementation. And through that review, we seek to help formulate new measures which can give added concrete expression and momentum to the basic commitments of the Final Act.

General Assessment

The first obligation we all share is to conduct a candid review of the promises each of us has made, the promises we have kept, and the promises we have yet to fulfill.

The assessment my country has made of

the overall record of participating states over the last 26 months shows encouraging evidence of progress. But the progress displayed is not progress enough. It still falls short of the goals of the Final Act and, just as important, of the high expectations the Final Act aroused. Those expectations remain valid, and we must all be frank in judging that many of them remain unmet.

Let me comment first on what my own country has done to implement the Final Act. In general, the act codified standards which reflect American policy in dealing with other nations and with our own citizens. Nevertheless, in response to the Final Act, we have looked closely at our own behavior and—where we have the need and the means—have acted to improve our conduct. In particular, we took two steps regarding the Final Act pledge to “facilitate freer movement and contacts.” First, President Carter this year removed all restrictions on travel abroad by American citizens. Second, with President Carter’s support, Congress recently relaxed our visa requirements so that people wishing to visit the United States will not be excluded because of political affiliation or belief.

Moreover, in the field of human rights, President Carter on October 5 redeemed a pledge he gave last spring by signing the international covenants on human rights at the United Nations. American adherence to those pacts has been a matter of personal concern to me and to many others for a decade.

The President is pledged to pursue ratification of the covenants. Meanwhile, his action yesterday is an earnest of our good faith and a proof of the positive impact the Final Act is having in the United States.

In the spheres of commercial, cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges, we have done much and have much yet to do. For example, the U.S. Government has made a special effort to inform our businessmen about provisions of the Final Act affecting their opportunities to enter and work in markets with which they have not always been sufficiently familiar. This year, we signed our first cultural, educational, and

scientific cooperation agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria; and we concluded negotiations on a similar agreement with Czechoslovakia. With the Soviet Union, we renewed several scientific cooperation arrangements.

Meanwhile, in some other signatory nations, we have seen a well-intentioned and productive effort to implement the principles and provisions of the Final Act. In some nations in the East, advances have been only modest and are still far below the Final Act's standards. And there are individual cases under the Final Act where forward motion has been stalled or even reversed.

Under the stimulus of the Final Act, some progress has been made in bettering relations among the participating states. The exchange of goods, knowledge, people, and ideas has expanded in some measure. Substantial obstacles do remain to travel and the flow of information between one part of Europe and another, but these have already diminished somewhat. This improvement can be seen simply in the numbers of people who have been able to leave old homes for the new ones in Europe, America, and Israel. These results mean real individual happiness, and we here must reaffirm our resolve to speed that development.

Likewise, in translating our shared political undertakings to the area of military security, the Final Act has brought another kind of exchange—promising but incomplete. Confidence-building measures, involving advance notification of maneuvers and exchange of observers, have made openness a virtue in a field where secrecy was once instinctive. We have laid a foundation on which this meeting can productively build. Thus we can see some progress.

We can see it in terms of individuals and families reunited after being separated by war, accident, and history. But we must recall the many who remain apart.

We can see progress in business contacts that become business contracts. But we cannot overlook the still inadequate supply of relevant economic data on which the growth of business confidence depends.

We can see progress in books translated, performers applauded, students instructed,

and scientific theories tested. But here, too, the openness and ease of contact promised at Helsinki has been only partly realized.

Thus, we cannot be satisfied with the record of implementation. The standard we have set together should be even higher, if the goals of the Final Act are to be realized.

Let me illustrate some area in which we in the United States feel old practices have not been changed sufficiently to meet the new imperatives of the Helsinki spirit.

In educational programs, it is not enough to increase the number of scholars involved; rather, a prerequisite for such an increase is improved freedom for scholars and their research. What value is there, for example, in financing a student's work abroad when for months he is denied admission to an essential archives and, when having finally been admitted one day, he is not permitted back the next—even to collect his notes?

Also, in seeking "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds," we cannot point convincingly to progress while international broadcasts are subjected to continuing interference.

Similarly, while steps have been taken to ease travel and working conditions for journalists, those advances are jeopardized when visas are made conditional on a correspondent's agreeing not to contact certain sources of information and opinion.

Finally, while real progress has been made in reuniting divided families and concluding binational marriages, satisfaction with those developments must be balanced by regret that many longstanding cases remain unresolved; that the resolution of routine cases is too often arbitrary and capricious; and that new bureaucratic obstacles are imposed on people seeking to join relatives abroad. This runs counter to the Helsinki promise "gradually to simplify" exit procedures. It is also hard to see the workings of the "positive and humanitarian spirit" when an ill and aged husband is denied, after long years of separation, the company of his nearly blind wife and their daughter.

Equally difficult to understand are broader restrictions on the right of individu-

als to travel or emigrate. That right is established in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." All of us have pledged in the Final Act to "act in conformity" with that Universal Declaration, and we have given specific emphasis to that promise in the Final Act's provisions on family reunification.

Human Rights and Détente

The 2 years since the Helsinki summit are particularly short when we set them against the historic divisions we are trying, through the Final Act, to bridge. Some of the deepest differences among the participating states lie in views on the status of the individual in relation to the state. The issue of human rights represents the widest gap between the ideals and practices of East and West. It is a sensitive subject on the international agenda, but one which can be dealt with in an understanding manner and one which must be discussed in order to facilitate further progress under the Final Act.

Precisely because the distance between our views on human rights is so great, we must all work to narrow the divide. This is not a simple process. In my own country, a mere 15 years ago, many Americans were denied the right to vote. But through commitment to an ideal and constant efforts to reach that ideal, this blemish on the American record was removed. Other serious blemishes remain and our efforts to remove them also remain constant. The process is inevitably a gradual one, but efforts like ours are what make progress in human rights possible under the Final Act.

In the United States, we also realize that human rights encompass economic and social rights, as well as political and civil liberties. It is our view that one set of values cannot be stressed at the expense of the other. Rather, it is the combination of these rights and the respect in which governments hold them all which offer the best promise that all can be attained.

Concern for these rights is not new either to Americans or to the other states taking

part in this conference. It is enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. It is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And the Final Act, in Principle VII, binds all the participating states to "... recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States."

American policy—evolving from a history of political development with deep roots here in Europe and nurtured by the efforts of other nations—has long pursued that vision. It is explicit in our Bill of Rights. It animated the four freedoms proclaimed by President Franklin Roosevelt—freedom from want and fear, freedom of speech and religion—for which Americans last fought on this continent in the war against Fascism. It was also part of the heritage of President Kennedy when, 14 years ago (in an address at American University on June 10, 1963), he launched a fresh initiative for world peace. He asked: "... is not peace, in the last analysis ... a matter of human rights ... ?" And he proposed (in an address before the U.N. General Assembly on September 20, 1963) an "... agreement on a freer flow of information and people from East to West and West to East."

When such an agreement was concluded in Helsinki (on August 1, 1975) as part of the Final Act, President Ford echoed his predecessor's words. He said: "The founders of my country did not merely say that all Americans should have these rights, but all men everywhere should have these rights."

On many occasions this year, President Carter has set forth his own commitment to the continuity of American policy in the area of human rights—whether political, economic, social, or cultural. At the United Nations last March, he stressed that:

... the search for peace also means the search for justice ... (and) the search for peace and justice means also respect for human dignity ... I know perhaps as well as anyone that our own ideals in the area of human rights have not always been attained in the United States. But the American people have an

abiding commitment to the full realization of these ideals. And we are determined, therefore, to deal with our deficiencies quickly and openly.

It is in that same spirit that the U.S. delegation will speak about human rights and basic freedoms here in Belgrade. We have much to learn from that exchange of views.

Let me illustrate some of our concerns. The Principle VII guarantee of religion and belief means to us that expression of faith must not be penalized by loss of reduction of educational or career opportunities. People should be free to worship without fear or state interference in their choice of ministers, literature, and houses of prayer.

Similarly, the "freedom of thought and conscience" we have all pledged to respect must have breathing space in which to flourish. Its expression should not be censored. Its exponents should not be imprisoned or exiled for making their thoughts known.

Moreover, the "legitimate interests" of "national minorities" in our 35 states require respect for unique cultural and linguistic heritages and active policies to preserve these traditions and achievements for future generations.

Our governments have assumed the responsibility to "promote and encourage the effective exercise" of these rights. And in Principle VII we subscribed to "the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties" in the field of human rights. The response of citizens to that challenge, alone and in private or public groupings in many signatory states, has been heartening evidence of the Final Act's healthy impact on all of us. In my own country, we have benefitted by the dedication, candor, and commitment of our [joint congressional] Commission on Security and Cooperation Europe. Its valuable work will be reflected in what we do here in Belgrade; and we are honored by having its members as part of our delegation.

All the more, then, we are also obliged to register vigorous disapproval of repressive measures taken in any country against individuals and private groups whose activities relate solely to promoting the Final Act's goals and promises.

Any such repression is contrary to the spirit and the letter of our common pledge. Rather, at this meeting, we should all reaffirm the valuable role to be played by individuals and organizations, in their own countries and in international associations, to help make that pledge a reality.

Conclusion

In the coming weeks, the U.S. delegation will focus its efforts in a constructive manner on improving relations among the participating states. We are here to help to strengthen prospects for cooperation and to help move closer toward what should be the noblest common goal of this conference: to give the process of détente a human measure and a humanitarian face.

In that spirit, the U.S. delegation will consider and, as appropriate, support new measures to improve implementation of the Final Act. We see opportunities for improvement in the following areas:

- Promotion of human rights;
- Execution of confidence-building measures;
- Qualitative expansion of scientific, economic, and commercial data exchanges;
- Easing of travel for journalists and businessmen;
- Freer access to printed and broadcast information from other countries; and
- Fuller opportunities for scholars and scholarship.

This list by no means exhausts our agenda or the specific ideas the United States, with other interested states, will pursue in the coming months. There are also opportunities to promote the exchange of literature, television programs, and culture of all kinds. There are possibilities for exploring, in appropriate agencies, as the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, the coordination of approaches to such pervasive problems as environmental pollution. And, there is great potential for expanding trade and for sharing the benefits of technology.

However, our success here will be measured not solely by words on paper but rather

by what we all do both here and at home after this meeting ends. Together we must give the process of implementation direction, higher goals, and fresh momentum to insure that—when we next meet in a similar assembly—we can record even greater progress.

In our work, we will need patience, perseverance, and perspective. This conference in Belgrade is one stage of a dynamic process and a continuing dialogue. And that Helsinki process is part of an even larger effort to build more secure and humane relations among our nations and peoples.

We are nearer the beginning than the end. This conference must give the people of the signatory countries and people throughout the world a first report of first progress. It must demonstrate to them our shared commitment to go further. We owe them our best efforts and results better than those so far achieved.

White House Statement, Washington, March 3, 1978

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

White House Statement on the Belgrade Review Conference. March 3, 1978

The President today congratulated Justice Goldberg and the U.S. Delegation to the Belgrade Review Conference of CSCE on their successful work during the past few months. The President is particularly gratified that the delegation has worked in close harmony with the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, chaired by Representative Fancell, cochaired by Senator Claiborne Pell, and including both congressional and administration members.

The United States has achieved its basic goals at the Belgrade Conference, which will conclude its work next week:

- we conducted a full and frank review of the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in all of its aspects. This included detailed discussion of human rights, including specific country-performance and individual cases. Human rights has now been firmly inscribed as a legitimate and proper concern on the agenda of international discussion;
- we maintained unity among the NATO allied states;
- we have worked with other nations to ensure that the process of security and cooperation in Europe, begun at Helsinki, will continue at Madrid in 2 years time;
- we took all of these steps in a spirit of seeking to enlarge the possibilities for cooperation among all the 35 states represented at Belgrade, and we will agree to the final document only to permit this process to continue.

Following the achievement of these basic goals at CSCE, we also presented, with our allies, a number of specific new proposals, designed to make more effective the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. Regrettably, the Soviet Union was not prepared to engage in a serious discussion of new proposals leading to agreement among the 35 states taking part. Nor, under the consensus procedure followed at Belgrade, was the Soviet Union prepared to agree to a final document that would take note of the full review of implementation—including human rights—that was the centerpiece of the conference.

We regret that the Soviet Union failed to permit the conference to proceed to its proper conclusion. We intend to press the Soviet Union to fulfill its commitment to respect human rights, to fulfill the Helsinki process, and to adhere to the final Helsinki Act itself. The Soviet refusal, under the consensus procedure, to accept a full final document in no way detracts from the success of the conference in conducting a full review of implementation, especially in the area of human rights. What has been done cannot be ignored, whether or not the Soviet Union is prepared to see it recognized in a formal document.

We will continue to build on the success that the Belgrade conference as a whole represents. During the period between now and the Madrid meeting, we will continue our efforts to promote implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. We will work closely with our allies, and with the European community, in that process. And at Madrid, we will renew the process of review, seeking always to raise the international standard of behavior, in all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act and particularly in the area of human rights.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 453-454.

DOCUMENT 37

Concluding Document of the CSCE Followup Meeting, Belgrade,
March 8, 1978

The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these States, met at Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 8 March 1978 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-up to the Conference.

The participants received a message from the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and were addressed by Mr. Milos Minic, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

The representatives of the participating States stressed the importance they attached to detente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered. In this context they underlined the role of the CSCE, the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act being essential for the development of this process.

The representatives of the participating States held a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of detente in the future.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, April 1978, pp. 43-44.

The representatives of the participating States stressed the political importance of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and reaffirmed the resolve of their Governments, to implement fully, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, all the provisions of the Final Act.

It was recognized that the exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE, although different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far.

They also examined proposals concerning the above questions and the definition of the appropriate modalities for the holding of other meetings in conformity with the provisions of the chapter of the Final Act concerning the Follow-up to the Conference.

Consensus was not reached on a number of proposals submitted to the meeting.

In conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Act and with their resolve to continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, the participating States will hold further meetings among their representatives. The second of these meetings will be held in Madrid commencing Tuesday, 11 November 1980.

A preparatory meeting will be held in Madrid commencing Tuesday, 9 September 1980, to decide on appropriate modalities for the main Madrid Meeting. This will be done on the basis of the Final Act as well as of the other relevant documents adopted during the process of the CSCE.

It was also agreed to hold, within the framework of the Follow-up to the CSCE, the meetings of experts of the participating States indicated below.

In conformity with the mandate contained in the Final Act and according to the proposal made to this effect by the Government of Switzerland a meeting of experts will be convened at Montreux on 31 October 1978, charged with pursuing the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods.

Upon the invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the meeting of experts envisaged in the Final Act in order to prepare a "Scientific Forum" will take place in Bonn starting on 20 June 1978. Representatives of UNESCO (U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe shall be invited to state their views.

Upon the invitation of the Government of Malta, a meeting of experts on the Mediterranean will be convened on 13 February 1979 in Valletta. Its mandate will be, within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act, to consider the possibilities and means of promoting concrete initiatives for mutually beneficial co-operation concerning various economic, scientific and cultural fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to the above subjects already under way. The non-participating Mediterranean States will be invited to contribute to the work of this meeting. Questions relating to security will be discussed at the Madrid Meeting.

The duration of the meetings of experts should not exceed 4-6 weeks. They will draw up conclusions and recommendations and send their reports to the Governments of the participating States. The results of these meetings will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Madrid Meeting.

All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in conformity with paragraph 4 of the chapter on "Follow-up to the Conference" of the Final Act.

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is requested to transmit the present document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is also requested to transmit the present document to the governments of the Mediterranean non-participating States.

The representatives of the participating States expressed their profound gratitude to the people and Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the excellent organization of the Belgrade Meeting and the warm hospitality extended to the delegation which participated in the Meeting. O

Concluding Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Before the
CSCE Followup Meeting, Belgrade, March 8, 1978

I wish to thank our Yugoslav hosts for the manner in which they have provided for us at this conference. The Secretariat—under the able direction of Ambassador Bozinovic, the Yugoslav delegation, and the Government and people of Yugoslavia—expended every effort to make our conference a success. I wish particularly to express appreciation to His Excellency, Ambassador Pesic. His constant steadfastness and determination, even when our work was in its most difficult hours, was an inspiration to all of us. It is a source of gratification to the American delegation that President Tito is this very week [March 6-9] in the United States where President Carter is conveying to him his personal appreciation for the uniquely constructive role that Yugoslavia has played not only in the Belgrade meeting but in the entire process of building security and cooperation in Europe.

I consider it appropriate in this final statement to express frankly the views of the U.S. Government on the Belgrade meeting and on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process that was begun in Helsinki and will continue in Madrid and thereafter.

The Belgrade meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the first formal sequel to the Helsinki summit—is now at its end. In the judgment of the delegation of the United States, the meeting has fulfilled its basic mandate and although it has been difficult, it has also been successful.

In these past months—with the support of our gracious, patient Yugoslav hosts and through the conscientious efforts of the delegates—our meeting

has confirmed the vitality of the Helsinki concept. Belgrade has tested the validity and flexibility of the CSCE process. It has not been an easy passage, but we have delineated the scope of that process and added to its depth. Most important of all, we have given our commitment to preserving the process and to making its growth our common enterprise.

We have had the exchange of views of which the Final Act mandates on the implementation of its provisions and on the prospects for improved mutual relations.³ We have spoken our own minds and have heard out the opinions of those who differ from us. In doing so, we have been able to make a sober assessment of past accomplishments, continuing shortcomings, and future challenges. We have agreed to continue this discourse bilaterally and in Madrid in 1980.

The United States has always viewed the fulfillment of Final Act commitments as part of a gradual but steadily advancing process of bridging the East-West divide, of extending the benefits of security and cooperation throughout Europe—including of course Berlin. The contribution of CSCE has been to engage 35 states—different in size and system, history and outlook—in that vital effort. The role of the Belgrade meeting has been to deepen that engagement and to make specific the conduct which it entails.

From our talks has emerged a clearer sense of the tasks before us. No country can be allowed to single out particular sections of the Final Act for their attention while ignoring others. Progress in the area of human rights and human contacts as well as

Source: Department of State Bulletin, April 1978, pp. 40-43.

disarmament and economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation are inextricably linked together in the Final Act. The significance of Final Act implementation—and of the Belgrade review of its progress—lies precisely in combining the various elements of detente in a coherent, related whole.

Last October I also spoke of giving detente a humanitarian face and a human measure.⁴ That has, indeed, been the theme of this conference. For though we are here to represent governments, we have managed to address the problems of people as well as of power. We have weighed the claims of individuals, not just the interests of states.

Thus we explored the promises made at Helsinki to respect the role of the individual and groups in monitoring the implementation of the Final Act; to heal the wounds of divided families; to facilitate the right of free emigration; and to better the conditions in which scientists, journalists, scholars, and businessmen work. There has been some progress in some of these areas but not nearly enough and regrettably there have been retrogressions.

The favorable resolution of such questions in the days to come will do much to create the climate of openness in which detente itself will flourish. A detente relationship which betters the lot of individuals and smooths contact between them is also certain to improve the ties between the states.

Human Rights

Crucially, of course, our meeting dealt at length with the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Our citizens' freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; their ability to exercise their civil rights effectively—individually or in groups—raised sensitive issues at Belgrade. Their sensitivity was part of their significance. Our meeting was the first to put those questions prominently and legitimately into the framework of multilateral East-West diplomacy.

That idea is a powerful one, and at Belgrade it has won powerful support. It has also aroused strong opposition. We have heard the contention that human rights are purely internal af-

fairs, that to discuss their observance in another nation is to violate that nation's sovereignty, to interfere in matters that are no outsider's concern.

The Final Act refutes that reasoning. The Belgrade meeting has made it untenable. By virtue of Principle VII, human rights are direct concerns of all Final Act signatories. Under the terms of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international covenants—as well as the Final Act—they are the subject of international undertakings. They are then, without question, the proper subject of the diplomatic examination and debate we have had in Belgrade. And they will remain, after Belgrade, the proper focus of continuing comment and efforts.

For the pursuit of liberty is an unending enterprise for man, the surest guarantee of this security and of peace. What the Final Act obliged us all to pursue is what Aleksandr Pushkin defined long ago as a better kind of freedom. That, he wrote, is the freedom not to bow your conscience, thought, or neck to rank or power. That concept of individual dignity is still the vision offered us by the Final Act, the vision all of us pledged to respect and promote.

We know, however, that not all of us have fulfilled that pledge in full or in good faith. The American delegation has spoken forthrightly at Belgrade of the broken and unfulfilled promises of Principle VII and basket 3. We have expressed our concern and our regret and—at times—our outrage at the incidents which have occurred in direct contravention of the Final Act and in profound disregard of its provisions in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Our meeting could not overlook such episodes, especially when unwarranted repression is directed against men and women whose only offense seems to be that they have merely sought to monitor or enforce or implement the provisions and the promises of the Helsinki Final Act. Their activity is encouraged by the Final Act. It needs to be protected, not punished.

Similarly, in our review of implementation, we could not gloss over—and cannot now—the plight of men and women persecuted for their

religious beliefs and for trying to pass those beliefs on to their children. Nor can we be silent now—or in the future—when numbers of ethnic minorities are denied their equality, particularly in their efforts to preserve the language and culture which are essential to their special identity.

We cannot pretend that such questions are irrelevant to the implementation of the Final Act, intrusive at this meeting and injurious—if discussed—to the development of detente. We live in the real world, not one of make-believe. We cannot make our world a better one if we turn a blind eye to its faults.

Those faults—just as much as our accomplishments and opportunities—were the legitimate subject of the Belgrade review. That review dealt productively with real shortcomings in Final Act implementation so that from our examination we could each and all move to remedial action.

That action is still required of us. Unfortunately, it is not detailed in the meeting's concluding document. The reason is plain. Consensus was denied and this I profoundly deplore.

Efforts to squelch the truth at Belgrade or at home will not change the truth. And they will not deflect the United States from insisting that candor is as important to the healthy development of international confidence as is respect for sovereign equality and individuality.

Candor and respect must be companion elements in the pursuit of security and cooperation. The foundation laid down in the Final Act—augmented by the record made at Belgrade—enables us to build an ever firmer structure of detente. Our first priority—always our overriding challenge—remains simply to implement the Final Act in all of its parts, to do so in good faith and with appropriate speed. The initial pace is not as important as the fact of continuing, forward movement.

From Belgrade, the United States intends to move forward. My country has had its performance questioned here and some of the questioning has been constructive. It will aid my country to improve its record. I wish others were of equal mind.

My delegation has also taken careful note of the thoughtful ideas advanced

by many delegations for action consonant with the thrust and spirit of the Final Act. Some such proposals can be set in motion by unilateral action; many can be refined and readied for decision in Madrid. The United States is prepared to participate constructively in such enterprises.

Political Cooperation

We especially value CSCE as a framework for increasing political intercourse among all participating states. The many and varied specific provisions of the Final Act provide a rich content for this commerce. The United States, in its efforts to deepen political relations with all CSCE states, will continue to work to translate that potential into reality.

In the area of confidence-building measures, for example, we have already seen in practice how states can build from the language of the Final Act to implement its spirit. In notifying smaller scale maneuvers, in making notifications amply informative, and in affording observers good overall views of maneuvers, some states have set an example others can productively emulate. Such experience has been constructive; it remains to be applied to major troop movements. In general, moreover, we can all think afresh about ways of "developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence," a possibility the Final Act explicitly sets before us. Although CSCE was not conceived as a forum for negotiating disarmament, we have all recognized the impetus it can give to that vital process.

Economic Cooperation

Further, in the field of economic and commercial cooperation, our frank discussions have reinforced the awareness of the need to reduce—indeed, through mutual action, to eliminate—existing impediments to trade. The potential for cooperation in this field is great, and the United States is fully prepared to explore the many possibilities for productive unilateral and reciprocal action. In such an endeavor, of course, other states must also engage in expanding the flow of timely and accurate economic information on which close, broadened contacts

among traders and investors so heavily depend.

If the Belgrade meeting has aided the flow of people, it has yet to make a similar impact on the transmission of information. Too many Eastern states continue to impede access to what many of their citizens want to read and see and hear.

Finally there is much we can do in bilateral and multilateral cooperation to widen the range and improve the quality of contacts among scientists and scholars, men and women of letters and of the arts.

The United States will continue to be especially attentive to the question of human rights. We are greatly concerned about those individuals and organizations which my delegation has mentioned—by name and by country—in the course of our discussions who are being denied their elementary human rights. And they are by no means the only ones. The list of those suffering repression is far too long. And their fate arouses the greatest anxiety. Our concern is not limited to one country or one set of individuals. "Injustice anywhere," said Martin Luther King, Jr., "is a threat to justice everywhere."

The Final Act enshrines the concept of justice—not privilege or power—ruling the affairs of men and the relations between states. The Belgrade meeting has reaffirmed that central tenet in the context of detente in Europe. Peace, we have seen, depends on the just conduct of nations to each other and to their own citizens.

Helsinki aroused great hopes. In some quarters it also appears to have aroused great fear. In Belgrade we, on our part, have attempted forthrightly to discuss both the hopes and the fears of governments and peoples. We recognize that some hopes may not be as high as they might have been when we came to Belgrade. But we have always known that the road to peace and security and cooperation is a long and arduous one.

The United States is determined to continue. Between now and at Madrid and thereafter we will seek to further implementation of all of the provisions of the Final Act. And we pledge to do all in our power to keep the hopes of Helsinki alive.

Opening Statement by R. Spencer Oliver at the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Montreux, November 2, 1978

We are most pleased to be here in Montreux at the kind invitation of the Swiss Government. The facilities are excellent and the surroundings are most conducive to serious work. We gather pursuant to the Final Act and to the decision of the Belgrade Meeting to further the elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The U.S. Delegation will work in the spirit that produced the Final Act--with open minds, ready to pursue potentially fruitful areas of understanding, seeking a common core of affirmative agreement that can materially advance our work.

A good example has already been set by the experts who met in Bonn earlier this year to prepare for the holding of the scientific forum envisaged by the Final Act. By concentrating effectively upon the tasks assigned them by the Final Act and by the Concluding Document of Belgrade, experts meetings can both advance the specific and important matters on their agenda and contribute to the positive evolution of the CSCE process of which they are an integral part.

Peaceful settlement of disputes is, of course, one of the principles included in the Final Act. It is one of the basic guides to relations between the participating states. The principle as enunciated in the Final Act re-enforces the commitments to which members of the United Nations have subscribed in the UN Charter--to settle disputes amicably so that international peace, security and justice are not endangered.

The effort, through the CSCE process, to give more concrete expression to this principle goes to the heart of the Final Act. It seeks to make our relations more secure, to advance the rule of law and to further the spirit of detente. The task of this meeting is to further the CSCE process, to make a positive contribution to it, and to give additional proof of the potential that is contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

Source: Department of State files. Mr. Oliver, the staff director and general counsel of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was co-chairman of the U.S. delegation at Montreux.

We know, however, that we have a difficult task before us. The thorough examination conducted during the 1973 to 1975 Geneva phase of the CSCE negotiations on the draft convention submitted by Switzerland showed that there are considerable variations in viewpoint on the substance of our work. We do not expect that all of these differences will have disappeared since 1975 or that they will entirely vanish in the coming weeks. But with good will, hard work, and careful thought it may be possible to find a generally acceptable formula--a way to bridge such differences as may still remain. We do sincerely hope that it will be possible for us here to refine our common thinking about what can and what cannot be done at the present time and to develop recommendations for governments to advance the cause of peaceful settlements.

We can and should begin our work with a firmly positive attitude. At the same time, however, our efforts should be directed to finding those specific areas and directions in which current advances are realistically possible.

We owe a debt of gratitude to the Swiss Government which has prepared and circulated a revised paper which draws upon and in some ways suggests modifications of the original draft convention. We appreciate this effort which seeks to take account of the comments provided by many governments, including that of the United States, to questions asked by the Swiss Government earlier in the year. The resulting paper is a useful and constructive contribution. It should help focus our thinking upon basic issues.

The United States position during the Geneva CSCE negotiations was that a system of peaceful settlement of disputes would represent a significant advance over the present situation only if it included compulsory elements--both a requirement that certain types of justiciable disputes be submitted to arbitration and a requirement that the results of that adjudication be binding upon the parties to the dispute.

We still consider this position to be a sound one. It is an aspect of our long-term commitment to the premise that the rule of law should be extended in the affairs of nations.

This is the area where we believe that there is the greatest need to make progress in the international legal system. We are particularly pleased that the Swiss Delegation has suggested in its paper that useful work might be done in seeking to identify and define specific categories of disputes which might be

submitted for arbitration--an approach which may provide a possibility for furthering agreement. We are also pleased at the recognition which has been shown of the need to assure that any new procedures or mechanisms we identify complement and do not merely reproduce or even derogate from those already existing, including the International Court of Justice.

We have come to Montreux with a constructive attitude and with hope of finding acceptable mutual understandings in the broad area of peaceful settlements. We are thus prepared to give careful study to ideas which others may have for exploring the prospects for progress.

We are willing to examine with a broad perspective any proposals or aspects of the subject which others find promising, although we continue to believe that the most useful work that we experts could do would be to concentrate on the mandatory and arbitral elements of dispute settlement.

We believe that this experts meeting can and should advance the purposes of the Final Act and the CSCE process by providing an impetus to efforts to make more certain, more clear and more effective the rule of law in international affairs. It may indeed not prove possible to reach comprehensive agreement in the limited time available to us, but we believe nonetheless that useful work can and should be done in focusing the discussion, narrowing differences, discovering and expanding areas of agreement, and finally, in coming forth with constructive and affirmative results.

We pledge our best efforts and are prepared to proceed in the hope that at the end of our meeting substantively useful and positive recommendations can be forwarded to our governments and for appropriate consideration at the Madrid Meeting.

Memorandum From President Jimmy Carter to Heads of U.S. Government Agencies, Washington, December 6, 1978

Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Director, International Communication Agency, the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, the Chairman, Board for International Broadcasting, the Chairman, Commission on Civil Rights, the Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Chairman, International Trade Commission, the President, National Academy of Sciences, the Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts, the Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities, the Chairman, National Science Foundation

This Administration attaches the greatest significance to achieving full implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This document contains solemn political pledges by the leaders of the 35 States of Europe and North America which participated in the 1975 Helsinki Summit—pledges to work toward lowering the barriers between East and West and improving the everyday lives of their people.

I believe that our own record of implementation has been second to none among the 35 participating States, but our work is not complete. The Final Act pledges us to strive constantly for improvement both domestically, in the area of civil and economic rights, and internationally, in the expansion of our cooperation with the other participating States. Other governments, including the Soviet Union, will better understand the depth of our concern for the full implementation of the Helsinki pledges if we demonstrate that we are working hard at home to fulfill even more effectively our side of the Helsinki bargain.

The work of each of your departments and agencies touches upon important aspects of our Final Act commitments, and I ask you to keep these commitments in mind as you develop your programs. You should work with the Department of State, and cooperate with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as they carry out their respective responsibilities to assess implementation and identify areas where American performance can be improved. To facilitate this task, I request that you designate an official at the Assistant Secretary or the Deputy Assistant Secretary level to serve as CSCE contact. I will appreciate your full cooperation with the Department of State as it prepares the Administration's semi-annual reports on CSCE implementation as well as offering your full cooperation to the Commission, which is preparing its own special report on United States implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

JIMMY CARTER

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 2166-2167.

Final Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Montreux, December 9, 1978

REPORT

OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, FORSEEN BY THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE EXAMINATION AND ELABORATION OF A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AIMED AT COMPLEMENTING EXISTING METHODS

In accordance with the mandate of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place at Montreux from 31 October to 11 December 1978 in order to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods.

At the opening meeting the participants were addressed by Mr. Pierre Aubert, Head of the Federal Political Department, on behalf of the Government of Switzerland.

The participants adopted an agenda and proceeded to a general exchange of views after which several proposals aimed at complementing existing methods for peaceful settlement of disputes were submitted and discussed. A working paper based on the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" was submitted for consideration which put forward the following subsidiary and compulsory procedures: negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Another working paper was submitted for consideration which put forward a proposal of mandatory consultations as a possible method for peaceful settlement of disputes. A further paper was submitted which put forward the concept of a comprehensive method for peaceful settlement of disputes within specific subject areas, including appropriate mandatory features. Other proposals and ideas were put forward for consideration. Divergent views were expressed and no consensus was reached on specific methods.

Source: CSCE Meeting of Experts, Montreux, October 31-December 11, 1978, Conference Document REM/8.

The participants stressed the importance their governments attach to détente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered. In this context they underlined the role of the CSCE, the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act being essential for the development of this process.

The participants reaffirmed the adherence of their governments to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Final Act of the CSCE. They also stressed the significance of elaborating, in accordance with the mandate contained in the Final Act, a method for peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participants agreed on a common approach to the elaboration of a method for peaceful settlement of disputes between or among the participating States which should be based on the following:

- consistency with the principles and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Final Act of Helsinki, especially principle V of the latter document;
- consistency with sovereign equality of States and the free choice of means;
- experience and the treaty and diplomatic practice and the views of all the participating States in this field;
- acceptability to all participating States irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development;
- subsidiarity to existing methods and institutions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes;
- complementarity to existing methods so as to promote, in good faith and a spirit of co-operation, a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law;
- flexibility of the method;
- capacity for progressive development of the method.

The method to be elaborated should contribute to peace, security and justice in Europe, to the further development of détente and co-operation among the participating States.

The participants recommended that the participating States consider the possibility of promoting and extending the existing practice of including, in appropriate treaties among and between them, provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participants recommended to the governments of States participating in the CSCE that they consider, at the Madrid Meeting, the possibility of convening another Meeting of Experts in order to pursue, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, taking into account the common approach set forth above, as well as the various proposals and ideas discussed at the Montreux Meeting.

The participants recommended that contacts between the governments of participating States continue in order better to acquaint themselves with each other's views on the subject of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Switzerland for the excellent organization of the Meeting and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay at Montreux.

Opening Statement by Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Valletta, February 16, 1979

Mr. Chairman, may I first express, on behalf of my Government and the American delegation with me here today, our appreciation for the warm welcome we have all had from the people and Government of Malta. If my British colleague will permit me to quote from an earlier visitor to Malta, Sir Walter Scott, we too find ourselves "enamoured of Valletta, that splendid town, quite like a dream," and we are glad to be here.

Personally, for me it is a very special pleasure, as a former resident of Malta, to be able to return so soon to a place, so aptly described by a Maltese proverb, as small in size but with a big heart. I am delighted to have the opportunity to work again with good friends on the Maltese delegation and also with several of my former Ambassadorial colleagues in Malta who head their delegations at this meeting.

Mr. Chairman, this historic structure in which we meet is an ideal setting for our work. Aptly and newly named as the Dar L-Mediterran, it symbolizes the long history of the Mediterranean basin and the continuity of Malta's own involvement in Mediterranean affairs. Its reconstruction as an International Conference Center is a credit to the skill of the Maltese artisans and workers whose efforts have made it possible for us to meet here in these impressive and comfortable facilities. I salute them for doing so well what the skeptics said could never be done in the time allotted to them.

May this place never be idle as a center for cooperative human endeavor.

It has now been almost a year since the conclusion of the Belgrade Conference. I think we can all agree that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe continues to be a valuable instrument for encouraging further cooperation among the peoples of Europe and North America. In fact the CSCE process has excited hopes for new and innovative approaches to both the form and substance of the human and official relationships so essential to an assurance of peace. It is also the hope of the 35 states who initiated this experiment in multilateral diplomacy that it should also stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean. Building upon the two useful experts meetings already held in Bonn to prepare for the scientific forum and in Montreux to continue work on a new method for the peaceful settlement

Source: Department of State files. Ambassador Laingen was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Valletta.

of disputes, it is our hope that this meeting of experts in Valletta will be an important step forward in the development of this CSCE process.

While the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe clearly has a European focus, the importance of developments in the Mediterranean to European affairs was recognized in the Final Act and reaffirmed at the Belgrade Conference.

The Mediterranean touches three continents and many different nations and cultures. The sea both divides and unifies at the same time. It is in one sense a barrier between the lands along its shores, separating Europe from Africa and the Middle East. Yet in another and more hopeful sense, the Mediterranean unifies those whom it touches. For thousands of years, it has been a highway of civilization, facilitating contact and commerce among the littoral peoples.

We are here at the Valletta Meeting of Experts to consider the Mediterranean in this second sense, as a unifying factor in an age of growing inter-dependence. We are here to seek ways to promote cooperation and to search for areas of agreement.

Our mandate is broad: "To consider the possibilities and means of promoting concrete initiatives for mutually beneficial cooperation concerning various economic, scientific and cultural fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to the above subjects already underway."

Just as the Mediterranean has a long history, so too does Mediterranean cooperation. I am sure that many of your delegations in preparing for this meeting, have been pleased to discover the already rich and substantial pattern of innovation and cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. Some activities involve a single nation. Some are bilateral. Some involve several of the Mediterranean states jointly. Some result from programs which apply to the Mediterranean area alone, while others result from global programs which have regional application. I have no doubt we will all be further surprised, and reassuringly so, as we learn in the course of this meeting about the extent of existing cooperation.

My Government takes welcome note of the fact that we are joined here by invited representatives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). They are among the multilateral organizations most directly and actively concerned in the Mediterranean area. They can give us essential background information for our discussions.

Mr. Chairman, my Government would like to endorse in particular, the Mediterranean Action Plan, of the United Nations Environmental Program. The parties to the Barcelona Convention have just concluded their first Consultative meeting. Their program is an outstanding example of the kind of mutually beneficial cooperation which we are here to encourage.

UNESCO's "Man and the Biosphere" program has also been very active and successful in promoting environmental research and training in the Mediterranean area, including a Mediterranean Scientific Conference held in France in September 1976.

The General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, a subsidiary of the FAO, serves an important advisory function in fishing resource management and development.

My country and several others represented here are working with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in planning for the launching in Spain of a Precipitation Enhancement Project (PEP) to assess the environmental impact of cloud seeding activities.

These programs, and others like them, deserve the support of this meeting.

As we consider ways of furthering this cooperation we will need to keep in mind also the considerable number of multilateral conferences already scheduled which will have an important effect on the Mediterranean, for example, a world climate conference is currently underway in Geneva. If my understanding is correct, the Federal Republic of Germany has invited interested parties to Bonn this June to negotiate a convention to protect migratory wildlife species. Later this year the United Nations will hold a conference in Vienna on Science and Technology for Development. In 1981, the United Nations will hold an important conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy. These are only a few of the multilateral meetings which will consider global issues of particular interest to the Mediterranean area. Preparations for these conferences are already underway, and they constitute important forms of ongoing cooperation, both regional and global in scope, which deserve our support.

We have already heard of many areas of cooperative activity throughout the Mediterranean, and we shall take inspiration from the efforts of our Maltese hosts, and Others, to stimulate further cooperation. My country is well aware of the historic and contemporary contributions of the Mediterranean to the world as a whole. The American people are proud that they have not only benefitted in many ways from this Mediterranean contribution but that we have been

able in turn to help the area rebuild from the ravages of war and then help it develop new avenues of cooperation and new areas of prosperity. We look forward to continuing to cooperate actively to these ends.

Although my country does not border on the Mediterranean, the United States is a nation with long-standing political, cultural, economic and ethnic ties with the region. From the earliest years of our independence, we have been involved here. In the most basic areas of human contact, the composition of our nation, we have benefitted from the immigration of vast numbers of Mediterranean people into the United States; and in turn these talented immigrants, their descendents, and friends, have often returned to this part of the world; they have returned in many capacities: as both teachers, and pupils; as artists and audiences, as merchants, investors and tourists.

In this sense, we clearly have vital interests in the Mediterranean, and we as a people see these interests served whenever we contribute -- as this meeting can -- to peace and stability, and to the encouragement of the greatest possible interchange of people, ideas and goods in the region.

Thus our nation shares with many of you a deep, daily engagement in all of the areas covered by the mandate of this meeting. As we consider, in coming weeks, the possibilities for further cooperation we believe we need not focus exclusively on the efforts of governments and international institutions -- important though these may be. In addition, we should also seek ways to enhance the opportunities for individuals and for private firms and organizations to contribute in their uniquely valuable ways to the broadening of avenues of cooperation in the area.

Let me cite several American projects in a few of these areas -- and I hope we can each add to our store of cooperative examples in coming weeks -- so that this partial listing might better illustrate the breadth of possibilities. For example, here on Malta an American-owned firm has grown to become the largest private sector firm in terms of employment, thereby contributing to jobs, earnings and trade; while our Fulbright Program is helping to build up the New University's Business Studies Department.

-- In Tunisia a joint commission has been established to promote and manage an active cultural and educational exchange programs.

-- In Israel, a scientific research program is supervised by a binational science foundation, which is funded by contributions from both the United States and Israel.

-- The American Universities in Beirut and Cairo, the latter with a unit here in Malta, have played significant roles over many years in the educational and national life of the Middle East.

-- American marine scientists have long been engaged in cooperative research efforts off the shores of North Africa and the Middle East, including scientists from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts.

My delegation looks forward in the course of this meeting to learning more about the equally extensive Mediterranean projects in which other countries represented here today are engaged and from which we can all benefit. They amount to a process of partnership impressively supportive of the purposes of the CSCE Final Act.

It is clear that in a world of limited resources but limitless horizons proper coordination will be essential if projects are to make their fullest contributions. Thus, we will want to review carefully the many ongoing programs even as we consider possible recommendations for ways to further promote economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.

In fact, we believe it is in precisely this area where our meeting of experts can make a truly significant contribution by strengthening the process of information exchange and by enhancing coordination of existing activities.

The states of the Mediterranean littoral understandably have a special interest in our topic and a special role to play at this meeting. Therefore, my Government welcomes the fact that several Mediterranean states which are not formal, direct participants in the CSCE have been invited to join in these deliberations. We look forward to hearing and benefitting from their views.

We do not ignore, Mr. Chairman, nor do we wish to gloss over the fact that conflict and disagreement too often have complicated cooperative endeavors in the Mediterranean. But neither should we overlook the cumulative contribution toward a more secure peace that governmental and private exchanges across the Mediterranean of the kind I have illustrated above are making in a wide variety of fields.

Our recommendations to our governments can, and we believe will, enhance that process.

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate our pleasure in being in Malta and our appreciation for the welcome we have all received. We are here to contribute to what we hope will be a positive meeting, one which will promote cooperation in the Mediterranean area and advance the purposes of the Final Act. We trust that the serious and cooperative spirit which characterized the two previous gatherings of CSCE experts will continue here in Valletta as we develop conclusions and recommendations to our governments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Final Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Mediterranean Cooperation, Valletta, March 26, 1979

In accordance with the mandate of the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place at Valletta upon the invitation of the Government of Malta, from 13 February to 26 March 1979 in order to consider within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the possibilities and means of promoting concrete initiatives for mutually beneficial co-operation concerning various economic, scientific and cultural fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to the above subjects already under way.

During the opening session of the Meeting, a message was received from Dr. Anton Buttigieg, President of the Republic of Malta, and the participants were addressed by Mr. Wistin Abela, Minister of Development, Energy, Port and Telecommunications of the Republic of Malta.

Source: CSCE Meeting of Experts, Valletta, February 13-March 26, 1979, Conference Document.

The participants adopted an agenda and agreed on modalities appropriate to this Meeting.

The participants had a general exchange of views.

In accordance with the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 all the non-participating Mediterranean States were invited to contribute to the work of the Meeting. Egypt and Israel accepted and made their contributions in plenary on 21 February. Syria addressed the plenary on 27 February. The representatives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), UNESCO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) made contributions relating to the work of the Meeting.

Two working bodies concerned with co-operation in the economic and in the scientific and cultural fields respectively were established by the plenary and pursued their work under its guidance. The non-participating Mediterranean States which made contributions participated in the discussions of the working bodies. Upon the invitation of the plenary, the representatives of the ECE and UNESCO made additional contributions in the working bodies.

The participants stressed the will of their governments to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States and reaffirmed the importance their governments attach to the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Final Act of the CSCE by implementing all of its provisions, as well as their readiness to pursue their efforts accordingly.

The participants considered many measures and activities already under way or envisaged, both bilateral and multilateral, relating to mutually beneficial co-operation in the fields of economics, science and culture; in doing so, they drew attention to certain current problems in the above-mentioned fields and examined ways of solving them. The participants were of the opinion that the exchange of views which took place in this context was a useful outcome of the Meeting.

The Meeting of Experts noted that particularly useful and concrete work in the fields specified in the mandate of the Valletta Meeting is being done by competent international organisations, notably by ECE, UNESCO and UNEP.

In accordance with the mandate of the Meeting and taking into account the contributions made at the Meeting by non-participating Mediterranean States and by the representatives of ECE, UNESCO and UNEP, the participants considered ideas and proposals for further initiatives intended to promote mutually beneficial co-operation in sectors falling within the fields identified for consideration by the Meeting.

The Meeting of Experts concluded that for many of those sectors ECE, UNESCO and UNEP provided a framework for investigating and developing further co-operation among the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States, whereas in other sectors unilateral efforts, or bilateral or other forms of multilateral co-operation were more suitable.

Accordingly, the participants, having examined the ideas, considerations and proposals which had been submitted, recommended to Governments of the participating States that they envisage within their possibilities and interests, through their participation in international organisations and in their bilateral and multilateral relations with the participating States and with the non-participating Mediterranean States, the following:

ECONOMICS

Continuing their efforts to contribute to the diversified development of the economies of the States concerned, including the non-participating Mediterranean States, taking due account of their national development objectives.

Developing the exchange of statistical data, including with the non-participating Mediterranean States, among national statistical institutes, and considering the convening of a meeting of experts within the framework of ECE, with a view to drawing up an inventory of existing data and considering further actions in the fields of data concerning national accounts, labour, agricultural and industrial production, trade, transport, tourism, the environment, education and health.

Examining within the framework of UNEP, the possibilities of participating States being provided with information and advice on relevant environmental programmes and activities with a view to achieving better harmonization between Mediterranean and other international programmes; contributing to the efforts to reduce pollution of the Mediterranean; and considering the possibility of developing co-operation initiated within the framework of the Barcelona Convention.

Considering the holding of meetings at a technical level, within the framework of the appropriate international organisations, in order to determine the most suitable criteria for making the best possible use of tourist resources and promoting further co-operation among interested countries in the fields of vocational training, in-service training and scholarships.

Intensifying the exchange, bilaterally as well as in co-operation with the competent international organisations, of the results of studies on the conservation and rational use of energy and developing their co-operation in the area of solar energy, including with the non-participating Mediterranean States, by supporting the activities of UNEP and taking due account of the outcome of the CSCE "Scientific Forum".

Considering the expansion of trans-European and Mediterranean transport networks and promoting with a view to facilitating trade, the further application in these areas of the TIR Convention as well as other instruments and recommendations elaborated within the framework of ECE relating to international transport of goods.







Considering co-operative efforts, within the competent international organisations, to adapt agricultural production in the Mediterranean to meet existing needs.

Urging better co-operation among the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States in the field of fisheries in the Mediterranean, and supporting further studies within competent international organisations on fish processing.

Supporting the programme sponsored by UNEP for the development of aquaculture in the Mediterranean as a co-operative project between all interested countries.

Promoting co-operation in the field of telecommunications technology among appropriate institutions or firms of interested participating States and non-participating Mediterranean States through the carrying out of joint research, including on new equipment and current technology, the exchange of information, the organisation of training courses for specialists, in co-operation with the International Telecommunications Union. Studying the possibility of convening a meeting of experts of interested countries on telecommunications in the Mediterranean.

Recommending the host countries and the countries of origin to intensify their contacts with a view to finding solutions to the problems which exist in the field of migrant labour. While fully implementing the existing agreements to which they are parties, they should also continue, by all appropriate means, their efforts to improve the situation of migrant workers in conformity with the provisions of the Final Act on migrant labour, including the solution of the problems in the economic, social, human and other fields.



SCIENCE

Practising more widely the holding, within the framework of the competent international organisations mentioned in the Final Act, of conferences, symposia and meetings on the most pressing scientific and technical problems of the Mediterranean that are of general interest.

Reinforcing their co-operation in controlling and eradicating certain diseases prevalent in the Mediterranean (e.g. thalassaemia), facilitating studies and conferences, particularly under the aegis of the World Health Organisation, with a view to establishing programmes for the prevention, detection and treatment of these diseases and for the training of specialized personnel, on the basis of the expertise which some participating States could share with other countries.

Urging further exchanges of views within the competent international organisations, on co-operative studies on gerontology, including environmental geriatric care.

Considering the convening under the aegis of the competent international organisations of a scientific conference on the protection of the Mediterranean ecosystem, particularly with a view to studying co-operative projects in the fields of afforestation, forest management, management of water resources, reclamation of arid and semi-arid areas, and drawing up an inventory of the technical centres for research existing in these areas.

Developing co-operation in the field of seismology, increasing the exchange of information on seismic phenomena in the Mediterranean and adjacent areas, and considering the convening, under the aegis of UNESCO, of a symposium on seismicity in the Mediterranean and its repercussions in Europe and Africa.

Studying, in co-operation with other participating States and with non-participating Mediterranean States, the possibility of the drafting of a comprehensive history of the Mediterranean utilizing the valuable experience of UNESCO and under its aegis.

Encouraging studies relevant to the needs of the Mediterranean, particularly in the fields of science and technology.

CULTURE

Supporting the holding of congresses and conferences by existing international organisations in the field of culture, both in the participating States and in the non-participating Mediterranean States.

Increasing their co-operation, both at the bilateral and multilateral level, including within the competent international organisations in the field of scientific research and in the protection and preservation of the cultural and historical heritage of the Mediterranean, notably archaeological and architectural remains, with a view to developing in particular underwater archaeological research and harmonizing the legal and technical modalities for the protection and preservation of this heritage.

Considering the preparation of a study on the relationship between the development of tourism in the Mediterranean and the protection, preservation and presentation of the cultural and historical heritage, with the participation of interested participating and non-participating States, and in collaboration with competent international organisations.

Expanding their co-operation in the field of the dissemination of scientific and cultural knowledge through radio and television; increasing the exchanges of scientific and cultural radio and television programmes; studying the possibilities, in collaboration with the competent international organisations, of using radio and television for vocational and adult training.

Promoting the exchange of films among the film libraries of the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States and the holding of Film Weeks.

Encouraging the efforts of UNESCO to help Mediterranean countries establish a Mediterranean Cultural Centre.

The participants recommended to the Governments of the participating States of the CSCE that they take into account, as appropriate, at the Madrid Meeting, the results of the Valletta Meeting and that they be mindful in the interim of the outcome achieved by unilateral efforts and within the framework of competent international organisations and in bilateral or multilateral co-operation, in the fields of the mandate for the Valletta Meeting.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government and the people of Malta for the excellent organisation of the Meeting and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Valletta.

Valletta, 26 March 1979

Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union,
Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Vienna,
June 18, 1979

[Extracts]

**JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R.
COMMUNIQUE, VIENNA,
JUNE 18**

By mutual agreement, President of the United States of America Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev held meetings in Vienna, Austria, from June 15 to June 18, 1979.

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The sides noted with satisfaction the positive developments which have taken place in recent years with respect to the situation on the European continent. They underscored the significance of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The two sides agreed that continuation of the CSCE process is important to promote security and cooperation in Europe. They called attention to the need for full implementation of all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The USA and the USSR will work to facilitate a constructive meeting of the representatives of the participating states of the All-European Conference, which is scheduled to take place in 1980 in Madrid.

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Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 1979, pp. 54, 57.

Opening Statement by Dr. Philip Handler Before the CSCE
Scientific Forum, Hamburg, February 23, 1980

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates to the Scientific Forum from the nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ladies and Gentlemen: Let me express the thanks of my country, and its Delegation, for the hospitality of our host, the Federal Republic of Germany, and to my friend, Dr. Klaus Gottstein, Executive Secretary of the Forum, for his diligence and imagination in preparing for this unprecedented gathering. Whatever the outcome of the Forum, we owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Gottstein and to the City of Hamburg for establishing a suitable atmosphere in which to conduct our discussions. This forum is not a "Scientific Meeting" as scientists use that term; it is part of the "CSCE Process." Its principal concern is the international scientific enterprise, including its rules of ethical conduct, rather than the substance of science itself. The Forum, therefore, is seen by the American delegates as an opportunity for scientists, speaking for themselves as scientists rather than for their governments, to discuss freely and without restriction those matters particularly germane to the improvement of scientific relations among the CSCE countries. We are delighted to hear Frau Hamm-Brucher's invitation to speak frankly. My purpose, today, is to summarize for you those matters that we most wish to discuss for the next two weeks. We who have gathered here believe that knowledge gained anywhere benefits mankind everywhere. The unprecedented burgeoning of understanding of living systems and of the physical universe in the last three decades requires no recounting. Nor does the equally remarkable proliferation of technologies that affect virtually every aspect of our daily lives. But those dramatic developments have markedly altered the societal role of the scientist precisely because it is science that now offers the principal means to affect the ancient scourges of humanity--war, famine, and pestilence--as well as to affect the quality of life everywhere.

The scientific communities of the world will inevitably be expected to assume greater responsibility for expanded food

Source: Department of State files. Dr. Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, was head of the U.S. delegation at Hamburg.

production and dietary improvement, for better health care and the eradication of disease, for improved communication, for new ways both to conserve and to harness sources of energy and--regrettably--for the development of new and more lethal weapons. We will also be faced with great need to continue popular education for citizenship in our technology-dominated world. Pari passu, we will surely consider ourselves ever more responsible for the ways in which the fruits of our labors are used by the larger society.

Knowing all this, and knowing that governments today seek to use science and technology in ways unthinkable but a few decades ago, we must also reckon with the fact that scientific interchange across national boundaries, among scientists and their institutions, has become far more complicated than it was. What can we foresee for the future of scientific cooperation, exchange, and communication?

Because science is international, we have always been faced with the problem of international agreement on technical standards: on units of measurement, on symbols and nomenclature. Now, it is even more important that we agree and conform to common standards of responsibility and behaviour.

It is ironic, therefore, that the obstacles to free and timely interchange among scientists are becoming more, not less, significant and complicated as our technical capacity to communicate expands. It is a paradox that scientific interchange has become more vulnerable as the forums for such interchange become more numerous. Our formal adoption of common standards of behaviour began in 1958, when the International Council for Scientific Unions (ICSU) first took a stand by adopting a resolution on political non-discrimination. In 1963, ICSU created its Committee on Free Circulation of Scientists. In 1976, it published its Resolution on the Universality of Science and the Committee on the Safeguard of the Pursuit of Science. (I am pleased that the distinguished chairman of that committee, Professor Ole Maaloe of Denmark, is a delegate to this forum.)

Thus, the one nongovernmental scientific organization with which every scientific community represented at this forum has some contact has a history of more than two decades of thoughtful, constructive progress toward the concept of common standards and values in the world of science. The Helsinki Final Act complements the ICSU initiatives and expands both their meaning and their force, since the Final Act was signed by governments rather than by scientists. Yet, today, this forum gathers in an atmosphere of international tension and with somewhat less than full trust. Those of you who read the press

dispatches from the United States will know that the American Delegation is here despite calls to boycott from a number of eloquent and eminent American scientists. You will be aware of the deep pervading concern of the American scientific community for the fate of individual scientists now in prison, or held against their will in their own countries. Harsh words have been spoken; some of them were mine at a recent hearing before the commission of our Congress charged with following the progress of the Helsinki Accords. The American Delegation to the Scientific Forum fervently believes that freedom is absolutely essential to the scientific endeavor. We are critical of national acts that fail to meet the basic tests of adherence to the Helsinki Final Act. We are dismayed about the manner in which some countries regulate the participation of their scientists in international scientific meetings; about the abridgement of freedom to leave a country, as well as permission to enter it; about the censorship of international journals of science; about the dismissal of scientists from their posts because they ask to emigrate, or because they disagree with current policies of a government; about the harsh treatment of scientists who have sought to monitor how well their governments adhere to the provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

Let me invite your attention to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and to that excellent little monograph by the Council for Science and Society and the British Institute of Human Rights, entitled "Scholarly Freedom and Human Rights." It makes the unambiguous point that "the success of a scholar's work depends as much on the freedom of others to study and do research as it does on his own."

The members of our Delegation will speak as individuals, as free men and women from a free country; we will offer constructive proposals on ways to improve the atmosphere for scientific interchange, on ways to find common standards and values, and on specific proposals for steps toward a true cooperative spirit.

In 1976, I told the annual meeting of our Academy that, "I am committed to defense of the human rights of all persons, and to those of scientists in particular. Not, as is often argued, because humanity may be denied the fruits of their science, but because they are precious as human beings; because abrogation of their rights is injurious to all mankind; because as liberal intellectuals, scientists not infrequently become involved in the defense of the human rights of others; and because I am likely to be best informed concerning their circumstances." To me, and to all members of the American Delegation, the questions of freedom of inquiry, freedom to write and publish, freedom to

speech, freedom to come and go across national borders, and freedom to live where one's heart and conscience take one, are indissolubly bound to freedom of one's person. We cannot consider scientific communication as separate and distinct from other forms of human communication. We perceive no essential distinctions between pursuit of truth about the nature of man or the physical universe and pursuit of truth about the human condition in the societies in which we live. We will speak out for those whose rights have been denied, for the cost of silence is the abandonment of human rights and that is a price we will not pay.

Nor do we speak for ourselves alone. In our country, in a spontaneous upwelling without precedent, thousands of scientists have been declaring themselves personally unwilling to engage in scientific interchanges with colleagues in the Soviet Union until the government of that country has restored the normal civil status of such scientists as Shcharansky, Kovalev, and Orlov, who have been imprisoned for acts consonant with the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement. They also protest the years of useless waiting of scientists such as Aleksander Lerner and Naum Maiman. And they are prepared to continue their protest until that scientist whom the Nobel Committee termed "the conscience of mankind" is once again allowed to serve his country and humanity with the freedom and honor he so well deserves. The scientific world refuses to accept protestations that such matters are the internal affairs of the countries involved. Indeed, agreement that these transgressions, wherever they occur, are of universal concern is the very essence of the Helsinki Accords. And if disaffection continues to spread among Western scientists, if the matters that trouble us are not rectified, if we are confronted with further crises of conscience, the interchanges that we have gathered here to foster will, instead, soon dissolve in bitterness and anger.

In the past decade or so, the number of scientists crossing borders among the CSCE countries has expanded remarkably. International scientific cooperative programs have developed with enthusiasm and substantial governmental support. All of us would like this cooperation to continue and expand and would like the scientific cooperative avenues to broaden. Some of the CSCE countries have benefitted more than others; it would be good to redress that imbalance, to assure that the fruits of the scientific endeavour are truly of equal benefit to all. The least complicated, yet in many ways the most important area of scientific cooperation is fundamental research--the exploration of nature itself. In an ideal world, this would require the support but neither the permission nor the catalysis of governments since it occurs readily on the initiative of scientists themselves. Since every political barrier to this

spontaneous process must be a matter of deep concern to scientists everywhere, such problems rank high on the agenda of this forum.

But there are also problems in the areas of applied research on our agenda. For example, there are opportunities for significant new cooperative ventures--bilateral and multilateral--in the fields of conservation, transmission, and use of energy. Patently, the success of efforts in these directions will be critical to the vitality of the economy and the quality of daily life in every country and may well be determinant with respect to the prospect for world peace. Before this century is over, the success or failure of science may well be judged by the success or failure of agriculture. There are vast possibilities for increasing knowledge of genetic mechanisms which can improve geographic adaptability and disease resistance. With patience and skill, the reproductive efficiency of livestock can be enhanced and the devastations of epizootic diseases can be reduced. Current research on plant diseases may enable environmentally-conservative biological methods of pest control, for example through the use of gametocides, sterilants, and species-specific microbial pathogens. Better knowledge of the photosynthetic process and germplasm exchange should enable markedly enhanced food production efficiency.

Scientists stand before the bar of a hungry, burgeoning humanity; we must not be found wanting.

We have just begun to bring the fruits of new biological knowledge and understanding to bear on the dread diseases of mankind. The eradication of smallpox is a classic model of international cooperation in the application of knowledge. That accomplishment is a tribute to Professor Raska of the Charles University in Prague who was, for years, the lonely principal proponent of what became the successful eradication campaign, and to Professor Henderson of Johns Hopkins University who planned and directed its final stages. We are normally constrained to seek like solutions to such other infectious diseases as measles and poliomyelitis; to help bring under control such tropical diseases as trachoma and schistosomiasis. And this conference should resolve what we are learning about interferon, hormones and their receptors, immunochemistry, genetic mechanisms, environmental challenge, the early detection and treatment of many forms of cancer, and the etiology and pathogenesis of cancer, atherosclerosis and "autoimmune diseases" must be shared fully with each other and with those who conduct research on health problems in countries outside the CSCE family.

To share the results of the combined health research of the CSCE countries is surely a moral imperative. Collective scientific research and decision-making are essential if we are to arrest global atmospheric and marine degradation and pollution. No nation has the resources, the access, or the talent to grapple with these problems alone. As one of our delegation has remarked, "Real progress in improving global environments while simultaneously making the fruits of technology accessible to a broader spectrum of the citizens of all countries is such a worthy objective."

We are well aware that only through the careful nurturing of cross-cultural communication can we bring a sense of perspective and balance to each other's views. The blights that bedevil many of the world's cities and the grinding poverty and ignorance of many rural people are, or are about to become, the common problems of all societies. We need each other if only to seek amelioration of these great evils.

It would be an immense tragedy if the glorious possibilities of cooperation in these ventures were to be denied to mankind in consequence of disintegration of the international scientific order because of the failure of some to live up to the standards of behavior to which our governments agreed in Helsinki. Are the ideological polarizations of today's world driving our scientific communities apart? Or can reason and good will prevail? We may know more two weeks hence.

It is my heartfelt hope that the results of this Forum will yet be recorded with pride by the scientists in attendance.

For the duration of this Forum, I suggest that we could usefully ask ourselves the following questions:

- (1) Can the ways in which the international organizations of science address their tasks be improved?
- (2) If traditional disciplines impose conventional boundaries that are inappropriate to today's needs, can new terms of reference be devised for the broadly-construed fields of inquiry before us?
- (3) Can we agree on guidelines to assure that international meetings and exchanges will take place in a climate conducive to free association and unfettered communication?
- (4) Is it possible to develop an international style that leaves arrangements for scientific interchange in the hands of scientists, not politicians, a style that facilitates the

acceptance of invitations and the dissemination of knowledge, in which the desirability of mutual benefit is implicit?

(5) Can we agree to strengthen the apparatus and the resolve of the International Council of Scientific Unions to develop and apply that set of common standards and values which is already part of its agenda?

But I must warn that even constructive, affirmative responses to these questions may not suffice. This meeting is being watched. This Forum, once deemed of little significance, has become a "step between Belgrade and Madrid," and the signals emanating from these walls will not go ignored.

To achieve the modest goals I have proposed, it is imperative that we and our governments first wholeheartedly accept and resolve to implement the elemental propositions concerning human rights that underlie the very roots of our scientific endeavor.

To quote another colleague: "... Intellectual freedom is essential to human society--freedom to obtain and distribute information, freedom for open-minded and unfearing debate and freedom from pressure by officialdom and prejudices. Such a trinity of freedom of thought is the only guarantee against an infection of people by mass myths Freedom of thought is the only guarantee of the feasibility of a scientific democratic approach to politics, economy and culture."

Those words were written by a foreign associate of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America: Andrei Sakharov. Thank you.

Final Report of the CSCE Scientific Forum, Hamburg,
March 3, 1980

REPORT OF THE "SCIENTIFIC FORUM" OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of the report of the meeting of experts representing the participating States and their national scientific institutions held in Bonn from 20 June to 28 July 1978, the "Scientific Forum" took place in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, from 18 February to 3 March 1980. It was held in the form of a meeting of leading personalities in science from the participating States.

During the opening session of the "Scientific Forum" the participants were welcomed by Hans-Ulrich Klose, Lord Mayor of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, and were addressed by Dr. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

During the first working session of the Plenary representatives of UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) made their contributions. Opening statements were made by representatives of delegations of the participating States.

Four subsidiary working bodies were established by the Plenary on alternative energy sources, food production, medicine, and the humanities and social sciences. Representatives of UNESCO and the ECE were invited to make additional contributions in these working bodies.

The "Scientific Forum" discussed interrelated problems of common interest concerning current and future developments in science, and promotion of expansion of contacts, communications and the exchange of information between scientific institutions and among scientists.

Source: CSCE Scientific Forum, Hamburg, June 20-July 28, 1980, Conference Document.

In this context the subsidiary working bodies considered the following areas and subjects:

Exact and Natural Sciences

Scientific research, in particular fundamental research, in the field of alternative energy sources

Exact and Natural Sciences

Scientific research, in particular fundamental research, in the field of food production

Medicine

Current trends in medical research, in particular in basic research and primarily on cardiovascular, tumour and virus diseases, taking into consideration the influence of the changing environment on human health

The Humanities and Social Sciences

Comparative studies on the social, socio-economic and cultural phenomena, especially the problems of human environment and urban development.

The subsidiary working bodies also reviewed written contributions submitted to the "Scientific Forum".

On the basis of their deliberations they drew up reports which were reviewed by the Plenary and are included, as amended, in Annexes 1-4.

As a result of its proceedings the "Scientific Forum" concluded the following:

- Since the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE, there has been a significant expansion of international co-operation in research and training and in the exchange of information. Progress, however, has been greater in some areas than in others. It is observed that the present state of international scientific co-operation still requires improvements in various respects. Such improvements should be achieved bilaterally and multilaterally at governmental and non-governmental levels through intergovernmental and other agreements, international programmes and co-operative projects, and by providing equitable opportunities for scientific research and for wider communication and travel necessary for professional purposes.

- This goal can, however, be reached only by respect for all the principles and by full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act. All participating States are, therefore, urged to observe the spirit and the letter of the Final Act, particularly with respect to conditions essential for international scientific co-operation.
- It is furthermore considered necessary to state that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms by all States represents one of the foundations for a significant improvement in their mutual relations, and in international scientific co-operation at all levels.
- Appropriate support should be given to arrange advanced seminars and training courses for young scientists from participating and other States that would enable them to study new scientific methods for shorter or longer periods. Information about these activities and arrangements should be disseminated as widely as possible.
- The different levels of scientific development in particular fields in the participating States should be taken into account when pursuing scientific co-operation.
- It is recommended that the participating States study the possibility of convening a new "Scientific Forum", at a suitable date, depending on developments in science and in scientific co-operation among the participating States. The results of the "Scientific Forum" in Hamburg may be taken into account, as appropriate, by the participating States at the Madrid Meeting, scheduled for November 1980.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the excellent organization of the "Scientific Forum" and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Hamburg.

Annex 1: Alternative Energy Sources

1. Introduction

The working body examined the problems created by the rapid dwindling of easily accessible reserves of fossil energy and reviewed alternative solutions provided by other energy sources.

During the discussions it became apparent that delegates from different countries interpreted the term "alternative energy" in different ways. However, it was agreed that the following four main categories should be discussed as energy options for the future:

Advanced utilization of fossil energy, nuclear energy (fission and fusion), solar energy (direct and indirect forms), and energy conservation. The working body made no attempt to give priorities to the different options.

2. Need for fundamental research on various alternative energy sources

2.0 General

The working body noted that the questions of developing energy resources are today of vital importance. The further development of civilization in the economic as well as in the political field depends on the possibility of satisfying demand for energy in industry, in the residential and service sectors, in transport, in food production, and in the mining and processing of minerals.

In spite of the necessity for and possibility of the more economical use of energy, the demand for energy will continue to rise. The problem demands especially urgent solutions because of the diminishing energy resource represented by oil and gas.

That is why the task of scientific research in the field of energy is to supply during the next decade a reliable scientific basis for planning and use of all basic resources of energy. Such a basis should include forecasts of the environmental effects of the various types of energy, and in particular improved assessments of the effects on the global and regional climate.

The working body recommends governments to use international co-operation for the fulfilling of this task.

It is not possible to give universal priorities for any research objectives, as many countries have already found and applied technological solutions to problems relevant to their situation, whose relevance for other countries has yet to be investigated.

2.1 Problems of utilization of fossil fuels: efficiency and safety

The urgent need to increase utilization of low-quality fossil energy resources – coal, brown coal, oil shale and tar sand, lignite, peat, etc. – as well as at the same time to tighten the environmental requirements, make it necessary to develop ever more advanced combustion methods, in spite of the need for an intensified interest in more efficient and cleaner combustion methods, as well as in the use of synthetic liquid and gaseous fuel from coal, oil shale and tar sands, and considering that several large demonstration projects exist, synthetic fuel production is still on a rather narrow basis. Both fundamental and applied research are needed on a broad front before synthetic liquid or gaseous fuels are capable of substituting for natural hydrocarbons on a commercial scale.

Particular attention must be given to the problems of safety in deep mining and to the efficiency of production methods in both deep and open-cast mining.

2.2 Nuclear energy

The problem of energy supply for the majority of participating countries cannot be solved without using nuclear energy for producing electricity and heat. The economic efficiency of nuclear fission technology has been established, the reliability has been shown to be good, and the environmental aspects are becoming well understood. All aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle will require continuing efforts to assure its full reliability and safety, in order to ensure public acceptability.

For the guarantee of further nuclear prospects the development of breeder reactors is necessary.

The working body states that insufficient effort has so far been made in the development of unconventional types of reactors.

The working body notes that research in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion is nearing the level of scientific demonstration. Great efforts are necessary, however, to demonstrate even more urgently the technological feasibility of fusion.

2.3 Solar energy and other renewable energy sources

Many ways exist for the wider application of solar energy through direct and indirect methods, and in decentralized and centralized forms. In the long term they could contribute significantly to the solution of energy problems. Some of these solar technologies are already in use, some are under development and some are still in the research stage. The same is true for geothermal and tidal sources of energy.

Apart from the scientific and technical problems, however, there are also a number of other open questions pertaining to the wider application of solar energy. Among those questions are economic, infrastructural, environmental, legal and administrative considerations. It is important that these problems are treated together with the scientific problems within a common framework in order to ensure a balanced and optimal use of solar energy.

The tentative suggestions for promising solar energy research areas in the list below do not assign priorities. Further, the selection of areas to a certain extent reflects the specialities of individual scientists in the working body. The list is therefore only indicative and is subject to revision.

- Energy storage, crucial to the small and large-scale use of solar energy and also of great general importance.
- Solar heating, including systems for integration into local or district heating schemes.
- Energy from biosystems, especially production and conversion of fuels from wood, cultivated biomass, etc.
- Solar electricity based on the industrial development of existing photovoltaic or photothermal techniques and on research on novel approaches.
- Basic research in photochemistry and photobiology.
- Scientific evaluation of future solar energy prospects on a national or regional scale.
- Integration of solar energy into existing energy systems, for different forms of energy and end-use requirements.

2.4 Energy conservation

Energy consumption and economic activity are very closely related. The principal way to optimize this relationship is conservation. Conservation should be aimed at minimizing energy losses, elimination of ineffective energy use, recycling of materials as well as development of energy-saving processes and technologies. Much research and development activity is needed continuously for efforts in energy conservation in industry, in transportation, in buildings and in appliances and services of many kinds and in improvements in technology. This can be achieved through fundamental as well as applied research.

In this context the working body would stress the vital role of technological innovation.

3. International co-operation

Special attention must be paid to the problems of exchange and assessment of scientific and technical data. Individual and institutional scientific contacts are seen here as the best means. Strengthening of existing information centres is another, e.g. within the framework of ECE and UNESCO.

The working body supports the existing forms of international and regional co-operation, increased contacts amongst research organizations, including the United Nations special organization, e.g. International Atomic Energy Agency, UNESCO, Economic Commission for Europe etc., and non-governmental organizations, e.g. International Council of Scientific Unions.

Forms of co-operation can include the organization of international conferences, symposia, schools, exchange of scientists between different countries and bodies, discussion of research programmes on a regional or bilateral scale, and the working out and realization of joint international projects. The working body notes with approval examples of international activity such as INTOR, (International Fusion Project) carried out under the aegis of IAEA, and the energy project of IIASA.

The working body especially asks international organizations to take initiatives to promote co-operation in fields of advanced coal utilization technology, deep coal mining safety and solar energy.

The working body on alternative energy sources considers its meetings to have been useful. Since the energy problem is important and of a long-term nature, the working body proposes the continuation of this type of interdisciplinary scientific meeting.

The working body had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

Annex 2: Food Production

The future demand, and for many the present demand, for food and feed in the world, emphasized by the "Scientific Forum" of the CSCE, requires sustained research and development efforts in all aspects of the food system.

The need became evident, during the discussions of the Working Body, for more integrated multidisciplinary research, training at undergraduate and post-graduate level, exchanges of scientists and their interaction. Although the Working Body recognised the limits of the mandate of the "Scientific Forum" it agreed that food production was of world importance.

In plant genetics and breeding there is a need for international co-operation on the development of more productive plants with higher photosynthetic capacity, more efficient capability to use available mineral nutrients, and better ability to withstand environmental stresses. In this research, scientists should make effective use of modern plant-breeding techniques, including haploid breeding, and various tissue culture techniques in addition to standard methods to obtain crosses, noting the importance of wide crosses. In research on crop production, there is a need for co-operation on the development of energy-efficient management systems based on biological nitrogen fixation and other ecological means as well as the conservation and management of natural resources. The importance of plant protection was stressed as a means of reducing losses.

In the area of animal production, there is a need for more co-operative research on the genetic improvement of farm livestock; the control of infectious diseases, metabolic disorders and infertility; the increased use of non-protein nitrogen in the ruminant diet; animal housing, nutrition and improvement of the efficiency of management systems; and elimination of stress susceptibility and improvement of products of animal origin.

Special attention is drawn to the need for international co-operation in identifying and preserving germ plasm of plants and animals in their natural ecosystems. This should include more, and more comprehensive, gene banks to preserve genetic materials for the benefit of plant and animal production in the future.

Fisheries contribute substantially to the food system. International attitudes should facilitate rather than hinder fisheries research. Continued international vigilance must be maintained on the effects on the stock of the size of catch and of pollution to ensure long-term benefits from this important natural resource.

Attention is drawn to the significant contribution that technology can make to the diminution of post-harvest losses and to the maintenance of the wholesomeness and nutritional quality of foods. More research is needed on alternative sources and economic production of basic food components such as proteins, essential amino acids, etc. Collective efforts should be expanded in the fight against all forms of malnutrition through the assurance of the natural quality of foods and protection against introduction of harmful contaminants during production, processing, storage and distribution. Intensified efforts are needed in the area of nutrition education both at academic and consumer levels and should include multidisciplinary behavioural studies on eating habits and food acceptance. In the final analysis, it is health and nutritional status that is the prerequisite for the well-being of all mankind.

The Working Body expressed confidence that existing governmental and non-governmental international organizations will be able to help in expanding research on the subject to which attention is drawn in this report.

The Working Body thus had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

Annex 3: Medicine

The outcome of the work of the subsidiary working body is presented in the following sections on cardiovascular, neoplastic and viral diseases. The working body had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

Cardiovascular Diseases

The various reports presented to the "Scientific Forum", and other information available, underline that cardiovascular diseases, where atherosclerosis and/or hypertension are involved, are of major concern in most participating countries. These two main and interrelated ailments with their complications – ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease and peripheral vascular disease together show a high level of incidence and account for a high death rate.

Therefore it seems imperative that special efforts of basic research should be focused on the mechanisms of atherogenesis and causal mechanisms in essential hypertension. On the other hand, it emerges from the reports that there is also great need for help from the behavioural sciences in order to improve compliance both of doctors and the public especially with respect to advice in the interest of prevention and treatment. Preventive measures in childhood are worth a special research effort.

From the various reports it is seen that marked and diverse research efforts are already being made in most countries towards illuminating the mechanisms that lie behind these groups of diseases. A main effort also appears to be directed towards their prevention and treatment.

Since the etiology and pathogenesis of these diseases are far from being fully understood and since these ailments dominate the disease pattern in so many countries, it appears that they must be looked upon as fields for international concern and that fruitful patterns of international co-operation should be encouraged. Such co-operation should be looked upon as an effort additional to the widespread research already going on in the different countries.

In order to identify projects and fields related to cardiovascular diseases where international co-operation might be fruitful one could use the following list of 'indications'.

'Indications' for making a bi- or multinational co-operative effort in the cardiovascular field*)

1. Co-operative research

1.1 international studies that exploit the transcultural differences in exposure to known or presumed risk factors (for instance in connexion with migration) to draw conclusions about causality either in a qualitative or a quantitative sense.

1.2 studies that require such large numbers of patients, in order to come to a conclusion, that these cannot be found in one single country. Large and complicated drug trials might be an example in point.

1.3 studies that are so costly that they can only be financed by a collaborative effort.

1.4 studies in which there is an abundance of patients of a certain kind, say with rheumatic heart disease, in one country and resources such as interested experts and/or financial support available in another country.

1.5 study projects that can only succeed if expertise in different fields from different countries is pooled.

1.6 study of occurrence, natural history and/or treatment of uncommon cardiovascular diseases that necessitates pooling of observations from different countries.

2. Evaluation

Comparative studies of the efficiency and effectiveness of different health care systems and health care practices in the fields of prevention, clinical medicine and rehabilitation.

3. Co-operative surveillance

Examples:

- a co-operative early warning system for the side effects of drugs.
- a co-operative early warning system for failures of certain types of electronic pacemakers.

*) Here it is meant that are distinct from research activities on a local or international co-operative basis, the results of which are then reported to audiences of scientific meetings and in the international literature.

4. Standardization of nomenclature

Examples:

- coronary angiogram
- congenital heart disease
- level of rehabilitation after myocardial infarction and cerebrovascular disease.

5. Standardization of procedures

Examples:

- determination of all blood lipids and lipoproteins used in epidemiological research.
- determination of prostaglandins.
- collection of epidemiological data.

6. Transfer of techniques

Examples:

- a systematic programme of practical courses in new and/or difficult biochemical determinations with an updated listing of such courses that is made internationally available.
- exchange of computer software in the field of epidemiology and clinical cardiology.
- facilitation of transfer of new or difficult techniques in the cardiovascular field.

7. Co-operative moves by scientists in the field of prevention

Example:

- simultaneous urging against cigarette consumption or in favour of food habits that can promote prevention.

Cancer

The group stresses that international co-operation in cancer research is necessary in order to achieve progress in the cancer problem.

Such international co-operation exists in Europe and throughout the world, and is carried out by a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations and societies.

The group urges governments and other appropriate bodies to increase support for such organizations, so that existing programmes of international co-operation can be continued and enlarged. Due care should be taken to avoid unnecessary duplication. Progress of international collaboration in cancer research should be monitored periodically by the appropriate bodies.

The group requests that special emphasis should be devoted to the following:

- (1) Free dissemination of regional and local data on cancer and related etiological factors, and assistance for field studies.
- (2) Extension of cancer registries to include new regions and countries.
- (3) Extension of information exchange in cancer treatment, including data on screening, testing, toxicity, drug interactions and, where applicable, exchange of drugs. Elaboration of ethical principles.
- (4) Standardization of reagents, diagnostic methods and test systems.
- (5) Access to research facilities and data from health care systems.
- (6) Training courses, especially for young scientists in oncology and appropriate basic biology, including new methods.
- (7) Increased opportunities, especially for young scientists to learn new approaches in cancer research, by short-term and long-term fellowships.
- (8) Direct and rapid contact between working scientists in collaborating laboratories, by all available means of communication.

Virology

In spite of great achievements in the prevention of some of the most severe virus diseases, the relative and absolute importance of viruses as causes of acute and chronic infectious diseases has increased.

For this reason, and being aware of the utmost importance of international co-operation, for example in the eradication of smallpox, the virologists feel that such co-operation is necessary in trying to solve some of the many important problems in virology. International co-operation exists already in the field of virology both in Europe and in the world and is carried out by several governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The virologists urge that the existing programmes in the field of virology should be continued and enlarged. Unnecessary duplication should be avoided.

Although partly covered by existing organizations and arrangements further international co-operation is required in the following:

- Rapid dissemination of information on epidemiology of virus diseases in the different regions.
- Some fields of molecular virology, as for example recombinant DNA, including safety regulations and evaluation of benefits.
- Promoting channels for information on new methods in diagnostic procedures, especially rapid diagnosis of virus diseases.
- Standardization of material for diagnostic tests as well as for materials used for prevention and treatment of virus diseases.
- Study and prevention of some of the common and especially important diseases such as respiratory infections and hepatitis.
- Obtaining access to research facilities in different institutions, especially for young scientists, including training courses, and long or short-term fellowships, for example in regional institutions prepared to give training in applied clinical and epidemiological virology.
- Direct and rapid contact between working scientists in collaborating laboratories by all available means of communication.

Annex 4: Humanities and Social Sciences

1. The main issues to be faced

A. General issues

The main issues to be faced include such general phenomena as rapid demographic, social, cultural and psychological changes, the impact of the increasing sophistication of technology, the shifting role of women in society, alterations of values concerning the environment, and limitations imposed by a growing energy shortage. (A more detailed list of the problems to be faced appears in the Appendix.)

B. Urbanization

The process of urbanization has brought new possibilities and problems which have affected rural areas and open spaces as well as cities and their inhabitants. Among them are effects of internal and external migration, problems of crowding, disorder and crime, alterations to the natural environment, and pollution of the atmosphere, water resources and the land. All of this calls for an improved understanding of the processes of urbanization and their relationship to regional development.

C. Environmental quality

There has been a growing consciousness of the importance of environmental protection, but there are practical problems due to imperfect understanding of the environment. In addition, economic accounting should to an increasing extent take into consideration not only economic activity but also the social, cultural and ecological values of the environment.

D. Research methodology

The highly complex problems of urban development and environmental protection require the use of multidisciplinary approaches, comparative studies and the development of mathematical, simulation or other kinds of models. Some of the difficulties in research on these matters are due to differences in the collection, analysis of data and other materials in the various countries.

2. The tasks ahead

Based on the above considerations, six major areas of research were identified:

- (1) Changes in population structures and characteristics.
- (2) Present and future social, cultural, behavioural, economic and spatial problems of the process of urbanization.
- (3) Preservation of national patrimony and environment.
- (4) Impact of new technologies on human behaviour, natural environment and urban ecosystems.
- (5) Organization of ecologically orientated urban and regional planning and management.
- (6) Education, training, preparation and diffusion of information.

These areas were drawn from the detailed list of topics presented in the Appendix.

To ensure that such research is undertaken, and that its results will be put to use, two developments are needed. One is a larger allocation of funding than is presently characteristic in the social sciences and humanities, especially in the lesser developed countries with smaller resources. The other is the creation of closer co-operation between scientists, planners, the public and policy-makers.

It was emphasized that the necessary research efforts can be attained by existing institutions with the support of governments and administrative authorities. There was also agreement that promotion and expansion of international co-operation and collaboration are needed in research as well as in the training of scientists and in the exchange of information.

3. Recommendations

- a) Scientific conferences and seminars should be organized during the coming years on the problems of urban development, cultural changes and the quality of the environment. These meetings could focus particularly upon problems in comparative studies and methodology in the interdisciplinary approach to investigations of social, socio-economic, ecological and cultural aspects of urban development and environmental change. These conferences or seminars could be organized by UNESCO or ECE, and where appropriate in co-operation with existing international scientific bodies including the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (known as the Vienna Centre) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). A consultative body of experts should prepare the meetings on the basis of results of national studies. The latter might focus upon a number of special pilot projects on urban and/or environmental issues, the results of which would then be discussed in the international forum.
- b) International, national and regional organizations operating in Europe should be encouraged by CSCE, within their field of competence, to arrange advanced training courses and seminars for scientists from states participating in the CSCE. In particular, provision should be made for young scientists to attend training courses arranged in participating states.
- c) An inventory of recently completed and ongoing studies on the problems of urban development and of the human environment should be organized. A review of experience in international co-operation in research and in the exchange of information should be undertaken. These reviews could be compiled by one of the existing international bodies, for example through UNEP, ECE or UNESCO.
- d) Eco-toxicological studies connected with relevant methods in the social and health sciences should be supported and improved on an international basis, especially within the relevant projects of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) of ICSU, and WHO.
- e) A series of comparative studies should be strengthened on the procedure in integrated urban and regional planning and management in order to determine the most effective way to link research to the process of decision-making.

f) The impact of science and technology on society; the methodology of interdisciplinary studies with special reference to behavioural, social and natural sciences; research and policy-making in social fields; the decision-making process including the involvement of the public; research in political sciences relevant to the CSCE countries; science policy and improved and more efficient forms of co-operation including the institutional framework, are themes which should be further explored in future meetings.

The working body had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

Appendix

General issues

1. The impact of increasingly sophisticated technology on urban development, life-styles and the environment, compared with "appropriate" technology which may be less sophisticated but more closely adapted to the environment and the preservation of social values.
2. The impact of an ageing population on the economy; requirements for social services, housing and transportation.
3. The effects of the changing role of women in the work force.
4. The effects of shifts in social values on the role the individual plays in planning and policy-making.
5. The gap between the perceptions of various groups of professionals as to what society needs and how this should be provided, and the perceptions of the public at large.
6. Finding effective means for including in planning and policy-making the results of research on human dimensions of urbanization and environmental quality.
7. Problems of undertaking and implementing truly comprehensive planning.
8. How to make research in social sciences and the humanities more relevant for planning and policy-making.

Environmental issues

1. The impact of environment on human health.
2. How to tackle the problems of environmental hazards and technological risks.
3. How to develop comprehensive environmental plans into which plans for industrial, transportation, urban and social development might be fitted.
4. Determination of the values which individuals attach to particular environments, and the extent to which such values vary over space and time.

5. Impediments to the improvement of environmental quality.
6. How to investigate objectively changes in the quality of life.
7. How to develop a broader perspective in planning so that more intensive use may be made of existing resources rather than bringing in new supplies from elsewhere, e.g. the introduction of wastewater renovation and re-cycling as opposed to development of water supplies at progressively further distances from the city.
8. The impact of economic development on environmental quality.
9. Sustaining an interest in the environmental question at the political level.

Methodological Issues

1. The circumstances in which an interdisciplinary approach is especially appropriate, and the ways in which it can be most successfully pursued.
2. The integration of non-technical and non-economic factors in models relating to urban development and environmental quality management.
3. Problems of undertaking comparative studies, especially where cultural traits make data collection difficult, or where meanings and values attached to given phenomena are unique to a particular area.
4. How to take account of shifts in social values and new developments in technology in planning and policy-making.
5. Provision of opportunities for education on the environment.
6. How to cope with decision-making under uncertainty.
7. Inclusion of predictions of shifts in social values and development of technologies in plans and policies.

Urban development and human environment

1. Social and cultural problems of urbanization

Changes in population structures and their impact on urban life and development. (Professional structure, the impact of women entering the work force, new family models, youth-adult correlations, increasing ratio of old people).

2. Urban migration and its consequences

Social effects of migration to and from cities and its impact on areas of immigration and emigration. Increasing diffusion of urban population from cities to countryside leading up to levelling of differences between urban and rural life. The role of small and medium-sized cities. The process of concentration and of deconcentration of urban activities.

3. The future of urbanization

Human adaptation to changes in urban life. The impact of technical progress on the functional and spatial structure of urbanization from the ecological point of view. Prognosis of new forms of urbanization. Environment and technology. Optimum size of cities. The "human scale" in urban development.

4. Technology and the economy confronted with human, social, cultural and ecological needs

Human perception of urban environment. Economic value of ecological and social factors. How to integrate ecological, social, cultural and economic criteria.

5. Preservation of national patrimony and environment

Interdisciplinary environmental research. Preservation of the national patrimony on a local and national scale (architectural and cultural and traditional

values, urban structures). Adaptation of old cities to new needs. Revalorisation of old housing system.

6. Interrelation of urban and regional development

Correlation between urban and regional growth and national development. Urban and rural development. Structural forms of the net of settlements. Process of urban concentration and deconcentration.

7. Methods of ecologically-orientated integrated urban and regional planning

Principles of integrated planning. Methodology of long-term urban and regional planning presenting several strategies of development. How to compare them from economic and ecological points of view (mathematical models). The territorial integration of planning and implementation. Systems of urban management.

8. Problems of big cities and metropolitan areas

Comparison of various cities' growth. Internal structures of metropolia, their complex problems: housing, recreation, traffic, places of work, etc. Special problems of highly industrialized cities and regions, harbour cities and coastal urbanization.

9. Education, training and information

Methodology of comprehensive environmental training and education of undergraduate and postgraduate specialists. Special training of young scientists. Information on the importance of ecological, social and cultural aspects of urban development and environmental protection for decision-makers and the general public. New means: mass media, etc.

Public participation in planning and implementation decisions. Public control of the mode of complementation of the results of planning based on scientific research.

Remarks by President Jimmy Carter at a Ceremony Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Accords, Washington, July 29, 1980

I know Griffin Bell, and I know what a taskmaster he is, so I'm sure you've had a full day already and also a very gratifying day with Secretary Muskie and with Arthur Goldberg, with the distinguished Members of Congress, and with Max Kampelman and your new Chairman, Judge Griffin Bell.

This event which will take place in Madrid is one of the most important of 1980. I'm very pleased that all of you could come to Washington today to meet with the leaders of the delegation. Our public members, about 30 of you, are here in the audience, and you've had a chance to review both the purpose of the Helsinki accords and what we hope to accomplish, working with the other nations, in November of 1980. We will have to rely on you very heavily, not only to represent our Nation and the principles on which it's founded but also, in an evocative way, a clear way, to present our beliefs and our commitments, our principles and our ideals to the rest of the world.

There is opposition abroad, as you well know, to the pursuit of the principles espoused by the 35 nations at Helsinki, and there is some skepticism here at home from others who don't understand the fundamental truth that peace on the one hand and the pursuit of human rights on the other are irrevocably interrelated. Peace and the pursuit of human rights cannot be strengthened one without the other; they cannot be successfully advanced independently of one another. That belief, which

we all share, is above party, as the history of the Helsinki process proves. A Republican administration signed the accords, and now a Democratic administration is deeply committed to carrying out those agreements.

The accords embody goals and values in which Americans believe, as human beings who are struggling to build a more decent and a more humane world. The pledges given by the 35 signatories at Helsinki 5 years ago were not lightly undertaken, and they cannot be lightly abandoned or ignored. The document that was signed there, even though it was called the Final Act, was not the end of our work. It was just a fresh start on work that commenced in this Nation more than 200 years ago.

The Madrid meeting this year is designed to assess what progress has been made and, if possible, to speed its pace and to widen the scope of that progress. Like the Belgrade meeting in 1977, attended by some of you, Madrid is an opportunity to look carefully backward and also to permit us to push forward vigorously.

Some have said that we should stay away from Madrid, that we ought to drop out of the Helsinki process. Such ideas spring from ignorance of the meaning of Madrid. Some have even compared the meeting in Madrid to the Moscow Olympics, suggesting that since American athletes chose not to go to Moscow, that American diplomats and citizens should not go to Madrid. This reasoning, of course, is very confused.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 1434-1439.

As host to the Olympics, the Soviet Union sought to enjoy both the fruits of aggression in Afghanistan and the prestige and the propaganda value of being the host of the Olympics at the same time. American athletes and those of 50 other nations rejected that equation as indecent and unacceptable. I commend them. They stayed at home, at great sacrifice to themselves, and without them, the Moscow spectacular has become a pathetic spectacle.

But Madrid will not be an aggressor's propaganda festival. The Spanish are the hosts, not the Soviets. The Soviet Union will be there, as the other 34 states will be there—to give an account of the manner in which the commitments at Helsinki have been fulfilled or not fulfilled is the undertaking of the meeting at Madrid. It would certainly please those who are most guilty of violation of the principles of Helsinki, including human rights, to be freed of their obligation to account for their actions before world opinion, which will be focused upon the meeting in Madrid.

There will be no medals awarded in Madrid. It's not a wrestling match or a gymnastic tournament among diplomats. What it will test is the progress made on the international agenda of security and cooperation and the firmness of the principles by which the 35 participants agreed to be bound.

In pursuing the cause of human rights, through the Helsinki accords, there are no shortcuts. The road that we're on is the right one. As the Belgrade meeting was ending, Dante Fascell, who was our congressional chairman at the time, said, and I quote from him: "Advocacy of human rights is not a quick fix. It holds no promise of easy victories." We know that all too well. But this advocacy of human rights, no matter how difficult it might be at times and how much it is scorned at times, must be pursued. And at Madrid it will be pursued, aggressively, persistently, and with the full focus on it of world opinion.

When I became President, as a matter of fact even in my acceptance speech almost exactly a year [4 years] ago, I emphasized our commitment as a nation to human rights as a fundamental tenet on which our foreign policy was based. That commitment of mine is as deep and as important to me today as it was then. It's as central to America's interests now as when our Nation was first born. Then, as now, our commitment to human rights persists in our own country and also worldwide. Beyond Europe, we've sought in Africa, Asia, Latin America to stand behind basic principles of respect for each individual person, for fair trials, for political liberty, and for economic and for social justice. We've made it clear that the United States believes that torture cannot be tolerated under any circumstances and that officially sanctioned, so-called "disappearances" are abhorrent in any society. As we've insisted on the right of free movement everywhere, so we've worked hard to give aid to the world's refugees, compelled to flee from oppression and hardship.

As we have maintained these policies as a government, sometimes they have not had the full support of American citizens. I have often had people come to me and say, "Drop this human rights posture. It's damaging our relationship with such-and-such a dictatorship, where people are being imprisoned and where they are being hidden or where they are being killed." We have maintained our position and will continue to do so.

We pursue these policies because we recognize that both our country and our world are more secure when basic human rights are respected internationally. In pursuing our values, we enhance our own security. Let no one doubt that our words and actions have left their mark on the rest of the world. Many governments have released their political prisoners. Others have lifted states of siege, curtailed indiscriminate arrests, and reduced the use

of torture. We've seen several dictatorships, some of them in this hemisphere, change into democracies, where their present leaders were freely elected by people who did not fear any further political persecution because they expressed themselves as human beings.

And because of our leadership, the defense of human rights now has its rightful place on the world agenda for everyone to see. I doubt that there is a leader on Earth who is frequently not reminded of the human rights of the citizens of that particular country and of the human rights performance of that country's neighbors or others associated with it in other parts of the world. Those who seek to deny individual rights must now answer for their actions, at least among these 35 nations. Those brave men and women struggling for liberty, often against great odds, are no longer alone. In the past, because our Nation turned its head away, they were frequently alone.

In working with the 35 Helsinki states, in North America and in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe, we pursue the same values with great vigor. The Helsinki accords commit the signatories to ease military threats and to ease international tensions, to promote progress and to respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the self-determination of peoples. We have never expected an uninterrupted record of progress. The behavior of the Soviet Union, in particular, has dishonored the principles of the Helsinki accords, both inside and outside its own borders.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasingly brutal occupation of that once free nation can no more be reconciled with the Helsinki pledges than it can be reconciled with the Charter of the United Nations. For invading a neighbor, the Soviet Union already stands condemned before the world. A hundred and four members of the United Nations condemned the Soviet Union and demanded the immediate withdrawal of its occupying troops. If they are still there at the time of the Madrid conference, we will continue the pressure for the withdrawal of those Soviet troops.

As many of you know vividly, because of the experiences of your own family and those people whom you love, Soviet authorities have also intensified at home their repression of the freedoms which they pledged at Helsinki. To promote the banishment into internal exile of Andre Sakharov, a great scientist and a great humanist, is the best known, but sadly not the only instance of such violations of the Helsinki commitment made by the Soviet Union.

More than 40 courageous men and women are now in prison or in exile just because they worked in private groups to promote the Helsinki agreement and to encourage the Soviet Union to live up to its pledges. Now they are silenced, but in Madrid, no one can silence their cause. And we will make sure—[*applause*].

Although I do have importunities from some of our own citizens to lessen our commitment and our public posture concerning human rights, I have had from those who are in exile or who are persecuted in foreign countries unanimous messages, sometimes of a highly secret nature: "Mr. President, do not abandon us; do not abandon the commitment of the United States to protect our rights."

Madrid will be a sober meeting. The talk will be frank and straightforward, but we hope without polemics. We will be seeking progress, not propaganda. There is some progress, of course, which we can welcome, and we will be glad to do so. Some confidence-building measures have been implemented.

The Helsinki accords have given some impetus to the long-term process of breaking down East-West barriers [relations]¹ and easing the flow of people and the flow of ideas across frontiers that were once almost completely closed. For example, thousands of people emigrated to the West last year from East European countries, in accord with the Helsinki undertakings. There have been recent efforts by a number of states to resolve outstanding family reunification problems with us, and we welcome those also.

¹ White House correction.

The Helsinki provisions have also helped Soviet Jews to emigrate, although the encouraging record level set in 1979 is being reduced this year. At Madrid, we will seek an explanation for that decline and a commitment by the Soviet Union to reverse it.

I might say now, as I approach the close of my remarks to you, that on all these issues at Madrid we can count on the support of the great majority of participants. This is not always the United States position in international fora. The others share the basic philosophy of international relations that underly the Helsinki accords. Indeed, the effort to negotiate the accords originally, and now to assure their implementation, has made Western Europe and the United States recognize all the more vividly how much we share political and moral values and interests, in a time when there is so much glib talk, most of it ill advised and erroneous, about Western disharmony. The Madrid meeting can give a clear expression to our unity on fundamental values and on fundamental goals, and with that support, we can continue at Madrid to pursue the aims to which we committed ourselves at Helsinki.

We want to encourage progress in human rights performance by the Soviet Union and its allies, and we have no hesitation about submitting our own record to examination by others at Madrid. We are not perfect; we don't claim that the United States is perfect. But we're making a strong and continuing effort to improve, because preserving and extending human rights is the heart and soul of our whole system in this country.

At Madrid, we will use the CSCE process to break down even more the barriers to human contacts between the East and the West, to help with the reunification of families, to help with the movement of people and ideas and the resolution of immigration issues.

We'll try, as part of a balanced result, to achieve practical progress in the military security field.

The Helsinki session should not become primarily an arms control forum at Madrid, but the United States is prepared to test the possibility of achieving significant, verifiable, and comprehensive confidence-building measures relating directly or indirectly to weaponry, which can help and to enhance mutual security desired in East and West Europe. Madrid gives us an important opportunity to restate both our genuine desire for better East-West relations and our firm belief that the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint are there, on which workable ties can be built.

There will be sharp differences at Madrid between the values we espouse and those which the Communist nations will seek to advance, but we will not go to Madrid looking for conflict. We approach that meeting, instead, eager for progress, determined not to abandon our principles in any instance, determined to put our views forward in the most forceful possible manner, and committed to only one contest—the struggle to advance freedom and, through freedom, mutual security.

The Helsinki accords, to us, hold a promise of a freer, more humane, and thus a more secure Europe, based not just on superpower accommodation but on the fundamental principles of international conduct. These principles require that states earn the respect of their neighbors by treating their citizens with full respect for their rights and dignity as persons. My own faith in the ultimate outcome of this struggle is undimmed. Our Nation's role must never be in doubt.

One of the best ways to express this commitment, I'd like to say in closing, is to quote from the words of Archibald MacLeish: "There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It's the American dream."

NOTE: The President spoke at 2:50 p.m. to representatives of ethnic and human rights organizations in the East Room at the White House.

In his opening remarks, the President referred to Arthur J. Goldberg, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 1977 Belgrade meeting of the Conference, and to Chairman Griffin B. Bell and Cochairman Max M. Kampelman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference review meeting to be held in Madrid.

Statement by Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie Before a Foreign Policy Conference on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, July 29, 1980

First of all I would like to take this opportunity to welcome all of you to this conference on CSCE. I would like to assure you that I do so from the perspective of a job that I like more every day, and I hope that I have that job for perhaps 4 years more. But I didn't come here today to campaign even for that job.

Five years ago in Helsinki, 35 nations gathered to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is a landmark document for it embodies essential principles of East-West relations and human rights. It pledges the European states, the United States, and Canada:

- To refrain from the threat of use of force;
- To respect the territorial integrity of each participating state;
- To respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
- To respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination.

Three years ago the Helsinki signatories met in Belgrade to review how those and other obligations were being carried out. This November they will meet again for the same purpose. We are fortunate to have with us today Arthur Goldberg, who served with distinction as chief of our delegation at Belgrade, and Griffin Bell and Max Kampelman, who will lead our delegation to Madrid. And I would like to convey my personal appreciation and gratitude to all three of them for having assumed or assuming this heavy responsibility.

Formal review conferences such as Madrid are only a part of what can fairly be called the "Helsinki process." This

meeting, too, is part of that process. More than 100 ethnic, religious, and human rights organizations are here today to help us fashion an effective approach to the Madrid meeting.

Through the persistence of our efforts and the weight of international opinion, we hope one day there will be open and frank meetings like this not only in Western countries but throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well.

I would like to take a few minutes this morning to discuss the place of CSCE in our foreign policy. The importance of CSCE is growing, and I believe it is important to understand why.

It is clear that in 1975 few understood the power of the Helsinki ideas:

- That the Helsinki accords would become a manifesto for the oppressed, giving them new courage and hope;
- That groups would arise spontaneously in many countries, including this one, to hold their governments accountable for the way they fulfill their obligations under the accords; and
- That CSCE would become a standard against which the actions of all signatory states would be judged on a continuing basis.

The Helsinki accords today are a dynamic force in the world. They are a recognized benchmark for human rights performance. And they have improved day-to-day life for thousands of Europeans, enhancing opportunities to visit loved ones, offering the chance for many to emigrate.

The impact of CSCE had not been limited to human rights. The process has fostered increased contacts in many

Source: Department of State Bulletin, September 1980, pp. 51-52.

areas: economic, scientific, and environmental. And it has provided a forum for useful discussions on security, discussions which we hope to advance at the Madrid meeting.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that there are dark corners where Helsinki obligations are forgotten. Andrey Sakharov has been banished to exile. More than 40 other individuals—men and women who took seriously the Soviet Union's commitments at Helsinki—have been arrested. Their only "crime" was to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords.

The Madrid meeting takes place at a time of heightened tensions between East and West—tension caused by the brutal Soviet effort to destroy the freedom of the people of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and continued occupation seek to crush the right of self-determination of the Afghan nation. The invasion is totally contrary to the Helsinki accords.

We remain open to a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. We are prepared to maintain the framework of East-West relations.

But the Soviet Union cannot expect that East-West relations will not be affected by what Soviet troops are doing beyond its borders and by what Soviet police are doing within them. Nor can the CSCE process—or the Madrid meeting itself—be insulated from the overall state of those relations.

The Soviets have argued that détente is divisible. It is not; Soviet aggression in one part of the world inevitably has consequences elsewhere. They have argued that an emphasis on human rights mars the prospect for peace. It does not; on the contrary, the two are inextricably linked. The Soviet leaders must come to understand that the prospects for a peaceful and cooperative relationship with the West cannot be divorced from how they treat their neighbors and their own citizens.

In current international circumstances, it has been suggested that the Madrid meeting is a gift bestowed on the Soviet Union and its allies and that the United States should boycott it. We reject such a course, for continuation of the CSCE process serves the interests of the United States. So the United States will go to Madrid, and we will advance these objectives:

First, we will press for progress on human rights. Our approach will be forthright but not polemical as we assess the record of compliance by the participants. And we will certainly take positive account at Madrid of any significant progress on human rights that is made before the review meeting begins.

Second, we will work at Madrid for an increase in contacts between ordinary people in Eastern Europe and in the West. We will seek specific progress, for example, in reunifying families and in resolving emigration problems.

Third, in the security field, we will explore the possibility of further military confidence-building measures. But we are not interested in cosmetic measures or talks which go nowhere. And we will not permit discussions of security at Madrid to overshadow or in any way diminish the attention paid to human rights.

It is essential that these objectives be pursued in ways which reinforce the unity of the NATO alliance. There will be efforts at Madrid to divide the Western allies. We must insure that such efforts do not succeed.

And the CSCE process can also help strengthen our ties with the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe. The states which signed the Helsinki accords did so in their sovereign capacities, not as members of a political or military alignment. We are also mindful of the opportunities CSCE provides to further our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe on a basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

Progress at Madrid and afterward will come slowly. But I firmly believe the CSCE process can contribute to a more humane and more secure Europe. That shall be our overriding objective in Madrid.

May I also confess at this point some envy that you all will have this opportunity. It is an opportunity to contribute to a moderation of the tensions between East and West on the only basis which makes any sense whatsoever in the terms of the prospects for peace—true peace and true accommodation in the world. The Soviets and those who are like-minded must be made and persuaded to appreciate the fact that only by accommodating their system and their goals and objectives to the rights created and endorsed by the Helsinki accords can true peace come.

So I congratulate you upon your interest. I pledge you my wholehearted support, and I hope with the leadership you will be following that we can somehow find our way through the minefields created by those who would like to convert this process to their own purposes: purposes which are at odds to the real objective of the Helsinki accords.

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1980.

² Press release 206. ■

Opening Statement by Ambassador Griffin B. Bell Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, November 11, 1980

It is appropriate that this second review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be held in Democratic Spain. From the days of Queen Isabella, Spain has played a major role in Europe, and the explorations of Columbus—sailing under the Spanish Crown—established the link between the Old World and the New, a link recognized at our Conference. It is also appropriate that the Spanish delegation should be headed by Javier Ruperez, my distinguished colleague, for we well remember the active and constructive role he played in the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act. In expressing my own delegation's view of that historic document, I can do no better than to quote the words of His Majesty Juan Carlos, the King of Spain. He said: "The main themes of international comity are reflected in the basic document of this Conference, the Helsinki Act of 1975, with regard to security as well as to cooperation, to humanitarian acts, to the right of free communication, and to the overall maintenance of individual and social rights."

The United States is fully committed to the process which began with the signing of the Final Act by the heads of state of our 35 nations. We are committed to that process because we believe it represents the soundest basis on which we can develop and strengthen our mutual relations. We support that process, as well, because it is founded on principles whose validity and truth have been tested and confirmed in our own experience throughout our own history as an independent nation. Let me cite a few examples.

- The Final Act demands respect for the sovereign equality of all nations. This principle was a touchstone of our early history as a nation, for we had to fight to establish and then to maintain our sovereignty and national identity.

- The Final Act proclaims the principle of self-determination of peoples, a principle which is basic to our American Revolution. Indeed, it was fitting that a visionary American President, Woodrow Wilson, should have championed that principle following World War I and that his efforts should have aided the emergence of several of the nations represented at this Conference. And it is fitting that, today, my country should be in the forefront of those calling for self-determination where it is ignored or denied.

- The Final Act embodies, at its core, the great principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a principle born during the European enlightenment, nurtured by such great thinkers as Locke and Voltaire, and given voice by Thomas Jefferson in these words from our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."

Let no one doubt, therefore, the fidelity of the United States to the commitments we undertook at Helsinki. We could no more turn our back on those commitments than we could turn our back on our own heritage as a nation.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, January 1981, pp. 18-20. Ambassador Bell was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Madrid.

CSCE is more than a document. It is a dynamic and positive process—

- A process which is slowly but surely breaking down the barriers which grew up at the height of the cold war.
- A process which is bringing people together across the East-West divide.
- A process which facilitates the exchange of ideas and information and the growth of economic contacts, and
- A process which calls on each of us to carry out the obligations we assumed at Helsinki and which calls on all of us to examine how well those obligations are being carried out.

This Madrid meeting is the second major gathering since that historic day in Helsinki. The Belgrade meeting made clear that CSCE was a continuing process because it confirmed that the nations which signed the Final Act could come together periodically to examine how their commitments to one another had been honored and implemented. Such periodic examinations of the record are necessary. Without them, the great undertaking of Helsinki might remain a static, not a dynamic, concept. It was, therefore, encouraging for my government that, although the discussions at Belgrade were sometimes difficult and always frank, the Belgrade gathering provided—by consensus—for the holding of a similar meeting at Madrid as the next major step in the Helsinki process. We can hope that this process will continue as all nations come to recognize the truth that strong and confident governments have nothing to fear from plain speaking, from whatever source it might come.

Because of our conviction that CSCE is a positive process, indispensable to the advancement of security and cooperation in Europe, my government will be second to none in working to insure that this Madrid meeting further strengthens the CSCE process. We are not here to confront and to polemicize; we are here to cooperate and to construct.

Human Rights

Those gathered around this table will hear often over the next several weeks that the words of the Final Act on human rights and human contacts must be interpreted in different ways when applied in different social systems. This argument is untrue—and profoundly harmful to the spirit of our enterprise. The men and women who are citizens of our countries do not possess human rights because they are members of this or that social system. They possess human rights because they are human beings. Those rights derive, in the words of the Final Act, from the "inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development."

To put it another way, I would like to cite a story involving the great Russian writer Lev Tolstoy and our American President Abraham Lincoln. Tolstoy was an admirer of Lincoln, and he liked to explain Lincoln's greatness to the simple people on his estate. Lincoln, Tolstoy said, was a great man because his every act was rooted in humanity, truth, justice, or pity. That description, it seems to me, suggests the principles on which the human rights in the Final Act are based.

The Final Act itself tells us what those rights are. They include the freedom of thought, of conscience, and of religion or belief. They include the freedom effectively to exercise civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and freedoms. They include the right not only to practice but also to profess religious belief according to the dictates of one's own conscience. And they are, taken together, an essential factor for peace, for justice, and for friendly relations and cooperation among states. Governments can deny them—but they can neither change, nor reduce, nor destroy them.

The principles I have just repeated come from the Final Act, but not only from the Final Act. They are principles which summarize over 2,000 years of our intellectual and political history, from Aristotle's charter for a just state, to Tom Paine's fiery defense of political freedom, to the eloquence

of Dag Hammarskjöld in the cause of human dignity. Those principles speak from our common heritage. They speak in the voices of patriots revered by each of our nations. They speak to all of us here and to all of the citizens of our countries. The question which history will ask about our endeavor is how well we lived up to those principles—whether we advanced or set back the cause of human rights and of human freedom.

It is a question which, in the first instance, each of us must ask himself or herself. We in the United States have done so and will continue to do so. I believe the U.S. record of implementation is something we can be proud of. We are a free society—free enough to admit our shortcomings and concerned enough to try to correct them. The degree to which we have fulfilled our obligations under the Helsinki Final Act is an open book for all to read. We are willing to profit from examination, suggestions, and criticism. And this should come as no surprise, for the very first document of our republic—our Declaration of Independence, signed on July 4, 1776—states that we owe “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”

Violations in Other Countries

Just as the obligations undertaken under the Final Act require each of us to look carefully at our own implementation record, so they require each of us to look carefully at the implementation record of others. The record since our meeting in Belgrade has had some bright spots, especially in the area of freer movement across international frontiers.

- A number of countries—among them Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria—have made important efforts to resolve the outstanding cases of their citizens who wish to be reunited with their families elsewhere.

- In several countries—such as Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland—there have been efforts to explore how church and state can better live with each other, consistent with the commitment in the Final Act to expand religious freedom.

- In Eastern Europe, as a whole in 1979, over 50,000 ethnic Germans were granted permission to join their relatives in the West.

- There has been encouraging progress in some countries toward creating more responsive and diverse social and economic systems.

- Several countries have undertaken studies of their own implementation records with a view to improving the performance. We hope this trend will continue.

- There has been some success in the security area of CSCE, where confidence-building measures have been implemented. Progress in economic, technical, and scientific cooperation has also been achieved, notably by the signature last year of the transboundary air-pollution agreement. In both the economic and security areas, progress has been modest, yet the Final Act has served as a catalyst for imaginative thought which bodes well for more ambitious steps when circumstances permit.

- Finally, the situation in and around the divided city of Berlin has remained relatively calm. It is of fundamental importance to European security and cooperation that Berlin continues to receive the full benefits of the Final Act and the quadripartite agreement.

As encouraging as this evidence of progress has been, there is a darker side of the record of implementation which must also be considered. In this regard, I must mention, first of all, the invasion of the independent nation of Afghanistan by armed forces of the Soviet Union, forces which remain in that country even as our meeting convenes. I shall not recite all the pro-

visions of the Final Act—and indeed, of the U.N. Charter and other solemn agreements—which this invasion violated. Nor will I pause to refute the transparent explanations which Soviet leaders have offered for their action. I will say only that the Soviet invasion cast a dark shadow over East-West relations which no meeting, no pronouncement, nothing, in fact, but the total withdrawal of Soviet troops, can dispel.

Were this the only instance in which the obligations of the Final Act had been ignored since our last meeting, our task here would be solemn enough. But this is not the case. As I have cited examples of progress, so must I call attention to a lamentable record of continued denial of human rights written over the past 3 years by the governments of some signatory nations.

- In the Soviet Union, in direct contravention of the Final Act, Western radio broadcasts—including those of BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation], Deutsche Welle, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty—have been jammed.

- In the German Democratic Republic, a new and punitive increase in required currency exchanges for Western visitors has drastically reduced the ability of West Germans, particularly, the elderly and the poor, to visit family and friends in the East.

- In the Soviet Union the Jewish emigration rate, which encouragingly reached a record high in 1979, has declined in 1980 by 50%, while at the same time, harassment and denial of exit permits continue as before.

- In Czechoslovakia, the courageous members of the Charter 77 group, created to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, have suffered continued harassment and periodic imprisonment. As I speak, Vaclav Havel, a

spokesman for this group, is serving out his 4-year term under harsh conditions of confinement, and

- In 1976 eleven men and women, citizens of the Soviet Union and long-time activists in the Soviet human rights movement, formed the Moscow Helsinki watch group to monitor the implementation of human rights commitments under Principle VII of the Final Act and under Soviet law. Similar groups appeared in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia. The reaction of the Soviet authorities was to subject these brave people to brutal repression. Of the 71 individuals who have belonged to the Soviet Helsinki watch groups, 24 have been tried and found guilty, and 19 of them are currently serving a total of 156 years in forced-labor camps and exile. Eleven more have been placed under investigative arrest. Nine others were already serving previous sentences when they joined the Helsinki watch. Seven have emigrated, two were stripped of their citizenship while traveling abroad, one was exchanged for a Soviet spy, and one has died.

I will name only a few members of this remarkable group, but they are representative of all those in the Soviet Union who strive for the rights that are promised them in the Soviet constitution and in the Helsinki Final Act. All the world knows of Professor Yuri Orlov, the physicist, a courageous man always in the forefront, founder of the Helsinki group. The world also knows of Anatoly Shcharanskiy, falsely accused of espionage in an attempt to intimidate the Jewish emigration movement. Orlov was sentenced on May 18, 1978, to 7 years of strict-regimen camp and 5 years of exile. Shcharanskiy was sentenced on July 14, 1978, to 3 years in prison and 10 years of strict-regimen labor camp. Members of the other groups I have

mentioned met similar fates. In the Ukraine and Lithuania, Mykola Rudenko and Viktoras Petkus were also sentenced to long prison terms because they sought fulfillment of Final Act commitments. All those who are free have the inescapable duty to speak out on their behalf and on behalf of the many others.

Finally, I speak now of a gentle and compassionate humanist, a man who has devoted his life to helping the poor and the oppressed. Listen to his words.

Despite all that has happened, I feel that the questions of war and peace and disarmament are so crucial that they must be given absolute priority even in the most difficult circumstances. It is imperative that all possible means be used to solve these questions and to lay the groundwork for further progress. Most urgent of all are steps to avert a nuclear war, which is the greatest peril confronting the modern world.

Could anyone disagree with those words? Can we not all unite around the thought they express? Do we not all recognize that this thought goes right to the heart of the deepest needs and yearnings of mankind? On January 22 of this year [1980], the author of those words was exiled to the closed city of Gorky in the Soviet Union. When Andrei Sakharov was banished, some of our best hopes for a spirit of security and cooperation in Europe were banished with him.

There are those who charge that incidents such as these prove the worthlessness of the Final Act. My government strongly disagrees. The fact that a principle has been violated does not make that principle less valid, or reduce our obligation to seek fuller implementation of the Final Act. In that spirit, the United States will make every effort, within the context of the Final Act, to help create a more secure, a freer, and a better life for the 1 billion people who live within the borders of the states represented here. But CSCE will provide the means to this end only if its provisions are taken seriously and are seen to be taken seriously by our citizens. There-

fore, my country will continue to speak out, in specific terms, against abuses of human rights. We call on all of you to do the same and to recognize that we cannot expect our citizens to have faith in future commitments if past commitments are ignored.

Our expectations for the present meeting are modest. The events I have mentioned have created an international climate which is not conducive to ambitious steps in the areas covered by the Final Act. It would be idle to pretend that CSCE can somehow be insulated from the overall state of East-West relations. Indeed, such a pretense could only diminish the importance of the commitments undertaken at Helsinki.

But we do see some possibility of progress. For example, we and our allies have been doing intensive work to develop confidence-building measures which will be militarily significant, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe. We hope that our consideration of such measures at this meeting will point the way toward a more secure future for us all. We are fully prepared to join with you in seeking to realize the full potential of confidence-building measures—we ask only that we concentrate on concrete steps and avoid empty declarations.

Conclusion

President Carter has asked me to give you the following message—he extends his warmest greetings to the delegates to this historic review meeting. For the President, CSCE is a unique and valuable forum which unites all the nations of Europe, the United States, and Canada, in a common effort to rid the world of artificial barriers to the free exercise of human rights and to the free movement of people and ideas across international boundaries. It is his firm conviction that it must be our common goal to preserve and enhance the Helsinki process toward the day when its provisions are fully implemented and true security and cooperation among our nations have finally been achieved. ■

Statement by Ambassador Max M. Kampelman Before the CSCE
Followup Meeting, Madrid, January 27, 1981

Mr. Chairman, one week ago today Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as the fortieth President of the United States. I speak at this first plenary session of our renewed meetings here in Madrid to assert once again that the position of the government of the United States, expressed at these meetings during our preparatory sessions and during the first phase of the main meeting, remains a constant one.

When our delegation first addressed this body during the first day of our preparatory meeting in September, I stated that our government was fully committed to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act; to the continuation of the process which that Act initiated; to the success of this Madrid meeting; and to further follow-up meetings after Madrid. I asserted then, Mr. Chairman, and reassert today, that these are objectives of the American government, reflecting the deep desires of the American people to achieve peace, security and stability in Europe and in the world.

There is a heritage that all of us represented at this conference share. Our civilization is characterized by optimism, by a faith in the process of history, by a conviction that the forces for the emancipation of the human being from the shackles of slavery -- whether it be an imprisonment of the body, the mind or the spirit -- will in the end prevail. This aspiration for freedom is an integral part of the yearnings of all peoples.

The Helsinki Final Act earned its place as a significant document for history because it recognized the indivisibility of peace and security and human dignity. It wove a seamless fabric for cooperation among us by establishing standards for moral and civilized behavior among us as nations and within our own societies for those who reside in our societies.

If this document is to be preserved as a vehicle for realizing our goals of peace and security, it must be guarded with care. For that reason, Mr. Chairman, we agreed that the first six weeks of our main meeting would require a full and thorough and detailed and frank review of its implementation.

Source: Department of State files. Ambassador Kampelman was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Madrid. This statement was made at the opening meeting of the second phase of the Madrid Conference.

When our main meeting began on November 11, my country was in transition. We were under the leadership of a President who was in office; and we were about to welcome a President-elect who was preparing to assume office. I stated then that our government was deeply concerned over the fact that the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act were being blatantly violated and that those violations cast a shadow over our meeting. The American people, along with peoples elsewhere, had come to question the validity of seeking new commitments from a state which had not lived up to commitments it had previously made.

During the course of these meetings, Mr. Chairman, we, and all but a few of all the other participating states, asserted that the invasion of Afghanistan was a gross violation of all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and was a serious burden across the full spectrum of East-West relations.

We expressed our serious concern about the unprecedented Soviet expenditures on armaments, the largest military buildup the world has ever seen. The movements and preparations of sizeable Warsaw Pact forces in Central and Eastern Europe, in direct violation of Principle II of the Helsinki Final Act, drew our sober attention and deep concern.

Delegation after delegation took the floor at these meetings, furthermore, to note with deep regret the evidence of growing repression in the Soviet Union in direct defiance of the First and Third Baskets of the Helsinki Final Act.

I made those statements then and I reassert them now, Mr. Chairman, with my government under the direction of a new President. The government of the United States and the American people continue to deplore these violations of the Helsinki Final Act. They are barriers to international harmony and peace.

The review of implementation phase of this meeting ended on December 19. It was, therefore, our hope, Mr. Chairman, that it would not be necessary at this reconvened meeting to refer in specific terms to violations and challenges to the integrity of the Helsinki Final Act. The violations, however, continue and intensify, and we have no choice but to respond in this forum.

Just prior to our recess, our delegation noted sadly the large number, more than twenty, of arrests, trials and related persecutions in violation of the Helsinki Final Act that had occurred in the Soviet Union since these CSCE preparatory meetings began in early September. I regret to say that there have been nine additional trials and at least two arrests since our meetings ended on December 19. Indeed, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee, whose activities should never have been interfered with and whose personnel should have been respected rather than persecuted, has now been reduced in number to two individuals willing to identify themselves openly with that organization.

We have learned that on January 9, Feliks Serebrov, geologist, a member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group and a founding member of the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, was arrested.

In December, Oksana Meshko, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group, was transferred from a psychiatric hospital to a prison and an imminent trial -- and I note for us all that this courageous lady is seventy-five years of age.

In December, an Odessa regional court ordered the two young children, ages four and twelve, of Baptist Maria Drumova to be removed from her custody on the ground that she was giving her children a religious upbringing. This is the first recorded court order of its kind since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

And in recent days, the distinguished writers Vasily Aksyonov and Lev Kopelev were stripped of their Soviet citizenship.

These acts of repression will not work. The voices from the prisons are heard. The human spirit is strong and cannot long be denied. Others come forward to replace those who are taken away. And they know they have friends wherever men and women think of freedom. And yet the repression continues.

It would appear, Mr. Chairman, that a conscious decision has been taken to violate the Helsinki Final Act and to defy those of us who urge compliance with it as the only realistic basis for international stability and peace. East-West relations, Mr. Chairman, are already severely troubled. Systematic continued violations of the Helsinki Final Act adds to that tension and makes our task here more difficult. Describing this reality is not confrontational. It is the violations that lend themselves to confrontation. Recognizing and describing reality is a necessary prerequisite for later cooperation.

No one should doubt American constancy to the powerful ideals of the CSCE process, to the preservation and enhancement of human freedom, to respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states, and to the goal of military security and cooperation among us. Those are my government's objectives. They are the objectives of the American people.

At the closing day of our first session, I made a plea in behalf of my government. It was that the subject of human rights draw us together and not drive us apart. Whatever philosophical and ideological disagreements we may have about how society should be organized, we should be unified on the principle of human dignity. For that is, after all, not only the guiding premise upon which democratic theory is based, but it was also the motivating ingredient which led Karl Marx to challenge the economic truths of his day and seek a society of greater justice. I repeat that plea today.

Practical steps taken to improve human dignity and freedom and to confirm the integrity of sovereign states would produce a significant improvement in the international atmosphere and would lead the American people to respond positively.

Reference was made here this morning to "detente." The word appears in the Final Act. If the word has any significance, we must realize that it does not today exist as an accurate description of East-West relations. It remains, however, an objective to be sought, yet to be achieved.

Mr. Chairman, our agenda calls for us to proceed, beginning today and for the next six weeks, to discuss and negotiate new proposals and hopefully to fashion a significant concluding document arising out of those new proposals. Our delegation will pursue that task diligently and responsibly. We all realize, however, that words alone will not accomplish our purpose if they are not accompanied by proper constructive action by all signatories of the Final Act. Positive action is called for if we are to rebuild the confidence necessary for agreement.

Our objective is clear. We seek a balanced set of new undertakings, which respect the interrelated pattern of our commitments in the areas of military security, human rights, economic cooperation, information, educational and cultural exchange.

Our task is not to seek a collection of illusory and meaningless words around unimportant and insignificant proposals designed to hide the realities of our problems. Our task rather is together to work here and elsewhere to improve the international atmosphere and build a web of interrelationships based on the Helsinki Final Act and thus designed to assure us the peace and security we seek.

On behalf of my government, Mr. Chairman, I pledge that we will make a serious effort to find a common ground, within the guidelines of our principles, upon which all thirty-five participating states can stand. The distinguished Chairman of the Soviet delegation spoke of "realistic diplomatic negotiations." We fervently hope that we will be joined in this effort by all who are assembled here today.

There is much to be done, here and elsewhere. Our peoples are looking to all of us for the leadership to help achieve the peace and liberty we all seek. Our delegation is ready to begin.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I close with my best wishes for the New Year to you, to Ambassador Perez-Hernandez and his associates, and to all of the individual delegates and participants at this meeting.

Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, December 16, 1982

Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here this morning at the site of the CSCE Review Meeting, so ably hosted by the Government and people of Spain.

As you know, I have just met with Ambassador Kampelman and his NATO colleagues. I was greatly impressed by their spirit of cooperation and their dedication to strengthening the CSCE process. Through our mutual efforts to ensure that the promise of Helsinki is fulfilled in practical ways, we are advancing a process that can reduce divisions and improve the human condition in Europe.

Unfortunately, not all of the 35 signatory states have taken the commitments we freely entered into at Helsinki with equal seriousness. In Afghanistan, in Poland and in the Soviet Union, the obligations undertaken in 1975 are being flouted, with grave cost to human life and human dignity.

For the Helsinki Final Act to be a living document, it must be honored by deeds, not just words. This does not mean that we expect the Eastern countries to be like us; but we do expect a sincere effort to abide by commitments freely made: to refrain from the use or threat of force; to honor the right of peoples to self-determination; to respect the dignity and fundamental human rights of individuals at home and abroad.

Events in Poland over the past year strike at the heart of the CSCE process. It was for that reason that Western foreign ministers came to Madrid last February to stand up for the people of Poland and in defense of the Helsinki Final Act. As free nations, we cannot turn our backs on the Polish people's struggle to realize the promise of Helsinki.

We want the Madrid meeting to strengthen CSCE. We seek agreement on a full concluding document which would embody balanced progress on human rights and security issues, including the mandate for a European Security Conference. But failure to honor existing CSCE undertakings is an obstacle to such an outcome. Therefore, we have jointly sponsored new proposals which address these failures. Our proposals—on such issues as labor rights, freedom of religion, and Helsinki monitors—extend the provisions of the Final Act and make the requirement for compliance unmistakably clear.

In making these proposals, we remain mindful that the Helsinki process is more than mere words. The actions of governments are what determine whether that process will flourish or wither away. Here today, I can tell you that the United States pledges to support and promote the standards of Helsinki vigilantly. No state which seeks the goals of peace and stability in Europe can fail to do the same.

Source: American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 456.

DOCUMENT 52

Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Washington, July 15, 1983

After nearly 3 years of negotiation, the 35 states participating in the Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are approaching agreement on a concluding document—one that will strengthen and extend the undertakings contained in the Helsinki Final Act. It is a call on all 35 CSCE states—particularly those who have so tragically failed to live up to promises made in Helsinki—to give life to these commitments and to rededicate themselves to advancing the freedom and justice on which security in Europe ultimately depends.

We have agreed to this concluding document, as we did in 1975 to the Helsinki Final Act itself, with no illusions about the nature of the Soviet Union or about the system which it seeks to impose over much of Europe. In an ideal world, agreements such as this would not be necessary. But we believe it is the best agreement attainable, one which significantly improves on the Helsinki Final Act and advances the efforts of the West to hold out a beacon of hope for those in the East who seek a more free, just, and secure life.

Together with the Helsinki accords, this agreement sets forth a clearer code of conduct for all 35 CSCE states—a set of standards to which we and the other Atlantic democracies will continue to hold all those who will have pledged their word at Madrid. We will sign it with the hope that it will serve as a step toward achieving our objective of a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Madrid accord will add important new commitments to the Helsinki process,

including provisions dealing with human rights, the trade union freedoms so tragically violated in Poland, terrorism, religious liberties, reunification of families, free flow of information, and more. It will provide for two important meetings of experts in the humanitarian field and for a security conference which will attempt to negotiate measures reducing the danger of surprise attack in Europe. Another full, followup meeting will take place in Vienna in 1986, where we will review the conduct of the participating states and seek to build on the accomplishments at Madrid.

The unity and resolve of the Western democracies at Madrid have made this achievement possible. Ambassador Kampelman and his NATO colleagues deserve the highest praise for bringing this long and often difficult conference to a successful conclusion. We also owe a special vote of thanks to Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain, whose thoughtful proposal set the stage for final agreement.

In concluding the Madrid meeting, we reaffirm our commitment to the Helsinki process. We will not flag in our continued determination to work with all governments and peoples whose goal is the strengthening of peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, dialog, when based on realistic expectations and conducted with patience, can produce results. These results are often gradual and hard-won, but they are the necessary building blocks for a more secure and stable world. The challenge remains. We must all consolidate and build on these gains; we must ensure that good words are transformed into good deeds and that the ideals which they embody are given concrete expression. Giving substance to the promises of Madrid and Helsinki will remain one of our prime objectives.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
July 25, 1983, p. 1007.

DOCUMENT 53

Statement by Ambassador Max M. Kampelman Before the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid, July 15, 1983

The 35 states participating in the Madrid CSCE review conference, after almost 3 years of negotiation, are approaching agreement on a final document. This conclusion meets the Western criteria for an acceptable, balanced, and substantive result. It confirms and expands upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The United States is pleased at the result and believes that the 2 years and 10 months spent negotiating in Madrid have been fruitful and well worth the extraordinary effort.

There follows a summary followed by an outline of the issues that have dominated the Madrid meeting, as well as a report on how the final document deals with those issues.

- The Madrid concluding document will add important new provisions to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. These provisions deal with the rights of workers to organize, with human rights, with Helsinki monitors, religious rights, human contacts and family reunification, access to diplomatic and consular missions, information, rights of journalists, and measures against terrorism.

- It also provides for convening a conference on security- and confidence-building measures and disarmament in Stockholm next year to work out detailed measures to reduce the fear of surprise military attack. An important new element in this decision is that the measures to be adopted at Stockholm will apply to all of the European portion of the Soviet Union, right up to the Ural Mountains, rather than only to the 250-kilometer (150-mile) band provided for in the Helsinki Final Act.

- In addition, the Madrid agreement schedules a series of additional meetings which are to take place over the next 3 years. There will be meetings on human rights, human contacts, and on the peaceful settlement of disputes; a cultural forum; and a seminar on economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean. A meeting is also scheduled in Helsinki during 1985 to mark the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act.

- Finally, the Madrid conference will agree to convene the next followup meeting in Vienna in November 1986 in order to carry forward the review process begun in Belgrade in 1977-78 and continued in Madrid over the past 2 years and 10 months.

One of the most important aspects of the CSCE process is the opportunity it provides for a thorough review of the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. During this review in Madrid, there was general condemnation of the failure of the East European states to live up to their Helsinki commitments, with special criticism of the Soviet and Polish Governments for their policies of internal repression and, in the case of the U.S.S.R., its interference in the internal affairs of Poland and Afghanistan.

The establishment by the Madrid concluding document of a whole series of supplementary meetings will ensure that this critical attention to the behavior of the Soviet Union and other East European governments will continue during the next 3½ years. Those experts' meetings, and the Vienna followup conference, will ensure that any state's failure to live up to the undertakings made in Madrid and in Helsinki will again attract the full spotlight of public attention.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, September 1983, pp. 59-64.

Implementation Review

The Madrid preparatory meeting, which began on September 9, 1980, and did not end until after the main meeting opened on November 11, 1980, a period of more than 9 weeks, focused on Western demands that discussions of new proposals on how best to strengthen the Helsinki process should be preceded by a review of how the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were being implemented. The agenda finally produced by the preparatory meeting provided that opportunity. The period of November 11 to December 19, 1980, was set aside for that review, and it was a thorough one. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the record of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were explored and recorded in meticulous detail.

Continuing Soviet and other Eastern violations of the Helsinki Final Act made it necessary to extend this review of implementation throughout most of the Madrid deliberations.

The final document acknowledges that this review took place ("They ... reaffirmed ... the importance of the implementation of all the provisions ... of the Final Act ... as being ... essential ..."). It was confirmed that the thorough exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by CSCE. In this context, it was agreed that those aims can only be attained by continuous implementation, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, of all the provisions and by respect for all the principles of the Final Act. That the review is essential to the health of the process, and that there must be an improvement in compliance ("Serious violations of a number of these principles were deplored during the assessments. Therefore, the participating states ... considered it necessary to state ... that strict application of and respect for these principles, in all their aspects, are essential for the improvement of mutual relations between the participating states. ...").

The United States is fully aware of the fact that the Helsinki Final Act cannot attain its objectives when certain states, particularly the U.S.S.R., continue to violate its provisions. There are no enforcement mechanisms under the act. The Madrid meeting has been, therefore, the appropriate forum at which to insert political and moral pressure into the process. The implementation review became the mechanism. The fact that it was efficiently undertaken by a united Western group of states, joined by most of the neutral and nonaligned states, made that possible.

Equally important, Madrid's implementation review afforded the opportunity for a large number of the participating states to communicate to the Soviet Union their deep concerns about violations of the accords. The message was clear: "Conform to the promises made in 1975 if you wish to be recognized as a responsible member of the international community."

Even as the pattern of Helsinki Final Act violations by the East continued, the United States took note of certain specific acts responding to Western concerns. The decision by Romania on its education immigration tax is an illustration. The suspension of some aspects of martial law in Poland and the release of Lech Walesa is another, although continued arrests and imprisonment of thousands and the continued outlawing of Solidarity put the *bona fides* of those steps into question. We have also noted and welcomed a few gestures from the Soviet Union and will continue to encourage further such steps. We hope there will be other developments in response to our concerns.

Poland

The imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 was a gross violation of the Helsinki Final Act even as the Madrid meeting was in session. This act of blatant defiance was met by a determined and unified presence of 20 foreign ministers, including U.S. Secretary of State Haig, during the week of February 9-12, 1982.

From February 9 until March 12, 1982, negotiations at Madrid came to a complete halt as the West refused to engage in "business as usual" and instead detailed the Helsinki violations represented by Poland's martial law and continued repression in the Soviet Union. On March 12, 1982, in recognition of Western determination, the Madrid meeting recessed for 8 months.

When the meeting reconvened on November 9, a group of Western states introduced a series of 14 amendments to a proposed compromise put forward by a group of neutral and nonaligned states (RM-39). The amendments were designed to reflect the view that "business as usual" remained impossible. The essence of many of these proposals was incorporated in a revised neutral and nonaligned document, submitted on March 15, 1983, after martial law was

ostensibly and technically suspended (RM-39 revised). That revised document, with improvements to it produced by the Prime Minister of Spain on June 17, 1983, has become the official concluding document of Madrid.

A number of provisions of that document reflect our Polish concerns. They deal with trade unions, religious freedom, and renewed obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force. Summary language in the preamble further reflects Western attention to developments in Poland. The United States and its Western allies never forgot during the course of the Madrid meeting that among the first of Solidarity's demands in August 1980 was that the Helsinki Final Act be reprinted and widely disseminated in Poland. We have kept in close touch with representatives of the Solidarity movement in Europe and the United States, and we have helped communicate their messages to the delegations in Madrid.

Trade Unions

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 did not include any language on trade unions. The Madrid document reflects a Western initiative stemming directly from the suppression of Solidarity in Poland. It clearly states that participating states "will ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions, the right of trade unions freely to exercise their activities and their rights as laid down in relative international instruments." This, of course, clearly refers to the conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). A reference to "the law of the State" follows, thereby referring to the fact that all states have laws which in some measure define union rights and activities. But that reference is associated with another provision asserting the requirement that such measures be "in conformity with the state's obligation under international law," again a reference to the ILO.

This provision also calls upon states to encourage direct contacts among trade unions and their representatives. The West, which has always made the point that unions freely organized in the West are not to be confused with the totalitarian state-controlled organizations known as unions in the East, was able successfully to insist that this provision be applicable only to "such" unions which are indeed freely organized by workers and free to function under ILO standards.

Monitors

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 provided a very clear basis of legitimacy to the courageous men and women who formed Helsinki monitoring groups within their own countries. Their purpose was to keep watch on how their states were complying with the provisions of the accord, a right they had under the 1975 agreement. In deliberate decisions to violate the provisions of the act, authorities in the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe persecuted and imprisoned those who exercised that right "to know and act upon their rights."

In Madrid, 14 states mentioned the names of 123 victims of repression, many of them monitors. This was in contrast to the Belgrade meeting where the United States was one of only two countries to mention the names of victims, and we mentioned six. The Netherlands was the other.

The language on monitors in the Helsinki Final Act is quite clear and should not require elaboration. Indeed, within the rules of Madrid requiring consensus, it was very difficult to formulate appropriate additional language more clearly. We were, however, able to incorporate language which, in some slight measure, further supports the legitimacy of monitor groups and other activities. In the introduction to the section on principles, for example, a sentence reads: "The participating states express their determination . . . to encourage genuine efforts to implement the Final Act." The Soviets may attempt to misinterpret this sentence in order to distort its meaning, but we take the justifiable position that the very act of urging compliance with the act is "genuine." This concluding document also states that "governments, institutions organizations and persons have a role to play" in that endeavor.

An examination of the ninth paragraph of the principles section reveals significant strengthening of Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act dealing with human rights. Recognizing that human rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person," it calls upon states to:

- "Assure constant and tangible progress . . . aiming at further and steady development . . . irrespective of their political, economic and social systems";
- "Ensure the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms"; and

- Recall "the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as embodied in the Final Act." The provision goes on to assert that states "will take the necessary action in their respective countries to effectively ensure this right."

We have no illusions as to Soviet intentions in this important human rights area. Our own determination must, however, always remain clear. Our insistence—in this case with some success—on continuing to improve the original wording on the act is a clear indication of that intent. It is also important that we keep raising the standards for responsible international behavior.

Religion

The Madrid final document makes small but important gains over the Helsinki Final Act in four areas dealing with religious freedom:

- By extending and strengthening Principle VII to provide that states will "take the action necessary to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience";
- By specifying that states "will consult, whenever necessary, the religious faiths, institutions and organizations, which act within the constitutional framework of their respective countries";
- By a provision, urged by the Vatican, requiring states to "favorably consider" registering religious communities of believers practicing or prepared to practice within their constitutional frameworks; and
- By language in Basket III stating that participating states will:

... Further implement the relevant provisions of the Final Act so that religious faiths, institutions, organizations and their representatives can, in the field of their activity, develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

Human Contacts

The whole issue of human contacts has been highlighted in Madrid by the sadly unsatisfactory record of Soviet performance. Their record on reunification of families is abysmal. We responded to these violations of the act by continuing to highlight the issue throughout the meetings. In addition, some forward movement beyond the Helsinki Final Act was achieved through six specific new provisions in the Madrid concluding document. The participating states have pledged:

- To "favorably deal with" and "decide upon" applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage. The Final Act provided only that they would "consider" or "deal with applications in a positive and humanitarian spirit";
- That marriage and family reunification applications will be decided "within six months," the first reference to a definite time period. We believe this to be a useful improvement over the Final Act commitment to decide "as expeditiously as possible";
- That making or renewing applications for family reunification will not modify rights to "employment, housing, residence status, family support, access to social, economic or educational benefits";
- To provide the necessary forms and information on procedures and regulations followed in emigration cases. This has been a serious problem for many trying to emigrate from the East;
- To reduce fees charged in connection with emigration "to bring them to a moderate level in relation to the average monthly income." The reference to monthly income provides a new standard by which to judge fee levels which in some cases have been exorbitant; and
- To inform applicants as "expeditiously as possible of the decision" on their cases and inform them of "their right to renew applications after reasonably short intervals" in cases of refusal. Both the fact that applicants must be informed of decisions and the recognition of the right to reapply are important in that many refuseniks in the U.S.S.R. have been given "final refusals" and told they could not reapply.

The Madrid concluding document also adds an important new element to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act by specifying that visitors to diplomatic and other official missions and consular posts will be assured of access to them and reaffirming the importance of facilitating the normal functioning of those missions.

There was one additional step taken after months of debate and stalemate. The West believes that it is important to provide a forum after Madrid and before the next followup meeting for the issue of human contacts to be thoroughly explored at a meeting of experts attended by representatives of all 35 countries. We look upon an experts' meeting as a means of providing an opportunity for further clarity and, perhaps, understanding among us all, so that by the time of the next followup meeting this issue might be less of an irritant.

The Government of Switzerland shared our belief and invited the participating states to an experts' meeting to deal with human contacts during April 1986. This was finally accepted by the Soviet Union. A late date was selected so that we will have time to examine how the six new provisions in the Madrid agreement will have been complied with. We look upon this meeting as an important development.

Human Rights Experts' Meeting

The desirability of convening a human rights experts' meeting was first expressed by the West in Madrid in February 1981. We looked upon this highly controversial proposal as vital if we are ever to achieve understanding between East and West. We define human rights by what we consider to be the reasonable standard of individual freedom. Communists think of freedom in terms of "class" and the "state." We are pleased that the proposed experts' meeting received approval after more than 2 years of consideration. It is to take place in Ottawa, Canada, in May 1985. Its agenda focuses on the status of human rights "in their states," i.e., the participating states, so as not to broaden its scope to include other areas of the world.

Information

The Madrid document contains a number of new and helpful provisions designed to strengthen the Helsinki Final Act provisions in this important area. They are:

- A provision that participating states will encourage the public sale and distribution of printed matter from other states, including making them "accessible in reading rooms";

- A provision that prices of foreign publications should not be excessive in relation to prices in their country of origin. This language is somewhat qualified because Western governments find it difficult to make commitments in this area;

- Language confirming that states will "further extend the possibilities" for the public to take out foreign subscriptions. In acknowledging that anyone can subscribe to foreign publications, this provision extends the Final Act which states only to "develop possibilities for taking out subscriptions according to modalities. . . .";

- A reference endorsing "direct contacts among journalists" which is not in the Final Act;

- A pledge to decide visa applications from journalists without "undue delay" and to reexamine within a reasonable time applications which have been refused;

- A sentence stating that journalists traveling for personal reasons will receive the same treatment as other visitors. This is a new element, not found in the Final Act, and is in response to complaints by Western journalists;

- A commitment to grant permanent correspondents and their families multiple entry and exit visas valid for a year;

- A pledge to "examine the possibility" of coaccrediting journalists permanently accredited to other countries. This is a useful provision for most Western news organizations which have only one or two journalists covering all of Eastern Europe;

- A commitment to take "concrete measures" to provide more extensive travel opportunities for journalists and to "inform journalists in advance" of new areas closed for security reasons;

- A sentence pledging states to "increase the possibilities" and "improve the conditions" for foreign journalists to "establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with their sources." We look upon the word "personal" as implying individual contacts, thereby strengthening the Final Act;

- A provision that radio and television journalists may be accompanied by their own sound and film technicians and use their own equipment. This is another useful addition to the Final Act;

- A provision that journalists may carry with them reference material, including personal notes and files to be used for their professional purposes, an important addition to the Final Act. A qualifier acknowledging that import of printed matter may be subject to local regulation—and Western states also have such regulations—is itself qualified by a statement that these regulations "will be applied with due regard to the journalists' need for adequate working material";

- A provision on press centers open to national and foreign journalists may be helpful considering the paucity of such facilities in the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern countries;

- A sentence in the culture section committing states to "gradually lower custom duties" on books, films, and other forms of cultural expression, as well as "encourage wider dissemination of and access" to these items. This is a minor advance over the Final Act;

- A "cultural forum" to be held in Budapest in 1985. This will provide an opportunity for the West to raise, if necessary, a review of how artists and writers in East European states are treated; and

- A provision in the education section calling upon states to encourage publication of "lists and catalogues of open archival material," an addition to the Final Act which may aid in negotiating future exchange programs and may be helpful to foreign scholars doing research in the Soviet Union.

Terrorism

The Helsinki Final Act does not deal with the subject of terrorism. The United States joined the Spanish delegation and others in urging that the Madrid final document include a provision on this vital threat to the security of all states. The final document does include such a provision. It includes:

- A statement that signatories will "take effective measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, both at the national level and through international cooperation. . . .";

- A provision that states will take measures to prevent their territories from being used for the preparation or organization of terrorist activities directed against other participating states and their citizens;

- A commitment to refrain from direct or indirect assistance, financing, encouraging, or tolerating terrorist or subversive activities directed at the violent overthrow of the government of other participating states; and

- A pledge that states will "do their utmost" to assure necessary security to all diplomatic, consular, and official representatives of other states.

Given the record of some of the states which approved this provision regarding international terrorism, there may be some understandable skepticism about such a provision. We strongly believe, however, that it is vital for an international modality to be established, and this provision helps to do so.

Security

The negotiations that led to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 had their conceptual origins in an original plan calling for establishment of a European security conference. The agreement that finally came out of Geneva and Helsinki was one that included a very significant humanitarian dimension, which the United States and its Western friends consider to be one of their major accomplishments. Nevertheless, the security questions that are a part of the Helsinki process remain of great importance to all of the participating states.

The NATO group of states in February 1981 presented a French proposal calling for the establishment of a conference to take place after the Madrid meeting to deal with military confidence-building measures. The problem of surprise military attack is one uppermost in the minds of Europeans. The United States joined the Western resolve that a conference on surprise military attack had to be carefully structured in Madrid so that it did not become a vaguely worded mandate for a "disarmament" meeting in which propaganda speeches rather than constructive decisions would be the major element.

Fortunately, the neutral and non-aligned states agreed with this Western objective. The East abandoned its proposal, originally submitted by Warsaw, and after long and intensive debate a mandate for the conference fully acceptable to us was adopted. It meets our four essential criteria:

- The conference will be an integral part of the CSCE process;
- The conference will not interfere with ongoing arms negotiations, such as MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions);
- The first stage of the conference will deal exclusively with confidence-building measures. This is stated in paragraphs two and six of the mandate for the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe which provide that "... the first stage will be devoted to ... confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe" and that "... a future follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for ... supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference ..."; and
- Confidence- and security-building measures agreed at the conference are to be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe.

The extension of the area to the Urals is quite significant, because the limited confidence-building measures

adopted in 1975 exempted the Soviet Union from their coverage, except for the first 250 kilometers within its borders. The Soviet Union, after first rejecting an extension to cover all of its European area, then urged that the geographic area be extended into the Atlantic Ocean as compensation for its extension to the Ural Mountains. The Soviet objective, of course, was to negate the international principle recognizing free use of the high seas and thus possibly to interfere with movement of U.S. forces in contingencies involving areas of the world outside Europe.

We presented a provision, which was in the original 1975 agreement, making certain that only "adjoining sea area and air space" would be included and only when activities in that area are a part of military activities taking place within Europe itself. This was eventually accepted by the East. We were pleased that this formulation was finally approved, because it clearly excluded independent air and naval activities from coverage. The mandate will now permit concentration at the meeting, which will be held in Stockholm, on the crucial confidence-building measures required to deal with the problem of surprise military attack on the European Continent.

Followup Meetings

During the preparatory meeting in 1980, the United States proposed to all of the delegations, most particularly to the Soviet Union, that all participants immediately commit themselves to hold a followup meeting within 3 years after Madrid. The Soviet Union refused to join us in that step and consistently refused to provide the West with such an unconditional commitment. This was apparently designed to intimidate other states into believing that the Helsinki process would end if the Madrid meeting did not conclude to Soviet satisfaction.

We are very pleased that the final Madrid document provides for another followup meeting which is to take place in Vienna in November 1986. This is a

longer intervening period than we would have preferred, but the final document also provides that there will be a 10th anniversary commemoration meeting in Helsinki in 1985, the year we might ordinarily have held a followup meeting.

We also have decided to hold a series of supplementary meetings between those in Madrid and Vienna. We hope that these will help keep the Helsinki issues alive and at the same time strengthen the Helsinki process. Here is a list of the eight future meetings provided for in the Madrid document:

- The first stage of a conference on disarmament in Europe commencing January 17, 1984, in Stockholm, to be preceded by a 3-week preparatory meeting to take place beginning on October 25, 1983, in Helsinki;
- A 6-week experts' meeting on the peaceful settlement of disputes in Athens, beginning March 21, 1984;
- A seminar on Mediterranean cooperation in Venice from October 16 to 26, 1984;
- An experts' meeting on human rights in Ottawa, lasting 6 weeks and commencing on May 7, 1985;
- A commemorative meeting in Helsinki in 1985 marking the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act;
- A cultural forum in Budapest sometime in 1985;
- An experts' meeting on human contacts in Bern, Switzerland, lasting 6 weeks and commencing April 16, 1986; and
- The third followup meeting of the CSCE in Vienna starting November 4, 1986.

Concluding Document of the CSCE Followup Meeting, Madrid,
September 6, 1983

CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

1. The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe met in Madrid from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, as well as the basis of the other relevant documents adopted during the process of the CSCE.

2. The participants were addressed on 12 November 1980 by the Spanish Prime Minister.

3. Opening statements were made by all Heads of Delegations among whom were Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of a number of participating States. Some Ministers of Foreign Affairs addressed the Meeting also at later stages.

4. Contributions were made by representatives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and UNESCO.

Contributions were also made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia.

5. The representatives of the participating States stressed the high political significance of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of the process initiated by it as well as of the ways and means it provides for States to further their efforts to increase security, develop co-operation and enhance mutual understanding in Europe. They therefore reaffirmed their commitment to the process of the CSCE and emphasised the importance of the implementation of all the provisions and the respect for all the principles of the Final Act by each of them as being essential for the development of this process. Furthermore, they stressed the importance they attach to security and genuine detente, while deploring the deterioration of the international situation since the Belgrade Meeting 1977.

Accordingly, the participating States agreed that renewed efforts should be made to give full effect to the Final Act through concrete action, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, in order to restore trust and confidence between the participating States which would permit a substantial improvement in their mutual relations. They considered that the future of the CSCE process required balanced progress in all sections of the Final Act.

6. In accordance with the mandate provided for in the Final Act and the Agenda of the Madrid Meeting, the representatives of the participating States held a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of detente in the future.

7. It was confirmed that the thorough exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE. In this context, it was agreed that these aims can only be attained by continuous implementation, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, of all the provisions and by respect for all the principles of the Final Act.

8. During this exchange of views, different and at times contradictory opinions were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far by participating States. While certain progress was noted, concern was expressed at the serious deficiencies in the implementation of this document.

9. Critical assessments from different viewpoints were given as to the application of and respect for the principles of the Final Act. Serious violations of a number of these principles were deplored during these assessments. Therefore, the participating States, at times represented at a higher level, considered it necessary to state, at various stages of the Meeting, that strict application of and respect for these principles, in all their aspects, are essential for the improvement of mutual relations between the participating States.

The necessity was also stressed that the relations of the participating States with all other States should be conducted in the spirit of these principles.

10. Concern was expressed about the continued lack of confidence among participating States.

Concern was also expressed as to the spread of terrorism.

11. The implementation of the provisions of the Final Act concerning Confidence-Building Measures, Co-operation in the field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of Environment, as well as Co-operation in Humanitarian and other fields was

Source: Department of State Bulletin, October, 1983, pp. 53-60.

thoroughly discussed. It was considered that the numerous possibilities offered by the Final Act had not been sufficiently utilised. Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean were also discussed.

12. The participating States reaffirmed their commitment to the continuation of the CSCE process as agreed to in the chapter on the Follow-up to the Conference contained in the Final Act.

13. The representatives of the participating States took note of the reports of the meetings of experts and of the "Scientific Forum," and in the course of their deliberations took the results of these meetings into account.

14. The representatives of the participating States examined all the proposals submitted concerning the above questions and agreed on the following:

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The participating States express their determination

- to exert new efforts to make detente an effective, as well as continuing increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, as undertaken under the Final Act;
- to seek solutions to outstanding problems through peaceful means;
- to fulfil consistently all the provisions under the Final Act and, in particular, strictly and unreservedly to respect and put into practice all the ten principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems, as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, including their commitment to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of these principles;
- to develop relations of mutual co-operation, friendship and confidence, refraining from any action which, being contrary to the Final Act, might impair such relations;
- to encourage genuine efforts to implement the Final Act;
- to exert genuine efforts towards containing an increasing arms build-up as well as towards strengthening confidence and security and promoting disarmament.

Principles

1. They reaffirm their determination fully to respect and apply these principles and accordingly, to promote by all means, both in law and practice, their increased effectiveness. They consider that one such means could be to give legislative expression—in forms appropriate to practices and procedures specific to each country—to the ten principles set forth in the Final Act.

2. They recognize it as important that treaties and agreements concluded by participating States reflect and be consonant with the relevant principles and, where appropriate, refer to them.

3. The participating States reaffirm the need that refraining from the threat or use of force, as a norm of international life, should be strictly and effectively observed. To this end they stress their duty, under the relevant provisions of the Final Act, to act accordingly.

4. The participating States condemn terrorism, including terrorism in international relations, as endangering or taking innocent human lives or otherwise jeopardising human rights and fundamental freedoms, and emphasize the necessity to take resolute measures to combat it. They express their determination to take effective measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, both at the national level and through international co-operation including appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements, and accordingly to broaden and reinforce mutual co-operation to combat such acts. They agree to do so in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and the Helsinki Final Act.

5. In the context of the combat against acts of terrorism, they will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organisation or commission of terrorist activities, including those directed against other participating States and their citizens. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups or organisations that instigate, organise or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism.

6. The participating States confirm that they will refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of

another participating State. Accordingly, they will refrain, *inter alia*, from financing, encouraging, fomenting or tolerating any such activities.

7. They express their determination to do their utmost to assure necessary security to all official representatives and persons who participate on their territories in activities within the scope of diplomatic, consular or other official relations.

8. They emphasize that all the participating States recognise in the Final Act the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves, as among all States.

9. The participating States stress their determination to promote and encourage the effective exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development, and to ensure constant and tangible progress in accordance with the Final Act, aiming at further and steady development in this field in all participating States, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems.

They similarly stress their determination to develop their laws and regulations in the field of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other human rights and fundamental freedoms; they also emphasize their determination to ensure the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms.

They recall the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as embodied in the Final Act, and will take the necessary action in their respective countries to effectively ensure this right.

10. The participating States reaffirm that they will recognise, respect and furthermore agree to take the action necessary to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

In this context, they will consult, whenever necessary, the religious faiths, institutions and organisations, which act within the constitutional framework of their respective countries.

They will favourably consider applications by religious communities of believers practising or prepared to practice their faith within the constitutional framework of their States, to be granted the status provided for in their respective countries for religious faiths, institutions and organisations.

11. They stress also the importance of constant progress in ensuring the respect for and actual enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as protecting their legitimate interests as provided for in the Final Act.

12. They stress the importance of ensuring equal rights of men and women; accordingly, they agree to take all actions necessary to promote equally effective participation of men and women in political, economic, social and cultural life.

13. The participating States will ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions, the right of trade unions freely to exercise their activities and other rights as laid down in relevant international instruments. They note that these rights will be exercised in compliance with the law of the State and in conformity with the State's obligations under international law. They will encourage, as appropriate, direct contacts and communication among such trade unions and their representatives.

14. They reaffirm that governments, institutions, organisations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing towards the achievement of the above-mentioned aims of their co-operation.

15. They reaffirm the particular significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and other relevant international instruments of their joint and separate efforts to stimulate and develop universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; they call on all participating States to act in conformity with those international instruments and on those participating States, which have not yet done so, to consider the possibility of acceding to the covenants.

16. They agree to give favourable consideration to the use of bilateral round-table meetings, held on a voluntary basis, between delegations composed by each participating State to discuss issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with an agreed agenda in a spirit of mutual respect with a view to achieving greater understanding and co-operation based on the provisions of the Final Act.

17. They decide to convene a meeting of experts of the participating States on questions concerning respect, in their States, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all aspects, as embodied in the Final Act.

Upon invitation of the Government of Canada, the meeting of experts will be held in Ottawa, beginning on 7 May 1985. It will draw up conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the governments of all participating States.

The meeting will be preceded by a preparatory meeting which will be held in Ottawa upon the invitation of the Government of Canada, starting on 23 April 1985.

18. In conformity with the recommendation contained in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts, another meeting of experts of the participating States will be convened, at the invitation of the Government of Greece. It will take place in Athens and will commence on 21 March 1984, with the purpose of pursuing, on the basis of the Final

Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. The meeting will take into account the common approach set forth in the above-mentioned report.

19. Recalling the right of any participating State to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance, and also the right to neutrality, the participating States take note of the declaration of the Government of the Republic of Malta in which it stated that, as an effective contribution to detente, peace and security in the Mediterranean region, the Republic of Malta is a neutral State adhering to a policy of non-alignment. They call upon all States to respect that declaration.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

The participating States,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament.

Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

1. The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

2. Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

3. The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 January 1984.

4. On the basis of equality of right, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interest of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole as well as the adjoining sea areas² and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea areas² and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

5. Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4 November 1988, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the Conference.

6. Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

7. A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, time-table and other organisational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

8. The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1. The participating States consider that the implementation of all provisions of the Final Act and full respect for the principles guiding relations among them set out therein are an essential basis for the development of co-operation among them in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the environment. At the same time they reaffirm their conviction that co-operation in these fields contributes to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole. In this spirit they reiterate their resolve to pursue and intensify such co-operation between one another, irrespective of their economic and social systems.

2. The participating States confirm their interest in promoting adequate, favourable conditions in order further to develop trade and industrial co-operation among them, in particular by fully implementing all provisions of the second chapter of the Final Act, so as to make greater use of the possibilities created by their economic, scientific and technical potential. In this context and taking into consideration the efforts already made unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally in order to overcome all kinds of obstacles to trade, they reaffirm their intention to make further efforts aimed at reducing or progressively eliminating all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade.

Taking account of the activities of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) already carried out in the field of all kinds of obstacles to trade, they recommend that further work on this subject be directed in particular towards identifying these obstacles and examining them with a view to finding means for their reduction or progressive elimination, in order to contribute to harmonious development of their economic relations.

3. On the basis of the provisions of the Final Act concerning business contracts and facilities the participating States declare their intention to make efforts to enable business negotiations and activities to be carried out more efficiently and expeditiously and further to create conditions facilitating closer contacts between representatives and experts of seller firms on the one hand and buyer as well as user firms on the other at all stages of transaction. They will also further other forms of operational contacts between sellers and users such as the holding of technical symposia and demonstrations and after-sales training or requalification courses for technical staff of user firms and organizations.

They also agree to take measures further to develop and improve facilities and working

conditions for representatives of foreign firms and organizations on their territory, including telecommunications facilities for representatives of such firms and organizations, as well as to develop these and other amenities for temporarily resident staff including particular site personnel. They will endeavour further to take measures to speed up as far as possible procedures for the registration of foreign firms' representations and offices as well as for granting entry visas to business representatives.

4. The participating States declare their intention to ensure the regular publication and dissemination, as rapidly as possible, of economic and commercial information compiled in such a way as to facilitate the appreciation of market opportunities and thus to contribute effectively to the process of developing international trade and industrial co-operation.

To this end and in order to make further progress in achieving the aims laid down in the relevant provisions of the Final Act they intend to intensify their efforts to improve the comparability, comprehensiveness and clarity of their economic and commercial statistics, in particular by adopting where necessary the following measures: by accompanying their economic and trade statistics by adequately defined summary indices based wherever possible on constant values; by publishing their interim statistics whenever technically possible at least on a quarterly basis; by publishing their statistical compilations in sufficient detail to achieve the aims referred to above, in particular by using for their foreign trade statistics a product breakdown permitting the identification of particular products for purposes of market analysis; by striving to have their economic and trade statistics no less comprehensive than those previously published by the State concerned.

They further express their willingness to co-operate towards the early completion of work in the appropriate United Nations bodies on the harmonization and alignment of statistical nomenclatures.

The participating States further recognize the usefulness of making economic and commercial information existing in other participating States readily available to enterprises and firms in their countries through appropriate channels.

5. The participating States, conscious of the need further to improve the conditions conducive to a more efficient functioning of institutions and firms acting in the field of marketing, will promote a more active exchange of knowledge and techniques required for effective marketing, and will encourage more intensive relations among such institutions and firms. They agree to make full use of the possibilities offered by the ECE to further their co-operation in this field.

6. The participating States note the increasing frequency in the economic relations of compensation in all their forms. They recognise that a useful role can be played by such transactions, concluded on a mutually acceptable basis. At the same time they recognise that problems can be created by the linkage in such transactions between purchases and sales.

Taking account of the studies of the ECE already carried out in this field, they recommend that further work on this subject be directed in particular towards identifying such problems and examining ways of solving them in order to contribute to a harmonious development of their economic relations.

7. The participating States recognise that the expansion of industrial co-operation, on the basis of their mutual interest and motivated by economic considerations, can contribute to the further development and diversification of their economic relations and to a wider utilisation of modern technology.

They note the useful role bilateral agreements on economic, industrial and technical co-operation, including where appropriate, those of a long-term nature can play. They also express their willingness to promote favourable conditions for the development of industrial co-operation among competent organisations, enterprises and firms. To this end and with a view to facilitating the identification of new possibilities for industrial co-operation projects they recognise the desirability of further developing and improving the conditions for business activities and the exchange of economic and commercial information among competent organisations, enterprises and firms including small and medium-sized enterprises.

They also note that, if it is in the mutual interest of potential partners, new forms of industrial co-operation can be envisaged, including those with organisations, institutions and firms of third countries.

They recommend that the ECE pursue and continue to pay particular attention to its activities in the field of industrial co-operation, *inter alia* by further directing its efforts towards examining ways of promoting favourable conditions for the development of co-operation in this field, including the organisation of symposia and seminars.

8. The participating States declare their readiness to continue their efforts aiming at a wider participation by small and medium-size enterprises in trade and industrial co-operation. Aware of the problems particularly affecting such enterprises, the participating States will endeavour further to improve the conditions dealt with in the preceding paragraphs in order to facilitate the operations of these enterprises in the above-mentioned fields. The participating States further recommend that the ECE develop its special studies pertaining to these problems.

9. The participating States recognise the increasing importance of co-operation in the field of energy, *inter alia* that of a long-term nature, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. Welcoming the results so far achieved through such endeavours and in particular the work carried out by the ECE they express their support for continuing the co-operation pursued by the Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Energy aiming at the fulfilment of all parts of their mandate.

10. The participating States reaffirm their interest in reducing and preventing technical barriers to trade and welcome the increased co-operation in this field, *inter alia* the work of the Government Officials Responsible for Standardisation Policies in the ECE. They will encourage the conclusion of international certification arrangements covering where appropriate the mutual acceptance of certification systems providing mutually satisfactory guarantees.

11. The participating States recommend that appropriate action be taken in order to facilitate the use and enlarge the scope of arbitration as an instrument for settling disputes in international trade and industrial co-operation. They recommend in particular the application of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 as well as a wider recourse to the arbitration rules elaborated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. They also advocate that parties should, on the basis of the provisions of the Final Act, be allowed freedom in the choice of arbitrators and the place of arbitration, including the choice of arbitrators and the place of arbitration in a third country.

12. The participating States recognise the important role of scientific and technical progress in the economic and social development of all countries in particular those which are developing from an economic point of view. Taking into account the objectives which countries or institutions concerned pursue in their bilateral and multilateral relations they underline the importance of further developing, on the basis of reciprocal advantage and on the basis of mutual agreement and other arrangements, the forms and methods of co-operation in the field of science and technology provided for in the Final Act, for instance international programmes and co-operative projects, while utilising also various forms of contacts, including direct and individual contacts among scientists and specialists as well as contacts and communications among interested organisations, scientific and technological institutions and enterprises.

In this context they recognise the value of an improved exchange and dissemination of information concerning scientific and technical developments as a means of

facilitating, on the basis of mutual advantage, the study and the transfer of, as well as access to scientific and technical achievements in fields of co-operation agreed between interested parties.

The participating States recommend that in the field of science and technology the ECE should give due attention, through appropriate ways and means, to the elaboration of studies and practical projects for the development of co-operation among member countries.

Furthermore, the participating States, aware of the relevant part of the Report of the "Scientific Forum," agree to encourage the development of scientific co-operation in the field of agriculture at bilateral, multilateral and sub-regional levels, with the aim, *inter alia*, of improving livestock and plant breeding and ensuring optimum use and conservation of water resources. To this end, they will promote further co-operation among research institutions and centres in their countries, through the exchange of information, the joint implementation of research programmes, the organisation of meetings among scientists and specialists and other methods.

The participating States invite the ECE and other competent international organizations to support the implementation of these activities and to examine the possibilities of providing a wider exchange of scientific and technological information in the field of agriculture.

13. The participating States welcome with satisfaction the important steps taken to strengthen co-operation within the framework of the ECE in the field of the environment, including the High-Level Meeting on the Protection of the Environment (13-16 November 1979). Taking due account of work undertaken or envisaged in other competent international organizations, they recommend the continuation of efforts in this field, including, *inter alia*,

- giving priority to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Resolution on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution adopted at the High-Level Meeting;
- the early ratification of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution signed at the High-Level Meeting;
- implementation of the Recommendations contained in the Declaration of Low and Non-Waste Technology and Reutilization and Recycling of Wastes;
- implementation of Decisions B and C of the thirty-fifth session of the ECE concerning the Declaration of Policy on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, including transboundary pollution;
- support in carrying out the programme of work of the ECE concerning the protection of the environment, including, *inter alia*, the work under way in the field of the protection of flora and fauna.

14. In the context of the provisions of the Final Act concerning migrant labour in Europe, the participating States note that recent developments in the world economy have affected the situation of migrant workers. In this connection, the participating States express their wish that host countries and countries of origin, guided by a spirit of mutual interest and co-operation, intensify their contacts with a view to improving further the general situation of migrant workers and their families, *inter alia* the protection of their human rights including their economic, social and cultural rights while taking particularly into account the special problems of second generation migrants. They will also endeavour to provide or promote, where reasonable demand exists, adequate teaching of the language and culture of the countries of origin.

The participating States recommend that, among other measures for facilitating the social and economic reintegration of returning migrant labour, the payment of pensions as acquired or established under the social security system to which such workers have been admitted in the host country should be ensured by appropriate legislative means or reciprocal agreements.

15. The participating States further recognize the importance for their economic development of promoting the exchange of information and experience on training for management staff. To this end they recommend the organisation, in an appropriate existing framework and with the help of interested organizations such as, for example, the ECE and the International Labour Organisation, of a symposium of persons responsible for services and institutions specializing in management training for administrations and enterprises with a view to exchanging information on training problems and methods, comparing experiences and encouraging the development of relations among the centres concerned.

16. The participating States welcome the valuable contribution made by the ECE to the multilateral implementation of the provisions of the Final Act pertaining to co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment. Aware of the potential of the ECE for intensifying co-operation in the fields, they recommend the fullest use of the existing mechanisms and resources in order to continue and consolidate the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act in the interest of its member countries, including those within the ECE region which are developing from an economic point of view.

17. The participating States, bearing in mind their will expressed in the provisions of the Final Act, reiterate the determination of each of them to promote stable and equitable international economic relations in the mutual interest of all States and, in this spirit, to

participate equitably in promoting and strengthening economic co-operation with the developing countries in particular the least developed among them. They also note the usefulness, *inter alia*, of identifying and assessing, in co-operation with developing countries, concrete projects, with a view to contributing to economic development in these countries.

They also declare their readiness to contribute to common efforts towards the establishment of a new international economic order and the implementation of the Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, as adopted. They recognize the importance of the launching of mutually beneficial and adequately prepared global negotiations relating to international economic co-operation for development.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. The participating States, bearing in mind that security in Europe, considered in the broader context of world security, is closely linked to security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, reaffirm their intention to contribute to peace, security and justice in the Mediterranean region.

2. They further express their will

- to take positive steps towards lessening tensions and strengthening stability, security and peace in the Mediterranean and, to this end, to intensify efforts towards finding just, viable and lasting solutions, through peaceful means, to outstanding crucial problems, without resort to force or other means incompatible with the Principles of the Final Act, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region;
- to take measures designed to increase confidence and security;
- to develop good neighbourly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States of the Final Act;
- to study further the possibility of *ad hoc* meetings of Mediterranean States aimed at strengthening security and intensifying co-operation in the Mediterranean.

3. In addition the participating States will, within the framework of the implementation of the Valletta report, consider the possibilities offered by new transport infrastructure developments to facilitate new commercial and industrial exchanges, as well as by the improvement of existing transport networks, and by a wider co-ordination of transport investments between interested parties. In this context they recommend that a study be undertaken, within the framework of the ECE, in order to establish the current and potential transport flows in the Mediterranean involving the participating States and other States of this region taking account of the current work in this field. They will further consider the question of introducing or extending, in accordance with the existing IMO regulations, the use of suitable techniques for aids to maritime navigation, principally in straits.

They further note with satisfaction the results of the Meeting of Experts held in

Valletta on the subject of economic, scientific and cultural co-operation within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act. They reaffirm the conclusions and recommendations of the report of this Meeting and agree that they will be guided accordingly. They also take note of efforts under way aiming at implementing them as appropriate. To this end, the participating States agree to convene from 16 to 26 October 1984 a seminar to be held at Venice at the invitation of the Government of Italy, to review the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in all the sectors outlined in the report of the Valletta Meeting and stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors.

Representatives of the competent international organizations and representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States will be invited to this Seminar in accordance with the rules and practices adopted at the Valletta Meeting.¹

CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

The participating States,

Recalling the introductory sections of the Chapter on Co-operation in Humanitarian and other Fields of the Final Act including those concerning the development of mutual understanding between them and distant and those concerning progress in cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people and the solution of humanitarian problems,

Resolving to pursue and expand co-operation in these fields and to achieve a fuller utilization of the possibilities offered by the Final Act,

Agree now to implement the following:

Human Contacts

1. The participating States will favourably deal with applications relating to contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families and marriage between citizens of different States and will decide upon them in the same spirit.

2. They will decide upon these applications in emergency cases for family meetings as expeditiously as possible, for family reunification and for marriage between citizens of different States in normal practice within six months and for other family meetings within gradually decreasing time limits.

3. They confirm that the presentation or renewal of applications in these cases will not modify the rights and obligations of the applications or of members of their families concerning *inter alia* employment, housing, residence status, family support, access to social, economic or educational benefits, as well as any other rights and obligations flowing from the laws and regulations of the respective participating State.

4. The participating States will provide the necessary information on the procedures to be followed by the applicants in these cases and on the regulations to be observed, as well as, upon the applicant's request, provide the relevant forms.

5. They will, where necessary, gradually reduce fees charged in connection with these applications, including those for visas and passports, in order to bring them to a moderate level in relation to the average monthly income in the respective participating State.

6. Applicants will be informed as expeditiously as possible of the decision that has been reached. In case of refusal applicants will also be informed of their right to renew applications after reasonably short intervals.

7. The participating States reaffirm their commitment fully to implement the provisions regarding diplomatic and other official missions and consular posts of other participating States contained in relevant multilateral or bilateral conventions, and to facilitate the normal functioning of these missions. Access by visitors to these missions will be assured with due regard to the necessary requirements of security of these missions.

8. They also reaffirm their willingness to take, within their competence, reasonable steps, including necessary security measures, when appropriate to ensure satisfactory conditions for activities within the framework of mutual co-operation on their territory, such as sporting and cultural events, in which citizens of other participating States take part.

9. The participating States will endeavour, where appropriate, to improve the conditions relating to legal, consular and medical assistance for citizens of other participating States temporarily on their territory for personal or professional reasons, taking due account of relevant multilateral or bilateral conventions or agreements.

10. They will further implement the relevant provisions of the Final Act, so that religious faiths, institutions, organisations and their representatives can, in the field of their activity, develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

11. The participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges among young people and foster the broadening of co-operation among their youth organisations. They will favour the holding among young people and youth organisations of educational, cultural and other comparable events and activities. They will also favour the study of problems relating to the younger generation. The participating States will further the development of individual or collective youth tourism, when necessary on the basis of arrangements, *inter alia* by encouraging the granting of suitable facilities by the transport authorities and tourist organisations of the participating States or such facilities as those offered by the railway authorities participating in the "Inter-Rail" system.

Information

1. The participating States will further encourage the freer and wider dissemination of printed matter, periodical and non-periodical, imported from other participating States, as well as an increase in the number of places where these publications are on public sale. These publications will also be accessible in reading rooms in large public libraries and similar institutions.

2. In particular, to facilitate the improvement of dissemination of printed information, the participating States will encourage contacts and negotiation between their competent firms and organisations with a view to concluding long-term agreements and contracts designed to increase the quantities and number of titles of newspapers and other publications imported from other participating States. They consider it desirable that the retail prices of foreign publications are not excessive in relation to prices in their country of origin.

3. They confirm their intention, according to the relevant provisions of the Final Act, to further extend the possibilities for the public to take out subscriptions.

4. They will favour the further expansion of co-operation among mass media and their representatives, especially between the editorial staffs of press agencies, newspapers, radio and television organisations as well as film companies. They will encourage a more regular exchange of news, articles, supplements and broadcasts as well as the exchange of editorial staff for better knowledge of respective practices. On the basis of reciprocity, they will improve the material and technical facilities provided for permanently or temporarily accredited television and radio reporters. Moreover, they will facilitate direct contacts among journalists as well as contacts within the framework of professional organisations.

5. They will decide without undue delay upon visa applications from journalists and re-examine within a reasonable time frame applications which have been refused. Moreover, journalists wishing to travel for personal reasons and not for the purpose of reporting shall enjoy the same treatment as other visitors from their country of origin.

6. They will grant permanent correspondents and members of their families living with them multiple entry and exit visas valid for one year.

7. The participating States will examine the possibility of granting, where necessary on the basis of bilateral arrangements, accreditation and related facilities to journalists from other participating States who are permanently accredited in third countries.

8. They will facilitate travel by journalists from other participating States within their territories, *inter alia* by taking concrete

measures where necessary, to afford them opportunities to travel more extensively, with the exemption of areas closed for security reasons. They will inform journalists in advance, whenever possible, if new areas are closed for security reasons.

9. They will further increase the possibilities and, when necessary, improve the conditions for journalists from other participating States to establish and maintain personal contacts and communication with their sources.

10. They will, as a rule, authorize radio and television journalists, at their request, to be accompanied by their own sound and film technicians and to use their own equipment.

Similarly, journalists may carry with them reference material, including personal notes and files, to be used strictly for their professional purposes.⁴

11. The participating States will, where necessary, facilitate the establishment and operation, in their capitals, of press centres or institutions performing the same functions, open to the national and foreign press with suitable working facilities for the latter.

They will also consider further ways and means to assist journalists from other participating States and thus to enable them to resolve practical problems they may encounter.

Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture

1. They will endeavour, by taking appropriate steps, to make the relevant information concerning possibilities offered by bilateral cultural agreements and programmes available to interested persons, institutions and non-governmental organizations, thus facilitating their effective implementation.

2. The participating States will further encourage wider dissemination of and access to books, films and other forms and means of cultural expression from other participating States, to this end improving by appropriate means, on bilateral and multilateral bases, the conditions for international commercial and non-commercial exchange of their cultural goods, *inter alia*, by gradually lowering customs duties on these items.

3. The participating States will endeavour to encourage the translation, publication and dissemination of works in the sphere of literature and other fields of cultural activity from other participating States, especially those produced in less widely spoken languages, by facilitating co-operation between publishing houses, in particular through the exchange of lists of books which might be translated as well as of other relevant information.

4. They will contribute to the development of contacts, co-operation and joint projects among the participating States regarding the protection, preservation and recording of historical heritage and monuments and the relationship between man, environment and this heritage; they express their interest in the possibility of convening an inter-governmental conference on these matters within the framework of UNESCO.

5. The participating States will encourage their radio and television organizations to continue developing the presentation of the cultural and artistic achievements of other participating States on the basis of bilateral and multilateral arrangements between these organizations, providing *inter alia* for exchanges of information on productions, for the broadcasting of shows and programmes from other participating States, for co-productions, for the invitation of guest conductors and directors, as well as for the provision of mutual assistance to cultural film teams.

6. At the invitation of the Government of Hungary a "Cultural Forum" will take place in Budapest, commencing on 15 October 1986. It will be attended by leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating States. The "Forum" will discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture. A representative of UNESCO will be invited to present to the "Forum" the views of that organization. The "Forum" will be prepared by a meeting of experts, the duration of which will not exceed two weeks and which will be held upon the invitation of the Government of Hungary in Budapest, commencing 21 November 1984.

Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Education

1. The participating States will promote the establishment of governmental and non-governmental arrangements and agreements in education and science, to be carried out with the participation of educational or other competent institutions.

2. The participating States will contribute to the further improvement of exchanges of students, teachers and scholars and their access to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and also their access to open information material in accordance with the laws and regulations prevailing in each country. In this context, they will facilitate travel by scholars, teachers and students within the receiving State, the establishment by them of contacts

with their colleagues, and will also encourage libraries, higher education establishments and similar institutions in their territories to make catalogues and lists of open archival material available to scholars, teachers and students from other participating States.

3. They will encourage a more regular exchange of information about scientific training programmes, courses and seminars for young scientists and facilitate a wider participation in these activities of young scientists from different participating States. They will call upon the appropriate national and international organisations and institutions to give support, where appropriate, to the realisation of these training activities.

4. The representatives of the participating States noted the usefulness of the work done during the "Scientific Forum" held in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, from 18 February to March 1980. Taking into account the results of the "Scientific Forum," the participating States invited international organisations as well as the scientific organisations and scientists of the participating States to give due consideration to its conclusions and recommendations.

5. The participating States will favor widening the possibilities of teaching and studying less widely spread or studied European languages. They will, to this end, stimulate, within their competences, the organisation of and attendance at summer university and other courses, the granting of scholarships for translators and the reinforcement of linguistic facilities including, in case of need, the provision of new facilities for studying these languages.

6. The participating States express their readiness to intensify the exchange, among them and within competent international organisations, of teaching materials, school textbooks maps, bibliographies and other educational material, in order to promote better mutual knowledge and facilitate a fuller presentation of their respective countries.

FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

1. In conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Act and with their resolve and commitment to continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, the participating States will hold further meetings regularly among their representatives.

The third of these meetings will be held in Vienna commencing on 4 November 1984.

2. The agenda, working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the main Vienna Meeting, unless other decisions on these questions are taken by the preparatory meeting mentioned below.

For the purpose of making the adjustments to the agenda, working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting, a preparatory meeting will be held in Vienna commencing on 23 September 1984. It is understood that in this context adjustments concern those items requiring change as a result of the change in date and place, the drawing of lots, and the mention of the other meetings held in conformity with the decisions of the Madrid Meeting 1980. The duration of the preparatory meeting shall not exceed two weeks.

3. The participating States further decide that in 1985, the tenth Anniversary of the signature of the Final Act of the CSCE will be duly commemorated in Helsinki.

4. The duration of the meetings mentioned in this document, unless otherwise agreed, should not exceed six weeks. The results of these meetings will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.

5. All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in conformity with Paragraph 4 of the Chapter on "Follow-up to the Conference" of the Final Act.

6. The Government of Spain is requested to transmit the present document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The Government of Spain is also requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.

7. The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

8. The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the people and Government of Spain for the excellent organization of the Madrid Meeting and warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Meeting.

ANNEX I

Chairman's Statement: Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean within the Framework of the Results of the Valletta Meeting of Experts

1. The Seminar will open on Tuesday, 16 October 1984 at 10 a.m. in Venice, Italy. It will close on Friday, 26 October 1984.

2. The work of the Seminar, guided by a Co-ordinating Committee composed of the

delegations of the participating States, will be divided among three Study Groups devoted to Economics, Science and Culture respectively.

3. The first three days of the Seminar will be devoted to six sessions of the Committee.

4. The first session of the Committee will be public and will be devoted to the opening of the Seminar, to be followed by an address by a representative of the host country.

5. The second session of the Committee will decide whether to hold further sessions of the participating States to guide the work of the Study Groups and to take any other decisions necessary for the Seminar.

6. The following four sessions of the Committee will be public and will be devoted to introductory statements by the representatives of the participating States which so desire (in an order selected by lot in advance) and to introductory statements by the representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States and the international organizations invited. The statements should not exceed 10 minutes per delegation.

7. Beginning on the fourth day and for the following three and a half working days, simultaneous meetings of the three Study Groups will be held.

8. The last one and a half days will be devoted to three sessions of the Committee. Two sessions will decide upon the most appropriate use for the documentation presented in the course of the work concerning the specific sectors indicated in the Valletta Report, such as publication of the introductory statements and distribution of the studies to the relevant international organizations, and will take any other necessary decisions.

The final session of the Committee will be public and will be devoted to the official closing of the Seminar with an address by a representative of the host country.

9. The Chair at the opening and closing sessions of both the Committee and the Study Groups will be taken by a representative from the delegation of the host country. Selection of the successive chairmen by lot will then ensure daily rotation of the Chair, in French alphabetical order, among the representatives of the participating States.

10. Participation in the work of the Seminar by the non-participating Mediterranean States (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) and the international organizations (UNESCO, ECE, UNEP, WHO, ITU) invited will follow the rules and practices adopted at Valletta. This means, *inter alia*, that they will take part in the work of the three Study Groups and of the four sessions of the Committee on the second and third day as well as its opening and closing sessions.

11. Contributions, on the subjects for consideration in one more of the working languages of the CSCE, may be sent through the proper channels—preferably not later than three months before the opening of the Seminar—to the Executive Secretary, who will circulate them to the other participating States, and to the non-participating Mediterranean States and to the international organizations which have notified their intention of taking part.

12. The Italian Government will designate the Executive Secretary of the Seminar. The designation should be agreed to by the participating States. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

13. Other rules of procedure, working methods and the mode of distribution for the expenses of the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Seminar.

14. The arrangements outlined above will not constitute a precedent for any other CSCE forum.

ANNEX II

Chairman's Statement: Born Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts

The Chairman notes the absence of objection to the declaration made by the representative of Switzerland on 15 July 1983 extending an invitation by the Swiss Government to hold a meeting of experts on human contacts. Consequently, the Chairman notes that there is agreement to convene such a meeting to discuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations, with

due account for the introductory part of the Chapter of the Final Act entitled *Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields* and for the introductory part of section one (Human Contacts) of that Chapter, which reads *inter alia* as follows:

The participating States,

Considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

Affirming, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of détente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field;

The meeting will be convened in Bern, on 15 April 1986. Its duration will not exceed six weeks. The meeting will be preceded by preparatory consultations, which will be held in Bern commencing on 2 April 1986. The results of the meeting will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.

The Swiss Government will designate the Executive Secretary of the meeting. This designation should be agreed to by the participating States. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

Other rules of procedure, working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses of the CSCE will be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Bern meeting.

The Chairman notes further that this statement will be an annex to the concluding document of the Madrid Meeting and will be published with it.

¹Press release 341 of Sept. 12, 1983.

²In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe (text in original).

³The organization of the Venice Seminar is set forth in the Chairman's statement of 9 September 1983 (see Annex I) (text in original).

⁴In this context it is understood that import of printed matter may be subject to local regulations which will be applied with due regard to the journalists' need for adequate working material (text in original). ■

Address by Secretary of State George P. Shultz Before the CSCE
Followup Meeting, Madrid, September 9, 1983

Spain, our gracious and creative host, has made a successful—and inspiring—transition to democracy. That success reminds us by its example that the light of freedom can never be extinguished and that the aspiration to human dignity is basic to all peoples. This is what the Helsinki process is all about. That is why the United States supports continuation of the process, strengthened as it is by what has been accomplished here at Madrid.

But we also meet at a time when basic human rights remain widely denied and in the immediate aftermath of a brutal tragedy, shocking to the conscience of mankind. The Korean airline massacre reminds us all of the extent to which the objectives of the CSCE process remain to be achieved. Our meeting here must, therefore, mark—as statement after statement of ministers have done—renewed determination in the pursuit of these fundamental objectives.

The Helsinki Process

The Helsinki process was launched with great hopes 10 years ago. It was born at what seemed to be an encouraging moment in East-West relations: the United States and the Soviet Union had just reached the first agreements on strategic arms limitation. Broad vistas

of economic cooperation appeared open. Progress seemed possible on human rights. There was an awareness that lasting peace required us to look at the totality of our relations. And so Helsinki was an attempt to deal comprehensively with the problems of security, economic relations, contacts between our peoples, their basic freedoms, and standards of international conduct.

The Helsinki Final Act is an eloquent statement of aspirations, to which the United States gladly subscribed because we subscribe to every one of its principles.

- It affirms the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and political rights; the rights of minorities.
- It calls for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people; greater scope for the press; cultural and educational exchange; family reunification; the right to travel and to marriage between nationals of different states; protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.
- And it reaffirms the basic principles of relations between states: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of frontiers other than through peaceful change.

The United States has always been realistic about the Helsinki process. We did not expect it to resolve all of the difficult security issues we face in an era of ideological conflict and military competition. We knew, from the beginning, that

Source: Department of State Bulletin, October 1983, pp. 50-52. Secretary Shultz represented the United States at the final session of the CSCE Followup Meeting at Madrid.

some would distort it to reinforce the division of the continent and the domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union, despite the Final Act's clear reaffirmation of freedom, political independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and noninterference.

Thus, when heads of state and government met in Helsinki in 1975 to conclude the first conference and sign the Final Act, the United States took the position that hope had to be tempered by realism and backed up by effort. President Ford expressed it well on that occasion: "History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep."

Since 1975

Reflecting on the experience of the last 8 years, we must be disappointed, but we cannot be surprised, that the years since then have seen many setbacks for our efforts to strengthen security, expand cooperation, build mutual confidence, and protect human rights. The record speaks for itself:

- There are governments in the East which have from the outset treated their commitments to human rights under the Final Act with open contempt. The Helsinki monitoring groups that citizens created to gauge their governments' performance have been systematically suppressed. Emigration, after an initial rise, has fallen dramatically. Dissidents have been subjected to ever more brutal treatment. And courageous men and women who dared to assert their human rights—or demonstrate for peace and arms control—are rotting in prison or condemned to mental hospitals.

- Similarly, within 2 years of signing the document pledging a commitment to the pursuit of peace, the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles with multiple warheads on each, aimed at the peoples of Europe and Asia, endangering the balance of power and creating an enormous security problem.

- Six years after signing a document pledging a commitment to sovereignty, independence, and self-determination, the Soviet Union coerced Poland into suppressing a free trade union movement whose only crime was to take workers' rights seriously in what claims to be a workers' state.

- And most recently, just days after accepting here a new document of still stronger commitments than those of the Final Act, the Soviet Union has ruthlessly taken the lives of 269 innocent people on a defenseless civilian airplane. And from this rostrum, its foreign minister shamelessly insisted that the Soviet Union would do so again, thus again demonstrating its callous disregard for human life.

The Basis for Security and Cooperation in Europe

These blatant acts of Soviet defiance against the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki accords have presented this Madrid meeting with its basic challenge. By accepting that challenge and insisting on injecting an element of accountability into the process, Madrid has saved the act from becoming an historic irrelevancy.

Let us look at the ideals of Helsinki as they relate to the realities of today. In the security field, we and our allies seek to enhance European security at the lowest possible level of arms. We are energetically involved in all ongoing

negotiations. We welcome the newly scheduled conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament. We know that the essence of security is mutual security. Unfortunately, as the fate of Korean Air Lines flight 007 once again reminds us, the Soviet Union defines its security in a way so absolute, self-centered, and cynical that it poses a danger to all other countries.

The SS-20s targeted on Western Europe and Asia dramatize the danger to us all. These missiles threaten international confidence and international stability. They are part of a steady and continuing Soviet aim for global military power far beyond any conceivable defensive needs. Their deployment began in 1977. On November 2, 1977, after about a dozen of these weapons had been deployed, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev declared: "We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium at present . . . between East and West in Central Europe, or between the U.S.S.R. and the United States."

Whether or not one agreed on the precise nature of the military balance at that point, a natural question arises as to why the Soviet Union has proceeded since 1977 to deploy more SS-20s at a feverish pace, for a present total of over 350 launchers and over 1,050 warheads. If there was balance then with a dozen or so weapons, it is difficult to deny that, today, there must be an imbalance that requires redress.

That balance will be redressed by the Atlantic alliance in the absence of an equal, verifiable agreement to limit them. The Soviet response to this, unfortunately, has been less genuine negotiation and more unilateral threats.

The democratic nations will resist such threats, which poison the atmosphere and are inconsistent with the genuine pursuit of security and cooperation. If no agreement is reached by the end of this year, NATO counterdeployments will begin. But we, for our part, are willing to keep on trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Union.

In addition to tipping the military balance, the Soviet Union and its allies embarked—in the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki Final Act—on a course of geopolitical aggression in Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. Cuban armies under Soviet direction intervened in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen; Vietnamese armies invaded Kampuchea, pioneering in the technology of chemical and toxin warfare against civilians; and the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.

The United States is fully aware that the Final Act stresses the "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole." We will work with those who seek peaceful solutions in regional conflicts, consistent with the desires and interests of the peoples concerned in Southeast and Southwest Asia, in southern Africa, and in Central America and the Caribbean.

We support that provision of the Final Act which treats economic relations as "an essential sector" of cooperation. But "their cooperation in this field," says the Final Act, "should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states." The steady growth in East-West economic exchanges that marked the early 1970s has slowed and leveled off.

The geopolitical developments I have just mentioned have contributed to this drop. But it is partly the result, as well, of the oil crisis and world economic recession and partly the result of the structural inefficiencies of the East's central economic planning.

It is ironic that a system claiming to exemplify the principles of the world's only truly "scientific" economic theory should have to resort to emulating Western methods, borrowing Western funds, and purchasing Western food and technology in order to sustain its performance. Nevertheless, we continue to hope that nonstrategic trade, proceeding on sound commercial terms, can make at least some long-range contribution to constructive East-West relations.

In reaching the vital question of human rights, the central point to make is that they are not just a separate "basket" of issues but an integral part of the whole subject of security and cooperation. As the Final Act declares, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is "an essential factor for the peace, justice, and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation."

Here we arrive at the heart of the matter. What is the real reason that progress in the Helsinki process is such an uphill struggle? What is it that security and cooperation in Europe fundamentally depend upon? What are the real, basic obstacles to security and cooperation in Europe?

It all comes down to the question: Why is Europe divided? We all know the answer. Europe was divided by force, and it remains divided by force—the force of a system that as a matter of both principle and practice is opposed to the free movement of people and ideas. This is a system that built a wall to keep ideas out and people in. This is a system that fears foreign radio broadcasts even more, perhaps, than it fears missiles.

Yet experience has shown that no wall is high enough, no jamming station strong enough, to keep out ideas or to keep down the hopes of men and women who yearn for freedom. The division of Europe is today, as it always was, unnatural and inhuman. Therefore, the attempt to keep Europe divided by raw power is inevitably a source of instability. There can be no lasting security or cooperation in Europe as long as one government is afraid of its own people and seeks reassurance in imposing a system of force on its people—and on its neighbors.

There will always be heroes who will not let us forget and who give their would-be masters no rest: Polish workers, Czech intellectuals, East German clergy and peace demonstrators, and Soviet dissidents of all faiths and from all walks of life who risk life and livelihood for the cause of liberty. The Soviet Union would earn great credit for itself in the spirit of Helsinki if it allowed these heroes who want to leave the Soviet Union to do so. The right to emigrate is a vital principle acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As this Jewish new year begins, let us hope that the coming year will see major progress toward freer emigration. Yet our concern is not only for those who wish to leave but those who remain. The condition of their lives, in the spirit of Helsinki and Madrid, is an important barometer of the true condition of security and cooperation in Europe.

In the most profound sense, the Helsinki process represents an historic effort to erode the cruel divisions between East and West in Europe. It is an effort that must continue because it embodies the most basic interests, deepest convictions, and highest hopes of all the peoples of Europe. Though this conference is coming to a close, our concern for human rights is enduring, and we will continue to advance this cause in every appropriate forum. We will continue to speak the truth. The struggle for human rights is unstoppable, and it remains a priority of American foreign policy.

Madrid and the Future

As the Madrid review meeting nears its end, I want to pay tribute here to the able leadership of the distinguished head of our delegation, Ambassador Max Kampelman. In speaking to this meeting, he spoke for a united country, for an American people united in support of peace and united in its commitment to human dignity. And he helped with others to forge the unity among the Western democracies without which even the modest progress we have made would have been impossible.

After almost 3 years of patient negotiation, we have a document that will expand and improve upon the 1975 Final Act. It adds important new commitments with respect to human rights, trade union freedoms, religious liberties, reunification of families, free flow of information, and measures against terrorism. It also provides, significantly, for followup in the human rights and security fields.

- A human rights meeting is scheduled in Ottawa in 1985, a meeting on human contacts in Bern in early 1986, and a full review conference in Vienna in late 1986. We hope that the Soviet Union will at long last pay heed to the concerns frequently expressed by many of us in Madrid and respond to those concerns.

- A conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament will convene in Stockholm in early 1984. The United States will negotiate seriously to reach agreement on militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable measures applicable to the whole of Europe. We also looked forward to the meeting of experts on the peaceful settlement of disputes scheduled for Athens in 1984.

The presence here of a distinguished congressional delegation signifies the dedication of my country to the Helsinki process and to the quest for security and cooperation in Europe.

We challenge the Soviet Union to undertake a serious dialogue on the full range of outstanding issues, with the goal of settling problems and reducing tensions. For our part, we will continue to negotiate patiently in good faith and will consider any proposals that meet our basic objective of enhancing true security and cooperation.

As sober realists, we are—and must be—prepared for continued and often arduous competition. Yet we also believe that this competition can—and must be—conducted in a way that leaves room for practical agreements that push back the specter of major conflict. In the nuclear age, this is our mutual responsibility. It is my government's solemn commitment.

As President Reagan declared last July 15:

We will not flag in our continued determination to work with all governments and peoples whose goal is the strengthening of peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, dialogue, when based on realistic expectations and conducted with patience, can produce results. These results are often gradual and hard won, but they are the necessary building blocks for a more secure and stable world.

Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz Before the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, January 17, 1984

First, my thanks to the people and Government of Sweden for their warm hospitality as hosts of this conference. It is particularly appropriate here in Stockholm to recall the heroic deeds of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who, in the last 2 years of World War II, saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from annihilation. I commend our Swedish hosts for their long tradition, exemplified by Raoul Wallenberg, of active and selfless dedication to the cause of peace and human rights.

Let me also acknowledge the contributions of the neutral and nonaligned participants in the Helsinki process. They have added a healthy balance and perspective to a decade of crucial deliberations on a wide range of vital European issues. Their participation in this forum offers them an historic opportunity to advance the cause of peace and stability in Europe today.

We are gathered here, in the words of the concluding document at Madrid, to negotiate and adopt "a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe." We are here to make progress toward a specific goal: to reduce the danger of surprise attack, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.

Benjamin Franklin once wrote: "One powerful prince keeping an army always on foot makes it necessary for his neighbors to do the same to prevent surprise." Today, the power of princes

has waned, but the threat from large armies and surprise attack has grown. And anxiety about surprise attack can have the perverse result of encouraging preemption or increasing the risks of war by miscalculation.

While we must heed the lesson of the 1930s, when weakness encouraged aggression, we must never repeat the tragedy of 1914, when statesmen let technology drive decisions and when nations stumbled blindly into a disastrous war. Therefore, the United States and its allies have long favored measures to increase openness and improve communication, to provide greater reassurance against surprise and greater insurance against miscalculation.

The confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Final Act were one positive step. Here at Stockholm, we hope to build on what has been achieved and discussed elsewhere. We should look for ways to make surprise attack more difficult; to make miscalculation less likely; to inhibit the use of military might for intimidation or coercion; to put greater predictability into peaceful military exercises in order to highlight any departures that could threaten the peace; and to enhance our ability to defuse incipient crises. Our aim, to use the current phrase, is to increase the transparency of military activity in Europe.

To achieve these goals, the United States and its allies will put forward in the coming weeks a series of specific proposals. We will propose that the participants in this conference agree:

Source: Department of State Bulletin, March 1984, pp. 34-36.

- To exchange information about the organization and location of our respective military forces;
- To provide annual previews of military exercises;
- To provide advance notice of significant military activities;
- To invite observers to such military activities;
- To enhance the capacity for rapid communications among our governments in times of crisis; and
- To provide for means to verify each other's compliance with the undertakings agreed at this conference.

We view these proposals as only a beginning. They will be designed to concentrate our deliberations, from the very outset, upon specific, concrete, realistic, and useful steps. The focus should be on practical accomplishment, as distinguished from empty promises of good intent. The United States is fully committed to the principles of nonaggression contained in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. But it would be a cruel hoax on the peoples of Europe for this conference to pretend that new reaffirmation of existing—and all too often violated—pledges represents progress in European confidence-building.

We will welcome and examine in a positive spirit any proposals by any member state; we will judge them by the criteria agreed upon at Madrid—that they be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe.

We have assigned one of America's most experienced ambassadors to represent us at this conference. James Goodby has participated for over a decade in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process and in America's search for effective arms control. His efforts here will have our government's full support.

The Helsinki Process

As we pursue these practical steps, we must bear in mind that building confidence and building security have a broader dimension. If we are truly to give the peoples of Europe an added measure of assurance about their future, the nations gathered here must apply themselves not only to the immediate tasks of this conference but also to the more fundamental issues that are at the heart of the problem of European security.

As we agreed at Madrid last September, this conference is "a substantial and integral part" of the Helsinki process. The Helsinki process is an historic attempt to deal comprehensively with the interrelated problems of mutual security, economic relations, contacts between our peoples, the basic human freedoms of our peoples, and standards of international conduct. The 1975 Final Act was an eloquent statement of aspirations, to which the United States gladly subscribed because its principles were rooted in our own philosophy and tradition.

But no such document is self-executing; no such standards of conduct are self-enforcing. It is the achievement of Helsinki to have embedded these principles and standards permanently into the discourse and consciousness of European affairs. It was an accomplishment of Madrid to reinforce the element of accountability in the process. The challenge before us today is to strengthen the forces working for these ideals and to continue to hold nations accountable for their failure to live up to them.

Europe is the cradle of the modern world. It gave birth not only to the industrial revolution but to much of modern culture, modern political thought, as well as the forms of modern diplomacy. Integral to Europe's heritage are the ideals of freedom, democracy, and national independence that have inspired the people of the United States and other peoples around the globe. Europe—all of Europe—deserves true peace and true security. Since 1945, Western Europe has seen a great reconciliation of old enmities and a great resurgence of freedom, prosperity, unity, and security. It is a crowning achievement of the European tradition in which the United States has been proud to play a part. But throughout the same period, an artificial barrier has cruelly divided this continent—and, indeed, heartlessly divided one of its great nations.

This barrier was not placed there by the West. It is not maintained by the West. It is not the West that prevents its citizens free movement or cuts them off from competing ideas.

Let me be very clear: the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed division of Europe. This division is the essence of Europe's security and human rights problem, and we all know it.

Human rights remain central to any discussion of European security. As the Helsinki Final Act declares, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is "an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation." The attempt to impose division on Europe is inevitably a source of instability and tension.

Since the days of Woodrow Wilson, my country has understood that true peace and security in Europe depend on a foundation of basic freedoms—not least of which is the right of peoples to determine their own future. The

Helsinki process is an historic, peaceful effort to ease, and in time to end, the division of Europe. Confidence-building in the larger sense means pursuing the work of Helsinki—through practical steps to break down barriers, expand human contact and intellectual interchange, increase openness, and stretch the boundaries of the human spirit.

East-West Relations and Arms Control

Yesterday President Reagan reaffirmed my country's commitment to three broad aims:

- To reduce, and eventually to eliminate, the threat and use of force in solving international disputes;
- To reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world; and
- To establish a better working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

The United States will pursue these broad aims diligently at this conference and in every forum and every channel. We believe in dialogue and in solving problems. We believe in realistic and meaningful engagement with others to advance the cause of peace.

History has seen many attempts to negotiate limits on numbers or characteristics or uses of major armaments. Before World War I, Great Britain and Germany negotiated on ways of limiting naval construction, particularly of battle ships, and on ways of enhancing mutual confidence about each other's construction plans.

Between World War I and World War II, there were extensive negotiations to limit the building of capital ships, including a significant naval disarmament agreement negotiated under American auspices in 1922. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 attempted to ban war as an instrument of policy.

These efforts, of course, failed to prevent war. The lesson of history is that efforts to prevent war or control weaponry do not operate in a vacuum. They are a dimension of international politics and cannot be divorced from their political context.

Therefore, while we pursue this effort with great energy—in Stockholm and all other forums—we must bear in mind that progress depends on many factors beyond the substance of the proposals or the ingenuity of the negotiators. For arms control and confidence-building to succeed, we must also work to shape the conditions that make success possible. This enterprise cannot prosper in conditions where some nations seek global or regional military superiority or resort to threats or intimidation as instruments of their foreign policy. Let me say for my country that the United States seeks no such superiority.

We in the West must, therefore, maintain the balance of power; we must maintain the cohesion of our alliances; and on this secure foundation we must seek to engage others in concrete efforts to resolve political problems peacefully. On this basis, we firmly believe pragmatic progress in East-West relations is possible. The example of Berlin under the Quadripartite Agreement is an instructive example of lasting progress achieved through unity, resolve, and genuine negotiation.

For more than a decade, the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in a series of negotiations on arms control and arms reduction. Over the past 3 years, we have actively pursued negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons; on the reduction or elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe; on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe; on banning chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament; on confidence-building measures to strengthen nuclear stability; and on enhanced safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

These negotiations have been valuable channels of communications between East and West; they raised mankind's hopes that the serious differences of political philosophy and ideology between us did not have to lead to war.

Some of these negotiations have now been interrupted by the Soviet Union.

This tells us a great deal about which side is eager for progress.

Nevertheless, the door remains open. We are ready for negotiations whenever the Soviet Union is prepared. In this regard, I am pleased to announce that, in coming months at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, the U.S. negotiators will be presenting a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons on a global basis. We will work in a similar spirit for early progress in other arms control forums, once resumed.

Arms control initiatives are part of a broader American effort to build a more stable, consistent, and constructive East-West relationship—a relationship not marked by the abrupt shifts, exaggerated expectations, and dashed hopes of the last decade.

While pursuing arms control, we have also sought to engage the Soviet Union in a candid dialogue on those regional crises and conflicts that threaten peace and poison our relationship. At the same time, we have proposed a range of bilateral measures to enhance both crisis communication and normal communication between us, to build confidence and reduce any chance of misunderstanding or miscalculation.

In Brussels last month, I joined my North Atlantic colleagues in extending to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries "the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation, and reciprocity." "For the benefit of mankind," the alliance Foreign Ministers declared in Brussels, "we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage."

Let us, therefore, embark here and now upon this renewed, open, and comprehensive East-West political dialogue. Let us so conduct ourselves in our deliberations that historians of the future will mark this gathering as a turning point in East-West relations. Let the opening of this conference, which itself marks an important expansion in the scope of East-West negotiations, also mark a new step in the broader relationship. We are prepared to move forward.

News Conference by Secretary of State George P. Shultz,
Stockholm, January 17, 1984

[Extracts]

Yesterday when I arrived, I declared that the United States approaches this conference in a constructive spirit. By now I have been here for about a day, and I have talked to many of the other visitors attending the conference, including some from the Eastern European countries. I find that the atmosphere is universally one of seriousness of purpose and intent and a general desire to see this conference result in several constructive measures. So from these little indications here and there, it seems to me that this conference has gotten off to a good start, and certainly from the standpoint of the United States, we welcome that.

Q. In your speech you said the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of what you call the artificial barrier between the West and what you call the "heartless division of Germany." Does this mean or does this square, really, with the 1975 Helsinki agreement, in which the United States and all 34 other nations recognized current boundaries as inviolable?

A. Current boundaries are country boundaries and these represent sovereign state boundaries. We recognize them, and I don't think that's in any way at odds with the statement that I made. It is true that there is a division, and that division takes shape in many ways, including restrictions on flows of people and ideas and information, goods. That was what I referred to, and it represents something that I think will serve Europe to the extent that that is lessened.

Q. Are you deploring the division of the people of Germany, or are you going beyond that and advocating the reunification of Germany?

A. I am deploring the divisions that separate people and families and separate nations from each other in ways that we regard as artificial.

Q. What is your comment on the rather tough speeches today held by the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia and East Germany?

A. I am afraid that I have been so occupied in bilaterals that I haven't heard those speeches, so I can't comment on them.

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Q. In your speech today, you specifically branded the Soviet Union as responsible for the breakdown in international peace talks. Do you see such a start as conducive to a good negotiating climate?

A. I couldn't hear the last part of your question, but my statement in my speech was just a description of what happened. That is, in the INF talks, the Soviet Union has left them and in the MBFR and START talks, they have, at least at this point, declined to set a date for their resumption. I am just describing what happened, that's all.

Q. Do you feel that such a description would tend to lessen the Russian willingness to negotiate?

A. You have to describe the reality as it is. I don't see anything wrong with that.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, March 1984, pp. 36-39.

Q. Back to the problem of the division of Europe. Do you recognize the legitimacy of the socialist countries beyond these lines in Europe?

A. We recognize that there are national boundaries, and nations have sovereignty, and they have a right to run their internal affairs and to run them as they see fit, and we think all nations should respect that right. What I was speaking about is the kind of artificial line across Europe, once described as an "Iron Curtain," and have deplored that.

Q. What is your assessment of the current state of relations between Western Europe and the United States?

A. I think very constructive all around. In terms of our NATO alliance, it's going very well. In terms of the trade between the United States and Western Europe, it runs on the order of about \$90 billion a year in two-way trade. That's a huge amount of trade. I meet regularly with the people from the Common Market and we, of course, have lots of disputes. But when you have that much trade, you are bound to have disputes. I think the problem for us, of course, is to manage the disputes in a way that doesn't jeopardize this gigantic flow of trade that is very much to our mutual advantage.

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Statement by President Ronald Reagan Following the Opening Session of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Washington, January 20, 1984

Secretary of State Shultz has just returned from Stockholm, Sweden, where he represented the United States at the opening of the European Security Conference, known as the CDE. Together with the Foreign Ministers of 34 other countries, he discussed East-West relations and, in particular, peace and security in Europe.

The primary purposes of the Stockholm Conference is to reduce the risk of surprise attack or war by accident or misunderstanding. The historical justification is clear. Twice in this century, Europe has been the scene of terrible conflict.

We must never allow this to happen again. Therefore, to strengthen the prospects for peace and security in Europe, the United States and our NATO allies will propose a package of practical and concrete measures at the CDE. We will suggest that all states of Europe, East and West alike, agree:

- to exchange information about their military forces and provide annual previews of military exercises;

- to give advance notification of significant military activities and invite observers to those activities;

- to enhance the capacity for rapid communications among our governments; and

- to provide for verification of compliance with the commitments made at the conference.

At the same time, we recognize that these steps alone cannot safeguard the peace in Europe and the United States cannot succeed alone. We can only do so in concert with our friends and allies. A hallmark of our foreign policy has been to build consensus among our partners in Europe and Asia—a consensus covering the full range of political, economic, and military issues.

The Atlantic Alliance is demonstrating once again in Stockholm that it remains the keystone of peace and security in Europe. Because we and our allies stand together, we are better able to meet our common challenges we face.

None of these challenges is more important than the need to establish a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Last Monday, I proposed that we and the Soviet Union make a major effort to secure progress in three vital areas.

- first, to find ways to reduce, and eventually do away with, the threat and use of force in international affairs;

- second, to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world;

- third, to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

The meetings this past week in Stockholm helped us toward these ends. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko had a full and serious exchange of views on key global questions. Of course, they did not resolve our differences. But the important thing is that despite those differences, we are determined to continue our efforts to make Europe and the world a safer and more secure place in which all of us may live in peace and dignity.

Note: Secretary of State George P. Shultz met with the President in the Oval Office on Friday morning, January 20, to discuss the Conference and the meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 57-58.

Announcement by the Department of State on NATO Proposals to the CDE Meeting, Washington, January 24, 1984

The NATO allies have tabled a package of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm. The six measures, which make up this package, are described below. The early introduction of the package demonstrates the seriousness of purpose with which the West has approached the CDE.

In keeping with the CDE mandate, the six Western proposals to be negotiated are militarily significant—designed to make real progress in improving security in Europe; they will be politically binding—a commitment acknowledged by all participants; they are verifiable—perhaps the most important factor of all in building confidence; and finally, the measures will be applicable to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. This is a significant advance over the measures negotiated in Helsinki in 1975 which were only applicable to the western 250 kilometers of the Soviet Union.

If they are adopted, the Western proposals will contribute to more openness, more predictability, and less uncertainty about the military situation in Europe.

They are concrete, practical, and realistic measures—not unverifiable declarations of good intent or repetitions of commitments already undertaken in other agreements. They are mutually reinforcing—that is, each measure is made stronger by the others. Specifically, the Western measures would enhance trust and security by:

- **Providing information about military forces**—each participating state would give all the others information on the structure of its major military units, thus providing a common framework for the other measures and mutual understanding of the significance of particular military activities;

- **Previewing military activities annually**—each participating state would give all the others general information on important military activities it has planned in Europe during the coming year. The annual preview would help clarify whether an exercise in time of tension had been planned long in advance or perhaps was meant as a warning to other states;

- **Advanced notice of important military activities**—each participating state would give all the others 45 days advance notice of important military activities scheduled to take place in Europe. This more detailed information would help clarify whether military activities were routine or possibly threatening. Other parts of the CSBM package are designed to increase chances of verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information provided;

- **Observation of military activities**—each CDE participant would invite the others to send observers to all important military activities. Ideally, these observers could confirm the routine and nonthreatening nature of the activity or provide warning if that was not the case. They could also help defuse tensions at critical moments as well as inhibit activities which might otherwise be intimidating to other states;

Source: Department of State Bulletin, March 1984, pp. 43-44.

- **Compliance and verification**—both parts of this measure would reinforce and verify compliance with the preceding proposals: first, a commitment not to interfere with a state's national technical means of verification; second, a requirement for monitoring compliance. Through the use of small monitoring teams, confidence in both the non-threatening nature of a military activity and compliance with all notification measures could be enhanced. These monitoring teams would be smaller than groups of national observers and could look more closely at questionable activities than could observers. This proposal can provide both a stabilizing and tension-defusing influence by verifying that a given activity is nonhostile; and

- **Development of a means of communication**—calls for arrangements to be made to improve communications among the participating states.

These CSBMs will not transform East-West relations overnight, but they provide a sound basis for steps which will increase confidence and build security in Europe. The United States and its allies are also prepared to consider other measures designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack and to enhance mutual confidence, consistent with the criteria agreed by the CDE participants.

DOCUMENT 60

Opening Statement by Louis B. Sohn Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Athens, March 12, 1984

I rise today in my capacity as representative of the Government of the United States to this meeting of CSCE experts gathered, in the words of the Madrid Concluding Document, to pursue "on the basis of the Final Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods."

The United States will pursue this aim diligently and seriously. As Secretary of State George Shultz said in Stockholm on January 17, "We believe in dialogue and in solving problems. We believe in realistic and meaningful engagement with others to advance the cause of peace."

It is fitting that we are meeting in Greece, the cradle of democracy, where some of the first battles for human rights were fought. I remember in my student days in Poland, we were

Source: Department of State files. Mr. Sohn, Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Georgia, was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Athens.

stirred by a performance of Antigone by Sophocles, in which Antigone was accused by King Creon of violating his edict that her rebellious brother shall not be buried. Her reply was that the royal pronouncements could not override "the unwritten and unfailing laws of heaven" that "live, not for today and yesterday but for all time." Creon replied that he must stand up for the rule of law, as "disobedience is the worst of evils that ruins cities." There was the beginning of the battle of the ages between unreasonable dictates of state and unalienable rights of individuals.

It was also in Greece that peaceful methods for settling international disputes first took hold. Several treaties of peace in the 5th Century B.C. contained arbitration clauses of the kind discussed at our previous meeting at Montreux. The treaty of 445, for instance, provided that disputes between the parties should be settled by legal means on the basis of justice and equality. When difficulties arose between Athens and Sparta, Athens invoked the treaty and asked for conciliation. The king of Sparta recommended the acceptance of the offer and the presentation of counterclaims, but the general assembly of the Peloponesian League rejected his recommendation. Sparta eventually lost this phase of the war. When a similar issue arose in 421 B.C., it was Sparta that proposed arbitration and Athens that rejected it. The

Peloponnesian War continued and ended in complete Athenian defeat in 404. Some ancient Greek historians have claimed that the fact that those who refused to arbitrate lost the war in both instances proves that the gods punish those who reject arbitration in favor of war. Perhaps there is also a lesson here for us.

In this century another son of Greece has made an important contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes. I have in mind Ambassador Nicolas Politis, one of the most influential diplomats of the 1920's.

During the drafting of the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Politis headed the committee on compulsory arbitration. Later, in 1928, he was the leading spirit in the preparation of nine model treaties, six of which dealt with conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, and three with international security. Some of these were combined into a General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Politis stressed the elasticity of the provisions, allowing States to accede separately to its various parts, and the importance of facilitating the development of compulsory arbitration, which was an essential element in the cause of security and disarmament. The document was approved by the Assembly and was ratified by 23 States, including France, the United Kingdom and Greece.

In devising a complex system of dispute settlement, Politis demonstrated drafting skill and conciliating genius. I hope that we may become his worthy successors.

Let me also to pay homage to Professor Bindschedler, whose untiring efforts led first to the presentation of a comprehensive draft in 1973, and a few years later to the Montreux Conference where the groundwork was laid for our present endeavors. Over the last ten years he has written widely on dispute settlement, and I am sure that his ideas will assist us in our deliberations.

I have recalled only a few episodes from mankind's long struggle to find adequate means for dealing with international disputes. Yet, one lesson is obvious. The methods of settling disputes cannot be discussed in a vacuum. They are linked intrinsically with the basic realities of the present European situation.

Peaceful Settlement and International Stability

First, there is a direct link between international stability and the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. The Charter of the United Nations points out that disputes between states must be settled in such a manner that

international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. The CSCE Final Act also deals very clearly with this issue. As Ambassador Kampelman stated at the Madrid Follow-up Meeting in 1980, "the Helsinki process constitutes but a part of a larger movement of politics and history." We have learned by bitter experience that unsolved disputes lead to threats to the peace and even breaches of the peace. The Charter's objective of effective collective measures for the removal of threats to the peace has been left unfulfilled in too many instances.

Our basic document, the Final Act of Helsinki, has two fundamental and inter-related objectives -- European security and European cooperation. These two objectives are closely related. Cooperation can diminish international tensions, making the maintenance of international security that much easier. In turn, cooperation requires developing adequate means for solving problems; otherwise disputes arise that make cooperation difficult.

We cannot ignore the reality that the spirit of Principle V of the Final Act, and related provisions which commit the participating states to solve problems peacefully, too often have been ignored. Since the Second World War, events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and Poland have taken a severe toll in human life and freedom. More broadly, one of

the states participating in the CSCE process has attempted to justify its actions which denigrate international peace and security under a so-called doctrine aimed at preserving "socialist advances."

If we really want to maintain international peace and security, we must concentrate on preventive measures, on the settlement of disputes between nations before they escalate into a breach of the peace. This can be achieved by using more effectively the means for settling disputes that the practice of States has developed by trial and error and that the Charter enumerates in Article 33.

Human Rights and International Peace

Second, progress on peaceful settlements is also linked with fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Helsinki Final Act declares that respect for human rights and freedoms is "an essential factor for the peace, justice, and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation."

When a nation denies the fundamental human rights and freedoms of its citizens, it does so in violation of the

accepted norms, including the Helsinki documents. Inevitably, this leads to tensions among nations -- all of which have a stake in compliance with standards of civilized behavior. Progress in the field of peaceful settlement of disputes will not be meaningful unless we also reduce the wellsprings of those disputes.

If we are true to the spirit of Helsinki, we must not forget those who have risked their lives in order to assert those human rights that the Helsinki Act guaranteed to them. They are not hooligans disturbing peace; they are heroes in the fight for freedom and peace. As Secretary Shultz stated in Stockholm, "there can be no lasting security or cooperation in Europe as long as one government is afraid of its own people and seeks reassurance in imposing a system of force on its people--and on its neighbors." If we are able to develop methods to protect individuals against the tyranny of the governments, international security will be among the principal beneficiaries.

International Law and Dispute Settlement

Third, there is a link between peaceful settlements and the growth of international law. Many of our difficulties in the last forty years result from the fact that the development of

international law has lagged behind the ingenuity of some and the callousness of others.

It took us a long time to agree on principles of friendly relations interpreting crucial provisions of the United Nations Charter. The essence of these principles has been incorporated in our own basic document, the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between the States Participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These are good principles, but rules alone are not sufficient. There are disagreements among us about their meaning and their application to specific situations that have arisen in recent years. The rules can and should be strengthened by complementary mechanisms for resolving disputes concerning their interpretation and application.

When nations disagree on the interpretation or application of a legal rule, the equality of States entitles each state to advance its own interpretation. In order to resolve conflicting interpretations, many important international instruments contain provisions for the settlement of disputes arising with respect to their interpretation and application. If the parties to a treaty agree to refer their dispute to an impartial authority for decision, the deadlock may be terminated.

It is sometimes contended that international tribunals are

not, or even cannot, be impartial. This misconception may result from the small number of cases handled by international tribunals. As long as the international system for settling disputes operates only sporadically, States that have lost a case will complain about the lack of impartiality. But when the numbers of disputes settled by international authorities increases, there is a likelihood that each State will win a sufficient number of cases to restore its faith in the impartiality of the system.

I recall in the early days of the United Nations there were two cases relating to admission of States to membership in the United Nations. When the International Court of Justice rendered its first advisory opinion on the subject, certain jurists complained that the Court was not impartial. But then after the second opinion, those same jurists were silent. Soon thereafter we had the human rights cases relating to Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The first opinion was again severely criticized. But when the second opinion came, it again quieted down the critics.

Returning to the relationship between international law and dispute settlement, the clearer the law, the more willing are States to submit disputes arising thereunder to compulsory settlement; and the more controversial a rule is, the less likely is acceptance of third-party decision. In general,

there are many controversies today about the validity of various rules of customary international law, and many States find it difficult to accept third-party decisions with respect to them. On the other hand, recent years have seen tremendous growth in conventional international law.

In the last forty years, more international agreements have been concluded than in the previous 2,000 years, and the rate of growth is accelerating dramatically. One fruitful area for concentration here would be on finding a method for settling disputes arising under these agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

If those treaties that establish the law agreed upon by the States parties to them do not provide a method for settling disputes, or if the methods provided in them have not been accepted by all the parties to a dispute, we might wish to devise here a method for settling disputes relating to their interpretation or application. By doing this, we would ensure that progress in the development of international law would be matched by progress in settlement of disputes arising under these new rules.

The United States will support positions at this meeting which contain graduated mechanisms for dispute settlement -- good offices, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration -- which will complement and strengthen existing procedures.






In our view, at least the non-binding mechanisms should be compulsory at the initiation of either party.

We recognize that, because of their binding nature, arbitral procedures have been less broadly acceptable to States. In view of this reality, we are prepared to examine formulations which could allow for the progressive acceptance of arbitration by nations. We would also note the need for safeguards to ensure that the third party participants in disputes be chosen in an appropriate manner, and with due regard to the disputants in the particular case.

We can be encouraged by some recent signs of progress in agreed procedures for dispute resolution. Those who fear that some traditional means for settling disputes, such as negotiations and consultations, may result in imposition of the will of a more powerful State on a smaller one should welcome the idea of having the option of removing a dispute to a more open setting, where a third party may be able to ensure that the interests of the States, and justice, are not endangered.

Last December the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance declared, "For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage." Mr. Chairman, we are present in Athens in that spirit -- to participate in serious dialogue on ways to enhance existing methods of settling disputes

peacefully. We will negotiate in good faith, and will consider any proposals which hold out the prospect for achieving progress. Patient dialogue based on realistic expectations remains the necessary mechanism for achieving the Helsinki goals of true security and cooperation.



Final Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Athens, April 30, 1984

REPORT

OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, FORESEEN BY THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING, IN ORDER TO PURSUE, ON THE BASIS OF THE FINAL ACT, THE EXAMINATION OF A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AIMED AT COMPLEMENTING EXISTING METHODS.

In accordance with the mandate of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in conformity with the recommendation contained in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting 1980, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place in Athens from 21 March to 30 April 1984 in order to pursue, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. The participants took into account the common approach set forth in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts.

Source: CSCE Meeting of Experts, Athens, March 21-April 30, 1984, Conference Document.

At the opening session the participants were addressed by Mr. Yiannis Capsis, Deputy Foreign Minister, on behalf of the Government of Greece.

The participants adopted an agenda and proceeded to a general exchange of views after which a number of proposals were submitted and discussed. A thorough discussion was held. Some progress was made in the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. Particular emphasis was put on ways and means of including a third party element in such a method. Divergent views were expressed and no consensus was reached on a method. It was recognized that further discussions should be pursued in an appropriate framework within the CSCE process.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Greece for the excellent organization of the Meeting and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Athens.

Athens, 30 April 1984

Opening Statement by Ambassador Raymond Ewing Before the CSCE Seminar on Mediterranean Cooperation, Venice, October 18, 1984

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am pleased to be able to lead the United States Delegation to this seminar on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean. We come to Venice looking forward to hearing the views of others and are prepared to engage in an open and full exchange.

It is fitting that Italy, a bedrock of Western civilization, should host this most important meeting. It is one more contribution that the people of this great nation have made to the CSCE process and the development of European understanding generally. We indeed are beneficiaries of Italian and Venetian hospitality and warmth and on behalf of my delegation I want to pay full tribute to the Executive Secretary, his able staff and the others responsible for the excellent arrangements which have been made for this seminar. No more appropriate city than Venice could have been chosen for this seminar. The people of this lovely city, with resourcefulness and daring, built a structure of commerce and civilization which tied together the Mediterranean and the rest of Europe in a mutually productive relationship. Venice derived its success from the Mediterranean, and gave much in return to the entire region. The magnificent art and architecture preserved in this city are a testament to the human spirit and a reflection of the role played by the Mediterranean and its peoples in the development of the civilization we share.

We are gathered here under a mandate from the Madrid Review Conference "to review the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in all the sectors outlined in the report of the Valletta meeting and stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors." We firmly believe that the CSCE process can make a positive contribution to economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean. We are pleased to be able to take an active role at this meeting in Venice.

Speaking in 1983, President Reagan said:

Source: Department of State files. Ambassador Ewing was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Venice.

"In concluding the Madrid meeting, we reaffirm our commitment to the Helsinki process. We will not flag in our continued determination to work with all governments and peoples whose goal is the strengthening of peace and freedom. As Madrid has shown, dialogue, when based on realistic expectations and conducted with patience, can produce results. These results are often gradual and hard-won, but they are the necessary building blocks for a more secure and stable world. The challenge remains, we must ensure that good words are transformed into good deeds and that the ideals which they embody are given concrete expression. Giving substance to the promises of Madrid and Helsinki will remain one of our prime objectives."

President Reagan's comments apply to this meeting as well as to all others mandated by Madrid. We are firmly committed to the continuation of the Helsinki process. We take the obligations which we and the other 34 CSCE states have made very seriously. We renew our pledge to work to live up to them, and we expect that all others will do the same. We believe that the economic, scientific and cultural objectives set forth in the report of the 1979 Valletta meeting of experts on cooperation in the Mediterranean offer the basis for important advances in regional cooperation. As we review the initiatives already undertaken or envisaged, we believe we will see that much has been done in the last five years to give meaning to the report of the Valletta meeting. During this period, the United States has continued to expand our efforts to strengthen and make more useful bilateral and multilateral cooperation in economic, scientific and cultural fields between the Government and people of the United States and the government and peoples of the Mediterranean region. We hope that the discussions in this seminar will offer all of us ideas which can lead to even more fruitful cooperation in the future.

The United States recognizes that economic, scientific and cultural ties among countries bring benefits to the peoples involved. The United States has, for many decades, therefore, taken a leading role in efforts to remove barriers to the freer movement of goods, people, knowledge and ideas across national frontiers. This is in the true spirit of the CSCE process, with its important commitments to expanded human rights, human contacts, economic interchange and enhanced security for all participants. Human rights is an integral element of the CSCE process, and the mistreatment of individuals such as Dr. Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov is of serious concern to us and an impediment to efforts to improve scientific cooperation.

Science and technology have been central to the economic and social development of the United States. They offer similar hope to all nations committed to the pursuit of sustained economic development and an open international economic system. The United States has increasingly made cooperative scientific and technological arrangements an essential part of our developmental assistance efforts and of our strengthened bilateral relations generally. Bilateral cooperation with Mediterranean states in these sectors has been an important focus of our overall efforts.

Mr. Chairman, the United States welcomes the representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean states to this seminar. We look forward to hearing the contributions of these delegations and the representatives of the international organizations in the three study groups and at the sessions of the coordinating committee in which they will take part. We believe they can make a significant contribution to regional cooperation which will benefit all who are interested in closer cooperation in the Mediterranean.

We are fortunate indeed, given the short duration of this seminar and the heavy burden we bear, that our colleagues in Madrid have given us very clear and precise guidelines on the conduct of this meeting. I refer to the chairman's statement of September 6, 1983 on organization of the Venice seminar as well as the section of the Madrid concluding document covering this meeting. My delegation believes that the mandate provided by Madrid should be closely followed in all its aspects. It is therefore with great regret that I have listened to statements by some delegations which we believe bear no relation to the subject of this seminar, that is to encourage economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean. While my delegation will not be drawn into any debate here about issues which are outside the mandate of the seminar, we firmly reject the contention that the United States is in some way responsible for any aggravation of international tension.

We salute the important ongoing work being done to enhance cooperation by the international organizations who are represented here. With their expertise and quiet dedication, these organizations, and others such as the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, make an invaluable contribution to the work we are here to review. We believe this seminar can help stimulate further work by these organizations in fostering economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.

As the world grows increasingly interdependent, it becomes clearer that cooperation must grow, in the private sector as

well as in the public sector. We are committed as well to working to enhance this cooperation and to ensure that it bears fruit.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to turn to the words of Secretary of State George Shultz: "The Helsinki process is an historic attempt to deal comprehensively with the interrelated problems of mutual security, economic relations, contacts between our peoples, the basic human freedoms of our peoples, and standards of international conduct. The 1975 Final Act was an eloquent statement of aspirations, to which the United States gladly subscribed because its principles were rooted in our own philosophy and tradition."

Our responsibility here in Venice is to live up to the promise of Helsinki and to fulfill the mandate of Madrid. With hard work and good will we can accomplish that task.

Report of the Seminar on Mediterranean Cooperation, Venice,
October 26, 1984

REPORT
OF THE CSCE VENICE SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC
AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESULTS OF THE
VALLETTA MEETING OF EXPERTS

In accordance with the mandate of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of Representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), a Seminar was held at Venice, at the invitation of the Government of Italy, from 16 to 26 October 1984, to review the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in all the sectors outlined in the report of the Valletta Meeting and to stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors.

Representatives of the participating States of the CSCE took part in the Seminar. Representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States and of UNESCO, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) were invited to participate in the Seminar in accordance with the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting.

Egypt and Israel accepted the invitation and participated in the work of the Seminar in the manner provided for in the above invitation. UNESCO, ECE, UNEP, WHO and ITU took part in the Seminar in the same manner.

The work of the Seminar was organized in accordance with the Chairman's statement at Annex I of the Madrid Concluding Document.

Written contributions to the Seminar, as provided for in the Chairman's statement, were submitted in advance.

The participants in the Seminar were addressed on 16 October 1984 by H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, on behalf of the host country.

Source: CSCE Seminar on Mediterranean Cooperation, Venice,
Conference Document.

The participants in the Seminar had a general exchange of views in the Co-ordinating Committee on questions relating to their economic, scientific and cultural co-operation within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act.

Recalling their existing economic, scientific and cultural co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Valletta Meeting of Experts, the representatives of the CSCE participating States reaffirmed their wish to develop further co-operation in these fields.

The representatives of the CSCE participating States stressed the importance attached by their Governments to the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Final Act by implementing all of its provisions, as well as their readiness to pursue their efforts accordingly.

The three Study Groups met to consider respectively the economic, scientific and cultural aspects of co-operation in the Mediterranean. The Groups reviewed the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in these sectors aimed at implementing the conclusions and recommendations of the report of the Valletta Meeting of Experts.

The participants discussed certain current problems in the field of international economic co-operation. They acknowledged that such co-operation should take into account the interests of those countries which are developing from an economic point of view. In particular, co-operation should stimulate the production and marketing of goods and services of such countries. The participants reaffirmed the will of their Governments to intensify such co-operation.

The Seminar noted that as well as bilateral and multilateral co-operation, a constructive and positive role is played by the competent international organizations, notably UNESCO, ECE, UNEP, WHO and ITU, in carrying out useful and concrete work in the development of co-operation in the areas covered by the Valletta report.

The representatives of the participating States of the CSCE, having examined the ideas and proposals put forward in the course of the Seminar, decided to recommend to their Governments the following specific fields where broader developments could be envisaged, within their possibilities and interests, whether through their participation in international organizations or in bilateral and multilateral relations with the participating States and with the non-participating Mediterranean States:

The promotion of bilateral and multilateral co-operation among participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States in the field of environment protection of the Mediterranean region within the appropriate frameworks, in order to contribute, in particular, to the implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), keeping in mind the provisions of the Final Act and the activities already included in the recommendations of the Meeting of Experts held at Valletta and the possibility of new initiatives in other fields of common interest, such as study programmes on jellyfish.

The strengthening, through the MAP, of actions aimed at better harmonization of national legislation on the protection of Mediterranean waters from pollution, in implementation in particular of the Barcelona Convention and its related protocols signed by the parties to the Convention.

The improvement of methodologies within the appropriate framework for evaluating economic damage caused by pollution in the Mediterranean and for determining means to protect the Mediterranean environment.

Co-operation in concrete actions aimed at ensuring compliance with standards laid down in the MARPOL Convention 73/78, for the prevention of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea resulting from maritime traffic.

Support for increasing efforts towards the preservation of the Mediterranean environment undertaken also within and beyond the framework of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP).

Co-operation among international organizations on the Mediterranean environment notably by the ECE and UNEP.

The promotion of a better cohesion between sea and land transport infrastructures and their methods of use, taking due account of new transport techniques; with this in view, giving due consideration to initiatives taken in the framework of the ECE related to: co-ordination of infrastructures, in connection with the Trans-European Motorway project (TEM) and studies on other European transport projects; harbour infrastructure and organization questions; and transport facilitation and training in the field of transport.

The encouragement of the more effective use of trans-shipment facilities with the aim of reducing costs, improving the timely distribution of goods, facilitating storage and thereby enhancing economic benefits.

The encouragement of more extensive participation by the countries bordering the Mediterranean in research and experiments aimed at providing coastal assistance to maritime navigation; and in joint studies on intra-Mediterranean maritime traffic and on the requirements of advanced types of maritime carriers.

The development and co-ordination of existing exchanges of statistical data, identification of the economic and social areas of priority interest for the further exchange of such data with due account taken of national legislation, and the promotion of research projects concerning social factors affecting economic development.

The continuation of efforts to solve problems in the field of migrant labour, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document.

Participation in national programmes of theoretical and applied scientific research on topics of Mediterranean interest by teachers and students from as large a number of interested countries as possible.

Greater access to libraries and archives of scientific institutions for research workers engaged in research on problems of Mediterranean interest, taking into account national legislation regulating the conditions of such access.

The extension and improvement where appropriate of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the scientific field, both at the intergovernmental level and between relevant institutions.

An increase in efforts to combat thalassaemia and other diseases in the Mediterranean; encouraging research including appropriate statistical research, particularly under the auspices of the WHO with the objective of enhancing programmes for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of those diseases prevalent in the Mediterranean region.

Joint research on the effects on human health of olive oil and leguminous plants, with particular reference to ascertaining the function of olive oil in the reduction of cholesterol.

Encouragement for the activities of the Community of Mediterranean Universities within which specific co-operation projects which appear to deserve support have been identified.

The identification of significant areas for cultural co-operation such as the conservation, protection, safeguarding and enhancement of the cultural heritage in the fields of archaeology, architecture, arts and crafts; the investigation of underwater archaeological remains; the training of professional staff and cultural personnel; cinematography; audiovisual media, with particular reference to their use in teaching activities; the dissemination of historical knowledge and the promotion of dialogue between historians of different traditions.

Recognition of the value and usefulness of instruments of cultural co-operation such as: cultural agreements; links between universities and institutes of higher education for the exchange of information and for the conduct of joint research projects; national and international cultural institutions, whether governmental or other, operating in the area; more contacts and co-operation among persons engaged in the field of culture from different countries.

Encouragement for efforts to deepen cultural co-operation in the Mediterranean in particular through a broader use of radio, television and publications, and through the collection of material and the data required for these specialized activities, as well as the training of personnel.

The representatives of the participating States of the CSCE took note of the document of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe detailing activities of co-operation which are of interest to the countries in the Mediterranean. It was agreed that such opportunities should be kept in mind.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government and people of Italy for the excellent organization of the Seminar and the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Venice.

Venice, 26 October 1984

DOCUMENT 64

Opening Statement by Ambassador Richard Schifter Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Ottawa, May 10, 1985

This Meeting, as we all know so well, has been convened, under the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, for the purpose of letting the signatories to the Helsinki Accord examine "questions concerning respect, in their States, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all their aspects as embodied in the Final Act." The key words of this call for our Meeting, "human rights and fundamental freedoms," had been the subject of detailed discussion at the Helsinki Conference which produced the Final Act. They were defined in Principle VII. As there stated, human rights and fundamental freedoms encompass:

- (a) freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;
- (b) civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- (c) the right to practice one's religion or belief in accordance with one's own conscience;
- (d) equality before the law of national minorities; and
- (e) the right to know one's rights and act upon them.

Source: Department of State files. Ambassador Schifter was chairman of the U.S. delegation at Ottawa.

Furthermore, Principle VII incorporates by reference such international human rights instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In summarizing Principle VII, I skipped over two paragraphs for the purpose of now focusing special attention on them. They read as follows:

"The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavor jointly and separately, including in cooperation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them."

These paragraphs, Mr. Chairman, constitute recognition by all signatories to the Final Act of the close link between respect for human rights and the development of friendly relations among

nations, the interrelationship between a government's respect for the rights of its own citizens and its regard for the inhabitants of this globe who live beyond its borders. There was a time, not long ago, when the great majority of the citizens of our respective countries did not pay a great deal of attention to what it was that was happening beyond the limits of their villages or towns and most assuredly did not pay attention to occurrences in other countries. It was the world's experience with the Nazi system that brought about a fundamental change in outlook. As Pastor Martin Niemöller observed, if you ignore the misdeeds done to your neighbors, there will be no one around to assist you once misdeeds are done to you. Increasingly, in recent decades men and women across the face of this earth have come to understand the validity of the thoughts of John Donne, who authored the words made famous by Ernest Hemingway:

"No man is an island, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or if thine owne were; any mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.

In my country, Mr. Chairman, as I am sure is the case in other countries as well, these words of John Donne have increasingly been reflected in the general attitude of people toward world events. In the United States this general attitude has through the electoral process been transmitted to the President and the Congress. The President and the Congress, in turn, have seen to it that the attitude to which I have referred is reflected in the formulation of our foreign policy. Our people care about the manner in which the governments of other countries deal with their own citizens and they insist that the Government of the United States make known the views of the American public on this vital issue and interact with other countries in keeping with these views. Thus, the link established in Principle VII between respect for human rights and friendly relations among States is not an invention of the drafters of the Helsinki Final Act, but the codification of a relationship which the authors recognized as existing.

The point I am making, Mr. Chairman, let it be clearly understood, is that in our view respect for human rights in individual states contributes to the improvement of international relations. By the same token, disrespect for human rights contributes to the deterioration of international relations.

The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, in his opening speech two days ago, also spoke of this linkage between human rights, on the one hand, and relations between states, on the other. However, he reversed the cause-and-effect relationship which I have just described. In his view, if I understood him correctly, detente leads to greater respect for human rights and international tension leads to a clamp-down on human rights. Through its distinguished representative the Soviet Union told us that if we cooperate with it in international affairs, it is prepared to cooperate with us in the area of human rights.

We have, Mr. Chairman, some problems with the logic of this proposition. When we use the term "human rights," we describe the relationship between a government and its own citizens. Does it stand to reason that if foreign countries establish friendly relations with a particular government that government, in turn, will - so to speak - reward the foreign countries by dealing kindly with its own citizens? And does it further stand to reason that if international relations are tense, the foreign countries will be punished by the government in question through the adoption of repressive measures against its own citizens? Would this not mean that a government holds its own people hostage, treating them well or poorly depending on the way other countries treat it in international affairs?

Nor need we deal with this problem as an abstract, philosophic proposition. We have empiric evidence in recent history that sheds light on this issue.

After the long dark night of Stalinism, the dawn of greater respect for human rights in the Soviet Union arrived in the spring of 1956, following Chairman Khrushchev's address to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That dawn came in a period often referred to as the Cold War. International crisis succeeded international crisis, to reach a terrifying crescendo in October 1962. Yet, during this very period of international tension domestic controls in the Soviet Union were eased, causing the era to become known as that of the thaw. What is clear is that the thaw came first, followed ultimately, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by significant relaxation of international tension.

We witnessed the same sequence, that of domestic change being followed by international change, not the other way around, in the Nineteen Seventies. At the very time that East-West relations improved further, bringing on the period of detente, the Soviet Union began its campaign to suppress political dissidents. To use the phrase which so frequently appeared in Soviet theoretical journals in those

days, "the correlation of forces was tilting in favor of the Socialist camp." And as it kept tilting throughout the Seventies, as detente continued, the tilt in the domestic sphere was against the exercise of human rights. The thaw having long since ended, freedom of expression was returned to the deep freeze. At the very time that United States and Soviet negotiators met to complete the SALT II negotiations, in 1979, reports of a wave of new arrests of Helsinki monitors cast an ominous shadow over the new agreement. There were many reasons as to why the United States Senate failed to ratify SALT II, but the least that can be said of the repressive measures taken by the Soviet Union in the late Seventies is that they did not help maintain the spirit of detente and most assuredly did not win Senate votes for SALT II.

The point I am making is, I am sure, clear. We must all learn from history. And the one lesson taught by the events I have just described is that respect for human rights leads to a relaxation of international tension, not the other way around.

Mr. Chairman. Given the commitment of all the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to principles of human rights and given the Final Act's recognition of the link between respect for human rights and friendly relations among States, how

should the signatories deal with reports of violations of these principles? If we were to ignore these violations, Mr. Chairman, we not only reduce the credibility of the entire Helsinki Process, but would thereby also make more difficult, in the words of Principle VII, "the development of friendly relations and co-operation among . . . States." For a government which has been reported to have violated human rights might ignore the complaints of affected individuals. But it will give more serious attention if the complaints are clearly stated by one or more other governments. Such clear statements can, at the same time, serve as good indicators to the recipient government of the specific steps that it could take if it wanted to make a contribution to the relaxation of international tension.

There once existed the notion, to be sure, that what a potentate did to his subjects is his business and not anyone else's. An American protest against human rights violations delivered during the Administration of President Theodore Roosevelt to the Government of Czar Nicholas II was rejected on that ground. But the world has moved on since then. Immediately following World War II the international community reflected on the horrors for which the Nazi regime had been responsible, horrors which were first visited upon the

country's own citizens, on persons persecuted for political dissent or ethnic origin or both, horrors which later enveloped most of the European continent. It was in light of these reflections that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted and adopted and that 27 years later Principle VII was incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act. Both documents elevated the issue of a government's respect for the human rights of its own citizens from the domestic to the international plane.

The international community understands, of course, that there exists no international judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over all 35 participating nations which can adjudge complaints against violators of the Declaration and the Final Act, issue cease-and-desist orders against them and enforce such orders. All that can be done is call attention to violations and hope thereby to apply moral suasion.

It is said, however, just as it was said in days of old, that even such discussion of reports of human rights violations constitutes intervention in the internal affairs of another State. Attention has been called to provisions of the United Nations Charter against such intervention and in the case of the Helsinki Final Act to the provisions of Principle VI

thereof. Some of our colleagues in this hall have heretofore discussed this point and have responded to it most effectively. Let me, therefore, add merely a legal gloss to the points already so appropriately made. To do so, let me draw attention to the provisions of Principle X of the Final Act. That Principle provides that

"[i]n their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, [the participating States] will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe."

And, most importantly, Principle X states that

"[a]ll the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others."

A reading of all of the relevant provisions of the Final Act and an examination of Principles VI and VII in the light of the guidelines provided by Principle X, Mr. Chairman, leads necessarily to the conclusion that in order to give meaning to Principle VII, participating States must feel free to call attention to violations of that Principle, so as to encourage

participating states to conform with their legal obligations under international law, and that the act of calling attention to any violations does not constitute intervention within the meaning of Principle VI. Intervention, as the word is used there, involves action which goes beyond mere comment or expression of concern.

In his presentation to us the other evening, our distinguished Soviet colleague offered one other reason why we should not be discussing each other's human rights problems at this meeting. The point he made was that the Madrid Concluding Document mandated each of us merely to report on human rights conditions in his own country and not elsewhere. In quoting from the Madrid Document he said that it provides for a review of respect for human rights "V Svaikh Stranakh", which, I am told, indeed means in Russian in "their own countries." If that were a correct quotation from the Concluding Document, our colleague might very well have a good argument. But it is not a correct quotation. The official Russian text of the Concluding Document calls for a review of respect for human rights "V Ikh Gosudarstvakh", which, I am further told, means in Russian "in their states", thus encompassing all of them, not limiting each of us to speak only about his own country. I am confident that after checking his version against the

official Russian text of the Concluding Document, our colleague will take due note of the discrepancy and recognize the difference in meaning.

Our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union told us that in applying international standards of human rights, we need to take into account the differences in interpretation of these standards in different social systems and cultures. We agree. We recognize, for example, that some of the more far-reaching decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the area of civil liberties, as to the scope of freedom of speech, including symbolic speech, or as to the rights of persons suspected or accused of having committed crimes, including limitations on police searches and seizures, or the exclusion of improperly seized evidence, are not likely to be given universal application in the near future. But there are a good many practical applications of human rights principles on which one should indeed be able to get full agreement among all the participating States of the Helsinki Final Act if the Act is to mean anything at all. They include such propositions as: no person should be incarcerated for the mere expression of dissenting views or for reporting events concerning human rights violations; no person should be punished for crimes he did not commit, on evidence manufactured by the police or by

prosecutors; no person should be subjected to governmentally-authorized discrimination on grounds of ancestry; no person should be deprived of the free exercise of his religion; no person who is not likely to do physical harm to another person or to himself should be involuntarily committed to an institution for the mentally ill; no person shall be compelled by his government to change his name and deny his ethnic origin or be discriminated against if he fails to do so; no group of persons shall be prevented from maintaining their language, their literature and culture. Propositions such as these, I submit, cut across all social systems and can be said to be truly universal. They should be discussed by us here so as to determine whether we can agree that these propositions must be deemed necessary corollaries of the provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

Human rights, Mr. Chairman, are a matter of deep interest to the United States Government, to which we apply thought and deliberation. Our goal is not to score debating points or propaganda victories, but to obtain results, to improve the lot of persons who are the victims of human rights violations.

It follows that once we become aware of a human rights violation or of a pattern of human rights violations, we seek, as Secretary Armacost has noted, to engage where possible in

quiet diplomacy, to resolve the problem without fanfare. We are glad to say that in a good many situations that approach has been successful. In fact, where there is a realistic hope that a quiet approach will succeed, we prefer to take that route.

However, Mr. Chairman, there are circumstances where, after some time, it becomes clear that a deaf ear has been turned to all the appeals that have been made to end human rights violations in a particular setting. It is in those instances and only in those instances that we deem it necessary to express ourselves openly on the reports which come to us concerning the subject of human rights violations.

It is not our intention, Mr. Chairman, to use a phrase that is often bandied about, to "seek confrontation" at a meeting devoted to a discussion of human rights. At the same time, we believe we would be remiss in our duties if we came to a meeting called to discuss human rights performance within the framework of the Helsinki Final Act without making reference to human rights violations of which we are fully aware and for which we have not discovered any other means of redress. In speaking of such shortfalls in human rights performance at this meeting we shall seek to avoid flowery adjectives and purple

prose. We shall seek to lay out the facts, simply and plainly. But it is our intention to send our message clearly to the appropriate address rather than marking it "to whom it may concern."

Let me add that we have come here in full recognition that the right which we claim for ourselves, namely the right to discuss reports of human rights violations in other participating States, is a right which adheres to all such States. This means that all participants have the right to discuss reports of human rights violations in the United States. But I hope that those who will speak on the subject of human rights in the United States will try, as we shall, to avoid flamboyance and to try to get their facts straight. Ours, as is well known, is an open country. It does not take a great deal of effort to establish whether certain allegations as to events in our country are accurate or not. I do hope that all those who will speak here about the United States will instruct their research assistants to utilize the opportunities for verification that do exist. There are, as we all know, a great many of them.

One point that has already been made in criticism of the United States, although we were not named explicitly, is that the United States Senate has failed to ratify certain international covenants in the field of human rights. I can offer, first, a purely technical answer, namely that we are here to discuss respect for human rights and not the question of how many times we have promised to respect human rights. But there is more to this issue than is covered by this technical answer. Human rights in our country, Mr. Chairman, are protected by the Constitution of the United States, by our State Constitutions, and, above all, by an independent judiciary. From a pragmatic point of view, ratification of the covenants would add nothing that is not already covered by domestic law in a manner in which human rights can be effectively enforced.

I should note that as the years pass our Senators may see less reason than ever to ratify such international instruments as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because they see that among those that purport to adhere to that international instrument are the most serious human rights violators, each of them relying on the fact that under the Covenant human rights may be abridged if the country claims that such abridgement is necessary for such purposes as public safety and order. In the

absence of an independent judiciary which can determine what is and what is not necessary to protect public safety and order, this loophole provision, repeated frequently throughout the Covenant, has served only to drain that document of real value.

To be sure, the authors of the Covenant did think of this problem and sought to guard against it. They created a Human Rights Committee, which, under an Optional Protocol, is empowered to receive and consider complaints. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union has not ratified the Optional Protocol.

This discussion of the covenants, Mr. Chairman, bears some special relevance to our work under the Helsinki Final Act. Increasingly in my country the question is asked as to what value there is in those Accords if they can be violated with impunity. The answer to this criticism must be that violations won't be ignored, that in a fair and just manner they will be discussed within the CSCE process and that there is indeed reason for hope that over time all signatories to the Helsinki Final Act will increasingly seek to bring themselves into compliance with its provision. That is the goal toward which we must bend all our efforts.

Draft Report Submitted to the Human Rights Meeting of Experts,
Ottawa, June 15, 1985

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF CANADA, ICELAND, ITALY,
NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING
STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE,
FORESEEN BY THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE
CSCE, ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING RESPECT, IN THEIR STATES, FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS, AS EMBODIED
IN THE FINAL ACT

1. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place in Ottawa, upon the invitation of the Government of Canada, from 7 May to 17 June 1985 on questions concerning respect, in their States, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all their aspects, as embodied in the Final Act.
2. The Meeting was preceded by a preparatory meeting which was held in Ottawa starting on 23 April 1985.
3. At the opening session, the participants were addressed by the Right Honourable Joe Clark PC MP, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on behalf of the Government of Canada.
4. The formal opening on 7 May and the formal closure on 17 June 1985, including concluding statements made by delegations wishing to do so, were held in open plenary meetings.

Source: Conference Document CSCE/OME.47/Rev.1, June 15, 1985.
The draft failed of adoption. The Conference was unable to
agree on a final report.

5. The participants adopted an agenda and had a frank discussion of implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document in the human rights field. Forty-five proposals for recommendations were submitted and considered by the participants.

6. During the discussion different, and at times, contradictory opinions were expressed as to respect, by the participating States, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all their aspects, as embodied in the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. While certain progress was noted in a few States, grave concern was expressed at serious violations of human rights in some participating States. It was confirmed that this thorough exchange of views aimed at increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constituted in itself a valuable contribution to the CSCE process.

7. This discussion was in conformity with the Final Act and therefore was not to be considered to be contradictory to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of any State.

8. The participants reaffirmed that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among their States as among all States. They expressed their concern that failure to achieve progress in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms jeopardizes the credibility of the CSCE process as a whole.

9. They therefore emphasized the critical need to assure immediate and tangible progress in the implementation of all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document on the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms, thus ensuring the balanced development of the CSCE process.

10. The participants recognized the responsibility of each State to take prompt action to bring their practices and procedures into conformity with their commitments in the Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document, as well as other international declarations and agreements by which they may be bound, thus assuring the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

11. They also emphasized that institutions, organizations and individuals have a positive and indispensable role to play in the achievement of the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, they recognized the importance of co-operation with and among institutions, organizations and individuals engaged as a matter of common concern in the protection of human rights in their own States or internationally.

12. They stressed the need, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, to intensify their efforts to implement fully Principle VII (Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief) of the Helsinki Final Act and the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting.

13. The participating States, recalling the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights in the field of human rights, as embodied in the Final Act and further reaffirmed in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, will take necessary action to remove legal and administrative measures so as to ensure in practice the right of all their citizens, individually or in groups, effectively to monitor the implementation of these documents. They will ensure the right of all their citizens freely to express their views on any question concerning implementation, in order to help ensure respect in their own country or in other participating States for these rights.

14. Further, they will, inter alia, publish or reissue the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments in the field of human rights by which they may be bound, disseminate these documents in their entirety, make them known as widely as possible and render them permanently accessible to all individuals in their countries. They will bear in mind particularly the possibility of drawing attention to these documents and other relevant CSCE documents on such occasions as the Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act and further follow-up meetings.

15. They will fulfil their respective obligations concerning the fundamental right to freedom of movement in all its aspects as set forth in those international instruments by which they are bound.

16. With a view to strengthening implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document concerning freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, and in compliance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and

Discrimination on the Basis of Religion or Belief, and any other international instruments by which they are bound, the participating States will pay special attention to the elimination of discrimination against the individual believer and religious communities wherever this occurs, on the grounds of religion or belief so as to ensure the equal exercise of their rights. For this purpose, they will create an atmosphere of tolerance and respect for all matters relating to freedom to profess and practise religion or belief, alone or in community with others, in public or in private.

17. They will grant the status provided for in their respective countries for religious faiths, institutions and organizations, to religious communities of believers practising or prepared to practise their faith, within the constitutional framework of their States, which apply for such status.

18. Further, they will engage in consultations with the religious faiths, institutions and organizations, in order to reach a better understanding of the requirements of religious freedom and to take action to ensure their fulfilment. For this purpose, they will act to guarantee, inter alia:

- the right of persons to give and receive religious education individually, collectively or through religious organizations, including the freedom of parents to transmit their religion or belief to their children;

- the freedom of the individual believer and communities of believers to establish and maintain contact and hold assemblies in common with fellow believers, including those of other countries;

- to produce, acquire, receive, import and make full use of publications and other materials concerning the profession and practice of religion or belief; to have access to and use the various media for religious purposes.

19. They will undertake the necessary measures and apply the provisions of their internal legislation and their international obligations emanating from agreements between States, as well as other international instruments by which they may be bound, contributing to the consequent realization and improvement of human rights and fundamental freedoms of members of national minorities, their legitimate interests and aspirations, thus refraining from discrimination against persons belonging to national minorities and safeguarding their national and cultural identity.

20. They stress the importance of ensuring equality of men and women in all spheres of life and will take appropriate measures in all fields to eliminate any discrimination against women in order to guarantee that all women and men may exercise and enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis. Such measures shall ensure in particular the equally effective participation of men and women in political, economic, social and cultural life. Furthermore, they shall promote efforts to prevent violence against women.

21. The participating States, in fulfilment of their commitment in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting in the field of trade union rights, will respect the right of freely established and joined trade unions and their freely chosen representatives to have direct and unrestricted contacts and communication among themselves.

22. They will authorize and encourage institutions, organizations and individuals to play their relevant role in monitoring the governments' respect for these provisions and in investigating individual complaints about alleged violations of them.

23. They will facilitate and support discussion and co-operation among individuals, groups and organizations engaged in the protection or promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms such as humanitarian organizations, churches, relevant professional groups, cultural organizations, women's organizations and youth organizations. One useful purpose of such international co-operation could be to elaborate and adopt sets of common professional and ethical standards to ensure full protection of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

24. They will respond to inquiries and representations from governments of other participating States and from private individuals or groups on matters concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms within their respective States. Such inquiries or representations may be made to foreign ministries or to such other offices as the participating State may designate.

25. The participating States, convinced that torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are among the most serious human rights violations and cannot be justified under any circumstances, and bearing in mind all relevant principles and provisions embodied in international instruments by

which they may be bound, will take all necessary steps to eliminate such practice and take effective legislative, administrative, judicial, and other measures to prevent and punish such acts in the territory under their jurisdiction.

26. They will, to the maximum extent possible, respond positively to requests to observe legal proceedings. They will admit observers to such proceedings or provide full explanations as to why such observers may not be admitted.

27. They will work toward the reduction in length of incommunicado detention to a minimum.

28. They will also improve and increase the opportunities for representatives of non-governmental humanitarian organizations to visit prisoners. Where possible, restrictions concerning the reasonable access of relatives and friends in privacy to individuals under detention or incarceration in prisons or other penal institutions will be progressively reduced.

29. They will ensure that individuals are protected from psychiatric practices which violate human rights and fundamental freedoms.

30. Noting that terrorism endangers or takes innocent human lives and is an intolerable violation of human dignity, the participants reaffirmed the relevant provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document on terrorism.

31. They will hold regular meetings in order to discuss questions of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to encourage the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting in this field.

32. The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Canada for the excellent organization of the Meeting and to the Government and people of Canada for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay.

Closing Statement by Ambassador Richard Schifter Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Ottawa, June 17, 1985

One of the essential elements of civilized government is that it respects the human dignity of its own citizens. That means that it lets them speak their mind, practice their religion, and come and go freely. There is, of course, much more to the cause of human rights, but these basic rights can properly be regarded as the minimum essentials, from which much else can be derived.

The validity of the principle which I have just stated is today accepted throughout the world. It is enshrined in important international documents, to which practically every government pays at least lip service. Regrettably there are some governing elites who stop at that point, who have failed to translate their international commitments into an appropriate code of conduct. That gap between commitment and conduct has been the principal topic of the Ottawa human rights conference.

The United States believes that governments should respect the human rights of their citizens because that is indeed a duty which governments owe their citizens, even if there were no international agreements on this subject. What these agreements do, in effect, is underline a pre-existing duty, rather than add a new one.

There were times when the international community considered the action of a government against its own people a matter of the internal affairs of that country and none of the business of outsiders. Those times are gone and the Helsinki Accords recorded that fact, namely that a government which respects the human dignity of its own citizens will, in turn, earn more international respect and, above all, confidence than one that fails to do so. As the Accords put it, respect for human rights is an essential factor for peace and the development of friendly relations among nations.

Source: Department of State files.

Let me now get to the essence of this conference. While human rights violations in a number of East European states were criticized, much of the discussion has focused on the shortfalls in human rights performance by the Government of the Soviet Union. We have expressed our deep concern over the severe punishment meted out to human rights monitors, such as Orlov and Shcharansky, who had done nothing other than report on failures by Soviet bureaucrats to live up to their Government's undertakings at Helsinki. We have expressed our deep concern about the interference by the Soviet Government with the free exercise by its citizens of their religious practices, about the cultural deprivation suffered by Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and other peoples suffering under Soviet repression. We have called for the Soviet Union to live up to its international obligation to let those people go who want to go and we have expressed our deep concern over the recrudescence in that country of virulent Government-sponsored anti-Semitism.

We are sadly aware of the fact that human rights violations have taken place even as we have met, talked, and deliberated. Prison sentences have been meted out to Lis, Frasnyniuk and Michnik in Poland. The fate of Dr. Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner is ominously unknown. The repression of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria continues. And Charter 77 activists, peaceful persons who exercised their rights to freedom of expression, remain incarcerated in Czechoslovakia.

As a result, questions have, understandably, been asked as to whether conferences of this kind do any good. These questions cannot be answered with certainty. Years from now historians will be able to make an assessment of the activities in which we are now engaged and will be able to pass judgment as to whether we have indeed succeeded in the tasks we set out to do. All that we can say today is that our study of history shows that ideas can have consequences and that in order for ideas to have consequences, they must be expressed and must be expressed clearly. At this conference we have spoken up for freedom. When I use the pronoun "we" I do not mean only the United States. What came clearly into focus is that the issue of human rights is not of concern merely in the context of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, but is a problem that beclouds the relationship of the Soviet Union with a great many countries, irrespective of their political alliances or lack thereof. What we hope, what we deeply hope is that responsible persons in the Soviet leadership will take to heart the message which emanates from the Ottawa Meeting and will see to it that Soviet practices are brought in line with the promise of the Helsinki Accords. No better contribution could be made to the relaxation of international tension. And no better way would there be to crown the Ottawa Meeting with success.

DOCUMENT 67

Testimony of Ambassador Richard Schifter Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 25, 1985

The Ottawa Human Rights Experts meeting was an international conference quite different from the kind of conference to which we have become accustomed. Most international conferences convene for the purpose of negotiating and resolving a dispute or for the purpose of discussing a problem of common concern and reaching agreement on a cooperative solution to that problem.

The kind of dispute which traditionally was the subject of international negotiations and agreements was a dispute that involved conflicting national interests. The issue of human rights, which involves, essentially, the treatment by the government of a country of its own citizens has, until the recent past, not been viewed as an appropriate subject for discussion at international conferences. When the issue of human rights was first put on the agenda of the negotiations that led up to the Helsinki Accords, it was dealt with as one of a series of problems of common concern to all the participants in the negotiation. Yet, anyone who

Source: Department of State files.

even cursorily examined the text of Principle VII, the human rights provisions of the Accords, would have noted that some of the signatory states had merely recodified their own practices in dealing with their citizenry while others had, in effect, pledged themselves to make significant changes in the relationship between individual citizens and their government.

The question of what the Soviet representatives had in mind when they agreed to the inclusion of human rights provisions in the Helsinki Accords can, for some time to come, be an interesting topic of speculation. What we can safely assume, though, is that they did not give a great deal of thought, at that time, to the possibility of their being held accountable at international gatherings for shortfalls in their performance under the Helsinki Accords. Nevertheless, accountability in the area of human rights has been introduced into the Helsinki follow-up process and has been a topic of discussion at Belgrade, at Madrid, and, once again, at Ottawa.

The ideal result of a follow-up meeting would be an agreement under which a country which is not now in compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords would obligate itself to comply henceforth. However, such a result cannot realistically be expected from the Soviet Union or from other countries in the Soviet sphere.

In that case, what good can be accomplished by a meeting such as that which had been scheduled to take place at Ottawa? That was indeed the critical question which we pondered as we prepared ourselves for Ottawa. We reached the conclusion that we faced two possibilities. As we saw it, the Soviet Union could use the occasion of the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting as an occasion in anticipation of which it might review some of its policies which are deemed human rights violations and might agree to alterations therein.

With that possibility in mind, we engaged in the months preceding the Ottawa meeting in informal conversations with Soviet representatives. We emphasized the contribution which the resolution of human rights problems could make to the relaxation of international tension. We also suggested that if some of these matters could be resolved in informal discussions, such resolution could have beneficial effects on the Meeting. To our regret, though not to our surprise, the Soviet response to our inquiries was not positive. We, therefore, had to fall back on our plan for the second possibility, namely that the Soviet Union would decide to tough it out at Ottawa. In that case, we decided, we would speak plainly and clearly of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and in other states whose governments violate

the human rights of their citizens. Recognizing the framework provided by the Helsinki Accords, we decided that we would concentrate on human rights violations which we deemed could be corrected with relative ease, without effecting systemic change within the Soviet Union or the other states in the Soviet sphere.

That is what we ultimately did. In our speeches we did not resort to invective and generalized polemics. But we did lay out the facts as we saw them and gave clear expression to our deep concern. As our speeches have been submitted for the record, they need not be summarized here.

Given the Soviet decision not to engage in preliminary talks on the subject of human rights, it was clear to us from the beginning that the so-called implementation phase of the Ottawa Meeting, the phase in which we discussed human rights performance, would be the most important part of the Meeting. And so it was. Nevertheless, we also had to focus on the fact that under the mandate for the Meeting "Conclusions and Recommendations" were to be prepared. We had to set aside time to deal with that aspect of the conference as well.

Under the process created by the Helsinki Accords all actions taken at a conference require the unanimous consent of all countries participating in a meeting. Given that fact and knowing of the Soviet decision to "tough it out," we recognized that the likelihood of reaching agreement on useful "Conclusions and Recommendations" was close to nil.

This set of circumstances posed a unique challenge to us. Do we simply recognize that nothing that we would propose would be acceptable to the Soviets and not even bother to prepare proposed Conclusions and Recommendations? Or should we draft proposals for a concluding document as if there were a chance of reaching agreement? We decided to take the latter course. And when I say "we," I refer to the sixteen participants who belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and who caucused every working day of the Ottawa conference. Representatives of the sixteen NATO countries met regularly, sifted through a series of suggestions made by the various member states, and then formulated specific recommendations. As the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document were couched in rather general terms, the thrust of our proposals at Ottawa was toward specificity. We recommended arrangements for the monitoring of criminal trials, reductions in the time period of incommunicado detention, freedom of movement, free contacts between representatives of free labor unions, etc. Any fairminded observer would have characterized our proposals as moderate both in tone and in substance. Yet, not one of them was acceptable to the Soviet delegation.

This result of lack of agreement on specific recommendations was, of course, foreordained in light of the Soviet decision not to engage in substantive preliminary talks with us in the months preceding the Ottawa meeting. A delegation sent to a six-weeks' meeting in Ottawa was obviously in no position to bind the Soviet Government to changes in its conduct of its domestic affairs which, though they might be deemed minor by our standards, would nevertheless be deemed significant in the Soviet Union. Nor was it reasonable to expect that a delegation would, after hearing its country criticized for a number of weeks, suddenly throw up its hands and say: "You have convinced us. We shall sin no more and will promise so in writing."

The point I am seeking to make is that absent an advance agreement with the Soviet Union, a meaningful concluding document at Ottawa was simply not in the cards. The only options that were available to us were a document which would paper over the significant differences in outlook with phrases that might have different meaning to the different sides, to end with brief factual statement, or have no final document at all. As the meeting progressed and the circumstances under which we would be concluding our session came more clearly into focus, the members of the Alliance came increasingly to the conclusion that no document at all would be preferable

to a concluding document that would do nothing other than mislead the public as to the nature of the conference. The neutrals and non-aligned made a final effort at the end of the conference to obtain agreement on a short document, an important element of which was a recommendation for future meetings of this kind. When, after acceptance of this proposal by the Western countries, the Soviet bloc rejected it, even the neutrals and non-aligned gave up. The result was no document at all.

As there has been quite a bit of comment on the fact that the Ottawa Meeting did not end with the adoption of any final text, let me state, in summary form, the conclusions that I would draw from that fact. First, we should note that the reason why there was no final document was, in its essence, that the Soviet Union was not prepared, at this meeting, to commit itself to changes in its human rights policies that would have given real meaning to a final text. Second, the participants in the Ottawa conference faced up to the absence of an agreement on questions of substance by letting the world see that fact plainly, without the varnish of a final text.

If there never was a chance of reaching a meaningful agreement, was there any purpose to the Ottawa conference? I would say there was and would now like to set forth the reasons that lead me to that conclusion.

(1) I share the view of a good many participants in the conference that we made a significant impact on the smaller Warsaw-Pact countries. We were left with the impression that these countries are interested in improving their standing in and relations with the West. From the messages they received at Ottawa from a great many Western countries they seemed to have recognized that improvement in their human rights performance could play a significant role in improving their standing in the West. There is reason to believe that this is the message that they have taken home.

(2) The fact that international meetings take place at which attention is paid to their plight encourages the brave men and women behind the Iron Curtain who stand up for their rights to continue their struggle. As news about the Ottawa Meeting was broadcast to Eastern Europe, the Meeting made a valuable contribution to keeping up the spirit of those who have sacrificed a great deal for the cause of freedom.

(3) Though the Soviet leadership is not likely to respond directly to complaints presented to them by diplomats in conferences closed to the outside world, the Soviet leadership does seem to be sensitive to adverse publicity. To the extent to which the Ottawa Meeting has received and may

continue to receive publicity which the Soviet Union deems adverse to its interests, it might have contributed to the forces at work that might, over time, change Soviet human rights policy.

(4) The chances of improving human rights performance in the Warsaw-Pact countries are significantly enhanced by an appeal from the West which is delivered in unison. At Ottawa, we were able to hammer out, as I mentioned before, a series of proposals for specific improvements in human rights conditions. These proposals were, at the end of the session, combined into a single document, designated OME 47, which was tabled in the name of seventeen countries. These were the ten countries which make up the European Community as well as the seven countries which belong to NATO but not to the EC. Operating under the pressure cooker of a conference, we composed this document in the space of about two weeks. In the absence of a conference, it might have taken years of crossing t's and dotting i's before such a document could have been completed. It is now on the record and can serve as the basis of a unified Western human rights campaign in the years to come.

(5) The fact that the neutrals and the West saw, basically, eye-to-eye at the Ottawa conference underlined the fact that the issue of human rights is not one that is tied to purely military alignments, but is one which truly concerns the conscience of the civilized world.

There is one final point which I would like to make. We must keep in mind that a meeting such as that which was held at Ottawa was unthinkable as recently as fifteen years ago. The concept of limited government, the ideas of the rights of the individual which originated with the thinkers and writers of the 18th century and which were enshrined in our own Declaration of Independence were ideas advanced first by individuals, then by groups and movements, and were then adopted by countries, but only for domestic application. The notion that governments might monitor the behavior of other governments toward their own citizens, that there would be international conferences at which the domestic practices of participating countries would be subjected to scrutiny is one of very recent origin. While the results might be meager in their beginning stage, they might be more plentiful in the future. What this means is that we ought to give the CSCE process further time to evolve before passing judgment on whether it has accomplished anything and whether the results justify our investment of effort.

Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Washington, July 30, 1985

Ten years have passed since the United States, Canada, and 33 European governments joined in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Today Secretary Shultz and the Foreign Ministers of those nations, East and West as well as neutral and nonaligned, are meeting again in the capital of Finland to commemorate this important event.

In 1975 President Ford affirmed the support of the United States for the universal standards of international conduct and the fundamental human freedoms contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Today I reaffirm our commitment to those principles and our equally firm dedication to give them meaning in the daily lives of all citizens whose governments have undertaken the obligations contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

The CSCE process has long been a source of hope that the division of Europe can be overcome and that the human freedoms enjoyed in the West will be honored and respected throughout the continent. The Helsinki process offers the peoples of East and West the way that, by patient and serious dialogue, we can improve the lives of our individual citizens and increase security and cooperation among our states.

As Secretary Shultz said in his statement in Helsinki, we had no illusions in 1975, and have none today, that words alone can strengthen security and nurture freedom. When heads of state and government gathered in Helsinki 10 years ago, President Ford stated: "History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep."

Sadly, despite some gains, the Soviet Union and several other signatories of the Helsinki act have failed to keep their promises. Despite the solemn pledge that citizens have the right "to know and act upon" their rights, brave men and women have suffered for taking this commitment by their governments seriously. Those who have tried to exercise freedoms of religion, thought, conscience, and belief have often paid a tragic price. The Helsinki accords called for freer movement of people and ideas across the European divide, but that flow remains impeded, and in the case of the Soviet Union it is but a trickle.

The Helsinki accords and the Madrid concluding document of 1983 provided standards by which to judge the conduct of the 35 participating states and set down a process which can be used to ensure accountability. The United States will continue to uphold these standards and press for compliance with them. We consider this a commitment on the part of all those who voluntarily subscribed to the Final Act of the Helsinki accords.

As we mark this 10th anniversary and reflect on the hopes initially raised by the CSCE process, it is time to renew our efforts to ensure that those hopes were not totally without foundation. We rededicate ourselves to the code of conduct embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. We call upon all of those who participate with us in CSCE to fulfill their pledges. With commitment and determination, we can make the promise of the Helsinki accords' first 10 years the reality of this second decade of CSCE.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
Aug. 5, 1985, p. 944.

Address by Secretary of State George P. Shultz at the Ceremony Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, Helsinki, July 30, 1985

Let me first join my colleague from the Soviet Union and the others who have spoken here this afternoon in thanking the Government and people of Finland for their fine hospitality and good preparations for this meeting. We all enjoy breathing the friendly air of Helsinki.

The modern political values that underlie our civilization were born in Europe. The belief in human progress, in intellectual freedom, in religious tolerance, in the rights of the individual against the state, and in a peaceful international order—these are the legacies that have been passed on to us by European thought and culture since the Enlightenment. At times, oppression, intolerance, and war have banked the flames of this humane spirit. But always these values have stayed alive, offering hope and inspiration to mankind—that we might explore the outer reaches of knowledge, that we might ascend to a higher plane of human existence, that we might live in peace with our neighbors, that we might have faith in progress and in freedom for ourselves and our world.

Today, tragically, Europe is a divided continent. Yet the ideals of European civilization have not been extinguished. They live still in every nation, in every city and village, on every street, in every home, West and East. They bind Europe together. The barriers, the walls, the barbed wire, and the weapons cannot truly divide Europeans from each other or from their heritage. The spiritual strength of European civilization cannot be broken by government-made artifice.

Europe, let us not forget, has been divided before, though never so starkly. Vastly different political systems have lived side-by-side on this continent for hundreds of years. Empires, constitutional monarchies, and dictatorships have stood beside republics and democracies. Religious wars, over the centuries, have caused the deaths of count-

less innocents. And in this century alone, the people of Europe have endured two world wars that ravaged their continent. Only the heroic efforts of the Western democracies and the Soviet Union saved Europe from Hitler's tyranny. Yet Europe has outlived even these times of trouble.

And the modern idea of liberty, since the 18th century, has continued to grow and flourish. It has survived all the historic conflicts and divisions of Europe because, even in the dark moments, the aspiration of individuals to speak, think, and travel freely—throughout the continent—was never extinguished. Belief in the rights of man has deep roots in European philosophy and history.

For now, we all live uneasily with the brutal and artificial division of this continent, even as we search for ways to end it. But nothing in human history has proven irreversible. Perhaps no one here of my generation can confidently expect that the walls and the barbed wire will magically disappear in our lifetime, but surely the division must be altered within the lifetimes of many who are alive today.

And yet, there are some things for which we can hope now: that the idea of liberty in Europe may continue to grow, even in those areas of darkness behind the walls, and that peace may reign over this continent, despite persistent confrontation between East and West. Today, competing powers and political values are arrayed against each other in Europe. Their differences may be ultimately irreconcilable. We hope not. But tensions will exist so long as some persist in violating the most fundamental human rights. Yet, can we not reduce the threat of armed conflict? Can we not achieve some greater measure of freedom for all Europeans, for all individuals? We, the inheritors of the European spirit, must keep it alive for future generations all across the continent.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 1985, pp. 30-33. Secretary Shultz was in Helsinki July 29-August 1, 1985, to participate in the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE.

Goals of the Helsinki Final Act

These are the hopes that inspired the Helsinki conference a decade ago. The statesmen at Helsinki understood that the twin goals of peace and greater freedom are intimately connected in Europe. They understood that we owed it to ourselves and to our children to keep the great European tradition alive, even in these difficult times.

Today, we mark the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. If any single lesson emerges from the history of the Final Act's first 10 years, it is precisely that the interests of individual human beings are a fundamental part of security and stability in Europe. Greater security and a more stable peace among our nations depend on greater freedom for the people of Europe.

The Final Act was an expression of the humane European tradition. It affirmed the most basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. It called for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people. It offered the possibility for greater cooperation among states and peoples. It reaffirmed the basic principles of relations among states. And it recognized, in its structure and in its purpose, that security, economic ties, human rights, and contacts among people are all equally important—and related to each other. Peace encompasses the totality of our relations.

In signing the Final Act 10 years ago, we recognized as governments that if we were to make progress toward greater security and more stable peace, we would have to go beyond the traditional agenda of governments. We recognized that our security requirements must extend beyond walls and weapons; that they had to include finding ways to lessen suspicion, reduce obstacles, instill greater confidence, and increase contacts among the peoples of Europe. And we recognized that these could only be achieved if commitments extended beyond our governments to engage the hopes, good will, and efforts of our peoples, too.

And, in fact, the Helsinki Final Act did engage the attention and enthusiasm of our peoples because it appealed to all that has bound European civilization together over the centuries and because it opened the door to a better future. The Final Act described ways to span the gulfs, to break down at least some of the walls that had been put in place since 1945. It offered a definition of our common security that was both comprehensive and precise. It gave the citizens of all participating states the hope that they could develop their full potential

and contribute to a better, safer world. But, above all, it sought to preserve the rights of individuals.

The message of the Final Act was that we can reduce the divisions in Europe, that we can ease the sufferings they have caused, and that we can someday hope to see an undivided peaceful continent if we are wise enough, practical enough, dedicated enough.

We all knew that it would not be easy to turn our hopes into reality. We knew that our expectations about what could be would have to be tempered by realism, that progress might come slowly. And we knew that, as President Ford said:

History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.

But we also knew that the goals and principles we set down here were worth striving for.

The genius of the Final Act was that it was not merely an expression of goals and principles; it was also a program of practical steps for turning our hopes into reality. It provided a standard toward which to strive and against which to measure our behavior. Perhaps we shall not soon see the day when all nations meet that standard, but the effort, in and of itself, could lead to a more secure peace, greater individual freedom, and, thus, a greater fulfillment of Europe's vast potential.

Progress During the Past 10 Years

Can we look back over the past 10 years and see some limited progress? I believe the answer is yes, though the reality of Europe's division remains. Let us review these past 10 years, and, in keeping with the wisdom of the Final Act, let us judge the progress in the most practical, concrete terms. Pious declarations are cheap. Real progress can only be seen in its effect on human beings.

The Final Act has had some practical effect. Today, journalists travel more easily between our countries. Large numbers of citizens in some East European countries have been reunited with their families in the West. By recalling what had been hoped for and what had seemed possible when the Final Act was signed, our review conferences at Belgrade and Madrid helped keep those hopes and possibilities alive.

So, too, our recent meetings in Ottawa and our current negotiations in Stockholm keep our aspirations alive.

These achievements are not negligible. They have pointed the way we must take if we are to put our relations on a better and more stable basis in the future and if we are to open up the possibility of freedom for all Europeans.

And yet, 10 years after the signing of the Final Act, no one can deny the gap between hope and performance. Despite the real value of the Final Act as a standard of conduct, the most important promises of a decade ago have not been kept.

Let's look at the specifics.

Soviet-Bloc Performance on Helsinki Principles

In the Final Act, we all committed ourselves to treat, in a positive and humanitarian way, the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family. Yet, over the past 5 years, the number of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality permitted to emigrate, mainly for family reunification, fell from more than 51,000 to 886. The regrettable trend is the same for Soviet citizens of German and Armenian nationality.

There are over 20 cases of American/Soviet marriages in which the Soviet spouse has been denied exit permission two or more times, in spite of specific provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Yuriy Balovlenkov, who married an American citizen in 1978, was on a hunger strike from March 25 to July 4 protesting 6 years of continued denial. He has seen only one of his two daughters and is in terribly weakened health.

The Final Act confirms the right of the individual to know and act upon the provisions of the agreement. Yet the citizens' group set up in Moscow to monitor implementation of the Final Act in the Soviet Union disbanded in September 1982 for fear of further persecution. Here is a group of enthusiastic Soviet citizens who were pleased and proud of the decision of their government to sign the Helsinki Final Act. Yet today, Yuriy Orlov, the group's founder, languishes in remote Siberian exile after 7 years in a labor camp. Founding member Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, imprisoned on a false charge in 1977, has completed his term in the notorious Chistopol prison and is now serving out the rest of his 13-year sentence in one of the most brutal of Soviet labor camps. Im-

prisoned group member Anatoliy Marchenko, currently serving a 12-year sentence, has been permitted no correspondence with his family for more than a year. Group member Ivan Kovalyov's health has reportedly deteriorated badly since his transfer to labor camp. His wife and fellow group member, Tatyana Osipova, recently had her own 5-year labor camp sentence extended by 2 years.

The founder of a peace group in Moscow, Sergei Batovrin, was first harassed, then put in a psychiatric ward, and then, when he persisted in advocating peace the way so many thousands of young people do in other countries, he was thrown out of his native land altogether. Other peace activists have met similar fates, as have those struggling for women's rights and free trade unions. The founders of a Social Democratic Party in Moscow were jailed in January of this year.

On June 14, Bogdan Lis, Adam Michnik, and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk were sentenced in Gdanek to terms ranging from 2½ to 3½ years on charges of having nothing ostensibly to do with their real "crime" of leading the fight for free trade unionism—a right recognized in the concluding document of the Madrid review meeting. In the Soviet Union, Vladimir Klebanov's efforts to found a free trade union put him in a psychiatric hospital for 4 years.

Nor has abuse of psychiatric treatment been limited to trade unionists and peace activists. In the Ukraine, Vladimir Khailo, an Evangelical Baptist, has been interned in psychiatric hospitals since 1980 for his faith and his efforts to emigrate with his wife and 15 children. He has refused an offer of freedom in exchange for renunciation of his faith.

All who would live an active religious life according to their faith—whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim—risk harassment, imprisonment, or confinement in psychiatric institutions. Baptists, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Seventh-day Adventists, and Pentecostals have all been increasingly subject to repression. Dina Shvedaova, Vasyi Kobrin, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, Father Gleb Yakunin, Pastor Nikolai Goretoi, and Pastor Viktor Valter are only a few of the Christians currently serving sentences of up to 12 years in prison or exile in the Soviet Union because of their faith. A small community of Pentecostals from the village of

Chuguevka in the Soviet Far East has suffered grievously in the past several months. Ten community elders have been sentenced to up to 5 years in labor camp and the rest fired from their jobs. Six families have been threatened with losing custody of their children.

At least 16 Jewish cultural activists, including 9 teachers of the Hebrew language, have been arrested in the Soviet Union since last July, and many have been convicted on obviously trumped-up criminal charges to 3-4 years of imprisonment and labor camp. Iosif Berenshtein, currently serving a 4-year term, was savagely beaten and stabbed while in prison and lost most of his vision. Yuliy Edelshtein, who is serving a 3-year term, is reportedly undergoing repeated beatings in his labor camp in Siberia as part of an effort "to exorcise his religious fanaticism," according to camp authorities.

Abuzakar Rahimov, a Muslim from Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia, was sentenced to 7 years in a strict-regime labor camp in 1982 for distributing material about the Islamic faith, including translations from the Koran.

Last year in Czechoslovakia, seven priests and nuns were arrested for "obstructing state supervision over churches and religious orders."

Finally, the man who more than any other represents the ideals enshrined in the Final Act—Andrei Sakharov—remains totally isolated from the outside world—in exile, probably still in Gorkiy. Even as I speak, he may be in a hospital following his most recent hunger strike on behalf of decent medical treatment for his beloved wife. We have reason to believe he was forced to break his hunger strike.

We cannot talk about the Helsinki process without talking about human beings, for they are supposed to be the true beneficiaries of the Helsinki Final Act. The fate of these individuals, moreover, affects the actions of thousands, maybe millions, by showing what happens to those who dare exercise their rights and freedoms.

Commitment for the Future

My country and most other countries represented here remain committed to the goal of putting the program of the Final Act into practice in all of its provisions. We know that hard work and patience are needed. We believe that the truest tests of political intentions are actual steps to improve cooperation

among states, to enhance contacts among people, and to strengthen respect for individual rights. The provisions of the Final Act are indivisible. We must see progress in all areas. At next year's Vienna review conference, we will have a chance to measure that progress again.

We are convinced that the future need not be as bleak as the recent past. As we look ahead toward the next decade of the CSCE process, we should also look back to the kinds of beneficial practical actions we enlisted then and measure ourselves against the standards we set.

We have an opportunity at the Stockholm conference to find concrete ways to increase confidence and security in the military field. The package of specific measures proposed by the Western participants in Stockholm addresses some of the causes of war—miscalculation and misinterpretation. These measures can help ensure that existing forces are never used. They encourage greater openness about military forces and exchanges of information that would increase mutual understanding and reduce the risk of surprise attack.

As President Reagan stated in Dublin over a year ago and more recently in Strasbourg, we are prepared to discuss the principle of non-use of force—a principle to which the United States is committed—if this will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements that give concrete meaning to that principle. A solution should be possible that adds to our security and contributes to peace in Europe, and thereby, ultimately, to a better life for our peoples. We are prepared to move ahead in all areas in Stockholm. And I was pleased to note in [Soviet Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze's address that he expressed a positive attitude toward these negotiations.

We can contribute to our common security, to a more stable peace, and to the future vitality of European civilization by steps directly affecting people's lives. The freedom of individuals to determine their own destinies is not only a good ultimate objective, it is also a good place to start. Sustained improvements are vital, but concrete steps—to improve emigration, to allow spouses and dual nationals to unite with loved ones, to release human rights activists and religious teachers—these concrete steps are also important.

Each of us has the obligation to press forward wherever we can. One particularly urgent task is to stop the spread of chemical weapons. Too many times in recent years, these weapons have been brutally employed, not only against military forces but against innocent civilians. The proliferation and use of these weapons represent an ominous warning that long-accepted constraints are breaking down. We must all look to the steps we can take to halt the use of these weapons now, to prevent further proliferation, and to invigorate the effort in Geneva to move toward a verifiable treaty that would genuinely ban these weapons forever.

The United States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity to help build a more secure world in the arms control negotiations currently underway in Geneva—where, I might say, we advocate radical reductions in offensive nuclear armaments. And in November our leaders will meet to examine the whole spectrum of issues before us. We are ready and willing to seize the opportunity. Let our two countries begin the patient, serious work of resolving problems and reaching agreements of benefit to us both and to other countries as well.

Steps to reduce weapons and enhance security, steps to enhance economic and other exchanges, and steps to relieve the suffering and enrich the lives of individuals—all these reinforce each other. They are part of the same broad program of security and cooperation enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. Taken together, they could lead us toward a new era in relations in Europe—one that could bring alive once again the promise of Helsinki and the larger promise of European history.

They are not massive or difficult steps to take. But they are important; they have a larger meaning. They require only courage and political will on the part of all of us.

Opening Statement by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Before the CSCE Cultural Forum, Budapest, October 15, 1985

On behalf of the U.S. delegation, I would like to join those who have spoken before me in expressing our appreciation to Dr. Hermann and his colleagues in the Executive Secretariat for the excellent facilities we will be working in and enjoying. I want to thank the Government of Hungary for hosting the Cultural Forum, a significant and unique undertaking in the CSCE process. I hope that in the weeks ahead, we will have the opportunity to enjoy the distinctive national culture of Hungary and the many beauties of Budapest, a country and city which have experienced and participated in so much of our world's history.

Our task at hand is to engage in an examination of one of the noblest activities of mankind—culture in its many dimensions. In a very real sense, we are about to explore that aspect of the human experience which elevates us as a species and gives our daily lives a sense of beauty and proportion. Equally important, the issues on our agenda have a direct bearing on better mutual understanding among our peoples.

What we will be discussing here has an immediate relationship to a more peaceful, secure world. There are many ways to contribute to this goal. One way to contribute to better mutual understanding is through the free flow of information about our respective cultures. Without effective communications, it becomes difficult and more dangerous to deal with the increasingly complex problems confronting the world today. These problems call out for new, creative thinking, and we hope that our efforts

here will contribute to improved communications and understanding. I can think of no challenge that has greater meaning and importance for the peoples we represent.

The United States is largely a nation of immigrants. Every country represented at this forum has seen its sons and daughters emigrate to my country. As a consequence, the cultural life of the United States owes a great debt to every other country here, for so much of your culture has influenced our own. And whose culture has not been enriched by the many writers, composers, painters, and artists from all parts of the European Continent and North America? If we take only one of the newer forms of artistic expression—the art of film, for example—my country owes a debt of gratitude to such pioneers as George Cukor and Michael Curtiz, both of whom came from Hungary.

Although not alone in this regard, the United States has long served as a sanctuary for artistic talent and a crucible for cultural creativity. We have welcomed those who, for reasons of persecution or repression of artistic expression, were compelled to leave their native countries. Some were fortunate enough to be able to return to their homelands to continue their creative work in freedom. Others remained in my country, enriching our cultural life. We hope that the legacy of what they have given to my country will one day also be shared freely and fully by their own countrymen, for their creative talents reflect the cultural heritage from whence they came.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, February 1986, pp. 81-82. Ambassador Stoessel was head of the U.S. delegation at Budapest.

The mandate that brings us here today and for the coming weeks resides in two documents—the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document. Had the cultural provisions of the Final Act been better implemented, the Budapest Cultural Forum would not have to discuss the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination, and cooperation, including the expansion of contacts and exchanges.

But it is a tragic fact, as Secretary Shultz noted on the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, that Europe is a divided continent. The visible barriers that exist are, in fact, the tangible evidence of deeper divisions—divisions over what man can think and create. How else are we to understand such statements as “too many foreign plays are being performed on our stages” or “artistic creation outside of politics does not exist”?

We take seriously the mandate of the Madrid concluding document—to discuss interrelated problems of creation, dissemination, and cooperation. It is our desire that this discussion should be conducted in a balanced and constructive manner. Our goal is a positive one. We seek to lift the barriers to cultural creativity and cooperation. At the same time, we will not shirk our responsibility by failing to deal with the fundamental problems that affect the cultural issues we are here to explore. We believe it is essential to explore the impediments to creativity, dissemination, and cooperation.

Because we believe strongly in the innate right of an individual to express him or herself freely, including in artistic and cultural endeavors, we think it is important to search for ways to remove obstacles to self-expression. The same holds true for dissemination and cooperation. Moreover, we believe that all peoples and national minorities should have the unquestioned right and opportunity to pursue and develop their cultural heritage in all its dimensions, including the teaching of language as an integral part of self-expression.

How can one advocate the importance of cultural interchange for peace and better understanding and at the same time deny the right of an artist to accept an invitation to exchange ideas and experiences with colleagues from other countries or prevent his or her works from being published or performed? These are the questions, together with exploring ways to expand cooperation, that deserve our serious attention and efforts in the weeks ahead.

Let me say clearly that we want greater and more diverse exchanges and contacts at all levels between our peoples and countries. Toward this end, we will be submitting proposals aimed at lowering impediments to contacts and improving our ability to communicate more directly and effectively. If we can move in this direction, the value of our efforts here will be beyond doubt.

The mandate for the forum also states that leading personalities in the field of culture will attend. In keeping with our belief that cultural creativity is inherently an individual endeavor, best left untouched by the hands of government, we have no ministry of culture. Therefore, our cultural representatives have no instructions. They will be expressing their own views and experiences on the questions under discussion. They may well disagree among themselves on how to approach particular issues. We think this is the natural order of things, including in the sphere of culture. We hope their efforts here will not be burdened with bureaucratic procedures or drafting responsibilities. On the contrary, we hope they will grapple seriously with the problems confronting us, that they will find new, untried ways to think creatively about how we can solve them.

It is fortunate that some know each other already through visits and cultural missions; some are even close colleagues who have worked to promote the goals of the Helsinki Final Act. Others will be meeting for the first time, and we hope they will form direct, close friendships in a common cause. Seldom, if ever,

have so many leading cultural figures come together to discuss mutual problems, experiences, and ideas. That is the most unique and promising aspect of the Budapest Cultural Forum. Let us hope and work for an atmosphere in which our leading cultural personalities can do their share in seeking to lift the barriers to genuine, unfettered cultural creativity and cooperation.

We know from the Holy Scriptures of old and from a Soviet novel of our time that man does not live by bread alone. To surmount the travails of existence, we need inspiration that expands our intellect, that fires our imagination, that nourishes our soul. As we begin this forum, let us pledge ourselves to a frank and substantive exploration of the issues our mandate has set before us. Let us together find the means by which we can remove obstacles to freedom of expression, direct cultural contacts, and uninhibited cultural development. We owe it to ourselves; we owe it to mankind.

Draft Report Presented to the CSCE Cultural Forum, Budapest, November 25, 1985

1. In accordance with

- the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

- the relevant provisions of the Madrid Meeting

- the report of the meeting of experts which took place in Budapest from 21 November to 4 December 1984.

the Cultural Forum took place in Budapest, Hungary, from 15 October to 25 November 1985. It was attended by leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating States.

2. After the formal opening of the Cultural Forum, participants were addressed by Mr. Gyorgy Lazar, Prime Minister, on behalf of the Government of Hungary.

3. Under agenda item 2 of the Forum, opening statements were made in open plenary meetings by representatives of the participating States. The views of UNESCO were presented by a representative of that Organization.

4. Under agenda item 3 of the Forum, and in accordance with the mandate for the Forum, participants discussed, both in plenary and in subsidiary working bodies, interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture.

5. The discussion of the above-mentioned interrelated problems was conducted in the context of the following fields:

- Plastic and Applied Arts—painting, graphic and photographic arts, sculpture, design, architecture, preservation of cultural and historical monuments;
- Performing Arts—theatre, dance, folklore, music, film, cultural programmes on radio and television;
- Literature—literature, publishing and translation, including reference to less widely spoken languages of the participating States;

- Mutual Cultural Knowledge—research, training and education in the arts, libraries, cultural heritage, preservation of and respect for the diversity and originality of the cultures of the participating States, museums, exhibitions.

6. The discussion covered a wide range of subjects in the cultural field. It also reflected the unique character of the Cultural Forum itself within the framework of the CSCE process and the vitality, strength and diversity of the various cultures of the participating States. The participants endeavoured to contribute to the discussion with a view to promoting further creation, dissemination and co-operation in the fields of culture. During the discussion different and, at times, contradictory opinions were expressed not only on matters of substance but also on the procedure of the meeting.

7. A large number of proposals were presented under agenda item 3 both in the plenary and in the appropriate subsidiary working bodies.

8. As a result of its proceedings the Cultural Forum concluded the following:

- In the course of its history, Europe has developed a cultural identity of its own which is also part of the North American heritage. This identity is reflected in a basic unity of cultural values which has survived and had proved its cohesion and resilience despite present political and ideological divisions.

- Since the signing of the Final Act, cultural exchanges and co-operation have proved to be a stabilizing factor in relations between States participating in the CSCE. They contribute to a better understanding between individuals and among peoples and thus help to promote conditions conducive to the building of confidence and the development of normal and friendly relations.

- International co-operation in the different fields of culture since the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE has been greater in some areas than in others. The present conditions for cultural creation and dissemination as well as for international exchanges and co-operation in the different fields of culture still require improvement in many respects.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1986, pp. 85-86. The proposal was tabled by the delegations of 17 Western countries. The draft failed of adoption. The Cultural Forum was unable to agree on a final report.

and achieved by taking active steps to allow the full and unimpeded development of artistic creativity and the recognition of the role of individual artists and the integrity of their creation. They should also be sought and achieved by the unimpeded dissemination of cultural works through facilitating and supporting discussion and co-operation among individuals, groups and private organizations in the different fields of culture; through providing equitable opportunities for wider communication, more direct contacts and travel for personal as well as professional reasons. Similarly, improvements should be made at governmental and non-governmental levels, bilaterally and multilaterally, through agreements between Governments and non-governmental organizations and international programmes, as part of a general expansion of cultural co-operation.

- This goal can, however, be reached only by respect for all the principles and by full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act and the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting. It was stressed that there was a critical need to make immediate, tangible and balanced progress in such implementation, particularly with regard to creation, dissemination and co-operation in the different fields of culture. The participants in the Forum urged all participating States to observe the spirit and the letter of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document in this respect.

- It is furthermore emphasized that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including cultural rights and freedoms, and including those of persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures, by all States represents one of the basic principles for a significant improvement in their mutual relations, and in international cultural co-operation at all levels.

9. The participants in the Forum discussed, *inter alia*, the following specific problems relating to its mandate:

- The denial of opportunities in some participating States for individuals in the different fields of culture to form independent institutions and organizations and to play, as individuals or as members of these independent bodies, a full and unhindered part in the cultural activity of their own States and internationally;

- Limitations on access to and the use of information, publications and materials relating to culture;

- Restrictions on access to the cultural achievements of other participating States, e.g. through cultural institutes;

- The denial to persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures of adequate protection, legal or otherwise, for the full development of their culture; and

- The need to support the efforts of individuals to reflect and promote the unity of European culture, which transcends the division of Europe.

10. The participants in the Cultural Forum urge the participating States to:

prevent individuals from forming or joining independent institutions and organizations in order to pursue and promote, as individuals or as members of these independent bodies, their interests in the different fields of culture, including the protection and promotion of cultural freedom and the respect shown by governments, including their own, for that cultural freedom;

- Ensure unimpeded communication, direct contact and co-operation, such as the holding of meetings and exhibitions by private persons, institutions and organizations active in the field of culture;

- Facilitate for humanitarian reasons the provision of the fullest information to artists and others in the field of culture, who have attempted, without success, to contact their colleagues in another participating State;

- Remove legal and administrative measures, such as censorship, which constitute barriers to creation and dissemination in the different fields of culture;

- Remove, while respecting intellectual property rights, restrictions on obtaining, possessing, reproducing, publishing and distributing materials related to the different fields of culture, including books, publications, films and videotapes, as well as on the private ownership and use of and access to typewriters, word processors and copying machines;

- Ensure unimpeded access of individual believers and communities of believers to religious publications and related materials;

- Ensure unimpeded access to public archives, libraries, research institutes and similar bodies for scholars, teachers, students and others who wish to undertake research.

- Permit unimpeded reception of broadcasts and place no restrictions on the right of individuals to choose freely their sources of broadcast information and culture;

- Abstain from placing undue obstacles to access to direct broadcasting satellites transmitting radio and television programmes, including those of a cultural nature, and allow individuals and groups to acquire the necessary equipment;

- Ensure that individuals engaged in the different fields of culture are free to travel abroad, and, in particular, that those invited officially or privately to travel to other participating States have the opportunity to do so;

- Make it possible, on the basis of bilateral arrangements, for each participating State to establish cultural institutes on the territory of the other participating States and to guarantee unhindered public access to them; and

- Protect the unique identity of national minorities and foster the free exercise of cultural rights by persons belonging to them; ensure in practice unhindered opportunities for these persons independently to maintain and develop their own culture in all its aspects, including religion, cultural monuments, historical artefacts, language, literature; and to ensure unhindered opportunities for them to give and receive, individually or collectively, instruction in their own culture, especially through the parental transmission of language, religion and cultural identity to their children.

11. Therefore, the participants in the Cultural Forum recommend that the participating States encourage, facilitate and support the initiatives which official institutes, non-governmental organizations and individuals wish to undertake to promote the aims of the CSCE in the field of culture, e.g., meetings, symposia, exhibitions, festivals, research, training and co-production programmes in which scholars, specialists and artists of the participating States may freely participate and to which they may freely contribute, in order to realize progressively the objective of promoting knowledge and culture which transcend geographic boundaries.

12. In particular, the participants in the Cultural Forum recommend that the participating States:

- Facilitate the participation in international drama festivals of individuals, productions or companies chosen by the organizers and not replace them by any other individuals, productions or companies without prior consultation;
- Encourage invitations to conductors and individual performers from other participating States to perform with orchestras and choirs in their own States;
- Promote the exchange of members of art and music academies as well as of teachers and students of drama and dance schools;
- Take into account the important role that exchanges of teachers, students and material play in the education of young film makers, particularly through festivals and prizes;
- Remove barriers to participation in film festivals, including restrictions on public access to such festivals and censorship and control on what films may be shown;
- Might consider the possibility of a meeting of writers on the subject of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity in Today's World"; a symposium on the subject of "The Impact of the Discovery of America on European Culture"; and a meeting of historians and cultural figures on "Transmission of Culture Through Emigration";
- Remove barriers to unimpeded participation in book fairs, displays and exhibits by prospective displayers; restrictions on public access to such book fairs, displays and exhibits; and censorship and control on what books or publications may be displayed;
- Consider the aesthetic aspects of the environment in the preservation, reshaping and building of cities;
- Might identify historic towns and cities for conservation and restoration projects in which other participating States might join;
- Might consider the possibility of establishing an international folklore centre of States participating in the CSCE which would be responsible for the collection, systematization and publication of the folk heritage of the participating States for educational purposes;

• Explore the possibility of computerization and dissemination in standard form of bibliographies and of catalogues of cultural works and presentations, such as musical scores, contemporary public sculpture, films, videotapes, documentary programmes shown on television, plays and the performances of artists and ensembles;

• Encourage the translation of research and literature, with special attention to bilingual editions as well as to the translation, publication and dissemination of literary works published in the less widely spoken languages in the participating States;

• Might consider proclaiming a city in a participating State "Capital of European Cultural Heritage" for one year. In the course of that year, the participating State in question would endeavour to make a special contribution to European culture in all its forms by organizing events and taking other initiatives in the city in question, including works by groups of artists. All other participating States would be invited to take part;

—Facilitate the holding of exhibitions which have a special reference to present everyday life;

—Encourage co-operation in protecting and preserving film material;

—Encourage the acquisition, co-production and regular exchange of television and radio cultural programmes;

• Encourage the appropriate national and international non-governmental organizations to work out a general framework regarding cultural exchanges such as exhibitions, guest performances, etc., including general and administrative guidelines, the possible simplification of customs and other procedures and ways of facilitating payment of fees to individuals and organizations where direct payments are rendered difficult by currency restrictions or economic constraints;

• Might consider the possibility of establishing a cultural foundation of States participating in the CSCE, which would aim at improving the conditions and opportunities of artistic creation; facilitating the dissemination of culture within and among States participating in the CSCE; and promoting cultural exchanges and co-operation among them.

13. The participants also considered a wide range of other proposals, not all of which have been reflected in this Report.

14. The participants expressed their appreciation of the effort which went into the preparation of these proposals, all of which will be recorded as they were submitted, annexed to this report, and sent forward for consideration in any further discussion of cultural questions within the framework of the CSCE.

15. The results of the Cultural Forum in Budapest will be taken into account, as appropriate, by the participating States at the next Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, scheduled for November 1986.

16. The participants expressed their gratitude to the Government of Hungary for the excellent organization of the Cultural Forum and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Budapest.

DOCUMENT 72

Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union,
Issued at the Conclusion of the Summit Meeting, Geneva,
November 21, 1985

[Extracts]

**Joint Statement,
Nov. 21, 1985³**

By mutual agreement, President of the
United States Ronald Reagan and
General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev met in
Geneva November 19-21.

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Attaching great importance to the
Stockholm Conference on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe and noting the
progress made there, the two sides
stated their intention to facilitate,
together with the other participating
states, an early and successful comple-
tion of the work of the conference. To
this end, they reaffirmed the need for a
document which would include mutually
acceptable confidence- and security-
building measures and give concrete ex-
pression and effect to the principle of
non-use of force.

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Source: Department of State Bulletin, January 1986, pp. 7, 9.

Closing Statement by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Before
the CSCE Cultural Forum, Budapest, November 25, 1985

MR. CHAIRMAN, FELLOW DELEGATES:

AS THE WORK OF THE CULTURAL FORUM DRAWS TO A CLOSE, I WISH TO ADD, ON BEHALF OF MY DELEGATION, MY WORD OF THANKS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR THE EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT PROVIDED TO ALL OF US DURING OUR STAY IN BUDAPEST. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD A SPECIAL WORD OF APPRECIATION TO THE TRANSLATORS, WHO HAVE WORKED WITH EXEMPLARY PATIENCE, DEDICATION AND EFFICIENCY TO SUPPORT OUR ENDEAVORS IN EVERY WAY. WITHOUT THEM, QUITE LITERALLY, THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO COMMUNICATION WHATSOEVER, AND I AM SURE THAT I SPEAK FOR ALL WHEN I EXTEND TO THE ENTIRE TRANSLATING STAFF OUR SINCERE THANKS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WE LEAVE BUDAPEST WITHOUT A FINAL DOCUMENT, THE FORUM, TO ITS CREDIT, HAS MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION. THAT IT HAS TAKEN PLACE AT ALL IS IN ITSELF A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. MANY VALUABLE CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE AND A HOST OF IDEAS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. THIS, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS ALL TO THE GOOD. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE SOUGHT TO DISCUSS PROVED MORE INTRACTABLE THAN OTHERS. NONETHELESS,

Source: Department of State files.

IN THE END IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE A FRANK AND OPEN DEBATE ON MANY ISSUES, EVEN IF THE DIALOGUE WAS NOT AS PRODUCTIVE AS SOME HAD HOPED. IN MY VIEW, THE IMPETUS FOR A WIDER AND MORE OPEN DISCUSSION OF OUR MANDATE CAME IN LARGE MEASURE FROM OUR CULTURAL PERSONALITIES, AND I AM PLEASED TO GIVE THEM CREDIT FOR A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF THE FORUM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION HAD HOPED THAT WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON A FINAL DOCUMENT, AND WE WORKED CONSCIENTIOUSLY UNTIL THE VERY END TO PRODUCE ONE. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, THE WESTERN GROUP SUBMITTED ITS DRAFT PROPOSAL, WHICH REPRESENTS THE FULL SCOPE OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE INTERRELATED PROBLEMS OF CREATION, DISSEMINATION AND COOPERATION. IT HIGHLIGHTS OUR CONVICTION THAT HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES RELATING TO FREEDOM OF CREATION, EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION ARE PREREQUISITES TO TRUE CULTURAL COOPERATION. THE FACT THAT THIS APPROACH WAS NOT ACCEPTED SERVES TO UNDERLINE THE BASIC DISAGREEMENTS WHICH STILL EXIST BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS AND IDEOLOGIES. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE HERE AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN EVOLUTION FAVORING GREATER PROGRESS IN THE FUTURE IN THE DIRECTION OF OVERCOMING THE IMPEDIMENTS AND OBSTACLES WHICH EXIST TODAY IN THE AREA OF CULTURE.

I WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK IF I DID NOT SAY THAT THE EXTREMELY POLEMICAL REMARKS MADE AT THE SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER TODAY WERE NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL TONE OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS FORUM. THIS TYPE OF RHETORIC IS OUTMODED AND CERTAINLY NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE ATMOSPHERE ESTABLISHED AT THE RECENT SUMMIT MEETING IN GENEVA BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. FOR MY OWN PART, I DO NOT CHOOSE TO ENGAGE IN POLEMICS ON THIS OCCASION OR TO POINT THE FINGER OF BLAME AT ANYONE FOR THE LACK OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING A SUBSTANTIVE FINAL DOCUMENT AT THIS CONFERENCE. THE UNITED STATES TRIED ITS BEST TO OBTAIN SUCH AN OUTCOME AND REGRETS THAT BASIC DIFFERENCES MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE., LET US ACCEPT THIS AS REALITY AND TURN OUR THOUGHTS TOWARD THE FUTURE AND THE MANY POSSIBILITIES WHICH EXIST TO PROMOTE TRUE CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN ALL OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH THE THOUGHTS EXPRESSED BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BECAUSE I TOO BELIEVE THAT WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN BUDAPEST CAN HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE IMPACT ON THE CSCE PROCESS.

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

Statement by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington,
December 11, 1985

I welcome the opportunity to testify today before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to present my assessment of the Budapest Cultural Forum to you and your distinguished colleagues. With your permission, I would like to request that this statement and attached documents from the forum itself, including U.S. plenary statements, be made a part of the record of this hearing.

The Cultural Forum—held in Budapest October 15 through November 25—was the most recent of a series of CSCE experts' meetings agreed at the Madrid review conference. It was the first such meeting devoted to the cultural content of the Helsinki Final Act, the first to bring together hundreds of distinguished individuals from different fields of cultural activity in the 35 participating states of Europe and North America, and the first to be held in a Warsaw Pact state. It was a unique gathering that produced both achievements and disappointments. I will try to give you a flavor of both, along with some firsthand observations on the conduct of the meeting itself.

I would first like to acknowledge the debt the U.S. Government owes to the 25 private American citizens who took time out from their professional and private lives to participate at Budapest. They gave willingly and freely of their vast expertise in exchanging views on professional topics with their counterparts. They repeatedly demonstrated the serious attitude of our country toward respect for CSCE commitments and repeatedly raised important problems of cultural communication and cooperation. We can be proud of our delegates' contributions, as well as respectful of their integrity. I also want to express my sincere appreciation to the staff members of the CSCE Commission who so competently and energetically contributed to the performance of the U.S. delegation.

In summarizing the results of the Cultural Forum, I must acknowledge that not all hopes were met. Western delegates, for instance, chafed under formal CSCE procedures that regulated discussion through use of a set speakers' list. Although the West pressed for revised procedures to promote free debate among the cultural figures, the

Source: Department of State Bulletin, February 1986, pp. 82-85.

East said no, except on two brief occasions. Also frustrating for delegates was the fact that in the two large working groups, several distinct fields of culture were under review at the same time. Most delegates participated for only a week at a time, having relatively few chances to take the floor. Nonetheless, cultural personalities from 35 countries met, conversed, exchanged ideas, and opened new horizons for each other—demonstrating the value of direct contact among people. They made many unofficial proposals for improving and expanding East-West cultural relations.

Another problem at the forum was that the 35 participating states were, as you know, unable to reach consensus on a concluding document. None was specifically required, although the demand and efforts for a written result ran high among most delegations. My own view is that the lack of consensus represents the reality of the gap between East and West on matters concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, pertaining in this instance to the conditions for cultural activity within and among states.

The mandate for the Cultural Forum was to discuss the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination, and cooperation in the different fields of culture. The United States and its NATO allies insisted, therefore, that a final document—to be acceptable—would have to give balanced treatment to these three themes and reach conclusions and recommendations pertinent to the problems discussed. The criteria applied by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to a final document were quite different. They wished to avoid stipulation of problems and concentrate solely on further plans for cultural cooperation.

I do not think that sort of document—one lacking substance—would have done the CSCE process much good. Despite exhaustive efforts by the West and the neutral countries to identify common ground in accordance with the mandate, the East refused to budge from its unacceptable position and created the choice—as at the Ottawa human rights experts' meeting—between a bad document and no document. I trust you will agree that the major obstacle to progress in the CSCE process is the lack of compliance with existing documents, not the lack of new ones.

When intense negotiations revealed that a substantive document was not within reach, Hungary proposed a short statement of the fact that the 35 states had met to discuss the problems of the mandate and expressed different and at times contradictory views. This alternative to a substantive document, while not ideal, would at least have acknowledged the disagreements between East and West at the forum. Romania blocked consensus on the Hungarian initiative, perhaps reflecting bilateral strains between the two countries.

The U.S. approach to the Cultural Forum was straightforward: to adhere to the excellent mandate in identifying problems relating to cultural activity and communication and to suggest possible solutions. We sought to ensure attention to all three themes of the mandate, to focus attention on specific problems and on possible avenues of resolution, and to promote productive discussions among the cultural figures. I think it would be instructive to mention some of the problems we considered most important to the deliberations of the forum and how we handled them.

The legitimate role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the field of culture was a primary concern of the United States, our allies, and many of the neutral countries, especially in light of the experience in Budapest of the International Helsinki Federation. I will return to this matter. Several NATO countries joined us as cosponsors of an official proposal on the role of NGOs. This was one of the principal themes of the comprehensive draft document agreed by the Western nations at the forum and a regular topic of discussion by U.S. and other Western delegates.

U.S. delegates brought attention during formal sessions of the forum to conditions of cultural repression in the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania by raising the names of known victims of repression and the generic situations that produce such victims. Numerous delegates from other Western countries did likewise. We reinforced our public stance in private bilateral meetings with the delegations of the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Romania. The U.S. delegation also took occasions to meet with and, therefore, show support for local dissident cultural figures.

In plenary speeches and interventions in the working groups, U.S. delegates emphasized the right of national minorities and religious groups to preserve and develop their particular cultures, including language instruction and the preservation of cultural and historical monuments. These interventions and a strong Western proposal on the issue made it an important theme in the forum's deliberations, to the discomfort of the U.S.S.R. and Romania in particular. Even a Hungarian delegate got into the spirit by referring publicly to the problems of the Magyar minorities in neighboring countries, making it clear he meant Romania and Czechoslovakia.

Censorship, jamming, restrictions on travel, and impeded access to cultural products were addressed repeatedly by the United States and other Western delegations in the working groups, plenary sessions, and numerous formal proposals. Since Western cultural figures, in many cases, have had direct experience with barriers to the free exchange of people, ideas, and information in the East, their interventions were especially eloquent.

Our NATO allies were broadly supportive of the U.S. approach in Budapest, although initially not as forthright as U.S. representatives in the working groups and more receptive at times than we to the East's emphasis on cooperation. We received enthusiastic NATO support for our official proposals that were intended to strengthen observance of cultural rights and freedoms.

Common Western cultural values and a joint determination that the Cultural Forum produce meaningful conclusions are amply reflected in the draft final document that the Western group (NATO plus Ireland) tabled when negotiations with the East stalemated. This document distills the Western negotiating position and sets out the results we think should have been reached at the Cultural Forum. I believe that the document will usefully serve as one of the bases for allied participation in next year's CSCE review conference in Vienna and hope it will gain currency among the concerned publics of Europe and North America.

The Eastern approach to the Cultural Forum involved procedural inflexibility, a preference for long speeches listing cultural accomplishments, emphasis on the "historic responsibility" of artists for peace, opposition to Western defense (especially nuclear weapons) policy, and avoidance of the numerous aspects of the forum's mandate where Eastern performance falls short. The Soviets and some of their Warsaw Pact allies also sought to drive wedges in the Western position by referring none too subtly to a European cultural unity, implicitly excluding North America and by constantly asserting that it was the U.S. delegation which opposed a final document. Neither theme found much support from Western or neutral delegations.

When the West raised relevant issues of cultural rights and freedoms, the East responded (sometimes with outlandish invective) that we were trying to disturb rather than contribute to the work of the forum by introducing extraneous political matters. Stressing the need for greater cooperation among the CSCE states, the Soviets and their allies made many suggestions for increased exchanges and joint projects of experts and students in the different fields of culture, under official or quasiofficial sponsorship and control.

Cooperation was a popular theme at the Cultural Forum, since it was part of the mandate and since all Eastern and some Western delegates often found it more congenial to consider fresh ideas for working together across borders than to tackle resistant and established obstacles. Our view, one that permeates the Western draft final document, is that true cooperation among states derives from the ability of their citizens to choose freely how, when, and where to express themselves and to share the fruits of their creativity. Governments have no business controlling cultural cooperation but should rather ensure that the conditions for such cooperation are optional. The proposals for cooperative action contained in the Western document are set in this context.

At the Cultural Forum, as at other CSCE meetings, the neutral and non-aligned countries played a key role in trying to bridge the differences between East and West. Delegates from these states played an active role in the work-

ing groups, often independently confirming points made by the West regarding the importance of freedom for individuals and groups to pursue their cultural interests. Toward the end of the forum, the neutrals informally presented to both East and West a draft final document that synthesized the discussions in a way they hoped would satisfy the interests of both sides. We considered the neutral draft a positive though not entirely adequate effort. We entered into negotiations with the East on the basis of this paper, hoping that our primary concerns could be accommodated.

The Eastern approach to the neutral paper was much less forthcoming and ultimately destructive to the chances of reaching consensus. The Soviets said the neutral paper was "West-leaning" and insisted that it could be a basis for negotiation only if a long series of distorting Soviet amendments were accepted.

It is important to consider events outside the forum that had a bearing on those within in order to get a full picture of what was and was not achieved. I regret—and at the time strongly protested publicly and privately—the decision of the Government of Hungary to prevent the International Helsinki Federation from conducting publicly a by-invitation-only symposium in Budapest during the first week of the forum. This decision violated Hungary's commitment as host to follow the precedent of the Madrid meeting concerning the important relationship of NGOs to the CSCE process. Other delegations felt as we did and expressed their criticism in various ways, public and private.

Aware of the issues at stake, we followed developments closely, noting that the federation was able to conduct its scheduled activities in private locales, without interference or harassment, and with Western media representatives in attendance. U.S. and other Western delegates also attended the symposium as observers in a show of solidarity and shared copies of manuscripts presented

there with other interested delegates at the forum.

There were two concerns that flowed from the circumstances confronting the federation: One was that there be no official repercussions for Hungarians who chose to attend, and the other was that Hungary's action not constitute a precedent for subsequent CSCE meetings. I spoke directly on these issues during plenary meetings and in private conversations with Hungarian authorities and believe there can be no doubt about how seriously the United States would view further misinterpretations of the Madrid precedent. The significance of NGOs to the CSCE process is well reflected in the Western document, in the formal proposal submitted by several Western delegations, and in numerous interventions made by U.S. and other Western delegates.

There was substantial media interest in the United States and Europe in the Cultural Forum, as the large number of journalists attested, but not nearly as much coverage as all of us would have liked. My interviews before and during the meeting—especially in *The New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *Washington Post* and with the wire services—presented our positions to the American public. Coverage by the *Voice of America*, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, and *Radio im amerikanischen Sektor* in West Berlin reached audiences in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, I gave interviews to Hungarian and West European print and electronic media. The problems of the International Helsinki Federation during the first week of the forum and the closing of the conference generated articles here and in Western Europe, and European colleagues in Budapest informed me that media interest in their countries was sustained throughout the forum, primarily on account of the participation of the eminent cultural figures. The press spokesman for the U.S. delegation briefed the VOA, RFE/RL and other correspondents at least twice a day on the forum's proceedings and arranged numerous interviews with U.S. cultural figures.

In addition to the participants from the United States in the International Helsinki Federation symposium, some 20 individuals and representatives of NGOs from the United States visited the U.S. delegation. We benefited from their expertise, as we did from the rich supply of materials sent to us by NGOs before the forum began. For our part, we assisted those NGOs who came to Budapest with information about the conference and practical advice and initiated a series of mailings to interested parties in the United States to keep them abreast of statements by U.S. delegates. We have in the mail to them now the draft Western document, and I intend to circulate this statement as well.

In drawing up a balance sheet on the Cultural Forum, I must candidly say that I wish it had accomplished more—that the 35 participating states had been able to do something to resolve the real problems that affect cultural creation, dissemination, and cooperation. However, if we continue our commitment to the CSCE process as an incentive for change over time in Eastern behavior, as I believe we must given the lack of feasible alternatives, then the absence of breakthroughs in Budapest should not disappoint us. In this light, I think we might reflect on the following results of the forum.

- The cultural figures from the 35 participating states, whatever their frustrations with the forum, built bridges among themselves that promote mutual understanding across borders;

- Soviet and East European delegations had no choice but to hear about their shortcomings in the cultural field from exceptionally articulate private citizens from the West, whose opinions carried irrefutable moral authority;

- Western attention to the problems and cases of cultural repression and insistence on compliance with the provisions of the Final Act give sustenance to the victims of such repression and others in the East who want their governments to uphold Helsinki commitments.

- Although no consensus document was reached (because a good one was not possible), the West has an agreed text that can serve our common interests at the Vienna review conference.

I will not attempt to oversell these results, but I do consider them positively and believe they represent the honest fruit of collective efforts by Western delegations at the forum.

Address by Ambassador Robert L. Barry Before the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, February 4, 1986

The Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe resumed work 1 week ago with a meeting attended by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister Dumas of France. The remarks of the two foreign ministers stressed the importance their countries attach to the Stockholm conference as a key instrument for enhancing European stability and security. They spoke as Europeans and described Stockholm as a dimension of a European process, the Helsinki CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process of cooperation and security building.

The United States attaches equally great importance to the Stockholm conference, and we share with our allies the vision of a Europe of independent states joined in cooperation rather than separated by mistrust and confrontation. We are not geographically a European nation, but we are tied to Europe: militarily to the defense of Western Europe; politically to the complementary goals of increased West European integration and the lowering of the barriers between East and West. Our participation in the Stockholm conference is a demonstration of this commitment to Europe.

Just before leaving Washington for Stockholm, I met with President Reagan. He issued a statement stressing the two dimensions of the Stockholm conference, military and political, and the important implications success there would have for the overall East-West relationship. The President underlined

the contribution Stockholm could make to European security in the larger sense, that which encompasses political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian—human rights—as well as strictly military matters. "The attainment of this broader concept of security," the President said, "is the fundamental objective of the United States."

The President also expressed his belief that the Stockholm conference could succeed in reaching an accord this year, a belief echoed by Minister Genscher and Minister Dumas last week. There is, in fact, a very good chance the conference will achieve what it was set up to do: establish a military confidence-building regime which could reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. In doing so, it would increase stability in the European military situation in the near term and give a political impulse to greater openness and cooperation between East and West.

Developing an Effective Confidence-Building Regime

If an agreement is reached in Stockholm, it will be similar in outline to the proposals NATO tabled at the beginning of the conference in January 1984. It will establish a mandatory confidence-building regime consisting of measures requiring exchange of information about military forces in Europe and requiring that significant movements from normal locations be forecast a year in advance, described in more detail several weeks

Source: Department of State Bulletin, April 1986, pp. 65-67. Ambassador Barry was head of the U.S. delegation to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

in advance, and observed by teams from other participating states. There will be adequate verification measures, including onsite inspection. There will be language reaffirming, but not redefining, the principle of non-use of force.

In contrast to the confidence-building measures in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which were largely political in significance because they were voluntary and lacked any provision for verification, these measures would have a real impact on the conduct of military affairs. Indeed, the broader political implications of a Stockholm agreement would flow from the practical military significance of the measures we agreed on.

In the view of the United States and our allies, this confidence-building regime coming out of Stockholm should accomplish several ends.

Risk Reduction. An agreement would reduce the risk of military confrontation arising from ambiguity about the nature of military activities and the intentions behind them. It would do this by requiring a routine exchange of information concerning military forces and their normal exercise practices which would, over time, develop a pattern of normal military activity in Europe. Establishing the data base which defined this pattern may take a few years, but once established, it could become the norm against which all military activity on the Continent would be judged. Conformity with such a norm could contribute to increased stability as well as greater predictability in the overall military situation. On the other hand, extraordinary military activity, determined by reference to the established norm, would become readily identifiable with the result that appropriate political and, if required, military countermeasures could be taken. Conformity with a pattern would serve the confidence-building aspect of a confidence- and security-building regime, while identifying deviations from the norm would be useful for the security-building aspect.

Use of Military Force for Political Intimidation. By requiring states to publish a schedule of activities far in advance, the confidence-building regime we are discussing would inhibit the use of military force for political purposes. Europe has seen too many examples of the use of so-called military exercises for the purpose of political intimidation, for example, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981. A mandatory confidence-building regime providing for forecasting, notification, observation, and inspection would not prevent such events in the future. But it would raise the political price to a threatening state and, thus, help to deter the threat. And inspection and observation would provide a clearer indication of the intent behind such sudden, large-scale activities. Since uncertainty about intent is a major factor in intimidation, an effective confidence-building regime would help counter intimidation.

Confidence Building and Openness. Requiring states to announce in advance a schedule for the activities of their forces would contribute greatly to predictability and stability. Consider the significance of 35 countries with very different security requirements and political ties agreeing that they would initiate no significant military activities without first announcing and explaining them formally and in detail in advance. Both militarily and politically, establishing the principle of openness and the right of states to know about the military intentions and activities of others—East, West, and neutral and non-aligned—would be of precedent-setting importance. Military commanders understand, I believe, the stabilizing effect that the correct degree of openness in military affairs affords. They accept the idea that intelligence information can indicate, with a considerable degree of assurance, whether their military activities are routine and nonthreatening in character. The confidence-building regime which we envision would expand openness and, thus, increase this assurance about the nature of activities

through overt mutual cooperation. Exaggerated claims for military secrecy belong to the past; real confidence and security building requires that we put outmoded practices behind us.

When we discuss openness among states, we touch upon the fundamental objective of U.S. policy which President Reagan emphasized: a Europe without barriers, where people of all countries can communicate with one another, travel freely, exchange ideas of all kinds, for the enrichment of all. In Stockholm, we deal with military exchange, and the need to find an alternative to secretiveness and confrontation in the military field is, perhaps, particularly evident. But relations at the military level are a reflection of relationships on more basic political, cultural, and economic levels. Stockholm can ease suspicion and increase openness and understanding through a confidence-building regime in the military field, but success there will also contribute to improvement between East and West across the spectrum of the relationship.

The concept of openness, whether in military affairs or in other fields, is an issue of great sensitivity to some of the participants in the Stockholm conference, especially to the Soviet Union. But my impression is that this sensitivity is lessening as a new generation comes to power in the Soviet Union. I am particularly encouraged that the Soviet leadership seems to have accepted the principle of onsite inspection as a necessary element of verifiability, as evidenced by a number of recent statements, including General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 proposals.

Although there has been no indication yet that the principle has been accepted for risk reduction activities as opposed to arms reductions activities, I see no reason why it should not be; Western inspection and observation proposals in the Stockholm context are less intrusive than elsewhere because they involve dynamic activities which, unlike static ones, do not require entry into sensitive installations.

The Soviet attitude is evolving positively in other areas as well. At the beginning of the conference, the East took a very polemical approach and advanced proposals not for practical, concrete confidence- and security-building measures but, rather, for declaratory measures on no-first-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons-free zones, reduction of military budgets, and the like, which represented their political agenda for Western Europe. In the past year, the East has gradually adopted a more practical and constructive approach. They have been more forthcoming on important procedural and substantive issues. In October, they joined with the other participants in accepting an informal working arrangement which focused the attention of the conference on specific measures with real military content.

Also in October, during his visit to Paris, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev accepted the idea of an exchange of annual schedules for military activities—a measure which both NATO and the neutral and nonaligned had proposed. In Geneva last November, Mr. Gorbachev joined President Reagan in asking for an early and successful conclusion of the Stockholm conference. Last month, in his statement of January 15, Mr. Gorbachev reaffirmed the commitment to progress, as President Reagan did on January 21.

Areas of Difference

In sum, the East has moved closer to the approach laid out in the conference mandate, on which the West based its package of proposals. One reason for the change is that NATO was well-prepared for this conference and has been patient and firm in the face of efforts to divert the agenda from military security to political issues. The East does want an agreement which will allow continuation of some kind of European security conference, and they must realize that the only agreement within reach is one which fulfills the mandate criteria and is concrete, practical, militarily significant, and verifiable.

I have already identified verifiability as the essential element of an agreement and an area where East and West have not yet been able to establish common ground. A second area of difference relates to information exchange. The East continues to object to a comprehensive exchange, describing it as an attempt to legalize espionage. The final Eastern position on information, as on inspection, will be a good indicator of just how far they are prepared to accept the concept of openness, which is the underlying premise of any confidence-building regime.

A third problem area has been the question of what types of military activity are to be covered. In our view, the Madrid mandate established what we call the functional approach. That is, air and naval activities are covered when they are functionally related to ground force activities; indeed, such combined arms activities are the only kind which have real military significance in the European context. The East has tried to include so-called independent air and naval activities in the measures under discussion, an attempt which the West has rejected. Now it appears that the East is willing to have an agreement which does not include independent naval activities. That removes a major obstacle in the talks. Inherently unverifiable independent air activities should also be set aside.

Relation to Arms Control, Security, and Human Rights

I believe that the will exists to overcome these obstacles. So let me try to relate success in Stockholm to the larger picture of arms control and East-West relations. The two tracks of arms reduction, on the one hand, and confidence building leading to risk reduction, on the other, are mutually reinforcing. We hope for success in Geneva and in Vienna—significant reduction in nuclear and conventional arms. If we can accomplish these reductions, they will, in themselves, build confidence and, thus, result in a more stable world. In the meantime, successful confidence building can help to pave the way for arms reductions.

The kind of regime we are trying to create in Stockholm would, if complied with, give a political impulse to other negotiations. Stockholm is also breaking new ground in another area. It is the only security forum which includes all the European states, except for Albania. It has stimulated the first serious formal exchange among the neutral and non-aligned states on security-related issues, resulting in the emergence of a common position on the issues before the conference. This, in turn, has made them see more clearly some of the complexities and difficulties involved with the arms reduction efforts, which are also important to them.

Success in Stockholm could have a positive effect on the entire range of East-West relations, as both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have independently recognized. To cite just one example, it could move the entire Helsinki CSCE process ahead. The CSCE followup meeting, which opens in Vienna in November of this year, will evaluate progress in all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act. That means examining developments in human rights as well as progress in the security field. For the United States and its NATO allies, balance among all 10 principles of the CSCE is essential to the continuation of the process.

Developments on humanitarian and human rights issues in the East since the Madrid review meeting of 1980-83 have not been encouraging. Nor can we point to notable success at the post-Madrid meetings such as the Ottawa human rights forum (Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting) or the Budapest Cultural Forum. We can hope for success at the Bern Human Contacts Meeting later this year, but, in any case, the Vienna conferees will not have a very bright picture to contemplate. A meaningful and politically binding Stock-

holm agreement, strictly complied with by all participating states, will make it easier for Vienna to decide on continuing the Stockholm security forum in some form after the CSCE review concludes its work.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me note that our work in Stockholm lacks the drama of dealing with vital nuclear issues, as the Geneva negotiators do. As [NATO Secretary General] Lord Carrington pointed out in a speech to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs last week, the pace of our work has been something less than electric, although he also pointed out that, compared to our MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions) colleagues in Vienna, we have been almost reckless in our haste. So it is little wonder that our efforts have gone largely unnoticed, both in the media and in our foreign offices. But, as the clock runs out on our deliberations, things are beginning to happen. Keep your eye on us for the 23 negotiating weeks remaining to us, and you may see something interesting—and important—begin to emerge. ■

Statement by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Michael H. Armacost Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Washington, March 25, 1986

I welcome this opportunity today to meet with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe² to discuss the Administration's approach to CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]—the "Helsinki" process.

The hearings held by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe are important. They focus attention on the contribution that improved respect for human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would make to overall East-West relations. We welcome the commission's sustained work over the past decade—and the efforts of concerned private American groups—to promote the goals of the Helsinki Final Act. Through your hearings, resolutions, participation on U.S. delegations, and research and publications, the commission and its staff have worked vigorously and served the interests of the United States well. We look forward to continuing this close and productive relationship as we prepare for CSCE meetings in Bern next month and in Vienna in November.

In your letter of invitation, you asked that I put the CDE [Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe] negotiations in Stockholm and other elements of the CSCE process into perspective and provide an assessment of the prospects for the Vienna review meeting and beyond. Let me begin with an overview that describes our assessment of the process, outlines our approach, and then looks ahead, mainly to the Bern and Vienna meetings. [Head of the U.S. delegation to the CDE] Ambassador Robert Barry will address more specifically the prospects of the CDE.

Assessing the CSCE Process

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe represents a framework within which the 35 participating states can work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, and security issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each of these areas is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation. The Western objective for the past decade has been to preserve and strengthen this process through thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and by agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

At the 10th anniversary commemoration of the Final Act, attended by 35 foreign ministers last summer in Helsinki, Secretary Shultz assessed the CSCE process. Although the reality of Europe's division remained, he noted, we have seen limited progress. The Final Act has had some practical effect. For example, journalists travel more easily between CSCE countries. Significant numbers of citizens in some East European countries have been reunited with their families in the West. And the review conferences in Belgrade and Madrid as well as other CSCE meetings have kept alive the aspirations embodied in the Final Act.

In summing up our assessment, however, Secretary Shultz concluded that:

... 10 years after the signing of the Final Act, no one can deny the gap between hope and performance. Despite the real value of the Final Act as a standard of conduct, the most important promises of a decade ago have not been kept.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, May 1986, pp. 69-72.

There is no need to recite the basis for this conclusion. The record of compliance of the Warsaw Pact nations with their CSCE undertakings is seriously flawed.

- The number of Soviet Jews permitted to emigrate fell from 51,000 in 1979 to somewhat over 1,000 last year. And we have seen similar reductions in the number of Armenian and ethnic German emigrants.

- While recent Soviet decisions to permit 33 families to be reunited in the West are welcome, we cannot forget that there are many others who remain separated from their families.

- The Soviet Union continues to imprison its citizens who speak out on human rights.

- Andrei Sakharov remains isolated in Gorkiy, although his wife has been permitted to travel abroad for medical treatment.

- Several religious groups are persecuted in Romania, religious leaders are imprisoned, and churches are demolished.

- In Poland, Bogdan Lis, Adam Michnik, and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk have been sentenced to prison terms for championing free trade unions.

- In Czechoslovakia, the regime severely restricts the Catholic Church and has been especially active in suppressing religious dissent within the Charter '77 movement.

- In Bulgaria, the government has attempted to deprive almost 10% of its people—the Turkish minority—of its ethnic heritage.

- And despite a generally favorable human rights record, in Hungary there is continued harassment of dissidents.

This mixed record has led some to express understandable skepticism over the value of continued involvement in the CSCE process. We share those frustrations. We believe, however, that we must keep faith with those who struggle to realize the goals of Helsinki. That is why, on the 10th anniversary of the Final Act last summer, President Reagan reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Helsinki principles and our dedication to giving them meaning in the daily lives of all citizens whose governments signed the Final Act.

Let me discuss the three basic considerations that lead us to view the CSCE process as a valuable instrument of Western diplomacy, despite the disappointments of its first decade.

Supporting the Western Agenda

First, it is clear that the Helsinki Final Act serves as a vehicle to marshal support for a fundamentally Western agenda. The Soviet Union sought to legalize the division of Europe, but the Final Act looks toward its peaceful unification. The East wanted to highlight the central role of the state, but the Final Act stresses individual rights and freedom. The Final Act asserted that respect for human rights was a fundamental element of genuine security and cooperation; it confirmed that a government's abuse of its own citizens was a legitimate subject for international discussion. Far from giving the Soviet Union a lever on Western Europe, the CSCE

process confirmed the continuing engagement of the United States in Europe.

The CSCE process has, thus, served to foster and reinforce alliance unity. In turn, alliance unity—insisting on compliance with CSCE undertakings and balance between security and human rights goals—has been essential to the limited progress we have made in CSCE.

And I should add that the NATO alliance has not stood alone in pushing for both balance and for progress in human rights. Our neutral friends have found that in CSCE they can play a special role. Their neutral credentials remain untarnished. But from the beginning in CSCE they have pushed for Soviet adherence to the commitments undertaken in Madrid and Helsinki.

International Conduct and Human Rights Standards

The second area where the Final Act plays a significant role in our East-West diplomacy relates to the standards it set for the conduct of individual governments toward each other and toward their own citizens. In Helsinki, the United States, Canada, and 33 European states agreed to observe 10 basic principles in their relations with one another, as well as with other states. We can cite no evidence that this has significantly altered Soviet behavior. But these principles have given a solid framework for Western arguments concerning that behavior.

A number of the principles—respect for sovereignty, non-use of force, nonintervention in internal affairs, equal rights and self-determination of peoples—have increased the impact of Western condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and of Soviet pressure on Poland in the early 1980s. The CSCE process helped focus the world's outrage at the unlawful Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, particularly during the opening weeks of the Madrid review conference. Similarly, the strong Western response in CSCE to the imposition of martial law in Poland drew international attention to Soviet actions that contradicted its Helsinki obligations.

It is in the area of human rights standards that CSCE has played a particularly significant role. The Final Act is based on the view that the interests of individual human beings are a fundamental part of security and stability in Europe. Greater security and a more

stable peace depend on greater freedom for the people of Europe.

At Helsinki in 1975, the Soviet Union and other East European countries willingly subscribed to principles affirming basic human rights and to provisions calling for freer flow of ideas, information, and people. These provisions were strengthened in the 1983 Madrid Concluding Document. These two documents added legitimacy to international discussion of the way a government treats its citizens. Coupled with a process of followup meetings, the Final Act gives the West a vehicle for keeping the pressure on Eastern governments for improvements in human rights performance.

One can only speculate on the motivations of the Soviet Union and other East European governments in signing the Final Act. If they thought their commitments would be ignored—they were wrong.

For years the Soviets sought to deflect human rights criticism by hiding behind "noninterference in internal affairs." The hollowness of this defense, however, has been exposed at successive CSCE meetings during which the Soviets have been forced to confront the facts of their poor record. At the CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa, the Soviets changed tactics and took the offensive, charging Western abuses of social and economic rights. This change of tactic implicitly conceded the legitimacy of raising human rights issues involving another country. And it testified to the growing force of international concern over human rights, a trend that the Final Act has nourished.

The Final Act has helped bring greater international attention to the cause of human rights. By signing the Final Act, the Soviet Union created the expectation that it would comply, making its failures to do so all the more troubling, not only in the United States but in Europe as well. In the United States, the Final Act gave rise to the CSCE Commission and provided a focus for the network of private organizations which have pressed for improved respect for human rights. The existence of agreed standards has also encouraged other Western governments to speak up against human rights abuses. And it has provided a focal point for efforts by European parliaments and private groups.

From the 1977 Belgrade review conference to the recent Budapest Cultural Forum, expressions of Western concern

over Soviet abuses have become increasingly frequent and specific. During General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Paris, for example, President Mitterrand reported to the French people that he had insisted that movement in "Basket Three" (Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields) of the Final Act take place at the same pace as in the other areas of CSCE. And French journalists took Gorbachev to task for Soviet failure to live up to the standards enshrined in the Final Act.

The Soviets, moreover, have shown themselves sensitive to such criticism, particularly when it adversely affects the image Moscow wants to cultivate in Western Europe.

The CSCE experts meeting in Ottawa last year, where I had the privilege to deliver the opening statement for the United States, illustrates well the diplomatic value of the CSCE process. Soviet intransigence and refusal to commit itself to any improvements in its human rights practices blocked agreement on meaningful, practical steps forward. Nevertheless, the meeting was worthwhile and advanced our objectives.

- It gave us nearly 3 weeks to debate Soviet adherence to the commitments in the Final Act. The West, both our allies and our neutral friends, put the Soviets and other East Europeans in the dock for human rights abuses. The East was effectively isolated.

- The West rejected initial Eastern claims that criticism constituted interference in the internal affairs of another state.

- The West held firm in rejecting Soviet efforts to distort Principle Seven of the Final Act dealing with human rights. Instead, the Western states tabled a set of specific proposals that constituted a common human rights agenda for the future.

In sum, Ottawa gave the West an opportunity to sound a united call for improved respect for human rights in the East.

We regret that the Ottawa meeting, like the CSCE process as a whole, has not done more to enhance the prospect of short-term improvement for individuals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But such meetings and the international attention they focus on human rights issues do advance the cause. The fact that attention is paid to their plight provides comfort, if not hope, to the citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And most of those in

Eastern Europe active in the struggle for human rights support the CSCE process. They welcome our emphasis on the commitments in the Final Act and our effort to bring about improved Eastern compliance.

It is undeniable that the CSCE process, more than any other forum, has served to focus the world's attention on massive Soviet human rights violations. And in doing so, the CSCE process has served to expose the nature of Soviet power and promote the cause of freedom around the world.

The meeting on human contacts in Bern that begins in April will focus attention on such important CSCE issues as freedom to travel, freedom to emigrate, and family reunification. As Michael Novak, the head of our Bern delegation, testified before you last week, it is our hope that this meeting will mark an advance toward lowering the barriers that divide the peoples and families of the East and West. We hope the spirit of cooperation on humanitarian affairs which emerged from President Reagan's Geneva meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will be given a new reality through concrete deeds. Steps forward on such issues would make an important contribution to the Vienna followup meeting later this year.

European Security Issues

Security is the third area in which the CSCE process plays an important role in our overall East-West policy. Far from fulfilling Soviet aims to diminish our role in European security affairs, CSCE provided a forum which engaged the United States and Canada, together with European governments, in a discussion of the basic questions of European security.

At the Madrid followup meeting, the West secured a mandate for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that serves our interests. The mandate recognized explicitly that the CDE was an integral part of the CSCE process, expanded the zone defined in the Final Act to cover the Soviet Union west of the Urals, and stipulated that the measures adopted should have military significance and be verifiable.

At the CDE conference, we have an opportunity to find concrete ways to increase confidence and security in Europe. NATO is pushing for adoption of specific confidence- and security-building

measures that address some of the proximate causes of war. They would make European military activities more predictable and more stable. Through skillful negotiation over the past 2 years, the West has prevented the Soviets from turning Stockholm into a forum for empty, propagandistic declarations that support their vision of a pan-European security order excluding the United States.

The growing consensus in Stockholm is based on the Western concept of security. It features practical measures which would increase our knowledge of potentially threatening military activities. And these measures would be verifiable by every state participating in the conference.

With the setting of a September 19, 1986, adjournment date and the recent move to drafting, the conference has now moved into a more intensive phase. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at their meeting last November made a political commitment to work with others for a successful conclusion in Stockholm. The U.S. delegation has been instructed to pursue concrete results at the negotiating table.

An agreement in Stockholm that met our objectives would serve the West's security interests by providing a set of concrete rules governing military activities in Europe. Through the exchange of information about forces in Europe and an annual calendar of planned activities, we would be able to increase mutual understanding about intentions behind those activities. This would provide greater openness and improved mutual understanding about military intentions and practices—contributing to enhanced stability and security in Europe.

If successful, the Stockholm conference can help achieve the primary goal of the CSCE process—lowering the barriers that artificially divide Europe between East and West.

These various strands of the CSCE process are tied together by the concept of balance. This concept is founded on recognition, inherent in the Final Act itself, of the interdependence among the three parts of the CSCE process—humanitarian, security, and economic. Military-security aspects cannot be dealt with productively if they are isolated from humanitarian and human rights considerations. Thus, for example, we have countered vigorously Eastern attempts to establish a military-security forum as an autonomous entity, overshadowing our efforts to improve human rights and human contacts.

U.S. Commitment and the Challenge Ahead

We are committed to balanced progress across the board. We insist on moving ahead in all areas because we believe all 10 principles are equally important. At the same time, there is no ready formula for the application of balance. It is not a mechanical concept. It is unrealistic to posit a fixed linkage between security and human rights. The trade-offs cannot be put in such simple terms.

And yet, it is also unrealistic to believe that real and enduring improvement can take place in East-West relations without progress on humanitarian and human rights issues.

To quote French Foreign Minister Dumas: "Can a state which is not at peace with its own citizens really gain the confidence of its neighbors?" Concrete steps in this area would go far toward restoring the political confidence and political support for constructive progress in CSCE.

Balance is the challenge for the Vienna followup meeting that begins November 4. The delegations at Vienna will have to weigh what has been achieved on human rights and human contacts, on cultural and economic cooperation, and on security. They will have to look at the results of the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, the Budapest Cultural Forum, and the upcoming Bern Human Contacts Meeting. The question of the future of CDE will be part of this overall assessment. Even if the CDE is successful, we must be careful to ensure that the security component is not allowed to dominate other aspects of the CSCE process.

In addition to maintaining balance, the West faces two other basic tasks at Vienna.

- The first is to maintain Western unity. The Soviet Union never tires of seeking ways to exploit the CSCE process to drive wedges between us and our allies. If we are to make progress on issues of importance to us, we must present a united front.

- Second, we must take stock fully and candidly of the extent to which commitments have been kept and the extent to which governments have fallen short. Vienna must establish a clear record. Governments must be made to account for their commitments.

Given the Eastern record on humanitarian and human rights issues, the Vienna followup meeting is likely to be a difficult conference. Progress on hu-

humanitarian and human rights issues in the months ahead would certainly enhance the prospects for a constructive outcome, which we would welcome.

We are at an early stage in our own planning for the Vienna meeting. We look forward to working closely with the commission in the months ahead on the issues we will confront in Vienna. As in Madrid, we will lean heavily on your skills, expertise, and judgment.

The Helsinki Final Act 10 years ago set an agenda for progress toward greater security and a more stable peace in Europe. It evoked a vision of a united Europe in which barriers were removed and freedoms were enjoyed throughout the continent, a Europe in which dialogue rather than conflict resolved differences and cooperation benefited individuals in both the West and the East.

That is the vision that will inform our approach to Vienna and beyond. The disappointments of the past decade indicate there are no easy strategies for achieving the ambitious goals set forth in the Final Act. Patience, skillful diplomacy, Western unity, and the courage of our convictions will be required.

In closing, let me recall President Reagan's statement on the close of the last review conference 3 years ago:

In concluding the Madrid meeting, we reaffirm our commitment to the Helsinki process. We will not flag in our continued determination to work with all governments and peoples whose goal is the strengthening of peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, dialogue, when based on realistic expectations and conducted with patience, can produce results. These results are often gradual and hard won, but they are the necessary building blocks for a more secure and stable world. . . . Giving substance to the promises of Madrid and Helsinki will remain one of our prime objectives.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe was established by the Congress in 1976. It is composed of nine Senators, nine Congressmen, and one representative each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. The commission monitors the acts of the CSCE signatory states, with a particular emphasis on their compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document. It also seeks to encourage the development of activities that expand East-West economic cooperation and a greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West. ■

DOCUMENT 77

Opening Statement by Ambassador Michael Novak Before the CSCE
Meeting of Experts, Bern, April 17, 1986

The people of the United States, through our delegation, would like to thank the people of Switzerland, and with them the Executive Secretary, and his every single staff person, for the generosity, the open-heartedness and the perfection of the arrangements with which they have welcomed us.

In this city, at every turn, the virtues of the Swiss people are apparent: dignity; a striving for excellence; a love for intellect and the works thereof; an instinct for the beauty of God's mountains and the creativity of humankind. In this way, the ordinary people of Switzerland -- their laws, their traditions, their habits of the heart -- shed light upon our mandate: "to discuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations."

In which country of the world are contacts among persons, institutions and organizations developed to a higher art? In which are human contacts so international, open, orderly and warm? If all the world were Switzerland, the burden of our mandate would be light.

Nearly eleven years ago, the distinguished Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, then Sir Alec Douglas-Home, threw down a challenge: "If we do not improve the life of ordinary people at this conference," he said of Helsinki, "we shall be asked -- and with justice -- what all our fine words and diplomatic phrases have achieved." Ordinary people. If we do not improve the life of ordinary people, words are empty. There remains a darkness in which many millions cry.

Ordinary people are our subject here. Ordinary people in their ordinariness -- with their spouses, their children, their parents, their grandparents and multiple relatives; the cemeteries where the bones of their ancestors lie and the shaded rooms in which their sick languish; their sports and travels; their friends and relatives blown abroad upon the winds of war and chance and choice; their professions; and the deepest convictions of their hearts.

Ordinary people are our theme. Our mandate is: to improve their lives. "To discuss the development of contacts" -- that is, to seek improvement in their contacts with other human beings and to discern the impediments, obstacles, and barbed wire walls; the tangles of law and administrative breakdowns which interrupt such contacts.

Source: Department of State files. Ambassador Novak was head of the U.S. delegation at Bern.

We act in the name of peace, security, and cooperation in Europe and these four go together: peace -- security -- cooperation -- and ordinary people, in their ordinary human contacts.

What do ordinary people want? It is no so very much: ordinary liberty to do ordinary human things, without any state standing in their way. This is a universal dream of all ordinary people everywhere. It is a dream embodied, codified, set down in clear words, and certified by 35 heads of state on the first day of August 1975, in Helsinki, Finland: Ordinary liberties for ordinary people.

In Moscow last February 25, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev expressed a portion of this dream in a few brief "fundamental principles":

"IN THE HUMANITARIAN SPHERE:

* -- ...broader contact between peoples for the purpose of learning about one another; reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and concord in relations between them...

* -- decision in a humane and positive spirit of questions related to the reunification of families, marriage and the promotion of contacts between people and between organizations..."

This is one nation's view of the universal dream. The dream is more powerful than the views of any nation, or of all nations. This dream does not originate in states. It cannot be contained by states. It is endowed in ordinary people everywhere, by the deepest and most powerful endowment.

This is the dream that haunts our ever ancient, ever new European civilization. For marxists as well as democratic capitalists, for believers and unbelievers, for all who speak the languages of Europe, think the thoughts of Europe, and give evidence in their lives of the habits of Europe -- for all these, the roots of European culture lie buried deep in these three convictions of Judaism and Christianity:

- (1) it is the vocation of Europeans (as of all humans) to change history, not merely to be passive before it;
- (2) to meet this vocation, every single human being has been created free and responsible, and is endowed with unalienable rights to pursue the vocation of human development to its fullest;
- (3) to protect these rights, governments are formed among men to improve the life of ordinary people, through the consent of ordinary people.

General Secretary Gorbachev speaks of a dialogue among "leaders of countries." It is also, far more deeply, a dialogue among the world's ordinary people. Everywhere, Europeans today seek the intellectual roots of our common humanity, our common roots, at the core of every European spirit.

This CSCE, this conference -- this institution of no fixed abode, and no permanent staff, and no permanent budget -- is fashioning a new Europe, and persons of middling age -- that is, most of us in this room -- have in our care the nurturing of this Europe, during the next fourteen years, until the year 2000, and into the next, twenty-first, century, hopefully to be the most creative of all human centuries.

Indeed, a new era in human contacts is already forming, through technology, which no government will be able to control. This technology is personal, and designed to obey individual will: personal computers, word processors, video cassettes, portable hand-held telephones and television communicators. It is now possible to control carbon paper through serial numbers. It is now possible to put padlocks on copiers. But it is not possible for central authorities to control the new personal media. Those who try will enter obsolescence.

As we enter this new age, the test for every nation will be: Does it improve the life of ordinary people? Or does it enter slow decline?

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I have tried to sketch the dream that unites all delegations in this room. Now I must face the other way, toward reality. The reality, alas, is not like the dream.

Let me put the matter as gently as I can. About one American in ten has at least one family root in Central and Eastern Europe: some twenty-three million Americans. One part of their growing family tree spreads branches in America; part grows still in Europe. Along such family networks, through such human contacts -- by letter and by telephone, by memory and sympathy, in ways both straight and indirect -- come jolting shocks of reality.

Of all American citizens, those of Central and East European heritage find it most difficult to exercise freely the rights of human contact with their families abroad. Our fellow citizens, who spring from Swiss or French, Italian or Spanish, Irish or Norwegian -- indeed from Latin American or African or Asian -- stock, find almost no difficulties in exercising free and open contact with their families in their *rodina* (homeland) of origin. Not so with us.

We hear pleas from relatives of ours in the Baltic States and Ukraine, among others; pleas from relatives of ours in countries in Eastern Europe; pleas from relatives of ours among Jews in several lands. We hear realities from thousands upon thousands who seek to visit, or to move abroad, according to the choices of their heart. To hear from such as these is to pass from dream to reality.

Let me say a word about how our delegation will proceed. The people of the United States are a biblical people. Like

the Bible itself, we think naturally in stories, in terms of individual cases, which are the foundation of the Common Law. From time to time, our delegation will, quite naturally, mention the individual cases of those whose dreams have not yet been realized.

In this context, my delegation honors the citizen monitors in so many countries, who took the words of the Helsinki Final Act with dreadful seriousness. These brave men and women -- heroes to the entire human race -- have bravely endured so much more than any of us to make the dreams of the Final Act the dramatic material of a new beginning. They have begun the task of making words of law deeds of flesh, of making dreams realities, of turning solemn international commitments into actual "decisions in a humane and positive spirit."

The people of the United States are also a family people. Families are dear to us, as are the multiplicity of freely chosen associations in which we live our daily lives. Our hearts are especially drawn to the divided spouses, separated from each other's arms for so many years. We are touched by family members, seeking to join that portion of their family tree they freely choose.

This is not the occasion for details. Suffice it to say that many letters and calls make us aware of greater pain than words well express. Perhaps the reality to which I speak is best expressed in the image President Reagan evoked in dispatching me to Bern -- an image of the Great Wall through the heart of Europe, dividing Europe, symbolizing the rude interruption of normal human contacts.

In the twenty-first century, will that wall stand? Will it be necessary? Will it remain, as an affront to dignity, to liberty, and to the ordinary human contacts of ordinary human beings?

It is said at times that Europe is today divided by two philosophies, two different social systems, two different images of how human contacts should be exercised. On one side, it is said, are those who believe that human contacts ought to be steered, ought to be controlled, by the state for the interests of the state. On the other side, it is said, are those who believe that human contacts ought to spring from the soul of every individual person, from choice, from will, from self-determination: human contacts of ordinary people, by ordinary people, for ordinary people.

Two different social systems, two different philosophies: suppose this description true. What is never addressed is why? How are these two systems justified? In the night, in the words of Chekhov, one hears the sobbing of a child. "Why?" the child asks.

Our mandate is to "discuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations." We will,

therefore, discuss laws, regulations, habits, and ways of acting. We will discuss these -- both in dream and in reality. We must discuss them with hope for concrete improvements in the lives of ordinary citizens -- in the words of General Secretary Gorbachev: new "decisions in a humane and positive spirit." And we must discuss them face-to-face with reality. Many ordinary people suffer in the dark.

Our delegation intends to hear, and to voice, their pain.

Above all, we look to a better Europe soon. An open Europe. A Europe without a wall. Europe free from fear: acting out in reality the peace, security and cooperation to which the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document committed all of us. We look to the scrupulous application of those commitments. All our nations have publicly affixed their names to them.

We thank every delegation for dreaming this dream with us, facing reality with us, so that all cooperating together, Europe may experience another, morally fuller, renaissance.

AMWXX

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, two delegations raised the question of terrorism. Because I was the Chairman of the day, and because their references were oblique, it seemed appropriate to wait until today to make a comment.

One does not have to agree with Thomas Hobbes to note: without civilization, there is only terrorism: nothing but brute power, murder, and fear. Civilization begins with triumph over terror.

Although the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document affirm several penetrating points about terrorism, terrorism is not the subject of our mandate at Bern. By contrast, though, civilization is a theme important to us because civilization is the pre-condition for authentically human contacts. Civilization is the rule of law substituted for the rule of terror. Since it is a work of reason, civilization consists in layer upon layer of defenses against terror. The right to defend civilization against terror is inherent in civilization. The right to defend civilization against terror is permitted by international law; it is commanded by the moral law.

During our first weekend in Bern, fellow delegates, on the evening of April 5, AS WE WERE JUST MEETING one another, scores of young men and women in Berlin were ALSO MEETING. It was a weekend. They were dancing. Like young people everywhere, they were carefree, relaxed, and happy with the happiness of youth.

So also, a few days earlier, were the passengers on a TWA airliner flying smoothly over Athens. These normal human

contacts among peaceful citizens of several states were suddenly jolted by explosions. From out of the blasted fuselage three adults and one infant were sucked out to their deaths. In Berlin, the dancing was stopped by horror, the same horror which surrounds all civilized people today, as once it did centuries ago.

Let me return to my original theme. Centuries ago, both in ancient times and in medieval times, the cities of Europe had their first origins in a determined battle against terrorism. These were walled cities -- often built above cliffs -- islands of safety amidst a countryside preyed upon by brigands and marauders.

In the coming renaissance of Europe of which I speak today, Europe will also break the grip of terrorism. Europe will rise free from terrorism. Europe will do so because of the resolution and determination of all its citizens. The citizens of the United States will be at their side. The citizens of Europe and of the United States now bear the burden of this struggle, not because we chose to, but because it was thrust upon us. Innocent civilians in innocent surroundings have the right to be free from fear. And they will be.

Draft Report Submitted to the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts, Bern, May 23, 1986

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF BELGIUM, CANADA,
DENMARK, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
GREECE, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG,
THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN,
TURKEY, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON HUMAN CONTACTS
REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE, FORESEEN BY THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
OF THE MADRID MEETING

1. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a meeting of experts representing the participating States took place in Bern, at the invitation of the of the Government of Switzerland, from 15 April to 26 May 1986 to discuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations.
2. The Meeting was preceded by Preparatory Consultations which started in Bern on 2 April 1986.
3. At the opening session the participants were addressed by Federal Councillor Pierre Aubert, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Government of Switzerland.

Source: Conference document CSCE/BME.47, May 23, 1986. The proposal was tabled by the delegations of 17 Western nations. The draft failed of adoption. The Conference was unable to agree on a final report.

4. The opening session on 15 April and the closing session on 26 May 1986 were held in open plenary meetings. During the closing session, statements were made by those delegations who wished to do so.

5. Under agenda item 2(a), a general debate on the development of human contacts took place. Under agenda item 2(b), forty-six proposals for recommendations were submitted and considered by the participants. Under agenda item 2(c), they drew up conclusions and recommendations. Two subsidiary working bodies under the guidance of the plenary dealt with the following questions as listed in section 1 (Human Contacts) of the Chapter of the Final Act entitled "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields":

SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY I:

- contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties;
- reunification of families;
- marriage between citizens of different States.

SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY II:

- travel for personal or professional reasons;
- improvement of conditions for tourism on an individual or collective basis;
- meetings among young people;
- sport;
- expansion of contacts.

6. The participants recalled the aims of the States participating in the CSCE to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of humanitarian problems that arise in that connection.

7. The participants affirmed that unimpeded human contacts strengthen mutual understanding, friendly relations and trust among peoples.

8. During the discussion, different and, at times, contradictory opinions were expressed concerning respect for and implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document relating to human contacts by the participating States. While certain progress was noted, grave concern was expressed about the failure to resolve a great number of humanitarian cases, including some raised in the context of this Meeting, about barriers to human contacts that continue to exist, and about additional barriers that have been created in some participating States, in disregard of commitments undertaken in the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document.

9. The participants expressed concern that failure to comply with the human contacts provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document jeopardizes the credibility of the CSCE process as a whole.

10. The participants emphasized the critical need for efforts to achieve lasting and tangible progress in the implementation of the human contacts provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. They recalled the responsibility of each participating State, irrespective of its political, economic and social system, to bring its laws, practices and procedures into conformity with

these provisions and with other international undertakings and agreements by which it may be bound.

11. Regarding the basic concepts underlying human contacts, the participants noted, in particular, the relevance of the right of an individual to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

12. The participants confirmed that their thorough and frank exchange of views on the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations constituted a valuable contribution to the CSCE process.

13. Convinced that in order to fulfil their commitments to facilitate freer movements and contacts further efforts are required, the participants recommend that the participating States:

(family matters)

- pay immediate attention to cases of an urgent humanitarian character, including, inter alia: travel to visit a seriously ill or dying family member; travel of the aged and those with urgent medical needs; travel to attend the funeral or visit the grave of a family member; travel for visits in cases of important family matters such as births, marriages, religious or civil ceremonies and other important family occasions; and travel for important public and religious holidays;

- in fulfilment of their commitments to facilitate freer movements and contacts, remove, inter alia, obstacles to the ability of members of a family, who so desire, to travel together for the purpose of contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties;

- give special attention to and deal favourably with applications from their citizens or nationals who are also recognized as citizens or nationals by another State to leave in order to visit that State or to settle there;

- give special attention to requests for exit documents and facilities submitted in order to reunite minor children with their parents;

- give primary importance to the wishes of the parties desiring to be reunited, in particular their wishes in regard to the country of settlement, in facilitating the exit of persons for the purpose of family reunification;

- in order to simplify the application procedures for family reunification, prolong the validity of the application forms and other related documents so that these documents remain valid throughout the application procedure; and provide that any document necessary for an application procedure be easily accessible to the applicant, also in case of renewed application;

- ensure that an application for travel for the purposes of family contact or family reunification with an individual family member who has permanently left his country of origin, will not be prejudiced by the circumstances in which this family member left his country of origin;

- should carefully review all outstanding applications for travel for the purpose of family reunification and for other purposes related to the aims of the part of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document dealing with human contacts with a view to ensuring that these applications are being dealt with in a manner consistent with the relevant provisions of those documents. Such reviews should be repeated at regular intervals;

(travel practices)

- recognize the right of their nationals to be issued with a passport, or with any other document allowing travel abroad, without delay and without any other conditions than those specifically laid down by the law in conformity with international commitments. Reasons should be given for any refusal to issue a passport or travel document and means of appeal should be available;

- abolish, for their nationals, the requirement to obtain an exit visa in order to leave their country; and issue exit visas to foreigners residing on their territory as expeditiously as possible and without any conditions other than those that may arise as a result of legal proceedings still in progress;

- publish within one year all laws, regulations and procedures including criteria for refusal - concerning decisions to permit their citizens to leave their country, on a permanent or temporary basis; and take steps to help make the laws that are in force accessible to all strata of the population of the country;

- remove legal and other obstacles restricting or inhibiting contacts on their own territory between their citizens and resident or visiting citizens of other States;

(other matters)

- promote the possibilities for individual religious believers and communities of believers to establish and maintain personal contacts and communication with fellow-believers and communities of believers in other countries, including travel, pilgrimages, assemblies and postal communications; and respect the ability of believers and communities of believers to acquire, receive and carry with them religious publications and related materials;

- bearing in mind the legitimate desire of persons belonging to national minorities and regional cultures on their territories to have contacts with persons in other States with whom they have close affinities, refrain from placing obstacles in the way of members of such minorities and regional cultures seeking to maintain contacts of this kind, including contacts through travel and communications;

- remove existing impediments which prevent individuals and the institutions and organizations which they have freely established and joined from maintaining contact, communication and organizational ties with similar organizations in other participating States without need of official sponsorship or approval; and permit individuals invited by such groups to travel to other participating States so that they are not replaced by another individual without the consent of the inviting organization;

- remove existing impediments which prevent freely established trade unions, their members and their representatives from maintaining contact, communications and organizational ties with similar organizations in other participating States without need of official sponsorship or approval;

- encourage direct sporting exchanges between them at local and regional level, as well as at national and international level, and take steps to remove existing obstacles to such exchanges;

- encourage the setting-up and facilitate the unimpeded implementation of town-twinning arrangements between authorities most directly concerned in order to develop direct contacts between their citizens;

- recognize that the freedom to establish and maintain communication is essential for effective human contacts; guarantee the freedom of transit of postal communications in accordance with the Universal Postal Convention, thus ensuring the rapid and unhindered delivery of personal mail; ensure all the conditions necessary to carry on rapid and uninterrupted telephone calls in accordance with the International Telecommunications Convention, including the use and development of direct dialing systems wherever it is possible; and respect the privacy and integrity of all such communications; and

- give favourable consideration to the practice of periodically holding bilateral meetings and round tables between delegations, whose composition is to be determined by each participating State, to deal with the questions concerning the promotion of contacts among their citizens, institutions and non-governmental organizations. The aim of these meetings and round tables will be to improve and develop co-operation in the humanitarian field among the participating States, to implement more fully the relevant

provisions set forth in the Final Act and in the Madrid Concluding Document, and to bring about as promptly as possible a satisfactory solution to outstanding humanitarian cases. In particular, on the occasion of such meetings and round tables, the participating delegations should also proceed to a mutual exchange of exhaustive information and full details, and to their updating in the event of changes, on the laws, procedures and practices in force in the respective countries with regard to applications for travel abroad submitted by citizens with a view to contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families and marriages between citizens of different States.

14. The results of the meeting will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna follow-up meeting.

15. The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Switzerland and for the excellent organization of the meeting and to the people of Switzerland for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay.

Draft Report Submitted to the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts, Bern, May 26, 1986

1. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the Chairman's Statement of 15 July 1983, annexed to the present document, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place in Berne from 15 April to 26 May 1986 at the invitation of the Swiss government to discuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations.
2. The meeting was preceded by preparatory consultations starting on 2 April 1986.
3. At the opening session, the participants were addressed by Federal Counsellor Pierre Aubert, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Government of Switzerland.
4. The formal opening on 15 April and the formal closure on 26 May were held in open plenary meetings. During the formal closure, statements were made by a number of participants.
5. The participants adopted an agenda and had a frank and useful discussion on the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations, on the basis of the provisions relating to human contacts in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. They discussed, in particular, measures to be taken for the improvement of such contacts.
6. During the discussion, different and at times contradictory opinions were expressed. The participants, however, reached the following conclusions:

Source: Department of State files. The draft was submitted by the CSCE Neutral and Nonaligned States. The draft failed of adoption. The Conference was unable to agree on a final report.

-- That the thorough exchange of views constitute in itself a valuable contribution to the CSCE process;

-- That, in order to enhance confidence among their peoples and the participating States, it is necessary to intensify the efforts to fulfill the commitments of the participating States as embodied in the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. In particular, they underlined the importance of giving full effect to all the principles and provisions of the Final Act and of the Madrid Concluding Document, thus strengthening security and co-operation in Europe;

-- That the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations will contribute to broadening co-operation and increase trust among the participating states;

-- That measures aimed at simplifying administrative procedures and practices contribute to the improvement of conditions for human contacts.

7. A number of proposals on human contacts were presented and discussed without any prejudice during the meeting. Although no consensus was reached on some of these proposals, the possibility for delegations of the participating States to present them for further discussion at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting was noted.

8. Resolving to pursue and expand cooperation in the field of human contacts and to achieve a fuller realization of the possibilities offered by the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, the participants recommend to the Governments of the participating states the following, to be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna follow-up meeting:

Contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families, and marriage between citizens of different states;

-- When dealing with applications for family visits to take due account of important family events and their significance for the applicant

-- To deal favourably with applications from members of a family to travel together for the purpose of contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, when personal and professional circumstances permit

-- To deal favourably with applications for family contacts without distinction as to the age of the applicant, when personal and professional circumstances permit

-- To facilitate travel for the purpose of family reunification, consider in a humanitarian spirit and give importance to consideration of the wishes of the parties desiring to be reunited






-- To give special attention on humanitarian grounds to cases of reunification of families where minor children are involved

-- To provide that any document necessary for an application procedure for family visits and family reunification be easily accessible to the applicant, also in case of renewed application, and to prolong the validity of such documents so that they remain valid throughout the application procedure, unless a change of essential significance for the consideration of the application occurs in the circumstances of the applicant

-- To simplify practices and gradually reduce administrative requirements for family visits and to accelerate procedures for applying for, processing of and deciding on family visits

-- To do their utmost to deal with applications for family visits favourably and in time, taking into account the purpose of the visit, and not to limit unduly the validity of the visas involved

-- In cases of renewed application for family contacts to take into consideration documents already supplied by the applicant in connection with a previous application, unless a change of essential significance for the consideration of the application occurs in the circumstances of the applicant



-- In implementing the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document to deal favourably with and to decide upon, as expeditiously as possible, applications for travel relating to family matters, pay immediate attention to those of an urgent humanitarian character, including inter alia travel to a seriously ill or dying family member, travel of the aged and those with urgent medical needs on the basis of a medical certificate which should not be delayed, by a medical authority in the country of residence, travel to attend the funeral of a family member

-- In emergency cases to intensify efforts by all the authorities concerned in order to decide upon applications in such cases as expeditiously as possible, using to the fullest possible extent existing modern means of communication so as to ensure that most rapid and effective cooperation among them, ensuring that the charges for priority treatment in emergency cases do not unduly exceed standard charges

-- To ensure, where necessary through bilateral arrangements, that persons who have settled permanently on their territory for the purposes of family reunification or marriages between citizens of different states, enjoy economic and social opportunities equal to those enjoyed by their own citizens, in conformity with the laws and regulations of the participating state in question

-- To consider favourably in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country of residence applications by migrant workers legally resident on their territory for contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families and marriages between citizens of different states and to reaffirm the right of such workers to free access to diplomatic and other official missions and consular posts, as well as their right to maintain contacts with their country of origin

-- To give full effect to the provision of the Madrid Concluding Document, that the presentation or renewal of applications for family meetings, family reunification and marriage between citizens of different states will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicants or of members of the their families concerning inter alia employment, housing, residence status family support, access to social, economic and educational benefits, as well as any other rights and obligations flowing from the laws and regulations of the participating state in question

-- To consider favourably applications by persons without distinction as to cultural, ethnic or national origin, permanently residing on their territory, for family reunification, regular meetings on the basis of family ties and marriage with persons of the same or any other cultural, ethnic or national origin residing in an other participating State

Travel for personal or professional reasons, and improvement of conditions for tourism on an individual or collective basis

-- In order to ensure that the inhabitants of their countries are made widely aware of the fundamentals of their national legislation concerning travel between states to publish and make easily accessible, where this has not already been done, all laws and administrative regulations relating to travel for family, personal or professional reasons, on a permanent or temporary basis

-- To issue exit visas, where required, for foreigners residing on their territory as expeditiously as possible, subject to the conditions specified in national legislation

-- In order to ensure better conditions for consular, legal and medical assistance for citizens of participating states travelling in other participating States to

- consider, if necessary, adhering to the Vienna Consular Convention and concluding, if needed, complementary bilateral agreements,

- consider adhering to relevant multilateral instruments in the field of legal assistance such as civil and family matters, and concluding, if necessary, bilateral agreements on such question,

- consider favourably the solution, inter alia by concluding bilateral agreements, of problems that may arise in connection with medical assistance, especially in cases of sudden illness or injury resulting from accidents

-- To facilitate the creation of satisfactory conditions, where they do not yet exist, for receiving tourists as well as persons who are participating in contacts and exchanges in fields such as culture, science, religion, education and sport and their representatives of corresponding institutions and organizations

Meeting among young people, and sport

-- To favour the conclusion, between youth or student organizations, of bilateral and multilateral agreements or programmes designed to develop contacts among young people and to promote exchanges among them

-- To favour visits and exchanges between universities and other higher educational institutions of different participating States, including direct contacts among their students and teachers, taking into account in that context that an invited person may be replaced when the inviting party agrees

-- To encourage direct sporting exchanges between teams and participants at local, regional and international levels on the basis of mutual agreements

-- To encourage exchanges and contacts among young people and their organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as the holding in this connection of bilateral and multilateral cultural, educational, and other activities and events by and for young people, in the spirit of

the recommendations contained in the documents adopted by the United Nations in the framework of the International Youth Year, concerning broadening contacts and exchanges among young people from different states.

Expansion of Contacts

-- To develop the possibilities of contacts on their territory between their citizens and citizens of other participating states in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document

-- To guarantee, in accordance with the Universal Postal Convention and the International Telecommunications Convention, the freedom of transit of postal communications, to ensure the rapid delivery of correspondence, including personal mail, and to ensure the conditions necessary for rapid telephone calls, including the use and development of direct dialing systems wherever it is possible, and to respect the privacy of all such communications

-- To review carefully all applications for travel for the purposes of family reunification and for other purposes related to the aims of the part of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document dealing with human contacts, which have not yet been decided upon or to which a formal answer has not yet been given, with a view to ensuring that all applications are dealt with in a manner consistent with the relevant provisions of those documents

-- To give favourable consideration to the practice of holding--on the basis of mutual agreement--bilateral meetings and roundtables between delegations, whose composition is to be determined by each participating state, to deal with questions concerning the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations. One of the aims of these meetings, roundtables will be to contribute to improving and developing cooperation in the humanitarian field among the participating states, including the discussion of current humanitarian issues

-- To consider widening the practice of intergovernmental agreements, protocols or programmes concerning exchanges in various fields, concluded on multilateral or bilateral basis, in contributing to the carrying out and development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating states

-- In implementing the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and the Madrid Concluding Document, to promote the possibilities of religious faiths, institutions, organizations and their representatives to establish and maintain personal contacts and communication with religious faiths, institutions, and organizations and their representatives also in other countries, including travel, pilgrimages, assemblies and postal communications and to allow them, within the field of their activity, to acquire, receive and carry with them religious publications and religious objects for their own use

-- To encourage the setting-up and to facilitate implementation of town-twinning arrangements between authorities most directly concerned in order to develop direct contacts between institutions, organizations and citizens of their respective countries.

DOCUMENT 80

Closing Statement by Ambassador Michael Novak Before the CSCE Meeting of Experts, Bern, May 27, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN:

FOR TEN AND A HALF YEARS NOW, THE HELSINKI PROCESS HAS SOUGHT TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF ORDINARY PEOPLE. IN MANY RESPECTS, IT HAS SUCCEEDED. HUMAN CONTACTS ARE IN SEVERAL STATES FREER AND MORE OPEN THAN THEY WERE TEN YEARS AGO. THIS IS A PRECIOUS GAIN.

ALAS, IN OTHER STATES, HUMAN CONTACTS ARE IN SOME RESPECTS WORSE.

BEGINNING EIGHT WEEKS AGO, ALL OF US ASSEMBLED HERE PLEDGED THAT WE WOULD EXAMINE THOSE MATTERS UNBLINKINGLY AND WITHOUT ILLUSIONS. AND SO WE DID.

AT BERN, MY DELEGATION DISCERNS THREE SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS. FIRST, THERE WERE THE INDIVIDUAL PERSONS HELPED, IF NOT ALWAYS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF BERN, NONETHELESS OCCASIONED BY OUR MEETING HERE. WE DO NOT HAVE A PRECISE COUNT OF THE PERSONS -- BUT DO KNOW THAT THEY NUMBER NEARLY A THOUSAND -- EARLIER NOT PERMITTED TO BE REUNITED WITH THEIR SPOUSES OR CHILDREN, WHO, BECAUSE BERN TOOK PLACE, HAVE THE PROMISE TO BE IN THE COMPANY OF THEIR LOVED ONES.

IT WAS WORTH IT, DURING THESE HARD WEEKS IN BERN, TO PLAY A SMALL ROLE IN A PROCESS THAT ACTUALLY HELPED SO MANY PERSONS. WOULD THAT THERE HAD BEEN THOUSANDS MORE!

SECOND, WE HAD AT BERN A PENETRATING REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE. ANYONE WHO READS THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT FEELS IMMEDIATELY IN THE PRESENCE OF TRULY NOBLE DOCUMENTS. THEY HAVE A VISIONARY POWER. YET, THE REAL NEED AT THIS POINT IN HISTORY IS NOT SO MUCH FOR NEW DOCUMENTS, AS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING DOCUMENTS. THE TEST FOR THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS NOT THE PRODUCING OF NEW DOCUMENTS. THE TEST IS COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE.

Source: Department of State files.

OUR DEBATES HERE WERE HONEST; THE SPIRIT WAS CANDID. WE ARGUED MIGHTILY WITH ONE ANOTHER. WE SHOWED CLEARLY, OVER AND OVER, THOSE PLACES, THOSE PRACTICES, AND THOSE METHODS BY WHICH THE NOBLE IDEALS OF HELSINKI AND MADRID, AFFIRMED ON PAPER, ARE FRUSTRATED IN DAILY REALITY. OUR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW WAS ONE OF THE BEST, VETERANS OF PAST MEETINGS HAVE SAID, IN CSCE HISTORY.

WE HEARD COUNTLESS SUFFERINGS DESCRIBED. WE HEARD HOW MILLIONS ARE SEPARATED FROM HUMAN CONTACTS, ELSEWHERE CONSIDERED NORMAL. WE HEARD MANY VOICES OF PAIN. OUR MAIL BAGS BROUGHT US NEW MATERIALS EVERY DAY. THERE ARE FEWER EXCUSES FOR ILLUSIONS THAN THERE WERE EIGHT WEEKS AGO.

THE THIRD GREAT SUCCESS OF THE BERN MEETING LAY IN AN INCREMENTAL GROWTH OF A COMMON EUROPEAN LANGUAGE, THE ANCIENT LANGUAGE OF OUR HEARTS AND INTELLECTS, OUR IDEALS AND HOPES. MORE AND MORE, THE DEBATES OF CSCE CREATE A COMMON BODY OF THOUGHT FOR ALL OF EUROPE, A EUROPEAN CONSCIENCE.

THESE ARE THREE GREAT GAINS: INDIVIDUAL PERSONS HELPED; A CLEAR-EYED EXAMINATION OF REALITY, WITHOUT ILLUSIONS; AND THE SLOW RAISING OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, ACCORDING TO A NEW COMMON MORAL LANGUAGE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, ALL THESE GAINS DEPEND ON WORDS. WORDS INSPIRE THEM. WORDS GUIDE THEM. BUT IN THE END ONLY THOSE WORDS HAVE WEIGHT THAT EMBED THEMSELVES IN REALITY: THAT ARE COMPLIED WITH, AND PUT INTO PERFORMANCE.

THE WORDS OF THIS HELSINKI PROCESS ARE ESPECIALLY PRECIOUS, BUT ALSO ESPECIALLY FRAGILE. THEY HAVE HIGHEST VALUE WHEN THEY ARE COMPLIED WITH. THEY GAIN THEIR WEIGHT FROM PERFORMANCE.

IN RECENT YEARS, MANY DELEGATIONS AMONG US REPEATED THAT FREE AND OPEN CONTACTS AMONG PERSONS HAVE DETERIORATED IN CERTAIN VIVID WAYS: DIVIDED SPOUSES, DISUNITED FAMILIES. COMPLIANCE HAS DECLINED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES PRECIOUS WORDS LOSE MEANING.

THE STRENGTH OF THE FOUNDING DOCUMENTS OF THIS PROCESS DEPENDS UPON THE CREDIBILITY OF WORDS. THAT IS WHY, TO MATCH THE DEMONSTRATED DECLINE IN COMPLIANCE IN RECENT YEARS, MY GOVERNMENT KNEW THAT A BERN DOCUMENT WOULD HAVE TO SET A HIGH STANDARD. OTHERWISE, THE PUBLIC WOULD LOSE CONFIDENCE. AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS THE ESSENCE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

EVERY DELEGATION HERE KNOWS THE BRILLIANT AND CAREFUL WORK OF THE COORDINATORS FROM THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS. THEY FAIRLY REFLECTED THE LONG, SLOW COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THEY PERFORMED AT THE HIGHEST HUMAN LEVEL.

BUT OUR CSCE PROCESS WORKS, RIGHTLY, THROUGH CONSENSUS. EACH STEP IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, RIGHTLY, DEMANDED COMPROMISE. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMPROMISE, AS IS NORMAL, LOOPHOLES CREEP INTO THE TEXT. TO THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS ADDED THE LOOPHOLE "WHEN PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT." HONEST AUTHORITIES WILL UNDERSTAND THIS ONE WAY, BUT CYNICAL AUTHORITIES WILL USE IT TO ALTER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AT WILL. LOOPHOLES ARE SOMETIMES NECESSARY. BUT, CUMULATIVELY, THEY EAT LIKE MOTHS INTO OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENTS.

INEVITABLY, TOO, ROBUST PROPOSALS LOST WEIGHT. UNTIL THE END, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ADD UP THE WEIGHT OF ALL TOGETHER. WHEN AT LAST MY GOVERNMENT COULD WEIGH THEM, IT FOUND THE DOCUMENT TOO THIN, CONTAINING LOOPHOLES DAMAGING TO COMPLIANCE.

MY GOVERNMENT TAKES WORDS SERIOUSLY. IN OUR COUNTRY, THERE IS UNEASINESS ABOUT THE GROWING GAP IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS BETWEEN WORDS AND COMPLIANCE. A DOCUMENT REDUCED IN WEIGHT BY MANY COMPROMISES, IT JUDGED, WOULD INJURE THE PROCESS ALL OF US CHERISH AND MUST PROTECT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION DEEPLY RESPECTS ALL OUR COLLEAGUES IN THIS ROOM, WITH WHOM WE WORKED SO HARD AND LONG. WE ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO OUR SWISS HOSTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE PROCESS GAINS IN STRENGTH FROM PAYING STRICT ATTENTION TO THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND COMPLIANCE. OUR GOVERNMENT LOOKS FORWARD EAGERLY TO RESUMING THE LONG, PATIENT AND CRUCIAL WORK OF THIS PROCESS IN VIENNA.

THE DEBATES AT BERN HAVE PAVED THE WAY FOR VIENNA. IN COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE, WORK TO IMPROVE HUMAN CONTACTS WILL SPEED UP. BERN HAS GIVEN AN UNDENIABLE IMPETUS TO BASIC ISSUES OF HUMAN CONTACTS. BERN HAS LAUNCHED A NEW SERIOUSNESS ABOUT COMPLIANCE -- AND IT HAS UNDERLINED THE EXTREME SERIOUSNESS OF FUNDAMENTAL WORDS.

DOCUMENT 81

Testimony of Ambassador Michael Novak Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 18, 1986

Mr. Chairman. First, allow me to express my deep appreciation to the Helsinki Commission for the truly welcome support it provided to the U.S. delegation at Bern. From Michael Hathaway, your excellent executive director, to Deborah Burns and Barbara Edwards, who did outstanding administrative work under difficult conditions and often worked very late hours, and including all the tremendous research and liaison work performed by Sam Wise, Orest Deychakiwsky, John Finerty, and Robert Hand, the staff of this Commission provided indispensable service to our delegation. I thank the Commission -- and each of them -- profoundly.

I was especially grateful that Congressmen Hoyer, Ackerman and Bustamante and other members of the delegation were able to be with us during the last seventy-two hours of the meeting. Their advice and counsel, and the tact and reserve they exercised in dealing with the entire delegation, are deeply appreciated.

Mr. Chairman, when I last reported to this Commission (on March 18), I said that our goals in Bern would be "practical results." On March 18, I defined our first three goals in these exact words:

We define "practical results" precisely. We mean movement in specific individual cases. And we mean an improvement in the general conditions for cross-border human contacts by individuals and associations. In addition, a successful meeting entails a careful review of the record of how CSCE commitments have so far been implemented.

Source: Department of State files.

Only later, in fourth place did I mention that our delegation would make a good faith effort to achieve a strong final document, if a strong one was achievable. I spoke of the realism of the Allies, neutral and non-aligned in advance of the meeting, and reported to you as follows:

[We] do not, for instance, put a premium on producing a new document. Good language on human contacts already exists in the Helsinki and Madrid documents. We do not suffer from a shortage of texts. What world suffers from is inadequate implementation of already existing texts.

It seems important to re-read this testimony of mine on March 18, because it outlines quite clearly what our intentions were when we began. The subsequent record shows that we more than fulfilled these intentions. Consider the first of our goals, movement on concrete cases.

Back in mid-March, it seemed -- not only to me but to others on our delegation and to some staff members of this Commission -- that we would be lucky to see the Soviet Union resolve even as many cases as had been resolved on the occasion of the summit talks between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva last November; namely, 33 cases, of which 25 had been fully acted upon by mid-March.

Actually, in Bern there were some practical results. On May 20 the Soviet delegation informed us that their government was resolving two new cases and that resolutions could shortly be expected in many more. On May 26, the last scheduled day of the Bern meeting, the Soviet authorities in Moscow gave us the names of 36 families whose cases were to be resolved. They told US Embassy officials that another list of names would soon be forthcoming, and indeed within 10 days we were given the names of an additional 29 families. About 200 persons in all will be affected by these decisions when they come to fruition.

In this fashion, the USSR did use the Bern meeting as an occasion for taking action on concrete cases. It is deeply regrettable that action was not taken on these cases in the normal process of fulfilling Helsinki commitments. It is regrettable that such decisions are only made upon political occasions. Nonetheless, our delegation made the argument, in Moscow and in Bern, that the road to confidence building lies through the treatment regimes extend to their own citizens, and that we are working for the day when the USSR and its allies will deal with their own citizens according to the internationally recognized standards they themselves have signed. In this context, I choose to interpret Soviet movement on cases as a helpful movement. The more of this the better -- until all Soviet citizens share in the free exercise of those rights recognized in the international agreements their government has freely signed.

Further, the Romanian delegation resolved about half the list of 27 specific cases presented to it in the course of the Bern meeting. Outside of Bern, between April 11 and June 1 Romania approved for emigration nearly 1,200 people from our representation list. These actions clearly reflected the current state of US/Romanian relations with respect to Romania's most favored nation status.

The Bulgarians resolved 12 of 18 U.S. representation list cases the week before the Bern meeting opened.

Secondly, Mr. Chairman, we aimed at movement in "general conditions." Here our review of compliance showed that there had been positive movement in several Eastern European countries. The borders of several Eastern European countries are much more open today than in 1975. On the other hand, there are many areas in which the situation of human contacts, in the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania in particular, has deteriorated. Administrative practices were shown to be in many respects worse than they had been in 1975.

On the other hand, the delegation from the USSR was driven to say on several occasions that, under the new General Secretary, there would be a new "spirit," new "practices," and a reform of legislation and administrative procedures in the area of human contacts. This was in the nature of a promise, not in the nature of evidence cited. Before granting credence, it is proper to insist on evidence. Still, the delegation from the USSR did at least promise reform, in accordance with the promises General Secretary Gorbachev made to President Reagan in Geneva and at the XXVII Party Congress. Until evidence is forthcoming, skepticism is in order. Nonetheless, the invitation has now been issued to hold the USSR to fresh promises.

Our third goal was an intensive review of compliance. Such a review did go on for nearly five weeks, since the NATO nations had agreed to use their time in presenting new proposals to explain from the past record why such proposals are now needed. On one day, e.g., sixteen of nineteen speeches presented evidence of abusive, non-compliant practices in the USSR, East Germany, Bulgaria, and other Eastern nations. This drumbeat -- often low-key, factual, and non-polemical -- continued day after day. Many veterans of the CSCE process said that the Bern review of compliance was the most thorough, objective, and calm of any in the history of the CSCE.

In part, this was because the main points about compliance had already been established at Madrid, Ottawa, and Budapest. Thus, the Soviet delegation in Bern only tentatively argued that the effort by an assembly of nations to monitor compliance in the field of human contacts represented "interference in the internal affairs" of the USSR. That line was dropped almost instantly. Instead, the Soviet delegation and some others chose, when criticized, to attack the critic. They did so typically with wild, loose, and passion-inflamed rhetoric, careless of accuracy and evidence, usually based upon criticisms of the West made by Westerners, and on the whole rather more damaging to the attacker than to the attacked. In responding to specific charges, we chose to welcome even such attacks, poor as they were, as a way of urging the USSR and its allies to open themselves further to the legitimacy of mutual criticism from abroad, as well as to internal criticism. Open criticism is the way scientific inquiry proceeds. Open criticism is also the way political reform advances.

As in Ottawa and in Budapest, we realized from the beginning in Bern that achieving an acceptable final document would not be likely. On the other hand, halfway through the conference, and after Chernobyl, it became obvious that the USSR and its allies might wish to achieve a final document in Bern. The question remained whether this would be substantive progress or propagandistic progress. We had promised to make a good faith effort to work for a strong final document if a strong document were achievable. From the beginning, we had ruled out a weak one.

Suffice it to say that at 4 a.m. on Monday morning, May 26, the day the conference was scheduled to end, the Soviets broke off all-night negotiations. As at Ottawa and Budapest, at that point we had no document. Up until then, the Eastern bloc had refused to agree to the original Western proposals even in their modest strength, and had instead introduced damaging loopholes and qualifications. They were not willing to go very far. All that had been left on the table was a pale imitation of the strong proposals the Western nations had agreed to and tabled as BME 47.

Of course, it could be argued that some of the compromise proposals offered "marginal" or "modest" steps forward. But some of them also took steps backward from Helsinki. This typically happened in one of three ways: (1) in some cases, the compromise language was weaker than Helsinki; (2) in some cases, new loopholes were introduced into the Helsinki process; (3) in some cases, the point of view of the compromise proposals subtly slipped away from the general obligations already agreed to under Helsinki, and began to treat those obligations, given existing violations, as goals we need to make progress toward. This last point deserves comment. Helsinki represents obligations agreed to by participating states; it does not represent goals to be striven for. To treat Helsinki obligations as goals toward which progress must be made is to alter the character of the Helsinki Accords in a potentially fatal way. They are not goals but general obligations.

Mr. Chairman, three or four of the compromise proposals may at first glance appear to represent the largest among the "modest" steps forward. Among these, for example, are the proposals on postal and telephonic communication and on religion. Under close analysis, the compromise resolution on postal and telephone service has one good quality and one weakness. The good point is that it would bring documented abuses in this area under the compliance review of the Helsinki process. The weakness is that the proposal basically reminds the participating states of obligations which

they already bear under existing international conventions, and which are nonetheless being flagrantly abused.

As for the proposal on religion, the compromise formulation is not only far weaker than the modest original Western proposal. It is in virtually the same form that the Western nations had rejected during the negotiating process. The West had rejected this form for three reasons: (1) no less than other citizens, religious citizens have universally recognized rights to travel and to receive publications through the mail; (2) the restriction of the proposal to official "representatives" of religious organizations -- but not to "individual believers" -- is an intolerable infringement of universal rights; and (3) the right to receive and to carry with them religious publications and religious objects is confined to the extremely narrow limit of "for their own use" -- i.e., not even for the use of their congregations or fellow believers. This is an intolerably narrow reading of basic human rights.

Mr. Chairman, I said in Bern that the compromise document did make some marginal advances. But when one looks at the sum total, one must add up the minuses as well as the pluses. No one asserted that the pluses are more than "modest"; some said "marginal." But when you count in the minuses, even these modest gains are reduced.

Moreover, the judgment one must make is whether the demonstrated record of non-compliance on large and basic issues, amply documented during our debates, truly gives hope that even "modest" or "marginal" improvements in new language will be taken seriously, when already existing large obligations are not. Judgment must be focussed on the probabilities of future compliance.

First, then, it is essential to compare the last-minute compromise proposals with the corresponding texts of Helsinki and Madrid. One must do this critically, with an eye hardened by experiences of violations since then. Second, one must compare them as well as with the original Western proposals on the same subjects. What are the pluses and the minuses? How does the whole add up? Our judgment was and is that the negatives either outweigh, or come close to outweighing, the positives.

Next, one must factor in the demonstrated record of non-compliance on matters large and small. In that context, our judgment is that the negatives clearly outweighed the positives. To accept the Bern compromise would have been to accept a document that could accurately be characterized in this way: some of its proposals merely repeat Helsinki provisions already being violated; some of its provisions are weaker than or more flawed than Helsinki; some (such as the one on religion) would have established possibly damaging precedents; and a few, at best, went modestly beyond Helsinki. (Even these last, alas, sometimes advance more specific language, but in a way that detracts from general obligations that already cover such specifics.)

In terms of policy, the most important point in the Helsinki process is its credibility. Solid words must not be allowed to become empty words. Agreements entered into merely to have agreements cannot be allowed to diminish public trust. Above all, agreements cannot be allowed to weaken the trust of those who suffer today because of large-scale and systematic non-compliance. In such circumstances, to enter into certain kinds of agreements would be a fraud.

Mr. Chairman, I told this Commission last March 18 that the goals of my delegation would be: (1) movement on concrete cases; (2) efforts to bring about greater compliance in specific types of cases; and (3) a thorough review of violations of the Helsinki Accords. I leave it to this Commission to judge how well we achieved the three goals we set out to achieve.

I also told this Commission that our delegation would not accept a weak document. I said then that the integrity of the Helsinki Process depends first of all upon credible compliance, rather than on the addition of more words. I again leave it to this Commission to judge whether, in difficult circumstances, we kept our word and showed proper judgment on the specific document at hand.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am more convinced than when I undertook this assignment that the CSCE process is worth every ounce of energy that this nation can put into it. That process depends on taking words with utmost seriousness, words signed by heads of government of thirty-five participating states. The CSCE process has borne great fruits in some countries in Eastern Europe and has heightened standards of international behavior. More than that, a newcomer to the CSCE process notices immediately the extent to which the language of Western ideals permeates not only the Helsinki Accords and the Madrid Concluding Document, but also the daily debates in plenary discussions and working groups. Even the Marxist countries rarely speak a Marxist language; even they are often obliged to use the language (even though not following the practice) of open societies. In the context of human rights, the importance of words is very great.

Mr. Chairman, looking forward to Vienna, when the whole range of the Helsinki Accords will be under discussion, the Allies have a much better opportunity to make real progress in the areas of human rights and human contacts -- for three reasons. First, the range of subjects on the table will be larger, greatly expanding the scope for meaningful negotiations. Second, the process will be open-ended; in order to achieve meaningful progress it will allow a time-period much longer than six weeks. Third, in Ottawa, Budapest, and Bern, the Allies have taken great pains to arrive at common, strong proposals. These proposals, carefully hammered out, already at hand, form a magnificent platform for real progress under the "third basket." In addition, a thorough and documented review of non-compliance is now part of the full record from which Vienna can proceed.

Mr. Chairman, the work of the Helsinki process is extremely important for millions of human beings. The work of this Commission in furthering that process is vital. Permit me once again to thank this Commission for the support it gave my delegation, before, during, and now again after the Bern meeting.

Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, June 18, 1986

The meeting that concluded last month in Bern on human contacts was the last Madrid-mandated CSCE experts meeting to take place prior to the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. Ambassador Novak will report on the Bern meeting in detail. I would like to make some general observations about Bern, and also about such experts meetings.

Several acknowledgments are due at the outset. The first is to Ambassador Michael Novak, who led the U.S. delegation at Bern with great energy and skill. He eloquently articulated the humanitarian values enshrined in the Helsinki process. He reaffirmed these values in stirring terms, forcefully presenting both the moral and practical arguments for the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies to live up to the promises they freely made at Helsinki and Madrid. I hope he will continue to lend his voice to those others who see CSCE as a process of fulfilling hopes that demand and deserve to become reality.

Second, I wish to thank this Commission for contributing its expertise and personnel to preparations for Bern and to the work of our delegation for eight weeks there. In this regard, I believe a special debt is due to Senator D'Amato and Representative Hoyer for the welcome support and advice they gave to Ambassador Novak, through correspondence in the course of the meeting and through Representative Hoyer's presence at the conclusion of the meeting.

Source: Department of State files.

Third, our work at Bern was substantially aided by support from the public that came in a variety of heartening ways. Mr. William Korey of B'nai B'rith served on the U.S. delegation and provided many valuable insights as proposals were introduced and considered. Non-governmental organizations from the U.S. were a substantial presence at a number of points during the meeting, calling attention to crucial human contacts issues -- and giving them names and faces. Many organizations and individuals not able to come physically to Bern nonetheless made their views known. They wrote and called the U.S. delegation before and during the meeting. The details they provided about human contacts problems effectively armed Ambassador Novak with the facts.

Our decision to withhold consensus from a draft concluding document proposed by the neutral and non-aligned states has naturally drawn substantial attention. The decision was not taken lightly. It represented the considered judgment of both our delegation and the State Department. With the hindsight afforded by the few weeks since the end of Bern, I can say we would make the same decision again. The proposed document had qualifications and loopholes which taken together might have been used by some governments to justify non-compliance with existing commitments. Our agreement to it would have raised further questions about the credibility of the CSCE process itself.

We understand the disappointment and concerns expressed by some of our Allies over the outcome of Bern. We will work to ensure Western unity at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting and are engaged, as you know, in a program of close and intensive consultations in preparation for it.

A number of our Alliance partners supporting the NNA draft believed that it would give an impetus to the CSCE process, viewed as a series of small, incremental steps that over time can improve the lives of people in East and West. This view stresses the creation of new incentives -- new commitments on paper -- to raise performance standards in the future.

We have sympathy for this view. We do not oppose new documents or new commitments per se. Our position depends to a great extent on the relationship between reality and words on paper. New documents must meet rigorous standards if they are not to be considered whitewash for failures to uphold past pledges. We believe there are other governments in the West which are happy that the document proposed by the NNA was not adopted at Bern. No Western government has defended the document as more than a potentially modest step forward. If the countries of Eastern Europe are serious about progress in CSCE, they will demonstrate so by their actions -- which speak louder than words.

I do not mean to dwell on the question of the Bern document. To us, the principal point was how seriously the U.S. takes the CSCE process and the words proposed to carry it forward.

Ambassador Novak intends to review the specific accomplishments of the Bern meeting. Let me make a few broader points. Our experience at Bern reflects the wisdom of having fought at Madrid for the series of experts meetings in the humanitarian field that has just concluded -- the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, the Budapest Cultural Forum, and the Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting. The foresight of this Commission is part of the reason that these meetings took place.

Ottawa, Budapest and Bern all had their share of frustrations, but they had and continue to have value. Each provided the West with a platform -- agreed by the East as legitimate -- from which to review problems in different areas of humanitarian concern. Without such meetings, it would be difficult to call the East to task face-to-face for its failures to abide by its CSCE promises. We believe that such meetings, by concentrating the attention of both governments and publics on particular aspects of the CSCE process, can promote progress over time. This relatively new tool of diplomacy in the humanitarian field must be exploited patiently and persistently. These experts meetings are not a perfect tool, but they are one we hope the Vienna Follow-up meeting later this year will agree to continue.

The three meetings produced detailed Western agendas for the Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, where all the "baskets" of CSCE will be under consideration and where it may prove easier to achieve real progress on humanitarian issues. The West reaffirmed its commitment to shared humanitarian values at Ottawa, Budapest and Bern. The West articulated in detail its views on human rights, cultural freedom and human contacts, respectively, in draft concluding documents tabled at these meetings. These documents are blueprints for steps the West has agreed it wants to see taken in these areas and a basis for our joint approach to Vienna.

Another key aspect of the experts meetings was the occasion they provided for discussions of cases of humanitarian concern. This has become an accepted feature of such meetings, though some countries of the East still resist the practice. I should note, of course, that some Eastern European governments have more constructive practices than others on humanitarian issues. Discussion of cases does not necessarily imply their resolution, but at Bern there were sufficient incentives created -- within the context of the meeting and outside it -- for some governments to make progress on cases. Such progress benefits not only the individuals directly involved, but also provides evidence of a government's willingness to fulfill commitments undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

We are not satisfied with this state of affairs, since the numbers of cases resolved during Bern were small in comparison with those who still suffer, unknown and uncouneted. It is also distasteful that human beings should be at the mercy of calculated political decisions taken by governments without compassion. Still, our fundamental interest in the CSCE process is to improve the lives of individuals. To the extent that experts meetings provide fora where individuals' problems can be discussed and -- on occasion -- resolved, such opportunities should be seized.

The experts meetings on humanitarian issues have also demonstrated the fundamental unity of European values -- humanistic, compassionate, and rooted in the concept of freedom -- and the common interest of all Western governments in upholding them. At Ottawa, Budapest and Bern, members of the NATO Alliance and the neutral and non-aligned states made common cause in holding the East to account for its disregard for such values and its violations of the provisions of Helsinki and Madrid that embody them. These values unify most of Europe. Their dominance forces the East to face the fact of its moral isolation, and stimulates the East to respond -- even if cynically -- in the same humanitarian vocabulary. This is what makes the Helsinki process a useful and hopeful one.

Statement by President Ronald Reagan on the 11th Anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, Washington, August 1, 1986

Eleven years ago today the United States, Canada, and 33 European countries signed in Helsinki the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The signatories undertook to observe important standards of international conduct and to pursue practical steps to reduce the barriers dividing Europe between East and West. Of special importance to the West, the Final Act affirmed basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Final Act is an eloquent statement of hopes and goals to which the United States fully subscribed, because its principles were rooted in our own philosophy and traditions. The United States remains firmly committed to the full implementation of the Final Act in all its provisions and to the indivisibility of its human, security, and economic dimensions.

Unfortunately the Soviet Union and its East European allies have repeatedly failed to carry out many of their Helsinki pledges. There has been limited progress since the signing of the Final Act. But the reality of Europe's division remains, and the most important promises of a decade ago have not been kept. That was our assessment on the 10th anniversary last year. It remains our assessment today. Eastern Governments continue to impede the free flow of people, information, and ideas. They continue to repress those who seek to exercise freedoms of religion, thought, conscience, and belief. They continue to disregard Final Act provisions as they choose.

As we commemorate this 11th anniversary, we should recall the hopes for greater peace and freedom in Europe expressed a decade ago. The Final Act recognized the interrelationship between these goals, that the interests of individual human beings are a fundamental part of progress toward peace in Europe, that a more stable peace among nations depends on greater freedom for the people of Europe. The ambitious goals of the Helsinki process can be achieved only through balanced progress on all fronts.

The next followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will open in Vienna this November. An important task of that meeting will be to take stock of the promises made and the promises kept, and to weigh the balance among the various dimensions of the Helsinki process. Governments must be made to account at Vienna for their commitments. The meeting must also address the challenge of achieving balanced progress if the Final Act is to have meaning in the daily lives of all citizens whose governments have undertaken its obligations.

The United States takes its commitments under the Final Act seriously and will continue to strive for the full realization of its goals for all the peoples of Europe. We call upon others to do likewise. We will work to ensure that the upcoming meeting in Vienna will mark a step toward making the promises of Helsinki's first decade a reality in its second.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, No. 32, pp. 1022-1023.

Proclamation by President Ronald Reagan on Helsinki Human Rights Day, Washington, August 1, 1986

A Proclamation

August 1, 1986, marks the eleventh anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Accords. Later this year, representatives from the signatory states will be meeting in Vienna to review implementation of these Accords, including the human rights and humanitarian provisions.

Human rights and fundamental freedoms lie at the heart of the commitments made in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and in the follow-on Madrid Concluding Document of 1983. These documents set forth clearly a code of conduct, not only for relations among sovereign states, but also for relations between governments and their citizens. This code holds out a beacon of hope for those people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who seek a freer, more just, and more secure life. We and the other Atlantic democracies will not let up in our efforts to see to it that these solemn commitments are fully honored throughout Europe.

We Americans will never waver in our commitment to implement fully the human rights and humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Accords, not only because these freedoms are fundamental to our way of life but because of our conviction they are the God-given entitlement of every member of the human family. Let us pledge ourselves

once again to do all in our power so that all people may enjoy them in peace. We also call on all 35 CSCE signatory governments to uphold these just and fundamental principles.

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 371, has designated August 1, 1986, as "Helsinki Human Rights Day" and authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation reasserting our commitment to the Helsinki Accords.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim August 1, 1986, as Helsinki Human Rights Day and call upon all Americans to observe this day with appropriate observances that reflect our continuing dedication to full implementation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Helsinki Accords.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this first day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eleventh.

Ronald Reagan

(Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 12:51 p.m., August 4, 1986)

Note: The proclamation was not received in time for inclusion in last week's issue.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, No. 31, p. 1031.

DOCUMENT 85

Final Document of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, September 19, 1986

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

- (1) The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE.
- (2) The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof Palme, on 17 January 1984.
- (3) Opening statements were made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads of Delegation. The Prime Minister of Spain as well as Ministers and senior officials of several other participating States addressed the Conference later. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden addressed the Conference on 19 September 1986.

Source: Conference document CSCE/SC.9, September 19, 1986.

- (4) The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed the Conference on 6 July 1984.
- (5) Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
- (6) The participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.
- (7) The participating States recognized that the set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which are adopted in the present document and which are in accordance with the Madrid mandate serve by their scope and nature and by their implementation to strengthen confidence and security in Europe and thus to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.
- (8) Consequently the participating States have declared the following:

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

- (9) The participating States, recalling their obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, accordingly reaffirm their commitment to respect and put into practice the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, as laid down in the Final Act.
- (10) No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.
- (11) They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
- (12) They will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing any other State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.
- (13) As set forth in the Final Act, no occupation or acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law, will be recognized as legal.
- (14) They recognize their commitment to peace and security. Accordingly they reaffirm that they will refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.
- (15) They will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any State, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that State relations of alliance.

- (16) They stress that non-compliance with the obligation of refraining from the threat or use of force, as recalled above, constitutes a violation of international law.
- (17) They stress their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security. They recall their determination and the necessity to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reaffirm their resolve to make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them.
- (18) The participating States stress their commitment to the Final Act and the need for full implementation of all its provisions, which will further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.
- (19) They emphasize their commitment to all the principles of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States and declare their determination to respect and put them into practice irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development.
- (20) All these ten principles are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.
- (21) Respect for and the application of these principles will enhance the development of friendly relations and co-operation among the participating States in all fields covered by the provisions of the Final Act.
- (22) They reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States and stress that all States have equal rights and duties within the framework of international law.

- (23) They reaffirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Respect for and the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms are essential factors for international peace, justice and security, as well as for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States, as set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.
- (24) They reaffirm that, in the broader context of world security, security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole; in this context, they confirm their intention to develop good neighbourly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act.
- (25) They emphasize the necessity to take resolute measures to prevent and to combat terrorism, including terrorism in international relations. They express their determination to take effective measures, both at the national level and through international co-operation, for the prevention and suppression of all acts of terrorism. They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities, including subversive activities, of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, including those directed against other States and their citizens.
- (26) They will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law; they also stress that strict compliance with their commitments within the framework of the CSCE is essential for building confidence and security.
- (27) The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- (28) The participating States have adopted the following measures:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (29) The participating States will give notification in writing through diplomatic channels in an agreed form of content, to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable* military activities in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).**
- (30) Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.
- (31) Each of the following military activities in the field conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below, will be notified:
- (31.1) The engagement of formations of land forces*** of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.
- (31.1.1) This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:
- at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or
 - at least 300 battle tanks
- if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.
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- * In this document, the term notifiable means subject to notification.
- ** See Annex I.
- *** In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

- (31.1.2) The participation of air forces of the participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.
- (31.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBNs.
- (31.2.1) These military activities will be subject to notification whenever the amphibious landing involves at least 3,000 troops or whenever the parachute drop involves at least 3,000 troops.
- (31.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBNs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBNs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.
- (31.3.1) The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves, at any time during the activity:
- at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or
 - at least 300 battle tanks
- if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.
- (31.3.2) Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBNs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBNs.
- (32) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

(32.1) Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

(33) Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:

(34) A - General Information

(34.1) The designation of the military activity;

(34.2) The general purpose of the military activity;

(34.3) The names of the States involved in the military activity;

(34.4) The level of command, organizing and commanding the military activity;

(34.5) The start and end dates of the military activity.

(35) B - Information on different types of notifiable military activities

(35.1) The engagement of land forces of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:

(35.1.1) The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable;

(35.1.2) Number and type of divisions participating for each State;

(35.1.3) The total number of battle tanks for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles;

(35.1.4) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above);

(35.1.5) The total number of helicopters, by category;

(35.1.6) Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters;

(35.1.7) Purpose of air missions;

- (35.1.8) Categories of aircraft involved;
- (35.1.9) The level of command, organizing and commanding the air force participation;
- (35.1.10) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;
- (35.1.11) Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support;
- (35.1.12) The level of command, organizing and commanding the naval force participation;
- (35.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBNs:
 - (35.2.1) The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of airborne troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults;
 - (35.2.2) In the case of a notifiable amphibious landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBNs.
- (35.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBNs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBNs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:
 - (35.3.1) The total number of troops transferred;
 - (35.3.3) Number and type of divisions participating in the transfer;
 - (35.3.4) The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;
 - (35.3.4) Geographical co-ordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration.

- (36) C - The envisaged area and timeframe of the activity
- (36.1) The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate;
- (36.2) The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of activities in the zone of application for CSBs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical co-ordinates) for each phase;
- (36.3) Brief description of each phase.
- (37) D - Other information
- (37.1) Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity;
- (37.2) Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities.

OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (38) The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:
- (38.1) - The engagement of formations of land forces* of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.
- (38.2) - The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (38.3) - In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (38.4) The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 17,000 troops, except in the case of either an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces, which will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.
- (39) The host State will extend the invitations in writing through diplomatic channels to all other participating States at the time of notification. The host State will be the participating State on whose territory the notified activity will take place.

* In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

- (40) The host State may delegate some of its responsibilities as host to another participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.
- (41) Each participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed.
- (42) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including members of its personnel accredited to the host State. Military observers will, normally, wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.
- (43) Replies to the invitation will be given in writing not later than 21 days after the issue of the invitation.
- (44) The participating States accepting an invitation will provide the names and ranks of their observers in their reply to the invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in time, it will be assumed that no observers will be sent.
- (45) Together with the invitation the host State will provide a general observation programme, including the following information:
- (45.1) - the date, time and place of assembly of observers;
 - (45.2) - planned duration of the observation programme;
 - (45.3) - languages to be used in interpretation and/or translation;
 - (45.4) - arrangements for board, lodging and transportation of the observers;
 - (45.5) - arrangements for observation equipment which will be issued to the observers by the host State;
 - (45.6) - possible authorization by the host State of the use of special equipment that the observers may bring with them;

- (45.7) - arrangements for special clothing to be issued to the observers because of weather or environmental factors.
- (46) The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host State will, if possible, accede to them.
- (47) The host State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.
- (48) The host State will provide the observers with transportation to the area of the notified activity and back. This transportation will be provided from either the capital or another suitable location to be announced in the invitation, so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme.
- (49) The invited State will cover the travel expenses for its observers to the capital, or another suitable location specified in the invitation, of the host State, and back.
- (50) The observers will be provided equal treatment and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.
- (51) The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (52) The host State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.
- (53) In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host State will:

- (53.1) - at the commencement of the observation programme give a briefing on the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification and provide the observers with a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of 1 to not more than 500,000 and an observation programme with a daily schedule as well as a sketch indicating the basic situation;
- (53.2) - provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; however, the observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, which will be subject to examination and approval by the host State;
- (53.3) - in the course of the observation programme give the observers daily briefings with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development and inform the observers about their positions geographically; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of these forces;
- (53.4) - provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State/States engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe major combat units of the participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit some units and communicate with commanders and troops; commanders or other senior personnel of participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission of their respective units;
- (53.5) - guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document;

- (53.6) - provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity;
 - (53.7) - provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their embassies or other official missions and consular posts; the host State is not obligated to cover the communication expenses of the observers;
 - (53.8) - provide the observers with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation programme and, when necessary, medical care.
- (54) The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds for observation are not or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this document.

ANNUAL CALENDARS

- (55) Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification*, within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. It will be transmitted every year, in writing, through diplomatic channels, not later than 15 November for the following year.
- (56) Each participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:
- (56.1) - type of military activity and its designation;
 - (56.2) - general characteristics and purpose of the military activity;
 - (56.3) - States involved in the military activity;
 - (56.4) - area of the military activity, indicated by appropriate geographic features and/or defined by geographic co-ordinates;
 - (56.5) - planned duration of the military activity and the 14-day period, indicated by dates, within which it is envisaged to start;
 - (56.6) - the envisaged total number of troops* engaged in the military activity;
 - (56.7) - the types of armed forces involved in the military activity;
 - (56.8) - the envisaged level of command, under which the military activity will take place;
 - (56.9) - the number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged;

* as defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

- (56.10) - any additional information concerning, inter alia, components of armed forces, which the participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.
- (57) Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.
- (58) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

- (59) Each participating State will communicate, in writing, to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification* involving more than 40,000 troops*, which it plans to carry out in the second subsequent calendar year. Such communication will include preliminary information on each activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.
- (60) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 75,000 troops, unless they have been the object of communication as defined above.
- (61) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.
- (62) If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

* as defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

- (63) According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content."
- (64) The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.
- (65) In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (66) Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State on whose territory, within the zone of application for CSBMs, compliance with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures is in doubt.
- (67) No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.
- (68) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.
- (69) An inspection will not be counted if, due to force majeure, it cannot be carried out.
- (70) The participating State which requests an inspection will state the reasons for such a request.
- (71) The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs (67 and 68).
- (72) Any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons for a request will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.

- (73) The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area". The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army level military activity.
- (74) In the specified area the representatives of the inspecting State accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.
- (75) Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection conducted by the inspecting State.
- (76) Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.

- (77) The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and an aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.
- (78) In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:
- (78.1) - the reasons for the request;
 - (78.2) - the location of the specified area defined by geographical co-ordinates;
 - (78.3) - the preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;
 - (78.4) - mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the specified area;
 - (78.5) - where in the specified area the inspection will begin;
 - (78.6) - whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously;
 - (78.7) - whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both;
 - (78.8) - whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles;
 - (78.9) - information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.
- (79) The reply to the request will be given in the shortest possible period of time, but within not more than twenty-four hours. Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.

- (80) Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all participating States without delay.
- (81) The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry.
- (82) All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.
- (83) Within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.
- (84) There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. While conducting the inspection the inspection team may divide into two parts.
- (85) The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel, will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (86) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.
- (87) The inspection team will have use of its own maps, own photo cameras, own binoculars and own dictaphones, as well as own aeronautical charts.
- (88) The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State, including the opportunity for continuous

communication between the members of an inspection team in an aircraft and those in a land vehicle employed in the inspection.

- (88) The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team a continuous view of the ground during the inspection.
- (90) After the flight plan, specifying, inter alia, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph (74) as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.
- (91) One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.
- (92) Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired within the 48-hour inspection period.
- (93) The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross country capability. Whenever mutually agreed taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.

- (94) If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.
- (95) The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States without delay.
- (96) The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State except when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry will be borne by the inspecting State.
- (97) Diplomatic channels will be used for communications concerning compliance and verification.
- (98) Each participating State will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.
- (99) The participating States stress that these confidence- and security-building measures are designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and emphasize that their implementation will contribute to these objectives.
- (100) Reaffirming the relevant objectives of the Final Act, the participating States are determined to continue building confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all. They are also determined to achieve progress in disarmament.
- (101) The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1987.
- (102) The Government of Sweden is requested to transmit the present document to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in Vienna and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Government of Sweden is also requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.
- (103) The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.
- (104) The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the Government and people of Sweden for the excellent arrangements made for the Stockholm Conference and the warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Conference.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

ANNEX I

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

"On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."

Wherever the term "the zone of application for CSBMs" is used in this document, the above definition will apply.

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that, taking into account the agreed date of entry into force of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures and the provisions contained in them concerning the timeframes of certain advance notifications, and expressing their interest in an early transition to the full implementation of the provisions of this document, the participating States agree to the following:

The annual calendars concerning military activities subject to prior notification and forecast for 1987 will be exchanged not later than 15 December 1986.

Communications, in accordance with agreed provisions, concerning military activities involving more than 40,000 troops planned for the calendar year 1988 will be exchanged by 15 December 1986. Participating States may undertake activities involving more than 75,000 troops during the calendar year 1987 provided that they are included in the annual calendar exchanged by 15 December 1986.

Activities to begin during the first 42 days after 1 January 1987 will be subject to the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE. However, the participating States will make every effort to apply to them the provisions of this document to the maximum extent possible.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

ANNEX III

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that each participating State can raise any question consistent with the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe at any stage subsequent to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

ANNEX IV

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that the participating States recall that they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right of neutrality. In this context, they will not take advantage of these rights to circumvent the purposes of the system of inspection, and in particular the provision that no participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSEMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

Appropriate understandings between participating States on this subject will be expressed in interpretative statements to be included in the journal of the day.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1966

Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Washington,
September 22, 1986

Today in Stockholm, the United States and 34 other governments adopted an accord that will, if faithfully implemented, reduce the risk of war in Europe, where there is the greatest concentration of military forces of the East and the West. I welcome this positive outcome at the CDE Conference. It will contribute to greater security in Europe and to improved East-West relations.

This accord also sends messages that should be welcomed by people throughout the world. It demonstrates that East and West, with seriousness of purpose and hard work, can establish common ground on which to build a more secure future. It also demonstrates that the nations of the West, around whose proposals the Stockholm accord was built, constitute a powerful force for peace.

The set of militarily significant and verifiable measures adopted by the Stockholm CDE Conference marks a substantial advance over those in the Helsinki Final Act. These measures will make military activities more predictable and inhibit opportunities for political intimidation. In particular, the Stockholm accord commits the 35 nations to notify one another of military activities above certain levels, to invite observers, to forecast activities a year in advance, and to allow inspectors to verify compliance with those commitments. This is the first East-West accord in which the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection of military activities on

its territory. Although these inspection provisions are very different from those we would require to verify agreements which reduced or limited forces, they are appropriate to the Stockholm confidence- and security-building measures and offer us the opportunity to gain experience in conducting inspections.

The Stockholm document, of course, must become more than promises on paper. Implementation of its commitments will be the true measure of its contribution to European security. For its part the United States will meet its commitments fully. Soviet compliance, especially with the verification provisions, will be an important gauge of the possibilities for future progress in conventional arms control.

By advancing the principle of openness in the military-security field, this CDE accord can also contribute to progress in the broader Helsinki CSCE process. The accord achieved at Stockholm on security issues makes all the more imperative balanced progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, which begins in November, the United States delegation will press for fulfillment of all CSCE commitments and for balanced progress across the full CSCE agenda.

These accomplishments are also a testimony to the skill, dedication, and energy of our negotiators. I want to congratulate Ambassador Robert L. Barry and his negotiating team on a job well done.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, No. 39, pp. 1239-1240.

Statement by Ambassador Robert L. Barry Before the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, September 22, 1986

The United States wishes today to join others in welcoming the document which the Stockholm Conference has just adopted. We believe the confidence- and security-building measures adopted here can make an important contribution to a more stable and secure Europe and to an improved East-West relationship. As you know, my delegation has been among those which have demanded that we produce substance here and not generalities. We have tried hard to meet the stringent standards of the Madrid mandate. We are satisfied that we have met these standards and produced a mandatory regime which could serve as a first step in a more demanding arms control and security process. Because of our general concerns about compliance with international commitments, my government will follow the implementation of the Stockholm regime with particular attention. We have all much to learn about confidence-building, and the measures adopted here will provide a test case as we consider how best to proceed in the future. Far from exhausting the potential of confidence- and security-building measures, Stockholm is, we think, a beginning. We should expand upon what we have done here. I think particularly of measures in the area of information exchange. The conference has not achieved nearly as much here in this area as we thought desirable and possible. It seems to us self-evident, that an agreed understanding of what forces are routinely stationed in Europe, with what combat capability, is a fundamental requirement of true stability. Equally, the establishment of an information base is a requirement of any serious effort to reduce the strength of these same forces. We have not even begun to establish such an information base here in Stockholm.

We have, on the other hand, taken what we regard as an important, even historic step in the area of verification. With acceptance of inspection, we have established the principle that any state with doubts about whether the military activities of another are in compliance with commitments has the right and is assured the means of going into the territory of that other state

Source: Department of State files. Ambassador Barry was head of the U.S. delegation at Stockholm. The 35 delegations at the CDE agreed to "stop the clock" on September 19 so that the adoption of the CDE document would be in technical compliance with the adjournment date set by the Conference in December 1985. Deliberations on the document were not completed until September 22.

to see for itself what is going on. There is no right of refusal of the inspection adopted here, whether explicit or implicit. We will follow implementation of the inspection provision with particular care. Because we are experimenting with challenge inspection for the first time, we will no doubt have to perfect the instrument we have built here. We must also recognize that any inspection regime intended to verify actual reductions in forces would have to be more rigorous and more demanding.

In this regard, I would note that my government remains convinced that the use of aircraft from neutral and non-aligned states would produce a more credible and effective form of aerial inspection than the use of aircraft from the state being inspected. Unfortunately, the East rejected this idea and the offers of those states which said they were prepared to help bring this valuable idea to fruition. This proposal remains on the table for the future.

The United States also believes that the successful outcome to the Stockholm Conference should provide a positive political impulse to other arms control and security negotiations and to the East-West relationship as a whole. In a few days, the Vienna Follow-up Meeting will begin weighing the accomplishments and failures of the CSCE process since Madrid. Our work in Stockholm will weigh on the positive side of that balance, but there will be much on the negative side as well. It will be the task of the Vienna meeting to draw conclusions about the future, but the United States will continue to be among those which require balanced progress in all areas.

Throughout the Stockholm Conference, President Reagan has taken a personal interest in developments here. The first foreign policy decision he took in January, 1981, was for the United States to participate in the Stockholm Conference. He has spoken frequently about the Conference and the importance he attaches to its successful conclusion both in public and in private conversations with me. Mr. Chairman, let me recall President Reagan's statement of January 21, 1986, that "The Stockholm Conference ... can contribute to security in the larger sense, that which encompasses political, economic, cultural and humanitarian matters--that is, human rights--as well as strictly military matters. The attainment of this broader concept of security is the fundamental objective of the United States." We believe, Mr. Chairman, that our work here in Stockholm will advance that overall objective. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement by Ambassador Robert L. Barry Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, October 1, 1986

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the results of the Stockholm CDE conference.

I wish to make some general observations about its significance and its implications; I would welcome the chance to discuss the details of the accord in response to questions.

For the past ten years, the United States and its European Allies have sought to ease the barriers dividing Europe through the process of dialogue and cooperation launched by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. We have pursued this across many fronts. The Stockholm Conference on Security-and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) has been an integral part of this broader process.

As the President stated last week, we welcome the positive outcome at the CDE conference. If faithfully implemented, this accord could reduce the risk of war in Europe, contribute to greater security and openness, and lead to improved East-West relations.

Source: Department of State files.

It is noteworthy that the Stockholm document was built around the proposals introduced by the West. Many Western commentators initially feared that Stockholm would provide the East with a platform to press its peace campaign and promote public support for proposals on nuclear weapons free zones, a ban on chemical weapons in Europe, a pledge on non-first use of nuclear weapons, and a freeze and reductions in military budgets. The course of the conference demonstrated that such fears were unfounded. Stockholm did not turn into a polemical debate about nuclear weapons. The East did not succeed in making Stockholm its propaganda forum.

Instead, the conference concentrated on the practical measures introduced by the West as well as neutral and nonaligned countries, pointing up the shortcomings of the East's declaratory proposals. To be sure, the final document consists of compromises struck during the negotiation. For example, it reflects Soviet interest in having Stockholm say something about the principle of non-use of force. But the content of this reaffirmation contains themes we in the West support: human rights, the need to combat terrorism, language opposing the Brezhnev doctrine. The bulk of the document, of course, deals with concrete confidence and security building measures proposed by the West. Most of the measures originally introduced by the NATO Allies in January, 1984 were incorporated into the CDE accord.

Allied unity and intensive consultations had much to do with this outcome. The proposals introduced in January, 1984 by NATO members were the result of an extensive study at NATO. They reflected a solid consensus on Allied objectives for Stockholm. That consensus and process of thorough consultations was sustained throughout the course of the negotiation, in Brussels, in Stockholm and in bilateral contacts in capitals. The Alliance successfully overcame repeated Eastern efforts at wedge-driving. Our united front was a key factor in convincing the East to drop its unacceptable proposals and to join in a serious effort to build a more secure future in Europe.

The measures adopted in Stockholm mark a significant advance over those contained in the Helsinki Final Act, transforming the concept of confidence-building into practical procedures. The CDE accord, if implemented, means greater openness about military activities in Europe. We will know more, sooner about larger numbers of Eastern military activities, and we will be able to resolve any doubts about compliance with the accord.

In comparison with the Helsinki Final Act:

-- for the first time, states are required to provide a comprehensive picture of their military activities through a requirement to forecast plans a year or more in advance.

- the CDE zone of application has been expanded to cover more than 1,000 miles of territory east to the Urals;
- the threshold for notification has been cut almost in half from 25,000 troops to 13,000, thus greatly increasing the number of military activities subject to these measures;
- the definition of military activities covered includes all significant activities such as concentrations of forces, not just maneuvers and exercises;
- states are required to give much earlier notification (42 days in advance compared to 21);
- the invitation of observers from all participating states is mandatory when 17,000 or more troops are involved.

And, perhaps the most significant advance of all was the CDE provision for mandatory inspection without right of refusal. This is the first East-West accord in which the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection of military activities on its territory. We not only secured Soviet acceptance of the principle of challenge inspection, but we also secured their agreement to a set of specific modalities. These modalities do not represent everything we aimed for. We continue to believe

that use of aircraft from neutral states, rejected by the East, would produce a more credible form of aerial inspection than use of aircraft from the state being inspected. Nevertheless, the provisions in the Stockholm accord will strengthen an inspector's ability to verify compliance.

In sum, the detailed provisions of the Stockholm accord, if faithfully implemented by all parties, can make military activities in Europe more predictable and inhibit opportunities to use military force for political intimidation. These were precisely the objectives of this administration in agreeing to enter into this negotiation.

What are the implications of the Stockholm document? First, this accord is not the last word on confidence building in Europe. It elaborated on the measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act, but it did not exhaust the potential of such measures. Stockholm did not achieve as much as we sought, for example, in the area of informational exchange. We continue to believe that the predictability of military activities in Europe would be enhanced by an agreed understanding of the dispositions and combat capabilities of forces routinely stationed in Europe. Experience with inspection, moreover, is likely to point up ways in which that regime could be enhanced. Our experience with the first trial of challenge inspection will also help us to develop a model for the much more demanding task of monitoring arms control agreements.

The mandate for CDE stated that the conference will "undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions" and it provided that the Vienna Follow-up Meeting will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the conference. The future of the CDE is thus an issue that will be addressed at Vienna.

Now that we know the outcome of the Stockholm conference, we are in a better position to determine what position the United States and its NATO Allies should take on security issues at Vienna. At a minimum, we will insist on and monitor closely full implementation of the CDE accord.

Whether Vienna should mandate the CDE to continue its work under the terms worked out in Madrid or whether it should supplement that mandate remains an issue under consideration in the Alliance's Conventional Arms Control Task Force. This group was established by NATO Foreign Ministers last May to consider how best to pursue the objective of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. A final report is due to Ministers at their December meeting, with an interim report to be presented to the North Atlantic Council in October.

One can envision several alternative approaches for taking the new steps that NATO Foreign Ministers called for last




May. These could be pursued either within the framework of the CSCE process or outside of it. We are still pursuing the basic analytical work in this area with our Allies. The decisions the Alliance will take in this area are likely to determine the shape of conventional arms control negotiations for the next decade.


The Stockholm accord also has implications for the CSCE process as a whole. By advancing the principle of openness in the military-security field, this accord can contribute to progress in the broader Helsinki process toward lowering the barriers which divide Europe. We hope that Soviet agreement to be more open about its military activities will be carried over into other areas of CSCE.

But this advance in one area of the process also highlights the need for balanced progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms, where the East's record of compliance has been severely flawed. Confidence-building in the larger sense means expanding human contacts and intellectual exchange, and increased openness across all fields of human endeavor. The contribution of the security arrangements negotiated at Stockholm to increased confidence in Europe will turn out to be limited without progress on these other fronts.

As President Reagan pointed out in his September 22 statement, the United States delegation to the Vienna Follow-up

Meeting will press for fulfillment of all CSCE commitments. We will insist that whatever comes after Vienna remain true to the original vision of Helsinki which recognized the interdependence of greater peace and freedom in Europe. We will insist on balanced progress across the full CSCE agenda. And we will insist that the promises made in Stockholm be fulfilled in practice.





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